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EDITOR'S NOTE
I had to test the truism that water means something different to
different people. I asked several friends, acquaintances, and strangers
what came immediately to mind when I said "water." The range of
responses supported the truism. Water meant:
(1) a type of waterbody: river, creek, lake, ocean, and my personal
favorite-"puddle"- from my seven-year-old neighbor;
(2) a type of recreational activity: canoeing, sailing, fishing, and an
expected "kayaking" from my friend who, if told he had to choose
between eating for a month and kayaking, would immediately and
gleefully grab a map and start throwing his kayak gear into the
back of his truck;
(3) life sustaining characteristics: thirst-quenching, necessary
(4) water flora and fauna: fish, lawn, otters
(5) weather: rain, snow, hail, drought;
(6) environmental concerns: pollution, quantity, quality; and
(7) miscellaneous responses: blue, wet, sprinkler, hydrant, ice, and
even war.
The contents of this issue of the Water Law Review also support the
truism of water diversity. Professor Dan Tarlock examines international
environmental water issues. James Lochhead and Felix Sparks explain
interstate issues. Sean McAllister focuses on local community efforts to
clean up a polluted watershed. Water is often the subject of litigation, as
Daniel Young, Duane Helton, and Lee Miller point out. From the
economist's perspective, explained by Professor Charles Howe, it is a
commodity. In Justice Greg Hobbs' case, it is often his muse. What does
it mean to you?

Amy W. Beatie
Editor-in-Chief

IN TRIBUTE

RALPH W JOHNSON

EMINENT SCHOLAR, CONSUMMATE TEACHER,
FISHERMAN NONPAREIL
DEDICATION TO PROFESSOR RALPH WHITNEY
JOHNSON
1924-1999

RACHAEL PASCHAL

Professor Ralph W. Johnson passed away on August 3, 1999, leaving a
legacy of outstanding works and scholarship that spread light into some
very dim and dusty corners of the American legal conscience. His
influence will continue to radiate, for Ralph lived with honesty and vitality
and his work beckons and guides those who seek positive change.
Any one of his accomplishments would signify a successful career.
Ralph's career, however, was more than a success. He was a thinker and
doer, engaged in a lifelong pursuit of problem solving. He naturally
searched for opportunities to expand theories and create reform. His
uncanny talent for recognizing legal voids was matched by his
inventiveness in marshaling resources to fill them.
Ralph is remembered foremost as a teacher. He inspired generations
of University of Washington law students to follow their hearts into the
practice of law. His courses in water, public lands, and Indian law
introduced thousands of students to the notion that the American justice
system is meant to serve nature as well as humankind. Never didactic, he
taught through kindness and humor that it is possible, even necessary, to
integrate personal ethics into one's approach to legal practice.
Ralph is also well remembered as a legal innovator, his career marked
by the major initiatives he launched. He co-founded the University of
Washington's renowned East Asian law program, served as counsel to the
United States National Water Commission at a critical juncture in the
evolution of national water policy, and conducted pioneering research in
the field of federal Indian law. One of his final efforts was creation of the
new Indian Law Center at the University of Washington Law School.
A hallmark of Ralph's work was his interdisciplinary, collaborative,
and diverse approaches to legal scholarship. He integrated economics,
ecology, and fisheries and atmospheric sciences into his legal writing. He
relished working with others and wrote widely on diverse topics related to
water law.'
One of Ralph's greatest contributions was his work in developing the
public trust doctrine as a modern theoretical basis for water resource
protection.
An avid fisherman, Ralph experienced firsthand the
degradation of streams and rivers caused by the unrelenting pressures of
extractive water development. He authored dozens of articles addressing
the theory and application of the public trust in public waters, no doubt the
1. See, e.g., RALPH W. JOHNSON & GARDNER M. BROWN, JR., CLEANING UP
EUROPE'S WATERS: ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICIES (1976); RICHARD G.
HILDRETH & RALPH W. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW (1983); ROBERT G. FLEAGLE
ET AL., WEATHER MODIFICATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1974).

most influential being his 1980 article Public Trust Protectionfor Stream
Flows and Lake Levels,2 cited by the California Supreme Court in its
famous Mono Lake decision, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County.3 When searching for a basis to hold that lake water
depletion resulting from tributary stream diversions was a form of pollution
that offended the public interest in environmental quality, the court found
Ralph W. Johnson's analysis persuasive. Since the Mono Lake decision,
water law has never been the same.
Ralph's second love was federal Indian law, second only because
discovered later in his career.
His contributions to the field were
monumental. Driven by a cogent sense of justice and a strong, personal
relationship with Native American fishermen suffering unconscionable loss
of treaty fisheries, Ralph studied and wrote prolifically on the subject of
Indian law, virtually inventing it as an academic field in 1968.
His first Indian law article, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation
Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error,4 a criticism of the Supreme
Court's analysis in fishing rights cases involving western Washington
tribes, may have been his most influential. United States District Judge
George Boldt relied on this article in his landmark decision awarding half
the Washington State salmon harvest as well as resource management
responsibilities to the treaty tribes. 5 After that decision, however, Ralph's
work had just begun. Realizing that newly won fisheries management
required tribal administrative and enforcement structures, Ralph worked
with the National American Indian Courts Judges Association training
tribal judges throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
For thirty years Ralph wrote, taught, and tirelessly encouraged
scholarship in the field of Indian jurisprudence. He founded the annual
Western Indian Law Symposium to focus and disseminate research on
contemporary issues in the field; co-edited the 1982 revised edition of
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law; and served on several
commissions, including the National Center for State Courts' tribal court
jurisdiction project, resulting in development of a model comity rule
between tribal and state courts, since adopted by several states.
Ralph W. Johnson's bibliography encompasses a redoubtable
compendium of scholarship. Yet no text could capture his essence. He
was completely accessible and always taken by surprise when paid high
honors. He took delight in relationships with his students, colleagues,
friends, and family. At the law school, his door was always open. He
counseled and mentored untold numbers of students.
He embraced
diversity. His love for the planet and for people elicited optimism, even
from the most curmudgeonly. He loved the outdoors, was a mountain
climber and rescuer, and he skied and fished until very near the end of his
life. He often cited that love as inspiration for his work.
Ultimately, Ralph offered a simple recipe for living: work hard, think
outside the box, live your ethic, and you can make a difference. The
difference Ralph made was enormous.
2. Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 233 (1980).
3. 658 P.2d 709, 712-28 (Cal. 1983).
4. Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United
States Supreme Court Error, 47 WAsI. L. REV. 207 (1972).
5. See United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).

No tribute to Ralph is complete without acknowledging the influence of
Anne's capacity to
his lifelong partner and spouse, Anne Johnson.
encourage, even urge Ralph to identify and address the socio-legal
Ralph Johnson's
problems they encountered was key to his work.
successes were, and are, Anne's successes too.
For those who knew and loved him, Ralph's passing is a true loss. But
he lives on, his thinking a vital force in American jurisprudence. Water
flowing in streams, Native American tribes reclaiming their authority as
sovereign governments-these are the legacies of Ralph W. Johnson,
eminent scholar, consurimate teacher, and fisherman nonpareil.
Ralph's life has touched iany people. If you are among them and
would like to remember hin, please consider giving a gift to the Indian
Law Center at the University of Washington School of Law, 1100 N.E.
Campus Parkway, Seattle, WA, 98105. The Center represents Ralph's last
initiative to promote scholarship in the field of Indian Law and promises to
fulfill the legacy begun more than thirty years ago.
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FROM GRAND STAIRCASE TO GRAND CANYON
PARASHANT:
IS THERE A MONUMENTAL FUTURE FOR THE
BLM?
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR BRUCE BABBITT
TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW CARVER LECTURE

FEBRUARY 17, 2000
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CARVER LECTURE BY UNIVERSITY OF

DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW PROFESSOR JAN LAITOS
The University of Denver College of Law is quite fortunate to have an
endowed lectureship that permits the law school to invite distinguished
officials in natural resources law to speak to the student body. This lecture
series is named the "Carver Lecture," after DU Law Professor (Emeritus)
John A. Carver, Jr., who worked as Under Secretary of the Interior during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Over the years, the annual
Carver Lecture has been presented by several past Secretaries of the
Interior (Stewart Udall, Cecil Andrus, and Donald Hodel), as well as the
then-current Chief of the United States Forest Service (Mike Dombeck)
and then-current Director of the United States Bureau of Land Management
(Pat Shea). The Carver Lecture has also been delivered by the Head of
Region 2 for the United States Forest Service (Elizabeth Estil), and the
Chief of the Rocky Mountain Region for the United States Park Service
(John Cook).
These speakers all have something in common-they have worked with
the federal government's primary agencies for managing and regulating our
public lands and resources, the Departments of the Interior and of
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Agriculture. The policies of these speakers have been quite instrumental in
shaping how this country views, and uses, the enormous treasure it has in
its publicly owned lands. Each of the speakers has, in the Carver Lecture,
acknowledged the vast changes that public land policy is undergoing now.
Perhaps more than ever before we are experiencing a radical shift in how
we perceive and use our public lands. These lands were for many decades
valuable chiefly for the economic value associated with the commodities
found on them-water, forage, minerals, timber, and energy fuels. Now,
they are vast playgrounds for recreationalists, as well as homes for
wildlife, archeological treasures, and wilderness.
Perhaps no one individual has played a greater role in assisting this
transformation of federal lands use than this year's Carver Lecturer,
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. He has exercised his powers as
Secretary of Interior to help bring about a transition from commodity to
recreation and preservation uses of public lands. His Carver Lecture,
delivered on February 17, 2000, reflects this change. Lands and "vistas"
in the West increasingly are subjected to protection from extractive
industries and are dedicated to long-term preservation. Federal agencies
that were once devoted to assisting ranchers, water developers, miners, and
lumbermen (e.g., the Bureau of Land Management) are now being asked
by the Interior Department to function more like the National Park Service.
These are important, fundamental changes in the roles for these agencies.
Secretary Babbitt has helped to accelerate their changed mission. The
College of Law is truly fortunate to have him deliver the Carver Lecture,
because he will surely be remembered as one of the key government
officials who was, over the past century, respectful of federal lands and
resources.
Whoever follows Secretary Babbitt into the office of Secretary of the
Interior will confront the legacy that Secretary Babbitt left behind: a
different role for the Interior Department, one that incorporates a different
set of expectations about our public lands. This year's Carver Lecture
suggests why the Interior Department had to change, and provides a
glimpse into the changing future of public land policy in this country.
II. INTRODUCTION OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR BRUCE BABBITT
BY DEAN NELL NEWTON

I want to thank you all for coming this morning. I especially would
like to thank the Natural Resources/Environmental Law Program and the
Carver Chair, which is held and ably managed by Jan Laitos, for
sponsoring this wonderful event and welcoming the Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt to the University of Denver College of Law. It is
my great pleasure to introduce Secretary Babbitt, who was appointed by
President Clinton in 1993. He has had one of the longest tenures of any
Secretary of the twentieth century, ranking with other great Secretaries of
the Interior, Stewart Udall and Harold Ickes, in length of service.
Among his many legacies is the preservation and restoration of a great
deal of land to the public for multiple uses, including recreation. Secretary
of the Interior Babbitt is also charged, I would be remiss in not bringing
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this up, with supervision of Indian Affairs. And he has been one of the
most open and fair-minded Secretaries of the Interior dealing with this
nation's Indian tribes. He certainly will be regarded as one of the great
Secretaries of the twentieth century, and I want to thank him again for
coming. I now turn the podium over to Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary of the
Interior.
III. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR BRUCE BABBITT

Dean, thank you very much. I appreciate the introduction. I was just
refreshing my memory about asking the Dean whether or not it would be
absolutely necessary for me to subject myself to questions. She said,
"Yes, that is a condition of appearing at the University of Denver Law
School." 1
I wanted to come here, and I accepted this invitation from the Dean
and the faculty with great enthusiasm, because I'm on my way to Grand
Junction. I have been coming to western Colorado for the last seven years,
and have received, I must say, mixed responses, varying from lynch mobs
to pretty productive discussions over time. But, this time I think there's
something in the wind, not only in Grand Junction but also throughout
Colorado and the West, that I would like to talk about.
The West is once again quickening to the issues of how we live on this
landscape and what kind of open space we want, and how it is we're going
to strike a more sensitive balance on the landscape in terms of
development, the use of natural resources, and our long-term presence on
this landscape. Colorado got off to a good start on these issues at the turn
of the century with the creation of many national parks, monuments, and
forests, an extraordinary legacy. But in recent decades, Colorado's been
quiescent. In fact, quiescence has occurred all over the West. And the
fact that has changed is that the West is filling up, the open spaces are now
beginning to close, and the West is becoming an urban place. And there is
now, I think, a sense of urgency, about not just celebrating the visionary
acts of a lot of great leaders in the first half of the century but turning to
the future and saying: "What is it that we want to see fifty and a hundred
years from now?"
I'm going to talk specifically about Colorado, because I do think there
is a sense of urgency, and to some degree there's been a sense of impasse
on this landscape-I believe attitudes are changing, the demand that we
address these issues is now palpably returning, and, I think, we have a
tremendous opportunity-but before I talk about Colorado and my
adventure out toward Grand Junction, I want to talk just a moment about
Arizona, because, among other things, I grew up in Arizona. I was, for a
magical nine years, the Governor of Arizona. It was the last golden age of
governments in Arizona. Someone surveying my successors since I left
office said: "The progression is conclusive proof that Darwin was wrong."
I don't mean that seriously, obviously.
1. A question and answer session followed the Carver Lecture but has not been
included.
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But I thought, about a year ago, that I would turn to Arizona, where I
have special connections and a long history, to try to join this dialogue on
"what should this landscape look like?" and "what is our place on the
landscape?" And I went back to Arizona and started at the Grand Canyon.
I said to the people of Arizona: "This is a national shrine, but there's
something wrong here because the Grand Canyon National Park is not coextensive with the ecosystem of the Grand Canyon." Because, as inspired
as Teddy Roosevelt and all of the others were, they saw the Grand Canyon
from a platform on the south rim. They had no concept of the grandeur,
and the extent and the glory of an ecosystem that runs 300 miles along the
Colorado River and extends up the tributaries into the volcanic highlands
of the Arizona strip. I said to the people of Arizona: "We've got to pick
up where these people left off, because there isn't a lot of time left. We
need to have a sort of vision of what kind of space we want in the long
run." I did it, incidentally, in a few other places in Arizona that nobody
had ever heard of which I thought were pretty interesting and where I've
spent a lot of time.
We got a wonderful dialogue going.
But then the Arizona
Congressional delegation said that any use by the President of the
Antiquities Act would be a shocking abuse of executive authority. "Stay
out of here and we'll get it done by ourselves." Well, I kind of bought
into that line in a moment of weakness and said, "Okay, I'll stay my
hand."
About three months later the Arizona delegation introduced a bill
called the "Grand Canyon Protection Act" which expanded the boundaries
and then reduced the existing protections under the general land laws.
They said, "We'll add a million acres to the Grand Canyon, but in this new
edition of the Grand Canyon we're going to encourage mining, we're
going to remove the existing restraints upon the division of private land,
mining, all of these other extractive activities." That's the point at which I
went to President Clinton in December and said "You have a little over a
year to draw this dialogue in Arizona to a close. We've offered to engage
the Congress, and what we got in turn was a sham piece of legislation."
That's the reason that President Clinton went to the Grand Canyon in
January.
It was an awesome day. He wanted to do it in the most remote part of
Grand Canyon. You can't get there from Arizona. You have to go to
Utah-and even when you're in Utah you can't get to most of it. So, they
decided that we would helicopter in. On a marvelous January day we
landed in Marine One on this vast plain. There was nothing in sight. It
doesn't look like anybody's been there since the end of the Triassic. And,
I'm looking out as we land, and there's a Marine in dress uniform,
standing in a patch of salt bush, the only guy on the whole landscape for a
hundred miles. And, it had its moments. We sat at a little table, the
President signed, and I looked over and all of the reporters were in line in
front of a baby blue port-a-john which was right next to Marine One. I
thought, "You know, there's sort of transcendent and mundane detail on
this landscape." But, in any event, apart from the details, he added a
million acres to the protected area of Grand Canyon National Park.
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Interestingly, the response in the Arizona press showed that seventy-eight
percent-of the people in Arizona said, "That's a great idea." And the split
was the same for democrats and republicans, urban and rural.
And, that kind of brings me to Colorado, because I sense the same kind
of disconnection on the Colorado landscape. I suspect if you took a poll
statewide in Colorado which asked a similar Colorado question, and I'll
come to the specifics, you'll probably get a similar answer. But it's not
reflected in the political process, as it was not reflected in Arizona.
So, that's the reason I'm on my way to Grand Junction: to see if we
can join a dialogue in which I'm saying on the front end: "It would be
great to get these protection issues resolved in the Congressional,
legislative process." But if that's not possible, I'm prepared to go back to
the President, and not only ask, not only advise, but also implore him to
use his powers under the Antiquities Act. I'm prepared to say to him:
"Mr. President, if they don't, and you do, you will be vindicated by
history for generations to come." Just as President Harrison, President
Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson, Taft, notably Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter, virtually every President in the past century has
done, often in the midst of intense controversy, but in every single case,
validated by history and the generations of Americans who have this
passion for the western landscape.
Now the specific issues in Colorado-and I'm going through each of
them in a little bit of detail, so I can hopefully sort of dry out some of the
issues in this kind of historic dialogue that goes on in the West.
The first one is southwestern Colorado. The country down below
Durango and out toward Cortez and Dove Creek is the richest, most
extraordinary archeological landscape in North America. I won't detail the
kinds of discoveries that are coming off of that landscape, but it is truly
incredible. In the nineteenth century, people who were down there saw
Mesa Verde immediately, and it is a ... I think it may in many ways be
the most evocative of all of our national parks. Now, I'll immediately
deny having said that when I'm in Arizona. But, I probably would stick by
it, because there is something about being on that landscape-a sense, a
palpable sense of the presence of our ancestors and the magical way that
they lived on that land in absolute resonance with the landscape and the life
on the land that is ... it is just really incredible. I can't describe it.
The people who were down there then said: "These sites need
protecting." And they protected Mesa Verde in the form of a national
park. But then they went west onto this landscape of riches, would see a
ruin, and would make a national park or a monument out of only the forty
acres surrounding the ruin. And if you go down to Hovenweep National
Monument, it's like little postage stamps on the landscape. Somebody saw
a ruin and fenced off twenty acres, ten, five, forty around it. And you
begin looking across this landscape and say: "Hey, wait a minute. This
isn't about a ruin here or there. Don't you see, it's about a whole,
interwoven landscape? It's about communities that were living in and on
this land and relating to each other and moving across this landscape and
drawing their living and their inspiration and their spirituality from a
landscape." Doesn't it make sense in light of a subsequent 100 years of
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understanding to say that we have room in the West to protect the
landscape, if you will, an anthropological ecosystem? The real science on
these landscapes doesn't come out of digging out a room and extracting a
few pots. That was the nineteenth century, and it was important. The real
discoveries today come from asking the deeper question of "How did
communities manage to live in spiritual and physical equilibrium with the
landscape?" And don't we need to assess all of the traces that have been
left in so many intense and variegated ways, whether it's with petroglyphs,
diversion structures for water, ramadas, all of those things. So, that's the
question in southwestern Colorado: Do we have the wisdom and foresight
to say, before it's too late, before these landscapes start to get chopped up,
that we can do better than to protect five or six Indian ruins out on that
land and say that there is room in this culture for a quarter million acres
from which we honor the past and, more importantly, from which we learn
and take inspiration?
The Colorado delegation in the last day or two, maybe week, has
introduced a bill to establish a protected area along these lines. Now, the
hour is late. This discussion has been going on for a year now. And I am
reminded of the Arizona experience. So we're going to have an, I think,
very important moment where we're now in, say, the seventh inning and
this team isn't just going to walk off the field. So, we have a nice dialogue
going there.
Now, let me take you to the San Luis Valley because this, too,
illustrates these lessons. The San Luis Valley is, first of all, an important
cultural landscape. It represents the northernmost reach of Spain in the
seventeenth century. The Spanish Empire made its way northward up the
Rio Grande to the founding of Santa Fe in 1620, the subsequent spread of
Spanish culture through northern New Mexico, and into the San Luis
Valley.
If you go down to those towns in the San Luis Valley, those
communities are still there and their traditions are intensely alive. They
speak of their presence on that landscape as if the seventeenth century were
just yesterday. And what's happened on that landscape is a series of events
which began about a decade ago when the City of Denver-I shouldn't say
the City of Denver, I should say some promoters in the best western
fashion-decided that they could sell water to Denver by going to the San
Luis Valley where there is a huge groundwater basin which has been
charged with water since the glacial ages, pump that water out, and send it
into Denver. I think you can see the implications of that kind of decision.
That's basically saying: "We will take a rural valley that's been inhabited
by people on the land for three centuries and destroy the rural culture in
the name of satisfying projected demands in Denver."
Do I exaggerate by saying it would destroy the valley? No. Because,
you're going to have a groundwater table that's got a 1,000 feet of water in
it. As the promoters were saying: "There's a Lake Huron underground in
the San Luis Valley." What they neglect to mention is that it's the top 100
feet of this underground Lake Huron that sustains the landscape, the
springs, the wetlands, which nourish the migrating flocks that come down
off the western flyway from Alaska to Central America. When you take
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the top 100 feet off of this underground Lake Huron the landscape goes
dry, the springs disappear, the creeks dry up, and the people who have
been living in balance in this valley are all of a sudden at the mercy of
outsiders.
Enter a National Monument called Great Sand Dunes National
Monument. It's an interesting National Monument, kind of like what there
It was established by Presidential
is in southwestern Colorado.
proclamation back in the days when people thought of the landscape as full
of curiosities. And the curiosity which led to Great Sand Dunes was some
admittedly great sand dunes. But, you know, that's it. You go down to
the San Luis Valley, go out from Alamosa in the morning, and watch the
sun come up over this valley. It's sort of a scintillating white light that
reflects off the crest of the Sangre de Cristos covered with snow at 14,000
feet and begins a backlight across this valley. And the sand dunes are nice.
But there's a lot more there.
And now, in dialogue with the local communities, we're saying:
"Shouldn't we have something that is more adequate to the landscape?"
Let's look at those sand dunes. First, look up. There's a 14,000 foot peak
of the Sangre de Cristos range that you can almost reach out and touch,
and an entire ecosystem coming down the flanks of those mountains down
to a four or five thousand foot valley.
Then, let's go out to these sand dunes in the spring and watch the
water bubbling out of the sand and forming the tributaries that nourish the
wetlands that form the headwaters of the Rio Grande. And isn't it time in
this generation, with all of these development schemes pressing in, to say:
"We've gone from curiosity to landscape. We can begin to think of an
ecosystem, and there's still time to protect that ecosystem"? And, in the
process, say to the people of Alamosa: "These water export schemes have
just acquired a new adversary. A built-up adversary called the National
Park Service, in charge of defending an ecosystem, an integral part of
which is not just sand, but water"? And now the people of the San Luis
Valley have an ally against all of these kinds of schemes. So, that's the
issue down there. Can we look up, see it whole, and get protection?
Now, I was down there in this continuing dialogue about a month ago
with members of the Colorado delegation, and there was legislation being
drafted. I'm hopeful we can get something done. But again, I look over
my shoulder at the Grand Canyon, remembering that experience, I'm
looking at my watch saying "It's February. It's a Presidential election
year. Congress will recess early and often." And we must bring this
discussion to the kind of resolution that's important for the people of
Colorado and the country.
Now lastly, back to Grand Junction. The story in Grand Junction is
also interesting. It is a magnificent landscape. It's named, of course,
because it is the junction in that valley of the Grand, and, actually, I get
confused, because the Colorado River used to be named the Grand, and
then Colorado woke up and said "No, it's grand, but it's Colorado." So
they've been renaming rivers over there. In that valley, the Gunnison and
the Grand-no, that can't be right-it's a junction of a couple of rivers
over there okay! And it's in some truly remarkable . . . this is plateau

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

country. The Morrison formation-all the Jurassic, Triassic formations;
trek across the landscape and you'll trip over a dinosaur. The Colorado
River begins its course through the canyons moving westward into Utah.
We have a national monument there because, clear back in 1910 a resident
of Grand Junction used to take his horse and buggy out on Sunday
afternoons to admire the red rocks immediately to the west of Grand
Junction, and, in the spirit of the time, the curiosities-an Indian ruin,
some sand dunes, nice red rocks right there. He was an early anti-sprawl
guy, I guess, because he said: "We ought to protect those red rocks." And
he contacted his Congressman and they got it done. So, we've got a
national monument there. But the remarkable thing is, go to the national
monument and start looking around and you'll say: "Hey, wait a minute.
This isn't about the view from the visitor's center.
It's about the
wilderness areas on the south bank of the Colorado that extend unbroken,
undeveloped, westward to Utah." It's about the Colorado River. It's the
Colorado River stupid. I KNOW the name of the river there. Whatever
the tributaries are, it's the Colorado River. But the monument doesn't
extend to the most obvious resource in the whole place, which is the
Colorado River.
Western Colorado is dinosaur city. There are quarries all over the
landscape. And it's a wonderful complex. The quarries are all outside of
the monument because, when this fellow from Grand Junction was
protecting the view, he wasn't into dinosaurs, or rivers, or wilderness
areas. So, doesn't that suggest that 100 years later it's time to assess our
surroundings now that there are 100 times as many people and say "What
is it going to come to?" Do we have the capacity to look up around us?
Because, right now on this landscape it's pretty much either/or. Is it going
to be a postage-stamp park, or wide-open public domain on which anything
goes (that's called BLM land)? And, once again, the dialogue we will
continue this afternoon relates to "Can we do it legislatively, or must we
do it by the more traditional method-by Presidential Proclamation?"
Well, this in a nutshell is the dialogue that is taking place all over the
West. It is taking place at this point in time because people are uneasy
about the future of the West. The population is growing. People who
came West precisely because of the extraordinary evocative power of the
land where they felt that they could live in a different relationship with
creation, are now finding that congestion, sprawl, thoughtless
development, and unrestrained exploitation of the land is threatening to
erase the very values, in the deepest of ironies, that not only brought them
here, but created the very opportunity which now, carried on in linear,
uncontrolled fashion, will threaten the end of the possibility of a new vision
and a sustainable way of life on this landscape.
Thank you.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
On May 21, 1997, the United Nations approved and opened for
signature the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses ("Convention").'
On one level, if the

Convention ever comes into force and is adopted by the United States, it
will not have a substantial impact on the use of our international bodies of
water. 2 Article 3 of the Convention provides that "nothing in the present

Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State
arising" from prior agreements; the article only expresses the hope that
countries will "consider harmonizing" pre-existing treaties with the

Convention.3 Thus, the Convention is subordinate to existing allocation
treaties. Our shared waters with Canada and Mexico are subject to several

well-developed treaty regimes. Separate treaties govern the Columbia, the
Colorado, and the Rio Grande Rivers between the United States and

Canada or Mexico. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 regulates the use
of the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence River, and other Canada-United

States boundary waters and their tributaries. 4
On another level, however, the Convention could have two significant
impacts on existing treaty regimes. Like many international agreements,
the principles of the Convention reflect established or emerging customary
international law.
Thus, the Convention may influence: (1) the

interpretation of existing treaties5 and (2) the substance and structure of
supplemental agreements to adjust to new uses.6
This article examines the possible influence of the Convention on the

1. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter International Watercourses Convention].
2. For a pessimistic assessment of the future of the Convention, see Lucius Caflisch,
Regulation of the Uses of International Waterways: The Contributionof the United Nations,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AT WORK 3 (Martin Ira Glassner ed., 1998).
3. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(3), 36 I.L.M. at 704
(permitting countries to modify the International Watercourses Convention in subsequent
agreements).
4. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11,
1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448. The treaty does not apply equally to all the Great
Lakes. Technically, Lake Michigan is a tributary water rather than a boundary water since
it is the only Great Lake wholly within the United States. However, the consistent practice
of the two nations is to treat Lake Michigan as part of the boundary water system. See
Richard B. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian
Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 469, 482 (1972).
5. Stephen C. McCaffrey, An Overview of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses (1999 paper prepared for the
Third Annual International Water Law Seminar, Securing Water Rights and Managing
Water Scarcity: Law and Policy in Practice, hosted by the Water Law & Policy
Programme, University of Dundee, Scotland). See also Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi
Sinjela, The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 97, 106 (1998).
6. See David J. Lazerwitz, The Flow of International Water Law: The International
Law Comnission's Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247 (1993).
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United States' shared international rivers and lakes by focusing on the
emerging relationship between international water law and the protection of
riverine and coastal ecosystems through adaptive management regimes.
This article accomplishes two things: (1) it places the relationship in the
context of the worldwide debate regarding the function of watercourses;
and (2) it uses the growing concern over the degradation of Colorado River
Delta as a case study to explore the possible application of the Convention
to an existing international water allocation regime.
II. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: COMPETING VISIONS
The Convention was adopted as the function of international water law
expands and changes, reflecting two competing visions of water use:
The
multiple-use and ecosystem conservation and management.
grundnorm of international water law posits that the use of international
water bodies be shared among riparian and littoral states. 7 A relatively
sophisticated but undeveloped and untested international law regime is
evolving to provide the ground rules for shared use. This emerging regime
is a major restraint on selfish assertions of state sovereignty and a is
positive step toward the peaceful settlement of water disputes. 8 However,
this regime makes two crucial assumptions that are increasingly at variance
with the rapidly emerging concept of environmentally sustainable resource
use and management which seeks to balance the maintenance of flows
required to perform the necessary ecosystem services with the support of
traditional consumptive and non-consumptive uses. 9 International water
use law assumes that international rivers will be used primarily for carryover storage and consumptive use and that the major constraint on
consumptive use is the duty not to cause substantial transboundary
pollution.0
International water law currently plays a limited role in striking a
balance between the two visions of multiple-use and ecosystem
conservation and management for many reasons. The principle reason for
the current limited use of international water law is that the allocation rules
are so open-ended that, at best, international water law provides only a
The role of law in
procedural framework for dispute resolution. 1
7. This principle is consistent with the modern characterization of international law as a
system to promote distributive justice to scarce resources among the international
community. In his seminal book, Thomas M. Franck describes the Convention as an effort
"to provide for distribution of a scarce resource through the application of broadly
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
conceived equity."
INSTITUTIONS 74 (1995).
8. See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER AND TH4E QUEST
FOR PEACE INTHE MIDDLE EAST (1994) (examining a water dispute that many predict could
lead to a war).
9. The utility of sustainable development as a resource management principle remains
contested. See, e.g., TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES (Daniel A. Mazmanian &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1999). However, in the past two decades, no alternative principle
has emerged to supplant sustainable development.
10. See infra notes 11-12.
11. Richard Kyle Paisley & Timothy L. McDaniels, hIternational Water Law,
Acceptable Pollution Risk and the Tatshenshini River, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111, 122-23
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international water allocation is inherently marginal 12 because stronger
incentives for nations to assert exclusive incompatible claims rather than to
seek shared solutions often exist. In this environment, ecosystem integrity
remains subordinate to optimum use. However, some signs indicate that
environmentally based river management will increasingly become equally
as important as mass allocations among riparian states. At a minimum, the
Convention reinforces powerful changes in our perception of the function
of river systems.
The dominant water use vision of the twentieth century sought to
develop and manage large rivers to promote the "optimum" development
of these systems. Under this vision, the flow of large river systems has
been perceived as a natural resource or "commodity" which should be
extensively developed to benefit those living in or outside the basin.13
Scientific conservation' 4 provides the basis for this vision, positing that the
entire river system should be intensively developed and managed to
maximize economic potential through large-scale, multiple-use projects. 5
After World War II, the idea of multiple purpose regional water
development was exported to the developing world,' 6 influencing
international water law. The traditional vision of a river system as a
commodity for use to the maximum extent possible remains the dominant
vision worldwide. While the traditional vision is alive and well in the
People's Republic of China and many other parts of the developing world,
developed and developing countries increasingly question the traditional
vision.
Scientific conservation provided the intellectual foundation for massive

(1995).
12. Any legal system, especially the international legal system, "represents a kind of
regulatory commons, where effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups
overcoming collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to respond." Thomas
W. Merrill, Golden Rules For Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 985 (1997).
But see Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The
Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 384, 392-94 (1996).
13. One of the principle themes of modern environmental history is the influence of
Western European law and economic theory on the perception of all resources as
commodities. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE
GREAT WEST

(1991).

14. In a previous article, I explored the intellectual origins of scientific conservation and
its influence on domestic and international law. See A. Dan Tarlock, International Water
Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYU. J. OF PUB. L. 181
(1996).
15. The theory that water projects yield large economic developments has always been
more of an article of faith among politicians and water managers rather than a rigorously
empirically verified hypothesis. One of the leading students of multiple purpose planning,
Irving K. Fox, characterized the debate as one between economic rationality, which
emphasized reallocation and conservation, and the development model, which saw water as
the engine of perpetual economic growth. See Irving K. Fox, Policy Problems in the Field
of Water Resources, in WATER RESEARCH 271 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds.,
1965); see also W.R. Derrick Sewell, The Changing Content of Water Resources Planning:
7he Next Twenty-five Years, in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD: THE MANAGEMENT OF A
CRITICAL RESOURCE

16.

BRUCE RICH,

57 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik Teclaff eds., 1978).
MORTGAGING THE EARTH:

IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT

THE WORLD BANK,

224-39 (1994).
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worldwide, large-scale water development. However, it is now recognized
that this development facilitated the destruction of the ecological integrity
of many large river systems and their floodplains by allowing nations to
alter the natural flow of rivers through dams, diversion systems, and flood
control projects. Thus, in the past two decades, the law has reevaluated
the benefits of multiple purpose development and we are now beginning to
calculate the high social and environmental costs of maximum
development. In brief, the argument is that many multiple-use projects
represent an inefficient allocation of resources, cause environmental
degradation, and are often socially inequitable. 7
In the United States, the costs of multiple purpose development were
primarily environmental and fiscal, although some Native American tribes
suffered the loss of tribal lands. The emphasis on supply augmentation
foreclosed the consideration of less environmentally destructive
alternatives, such as water markets, demand management, 8 and adaptive
management, to meet demand. In the developing world, the costs are
environmental, fiscal, and social. Foreign driven projects often have
Due to the
devastating impacts on local subsistence economies. 9
international environmental and human rights movements, the idea that
regional multiple purpose river projects will provide economic
development has been challenged. Developing countries have opposed
dam projects because they displace minority populations, inequitably
distribute water, and often fail to deliver the promised economic benefits. 2 °
For example, throughout the world, structural flood control measures are
often self-defeating. Structural flood control measures destroy natural
flood control landscapes such as wetlands and create a moral hazard.21
Dams, levees, flood insurance, and generous disaster relief programs
inefficiently encourage people to assume the risks of floodplain
development.
The process of "environmental accounting" has recently led to a more
radical ecological ideal of the function of river systems and their
The newer ecological integrity vision is less clearly
floodplains 2
articulated than multiple-use because it rests on a more complex view of
17.

See

DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH OF AN

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC (1991).
18. See SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY 165-82 (Worldwatch

Envtl. Alert Series) (Linda Stark ed., 1997).
19. See W.M. ADAMS, WASTING THE RAIN: RIVERS, PEOPLE AND PLANNING IN AFRICA
(1992).
20. See RICH, supra note 16; see also THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
A recent United Nations
LARGE DAMS (Edward Goldsmith, et al. eds., 1984).
Development Programme study concludes dams and diversions have extripated or put at risk
20% of the world's freshwater fish. People and Ecosystems: The Fraying Web of Life.
< http://wri.org/wri.org/wri/wrr2000 >.
21. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REV. COMM., ADMINISTRATION FLOODPLAIN
MGMT. TASK FORCE, SHARING THE CHALLENGES: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST

CENTURY 142-43 (1994).

22. Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff is one of the leading advocates of the need to recognize
the benefits of historic flood patterns as well as the benefits of flood control. See Ludwik
A. Teclaff, Treaty Practice Relating to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J.
109, 115-18 (1991); LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
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the human role in the functioning of natural systems.23 The ecological
integrity vision sees river systems as dynamic, ever-changing, functioning
ecosystems which serve a variety of functions from the maintenance of
consumptive uses to the maintenance of the historic natural "services" of
rivers. The new vision is not a simple river preservation concept because
it will be realized, if at all, within the framework of environmentally
sustainable use and development.24 River use must always accommodate a
sustainable, non-wasteful level of consumptive use.25 International water

law also potentially includes a justice component.

In exercising their

claimed international right to develop, individuals and defined groups may
have a right to a minimum amount of 26non-polluted water for human
consumption and sustainable development.

The newer "river-as-ecosystem" concept starts with the premise that
we must try to integrate human uses of a river system with the maintenance
of natural environmental sustainability 27 both in the design of new projects
and in the re-engineering and operation of existing facilities.28 A recent,
precedent setting report on Middle East water use concluded "maintaining

and enhancing ecosystem goods and services is essential for the economic
development and welfare" of the region especially over the "medium and
longer terms.

" 29

A prime example of ecosystem services is the

maintenance of fresh/salt water balances in the deltas and estuaries of the
great rivers of the world.
The baseline, or norm, is the historic
hydrographic of the river and the functions sustained by the flow of the
river over time.3" These functions include the maintenance of natural

systems, such as wetlands, and human economies.

Consistent with this

23. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).
24. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENEATIONAL EQUITY 238-45 (1989).
25.

See

WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV.

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-1

ADVISORY COMM'N,

WATER IN THE WEST:

to 3-3 (1998) (endorsing the concept of

sustainable consumptive use).
26. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
27. For a helpful introduction to modern ecology and its influence on environmental
management for attorneys, see Judy L. Meyer, Changing Concepts of System Management,
in SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78, 80-88 (1992) (Water Sci. & Tech. Bd. Tenth
Anniversary Symp.); Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts it Ecology, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in
Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1121
(1994). See generally REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY:
PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY 46 (1994) (arguing that changes in
environmental management build on the substitution of a non-equilibrium for an equilibrium
paradigm in ecology).
28. See supra notes 22-25.
29. COMMITTEE ON SUSTAINABLE WATER SUPPLIES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, WATER FOR
THE FUTURE: THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL, AND JORDAN 66 (1999).
30. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity,
2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 11-12 (1997); A. Dan Tarlock, River Management
in the Twenty-first Century: The Vision Thing, 6 RIVERS 43, 45, 48 (1997). For a specific
application of this concept to a major international river, see Independent Sci. Group,
Return to the River: An Ecological Vision for the Recovery of the Columbia River Salmon,
28 ENVTL. L. 503 (1998).
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analysis, Hungary, Croatia, and Yugoslavia have agreed to create a joint
wetlands nature reserve where the Drava and Danube Rivers meet as "part
of a broader effort to rethink the management of Europe's rivers . . . to
return to a more natural approach."'
In addition, the flow cycle of the
pre-Aswan Dam Nile River is the classic example of the ecological-social
vision, 32 while the post-dam river is a prime example of the commodity
vision.
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUITABLE UTILIZATION
Equitable utilization of shared, scarce resources is the fundamental
principle of international water law. The concept is derived largely from
United States water law and is designed primarily to promote fair
development opportunities among all riparian states. However, recent
international efforts to restate and reform international water law, by
addressing existing and potential environmental degradation, have
supplemented the objective of promoting fair development.
The
Convention remains primarily an allocation framework and is both
progressive and regressive compared to other formulations of rules. The
Convention attempts to incorporate more environmentally sensitive rules
compared to past international water law principles.3 3 While this is a
positive step, the additional principles that encourage aquatic ecosystem
management must supplement the emerging allocation rules. Because the
Convention incorporates a number of international environmental rules, it
can be the starting point for the development of an international law of
riverine ecosystem management.
A. THE UNITED STATES MODEL: RIVERS AS COMMODITIES

United States water law serves as the principal model for international
water law.34 Interstate rivers vein throughout America and many interstate
and inter-basin conflicts have arisen. In the United States' federal system,
states cannot wage war on each other.35 Interstate disputes must be solved
either by the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, quasi-treaties, or congressional interstate compacts.36

31. Marlise Simons, Where War Roiled Danube, Nature is Peacemaker, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1999, at A4.
32. Nile River irrigation began to be modified in the nineteenth century. Barrages and
dams were constructed to regulate the Nile's flow, but historic patterns were relatively
maintained until the construction of the High Aswan Dam. See H.E. HURST, THE NILE: A
GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE RIVER AND THE UTILIZATION OF ITS WATERS (1957).
33. See International Law Comm'n, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992).
34. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revised, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 (1984).
35. In 1934, Arizona's governor ordered a unit of the state National Guard to occupy
the Parker Dam construction site to prevent the Department of the Interior from carrying
out a contract with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, but the mini-war
did not prevent the dam. Jack L. August, Jr., THE VISION INTHE DESERT: CARL HAYDEN
AND HYDROPOLITICS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 146-48 (1999).
36. Id. at 382-84.
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Principles of federalism and international law establish a rule of interstate
entitlements. 37 The principle of equitable apportionment between basins

and states is the basis for interstate water law.
Equitable apportionment is an adaptation of the two major legal
systems in force in the United States: the common law of riparian rights
and the doctrine of prior appropriation, which applies in the arid regions.39
United States water law can be explained as an effort to remove legal
barriers to maximum or multiple-use and to allow the creation of

individual, correlative property rights in water to the maximum extent

possible.4" For example, in the Western United States, prior appropriation

promotes multiple-use by recognizing a relatively firm property right to
store and consume as much of the natural flow as possible and to use water
outside the watershed. The powerful rule of prior appropriation developed
on small streams to support hydraulic mining, but was projected on

progressively large geographic scales.41
Equitable apportionment promoted multiple purpose development by
projecting the principle that prior uses required protection unless

compelling, competing considerations existed across state lines.

This

principle both protected vested rights and encouraged states to quantify
their future claims through interstate compacts to enable federally financed
regional water development. In the early twentieth century, the United

States Supreme Court ("Court") adjudicated water use disputes across state
lines pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Upstream withdrawals along the
Arkansas River in Colorado reduced available supplies downstream in

Kansas.42 In the Midwestern United States, the reversal of the flow of the

Chicago River caused pollution to be discharged by the city of Chicago
into the Mississippi River and triggered a lawsuit by Missouri.43 The state
alleged that Chicago's discharge contributed to a typhoid epidemic in Saint
Louis. 44 The Missouri and Kansas lawsuits required the Court to develop a
law of interstate water use.
The result was the law of equitable
37. Id. at 402-03.
38. Id. at 394-95.
39. Id. at 384.
40. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., of the Colorado Supreme Court, characterized the
purpose of the beneficial use requirement in western water law as the advancement of "the
fundamental principles of Colorado and western water law that favor optimum use, efficient
water management, and priority administration, and disfavor speculation and waste." Santa
Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999).
41. See A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance: The Legacy of
California Water Law and Politics, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 71, 75-84 (1994) (providing a
history of the role that prior appropriation played in the development of California).
42. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906). The litigation continued, in one form or
another, for over a century, and Kansas eventually prevailed against Colorado after losing
two original jurisdiction actions. In 1947, the states negotiated an interstate compact. In
1985, Kansas brought an original action to enforce the compact, claiming that Colorado
exceeded its compact share. In 1995, the Court upheld the Special Master's finding that
post compact high capacity wells in Colorado caused material depletion in useable river
flows in Kansas in violation of the Arkansas River Compact, Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S.
673, 680 (1995), and remanded the case for a trial to determine Kansas's remedies. Id.
43. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 497 (1906).
44. Id. at 503.
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apportionment to resolve interstate conflicts. The Court initially looked to
the classic rule of international law that all states have equal legal rights to
fashion the principle of equitable apportionment 45 because all riparian states
are of equal dignity.
In the United States federal system, states are only quasi-sovereign.
Thus, it was possible for the Court to hold that the use of common
resources, such as interstate streams and groundwater basins, must be
shared among co-riparian states. Formally, the Court has developed a
"flexible doctrine" for apportionment that balances the need to
accommodate new uses with the protection of existing economies.4 6 The
open-ended equitable apportionment formula applied by the Court purports
to weigh the comparative merits of different river uses over a long period
of time. In reality, the Court consistently has rewarded early development
by protecting prior uses against subsequent uses. In 1982, the Court
suggested that it would not protect an inefficient existing use to permit a
new and more efficient use of the water when "reasonable conservation
measures [by existing users] can offset the reduction in supply due to
diversion."47 Two years later it recanted this heresy and preserved the
priority of a small reclamation district, leaving open the possibility,
however, that a new diversion could displace an existing one if the state
made a strong showing that an immediate demand for a highly valued use
existed.4"
Unless states agree to an interstate compact that guarantees future
shares to slower developing states, equitable apportionment often
contributes to the degradation of large river systems by stimulating a raceto-develop.
The bias against conservation and the displacement of
inefficient uses makes protection of flow rates difficult. Thus, in prior
appropriation states, equitable apportionment has not protected instream
flows. Eastern, or "humid" states, better protect instream flows because
the Court generally follows the law of the states in which the conflict
arises. Thus, in common law or riparian rights states, the flow can be
often protected if it is being "used." For example, the Court has protected
the ecological integrity of the Great Lakes system by substantially limiting
out of basin diversions to protect pre-existing navigation uses.49 The Court
has also prevented diversions that might impair the waste assimilative
capacities of a river."
The recent attempts to claim instream flows on the Platte River
illustrate the resistance of the law of equitable apportionment to new
management concepts. In the 1930s, the Court adjudicated rights to the
North Platte River between Nebraska and Wyoming users. 5
Nebraska
reopened the decree in the 1980s to protest some new diversions by
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Kansas, 206 U.S. at 97.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
Id. at 190.
Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310, 323-24 (1984).
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 419-20 (1929).

50. New Jersey v. New York, 282 U.S. 336, 346-47 (1931).
51.

Nebraska v. Wyoming I, 325 U.S. 589, 656-57 (1945).
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Wyoming. 2 The first decision in the reopened decree litigation did not
address environmental issues.53 Fortunately, the Court's opinion does not
preclude environmental management of the Platte; it only renders it less
legally secure. The three basin states, Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming,
subsequently signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Secretary of
the Interior and developed a basin-wide wildlife protection plan resulting in
the emergence of a multi-jurisdiction management regime which includes

flow augmentation, foregoes new projects, and modifies existing projects

to increase storage. 54 However, the fact remains that no public or private
entity can claim rights to a wildlife protection flow under the equitable

apportionment doctrine.55

B. MODERN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: EQUALITY AMONG STATES
AND BASINS

Modern international water law starts with the assumption that all
states whose territories contribute to an international drainage basin have a
right to an equitable share, which includes a right to a fair development
opportunity of the waters of the basin.5 6 All nations must adjust their use
to accommodate the needs of other states because sovereignty is not a basis

to withhold resources from downstream states or to prevent upstream states

from using their fair share of the resource. This remains the core-and
only certain-principle of international water law.
The doctrine of equitable utilization participation is a rule of customary
international law.57 The equitable utilization participation principle was
adopted prior to the rise of the worldwide environmental movement in the
late 1960s and has been reaffirmed in subsequent non-binding declarations

such as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
("1972 Stockholm Conference"), 58 the 1977 World Water Conference in
Mar del Plata, 59 the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development in Rio de Janeiro ("Rio Declaration"), 60 and most recently in
52. Nebraska v. Wyoming II, 507 U.S. 584, 587 (1993).
53. See id.
54. Margaret Zallen, Integrating New Values With Old Uses in the Relicensing of
Kingsley Dam and Related Facilities:Making Part of the Problem a Part of the Solution, in
DAMS: WATER AND POWER IN THE NEW WEST, (1 8th Annual Summer Conference Nat.
Resources L. Ctr., University of Colorado School of Law, 1997).
55. Nebraska water law and the federal Endangered Species Act both recognize instream
flow rights. See J. David Aiken, hIstreai Appropriations in Nebraska, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION INTHE WEST

313, 314 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al. eds., 1993).

56. Commentators have advocated an expanded sharing principle, a "community of
property" model which is premised on co-riparian cooperation. Under this model, rivers
and associated resources are jointly managed without regard to international borders, on the
principle that all riparian states are entitled to equitable participation in the development of
the resource. Unfortunately, this theory does not yet reflect state practice.
57. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 149 (Sept. 25).
See Sharon A. Williams, Public InternationalLaw and Water Quantity Management in a
Common DrainageBasin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 165 (1986).
58. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416
[hereinafter Stockholm Conference Report].
59. World Water Conference, Mar. 7-18, 1977, 15 I.L.M. 734.
60. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
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Modern international water law rejects the idea that

upper riparian states have an absolute right, by virtue of their territorial
sovereignty, to water that originates in their boundaries.
Modern
international water law equally rejects the idea that lower states have an

absolute servitude that entitles them to the natural flow of all rivers.62 The
United States asserted the former in the notorious Harmon Doctrine,6 3 but

the subsequent state practice of recognizing the claims of Mexico to a share
of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers,' and the long history of the
shared use of international waters between Canada and the United States,
have led to the conclusion that exclusive sovereignty was never a widely
accepted state practice.'
International water law promotes development although it must
accommodate two conflicting legal principles: equitable sharing and the
exclusive right of each state to develop its resources to a greater degree

than must occur in a federal system.'

Both principles ultimately lead to

the protection of prior uses and the idea that the entire dependable flow of
the river should be dedicated to consumptive uses. The tests to determine
reasonable and equitable use change with different formulations, but all
derive from the 1967 Helsinki Rules. 67 The relevant factors to consider in
determining what constitutes reasonable and equitable uses of the water
include: geography; hydrology; climate; past utilization; population; the
economic and social needs of the basin; and the availability of alternative
sources of supply. 6 In theory, the international standard gives somewhat
less weight to pre-existing uses and more protection to environmental
values and social equity compared to the United States doctrine. However,

Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
61. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, 36 I.L.M. at 700.
62. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 3 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing the
development of international water law).
63. The Harmon Doctrine refers to an 1895 opinion by United States Attorney General
of Ohio, Judson Harmon, advising the Secretary of State that the United States had absolute
sovereignty over the waters of the Rio Grande River in Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas
before it reached the Mexican border. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 (1895). See generally

Jacob Austin, Canadian-U.S. Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of

International Rivers: Study and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 393
(1959).
64. See Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1966);
Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19
STAN. L. REV. 367, 367-69 (1967).
65. See Austin, supra note 62; see also Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine
One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1996).
66. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Conference illustrates the tension between these
two concepts:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Conference Report, supra note 57, 11 I.L.M. at 1420.
67. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 52 INT'L L. ASS'N
484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
68. Id., art. V.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

flexibility is achieved at the cost of indeterminacy and the net result is that
rapid, uncoordinated, multiple-use development is rewarded over
environmental protection.6 9
C. THE GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS DAM DECISION

The role of international environmental and water law in protecting
riverine ecosystems is underdeveloped but emerging. Little hard law exists
despite the many declarations, sets of rules, principles, and the
Convention.7" The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") illustrates in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam decision, both the underdevelopment and
emergence of hard law. 71 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision, the ICJ
affirmed the primacy of equitable apportionment and suggested that the
doctrine can include an aquatic ecosystem conservation component, but
rejected an ecosystem protection claim by a downstream riparian state.7 2
The opinion offers some hope that international environmental and water
law will recognize that riparian states have a right to the protection of their
riverine ecosystems from the actions of other states and that cooperation
and shared management may be required to enjoy this right. The facts of
the case were not ideal for the establishment of such a claim, but the
foundation for future protection through adaptive aquatic ecosystem
management can be found in both the majority opinion and especially in the
Separate Opinion of Vice President Weeramantry.73
In 1997, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision was ICJ's first major case
that related to the allocation and environmental protection of an
international river, the Danube. The case grew out of a joint river basin
investment treaty entitled the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System ("1977 Treaty"), signed on
September 16, 1977. The 1977 Treaty was signed at the height of the Cold
War between then Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the construction of the
multiple purpose Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
hydroelectric,
navigation
improvement, and flood control lock and dam project on the Danube
between Bratislava and Budapest. 74 The project consisted of two series of
interconnected locks, each in the territory of one state, a dam in the joint
territory (the Gabcikovo dam), and another dam downstream solely in

69. The difficulty of applying the rules to the Jordan River in the Middle East is a prime
example of the indeterminacy of apportionment standards. See Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing
Common Water Resources According to International Water Law: The Case of PalestinianIsraeli Waters, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1995).
70. See Patricia K. Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in International
Watercourse Law through the Prism of Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation, 36
NAT. RESOURCES J. 417, 419-21 (1996); Forward to, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE Xiii-XXVi (1997).
71. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 16-17. See generally Paul R. Williams, International Environmental Dispute
Resolution: The Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the
Gabcikovo and Nagymnaros Damns, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
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Hungary (the Nagymaros dam).7" Article 14 of the 1977 Treaty provided
that the two countries would agree to the establishment of a Danube water
balance between the two dams "unless natural conditions or other
circumstances temporarily require a greater or smaller discharge" to insure
that the contemplated Gabcikovo bypass canal and hydroelectric plant to be
built in Czechoslovakian territory did not impair the flow of the Danube
for navigation.76
During the 1980s, the project became controversial in Hungary for
economic and environmental reasons.77 By the spring of 1989, the
Gabcikovo dam was eighty-five percent complete and the bypass canal was
between sixty and ninety-five percent complete; Hungary, however, had
only constructed the coffer dam for its promised downstream Nagymaros
dam in the Danube bend. 78 After growing concerns about the economic
feasibility of the project and unresolved environmental risks, Hungary
unilaterally suspended work on the project in 1989 and suspended the 1977
Treaty as a "mistake" after breaking away from the then-Soviet Union in
1990. 79
Hungary justified the suspension of the 1977 Treaty as an
"ecological state of necessity." 8 The possible ecological risks raised by
Hungary included the replacement of Danube groundwater flow with
stagnant upstream reservoir water, the silting of the Danube,
eutrophication, and the threat to aquatic habitats from peaking power
releases. 8
The newly-established Slovakia continued to implement an
alternative solution, formulated by Czechoslovakia prior to the 1993
division of the two countries, which involved a dam and diversion solely
on her territory. 82 Hungary unilaterally terminated the 1977 Treaty in
1992.83
The ICJ decided the respective states' rights under the 1977 Treaty and
did not directly apportion the flow of the Danube. 84 To justify termination,
Hungary invoked a number of familiar contract defenses, including
impossibility and changed circumstances, and asserted that the emerging
precautionary principle imposed "an erga omnes obligation of prevention
of damage. . . ." and thus precluded her continued performance of the
treaty.85 To defend suspension of the 1977 Treaty, Hungary invoked
Article 33 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the
International Responsibility of States, which allows a state to avoid an
international obligation when so doing is the only means to "safeguard..
an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril. 86 In a
75.

See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 20.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 22.
See id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 37, 222.
Id. at 36-37.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 35 (Sept. 25).
Id. at 25.
See id.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 39.
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significant expansion of the concept of state necessity, the ICJ agreed that
the environmental risks related to an essential state interest.87 However,
the ICJ rejected some of the broader proposed readings of the
precautionary principle and interpreted Article 33 to require "that a real
'grave' and 'imminent peril' existed in 1989 and that the measures" of the
state were "the only possible response."88 Article 33 embodies a limited
precautionary principle, but to invoke it a state must demonstrate by
credible scientific evidence that a real risk will materialize in the near
future and is thus more than a possibility. 9 The ICJ found that Hungary's
evidence of risk and the possible range of alternatives did not meet the
standards of Article 33. 90
Hungary also argued that the rejection of the 1977 Treaty was justified
by changed environmental and political circumstances, but neither was
found sufficient to justify non-performance of the treaty. 91 By a fourteen to
one vote, the ICJ concluded that the 1977 Treaty created a territorial
regime on the reach of the Danube that was unaffected by the break up of
the former Czechoslovakia. 92 The ICJ rejected Hungary's environmentally
changed conditions defense because the possibility that subsequent
environmental information would require a modification of the project was
not completely unforeseen in 1977 and did not preclude a mutual
adjustment by the two countries. 93 The ICJ deemed environmental risks
not to be the kind of exceptional circumstances that require a court to
disturb the principle of pacta sunt servanta.94 Thus, the 1977 Treaty
regime remained in place. However, the ICJ acknowledged that changed
environmental conditions might effect the operation of a project.95 Thus,
new knowledge of ecological risk may impose a duty on parties to a
complex river basin development treaty to consider the information in the
ongoing implementation of the treaty and management of the river.
Slovakia was unable to convince the ICJ to order Hungary to complete
the project because Slovakia had also breached the 1977 Treaty through its
unilateral diversion which violated the doctrine of equitable apportionment
and the doctrine that self-help must be proportional to a suffered injury.96
87.
88.

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25).
Id.; see also Afshin A-Khavari & Donald R. Rothwell, The IJC and Danube Dan

Case: A Missed Opportunityfor InternationalEnvironmental Law?, 22

MELB.

U. L.

REV.

507, 515 (1998) (arguing that a required level of scientific certainty will defeat the
operation of the precautionary principle).
89. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.

90. See id.
91. Id.at 64.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 82.
94. Id. at 143-44, 224.
95. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 92 (Sept. 25). See
Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not apply to the operations
of dams constructed before NEPA's passage). But see Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v.
Green, 953 F. Supp. 1133, 1147 (D. Or. 1997) (holding NEPA requirement applied to ongoing management activities).

96. See Gabcikovo-NagynarosProject, 1997 I.C.J. at 7.
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The ICJ first held that Slovakia's alternative, which temporarily diverted
ninety percent of the flow of the Danube, violated the 1977 Treaty regime
because it contemplated joint, not unilateral, actions.97 Thus, Slovakia
could not justify its unilateral actions as mitigating damages because "an
injured State which has failed to take the necessary measures to limit
damage sustained would not be entitled to claim compensation for that
damage which could have been avoided." 9' Under customary international
water law, Slovakia's territorial alternative was an illegal diversion because
she deprived "Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of
the natural resources of the Danube . . . 9 In the end, the ICJ voted
thirteen to two that the two states must undertake good faith negotiations
consistent with both international environmental norms such as sustainable
developmentl °° and the law of international water courses to develop a new
management scheme in the context of the already constructed projects in
Slovakia.01°
The ICJ's opinion, limited as it is, firmly establishes that international
rivers are shared resources subject to the principle of equitable
apportionment and that all riparian states have equal rights to enjoy both
the commodity and non-commodity ecological benefits of the river,
hydrologically connected groundwater, and the riparian corridors. For this
reason, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam decision is an extremely important
international and environmental protection precedent because the opinion
integrates the merging norms of international environmental protection and
the law of international watercourses into the law of treaties and water
management, clearly establishing that the doctrine of equitable
apportionment is the grundnorm of international water law. The case: (1)
confirms that multiple purpose river basin development treaties may
establish a continuing (and environmentally sensitive) management regime
that cannot be unilaterally abrogated; (2) recognizes that sustainable
development and ecological risk assessment may be incorporated into the
customary rules of international water law; and (3) holds that these
customary rules can apply to treaties negotiated prior to the recognition of
these emerging norms.
Vice President Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, issued a separate opinion
that adopts the interrelated principles of environmentally sustainable
development and cautionary environmental assessment and management as
erga omnes customary rules. 10 2 After an extensive survey of the
97.
98.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 44.

99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 83 (downgrading sustainable development to a "concept" rather than a
principle).
101. In 1995, Slovakia and Hungary signed a temporary agreement to divide the water in
the Danube between the original river bed and the Moson branch. The increased water
flow was expected to repair the ecological damage at the expense of an annual decrease of
150 gigawatt hours of electric production at Gabcikovo.
Hydroelectric and Other
Renewable
Energy
(last
modified
May
24,
1996)
< http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo96/hydro.html >.
102. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25)
(separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
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emergence of international environmental law and the Asian history of
balancing resource use and nature protection, he concluded that among the
principles
which may be extracted from the systems already referred to are such farreaching principles as the principle of trusteeship of earth resources, the
principle of intergenerational rights and the principle that development
and environmental conservation must go hand in hand. Land is to be
respected as having a vitality of its own and being integrally linked to the
welfare of the community. . . . Sustainable development is thus not
merely a principle of modem international law. It is one of the most
ancient ideas in the human heritage. Fortified from the insights that can
be gained from millennia of human experience,
it has an important role to
103
play in the service of international law.
IV. THE INCOMPLETE INCORPORATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DUTIES INTO
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
While equitable utilization is a sound principle of international law,
considerable tension exists between the concept and sustainable aquatic
ecosystem protection and management. Equitable utilization was part of
international law before the concept of international environmental law
began to coalesce in the 1970s after the 1972 Stockholm Conference and
environmentalists viewed the doctrine with some distrust because it seems
to allow "reasonable environmental degradation."" ° This distrust reflects
the inevitable tension between protecting and using nature.
All
international efforts to promote environmental protection exist in the
context of the right to develop-vigorously championed by developing
5
countries°"-and
the background principle of water law which has never
103. Id. at 110. See. Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens
and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteriafor Peremptory Norms, 11

ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 125-28 (1998) (discussing the jurisprudential basis for
Vice-President Weeramantry's suggestion that international environmental law norms may
evolve into erga ones obligations).
104. See generally LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (3d ed. 1996).
105. See Bengt Broms, Natural Resources: Sovereignty Over, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 306 (1987) (discussing the history of the relationship between
the right to develop and state sovereignty). Modern environmental law, of course,
challenges unlimited sovereignty. See, e.g., Kerstin Odendhal, DIE UMWELTPFLICHTIGKEIT
DER SOUVERANITAT [THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY] (1998) (stating
the sovereign right to develop continues to be the "real" practice of the international
community).
The principle of the right to develop is beginning to play a role in water use controversies.
The Canadian Provinces and the U.S. states which border the Great Lakes are concurrently
concerned about the environmental and other risks posed by possible water withdrawals for
bulk tanker shipments, and the right to develop is the conceptual basis for an anti-export
strategy. Some international trade experts, especially in Canada, have opined that Article
XI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") invalidate all flat export bans. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT];
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289 & 605
GEO. INT'L
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been preservation of the natural hydrologic regime. Perhaps for these
reasons, the Rio Declaration does not directly mention equitable utilization;
however, the Rio Declaration and preparatory conference documents

[hereinafter NAFTA]. Article XI bans "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges. . . "on exports and imports, but Article XX(g) allows a state to defend an
export ban that is necessary to conserve "exhaustible natural resources." GATT, arts. XI &
XX(g). The three NAFTA countries have agreed to exclude non-bottled water from the
agreement. The text provides in part:
The NAFTA creates no rights to natural water resources of any party to the
Agreement unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become a
good or product, it is not covered by the provisions of any trade agreement
including the NAFTA. And nothing in the NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA
Party to either exploit its water for commercial use, or to begin exporting water in
any form. Water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, water
basins and the like is not a good or product, is not traded, and therefore is not and
never has been subject to the terms of any trade agreement.
Accord for the Prohibition of Bulk Water Removal From Drainage Basins (last modified
Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.ccme.ca/le_about/legcommuniques/leg7_water.html>
[hereinafter Accord]. Canada's North American Free Trade Implementation Act similarly
provides that water in packages, products, or tanks is a good, but that natural surface or
groundwater, is not. R.S.C., ch. 44, § 7(2) (1993) (Can.). This "soft" declaration does
not, of course, settle the issue.
All Canadian provinces, with the exception of Quebec, have agreed to a ban on bulk water
removal from the Canadian portion of the country's major drainage basins. See Accord.
The policy will be implemented by each province and contains several exemptions and
exclusions such as bottled water, water packaged in small portable containers, water used in
food production, water to meet short term safety, security or humanitarian needs "and other
purposes as determined by individual jurisdictions to meet environmental and other
management needs consistent with the objective of the Accord." Id. The Water Resources
Act of 1986 allows any Great Lakes state to veto any withdrawal outside of the basin. 42
U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d) (1994).
The opposite argument is that neither GATT nor NAFTA change the basic principle that
state sovereignty allows a state to decide whether to allow trade in raw natural resources.
Several World Trade Organization ("WTO") decisions reject the conservation defense when
a nation has attempted to conserve marine resources outside of its territory. However, the
WTO decisions do not preclude the application of environmental and other conservation
measures to a nation's internal waters because they are premised on the protection of state
sovereignty over internal resources. Recent WTO Appellate decisions have qualified
Article XX by holding that export restrictions must not only fall within the enumerated list
in Article XX but they must also be consistent with the "chapeau" which provides that
"such measures are not [to be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." WTO Appellate Body, Report of
the Appellate Body in U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35
I.L.M. 603, 617 (1996); see also WTO Appellate Body, Report of the Appellate Body of
U.S.-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 36 I.L.M. 832,
WT/DS58/AB R (Oct. 1998) (complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand holding
the U.S.'s failure to justify the application of different standards to different exporting
countries and recognized the right of WTO members to preserve their environmental
resources); Bret Puls, The Murky Waters of International Environmental Jurisprudence:A
Critique of Recent WTO Holdings in the Shrimp/Turtle Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 343 (1999); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Mex. Complaint Concerning U.S.
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 1991 WL 771248 (Sept. 3, 1991); GATT Dispute Panel
Report on EEC & Neth. Complaint Concerning U.S. Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 1994
WL 907620 (June 16, 1994). Traditional water conservation management does not violate
the fundamental premise of trade law that all trade partners be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. See generally INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE
WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES

(2000).
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incorporate the basic ideas of equitable apportionment.' " Principle 2
reaffirms both the right to exploit sovereign resources and the duty to avoid
damage to the environment of other states."°7 This is reinforced in
Principles 17 and 19 which mandate international environmental

assessments and require that a state undertaking an activity "that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect" notify potentially
affected states and consult with them "at an early stage and in good
faith." 0 8 Preparatory documents reaffirm the importance of shared use of
transboundary resources."
This section of the article examines three
examples of the tension between equitable utilization and sustainable
aquatic ecosystem protection and management.
A. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: LIMITED BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION

Projected changes in the global climate from carbon dioxide ("C0 2")

emissions create additional stresses for international water allocation
regimes and dependent ecosystems.

After a period of retreat from the

extreme predictions of the 1980s, the scientific community seems to be
coalescing around the view that the problem is a serious one," 0 although
this view is much contested. If changes occur, existing allocation regimes
will face challenges because they are premised on the availability of a
guaranteed supply of water or the average annual flow augmented by carryover storage."' If droughts and increased evaporation occur, the available
water from international rivers will be consistently less than the parties to
the allocation regimes originally expected and existing allocation regimes
have no mechanisms to adjust to these changed conditions."12 Many

"experts" have suggested that increased reliance on markets or existing
allocation regimes can mitigate the projected effects of global climate

change." 3 However, international water allocation is a prime example of
Declaration, supra note 59.
princ. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 876.
princs. 17 & 19, 31 I.L.M. at 879.
generally Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources:
of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water
Report
of
the
Secretary
General
of
the
Conference,
A/CONF.151/PC/100/ADD.22, reprinted in 1 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS
513-57 (1992).
110. See Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of International Rivers
and Their Legal Arrangements, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 741, 762-66 (1990).
111. The latest United States assessment warns of increased droughts, earlier spring
runoffs, lower summer flows, and higher evapotranspiration rates.
U.S. National
Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change.
<http://www.nacc.usgcrp.gov/sectors/water/draft-report/fullreport.html>
(last visited
6/12/00).
112. See Lazerwitz, supra note 6, at 269-70.
113. I have addressed these issues at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think Again
About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 169 (1992). Water marketing has been
proposed as an adaptation strategy. Economists and many western water critics have long
criticized western water law because it ignores higher, alternative values of water. Critics
assert that too much water is used to grow surplus or low-valued crops, too much water is
used in a wasteful manner, and that increased transfers are desirable. Prior appropriation
allocates the risks of shortages by a simple principle-priority of use. The question is how
106. Rio
107. Id.,
108. Id.,
109. See
Application
Resources:

Issue 2

SAFEGUARDING INT'L RIVER ECOSYSTEMS

the lack of adaptation mechanisms in existing allocation institutions and the
fact that adaptation solutions remain untested and problematic.
International river agreements are often negotiated so that a dam can be
built accompanied by the expectation that any shortages will be short-term
and mitigated by the carry-over storage of the reservoir. The resulting
treaties often provide only for temporary reallocations and contain no
mechanism to address long term declines in expected available supply. For
example, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement allocates a fixed amount of
water to Egypt and the Sudan, but does not bind the other basin states and
provides only a weak mechanism for short-term drought relief.1 14 The
Mexican-United States Treaty ("1944 Water Treaty"), which allocates the
Colorado River between the two countries, provides that the United States
need not fulfill its delivery duty in extraordinary drought.11 Because it is
not clear that this would apply to global warming, Mexico is not
guaranteed a clear entitlement if long term supplies decline. If the normal
drought mechanisms are used, the resulting allocations may be widely
perceived as inefficient and unfair and will not be followed. Water
marketing may be possible but will be difficult between sovereign
nations." 6 In short, adaptation is not a realistic option when an allocation
regime lacks mechanisms to deal with changed conditions." 7
B. THE PRIORITY OF DEVELOPMENT OVER ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
The core idea of equal development opportunity is at the heart of the
Convention. Thus, equal development will be the basis for the argument
that development has priority over aquatic ecosystem protection. The
innovations of the Convention are commendable, but the fact remains that
the protection of a river system's ecological integrity remains secondary to
the promotion of development. Specifically, the Convention makes it
difficult to promote the protection of the ecological integrity of river
systems for two principal reasons. First, the new rules largely exclude
floodplain and wetland protection and focus almost exclusively on pollution
prevention. Second, rivers are still not viewed as ecosystems.
Article 5 of the Convention enjoins states to use watercourses in an
"equitable and reasonable manner."" 8 The next sentence reinforces the

flexible the water transfer system will be in the future. Two sets of problems, one
institutional, the other distributional must be addressed. The first question is whether water
users will respond sufficiently to market incentives. The second and more difficult question
is whether the redistributions commanded by the market are fair and consistent with
ecosystem sustainability in both the short and long run. See COMMITTEE ON WESTERN
WATER MGMT., NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,

EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).

114. See Goldenmann, supra note 109, at 749-56.
115. Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3 & Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter the 1944
Water Treaty].
116. See supra note 111.
117. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 63.
118. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, 36 I.L.M. at 711.
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idea that development is primary and environmental protection is secondary
stating that, "[i]n particular, an international watercourse shall be used and
developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and
sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account
the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate
protection of the watercourse.""' 9 Article 6 follows Article 5 and lists
seven non-weighted factors relevant to the determination of what is
equitable and reasonable. 12 ° While the factors are the subject of extensive
debate, the important point is that they promote development by either
protecting existing development or facilitating new development. For
example, Article 6(e) rewards states that develop first because existing uses
are a relevant factor. 2 ' Slower developing states are equally encouraged to
develop by the ability to show a "social and economic need" for the water,
recognition of the value of "potential" as well as existing uses, and the
ability to argue the comparative efficiency of different water uses, although
this is a high burden to sustain. 122
1. Pollution: A Use to be Tolerated or Mitigated
The reporters of the Convention were sensitive to the tension between
development and environmental protection. The reporters tried to mitigate
this tension, one of the most difficult problems the drafters of the
Convention faced. 123 The final version of the Convention incorporates
some elements of the idea of ecosystem protection into multiple-use
development, but the integration is incomplete and the Convention still
promotes the continuation of this problem' because pollution prevention
and ecosystem degradation remain subordinate to use. Pollution reduction
and prevention is an important component of ecosystem protection, as
illustrated by the joint Canada-United States Great Lakes pollution control
strategy.' l 5 However, the focus on pollution can be too narrow because it
ignores more subtle threats to ecosystems from diversions, barriers, and
land use practices. Modern environmentally sensitive legal regimes try to
correct this problem by mandating or encouraging long-term, monitored,
adaptive ecosystem management, but the concept remains vague,
controversial, 126 and very difficult and costly to integrate into existing river
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id., art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 719.
Id.
Id.
See Albert Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That
of Reasonableness or That of No Hann?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635 (1996).
124. See Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Fifth Session of the International Law
Commission, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 139 (1994).

125. See

NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN

EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1985); Symposium, Prevention of
Groundwater Contamination in the Great Lakes Region, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345 (1989).

126.

Many ecologists criticize the concept of adaptive ecosystem management as simply a

restatement of multiple-use development. See Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 21013. Proponents of multiple-use development often see the concept as a new antidevelopment regime. See e.g., Rebecca Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea,
But What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (1995).
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management regimes. International rules adopt the view that adverse
environmental impacts are an inevitable consequence of development that
can often be mitigated rather than prevented.
Article 7 initially enjoined states to use water "in such a way as not to
cause appreciable harm to other watercourse states," but two objections
surfaced that led to a major revision.' 27 Proponents of multiple-use
development criticized the Article 7 standard as a departure form the
common understanding of equitable apportionment because it subordinates
development to environmental quality.'
Environmentalists made the
opposite criticism that the section does add a new environmental protection
dimension, but does not prohibit all harm, rather only harm "capable of
being established by objective evidence;" thus, it does not include the
crucial concept of risk prevention.' 29 The basic solution, proposed by the
last reporter, was to subordinate the duty to prevent pollution to the right
of equitable utilization, but to create a flexible process to resolve disputes.
Article 7 was redrafted to impose a duty on states and create a process not
to cause significant pollution, subject to an extraordinary circumstances
exception.
Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international
watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other water
course states, absent their agreement, except as may be allowable under
an equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse. A use which causes
significant harm in the form of pollution shall be presumed to be an
inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is: (a) a clear showing of
special circumstances indicating a compelling need for ad hoc adjustment;
30
and (b) the absence of any imminent threat to human health and safety.'
The final version of Section 7 was changed in the United Nations prior
to adoption and accords equitable utilization a strong preference over the
no-harm doctrine.13 ' Section 7 is a victory for slower developing upstream
states132 and provides:
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse states.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
state, the State whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of an
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard
127. See Edith Brown Weiss et al., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
875-80 (1998) (providing a history of the drafting of Article 7).
128.

See International Law Comm'n, supra note 33, at 4-8.

129. See Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 11, at 124-25.
130. First Report of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 4 5th Sess.,
Report ,1 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/451 (1993).
131. See Charles B. Bourne, The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the
1997 Watercourses Convention, 1997 CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 215, 221-24 (1997).
132.

See McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 12; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of

Water Management: To Global Climate and Other Hydrological Stresses, 35 J. AMER.
WATER RES. Ass'N 1301, 1319 (1999).
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for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected
State, to eliminate or mitigate such133harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.
Compared to prior formulations of equitable apportionment, the
Convention is a step forward because it places more emphasis on
conservation and alternatives. 34 Article 6(a) requires the consideration of
"geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other
factors of a natural character," and (g) makes available alternatives of
"comparable" value to a planned use relevant in deciding whether a use is
equitable and reasonable."I' Unlike United States law, 136 Article 6(f) makes
"[c]onservation, protection, development and the economy of use of the
water resources" a relevant factor to take
into account in determining
137
whether a use is reasonable and equitable.
2. The Isolation of River Corridors from the Water: Rivers Are Canals
Not Ecosystems
International water law remains a channel-not watershed or
ecosystem-based-legal regime. This focus is inherently biased toward
development and against ecosystem protection. The Convention applies to
international watercourses not river systems. The Convention defines the
term "watercourse" as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and
naturally flowing into a common terminus. 13 8 The definition is
progressive because it includes connected groundwater and recognizes that
groundwater depletion is a major cause of stream and riverine ecosystem
degradation but land in watersheds and confined aquifers probably remain
separate from the rules. Thus, management initiatives can exclude
necessary land management
options so the definition can be fairly
39
characterized as narrow. 1
Ultimately, the definition is a step-backward from previous definitions
of international river systems. More generally, domestic and international
legal regimes maintain a persistent but artificial separation of rivers from
the floodplains 4 ° and wetlands. Thus, this separation influences domestic

133. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, 36 I.L.M. at 706.
134. Note, Come Hell or High Water: A Water Regime for the Jordan River Basin, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1997).
135. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 706
(emphasis added).
136. See supra Part III.A.
137. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 706.
138. Id., art. 2, 36 I.L.M. at 704.
139. The San Pedro River depletions must be addressed by the creation of a long binational conservation area. See infra note 141.
140.
Human actions that dampen or eliminate natural disturbances are likely to be a
threat to biodiversity in many kinds of environments. For example, many riparian
plant species such as cottonwoods become established after floods, which create
new deposits of bare silt and gravel where seedlings can establish. Eliminating
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and international legal regimes (and which they influence) to prevent water
use rules-premised on the need to share a common resource-from
Further, under some
becoming a basis for land use regulation.
interpretations of equitable apportionment, traditional practices such as the
use of flood waters for irrigation may be inefficient and impose a duty on a
riparian state to conserve water for the benefit of downstream states.
Waste counts against a state in the balancing test, and conservation has
traditionally meant that water should be efficiently consumed.
The Convention, however, does contain several innovative new
environmental protection rules. For example, Article 20 requires that
states protect the ecosystems of international watercourses, and Article 22
requires a state to "take all measures necessary to prevent the introduction
of species, alien or new" into a river system if the species "may have
effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse.'141 This standard
originates from the objections that Canada142lodged against the United States
Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota.
The current risks faced by the Upper San Pedro River illustrate the
need to view international rivers as integrated ground and surface water
systems with broad corridor ecosystems. On the Upper San Pedro, a small
river that flows north from the state of Sonora, Mexico into Arizona where
it joins the Gila River, downstream groundwater depletion may destroy the
143
largest surviving expanse of broadleaf riparian forest in the region.
"[P]umping reduces the flow of the river and consequently adversely
affects riparian vegetation" 144 unless the perennial flows in the Upper San
Pedro Basin can be sustained. In 1998, Congress created the San Pedro
National Conservation Area made up, in part, of retired farmland and
water rights on the upper reaches of the United States portion of the river.
However, this effort will not preserve the corridor. The only viable
solution recommended by an expert study commissioned by the Council on
Environmental Cooperation was to extend the protected area to straddle the
Mexican-United States border.1 45 It is possible to re-establish high quality
riparian habitat in Mexico by redistributing United States pumping and
retiring irrigated agriculture and grazing. The solution will not be easy.
The solution options include actually reversing the urban and agricultural
periodic flooding by building dams may prevent regeneration of many species and
drastically alter riparian plant communities.
Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 45. See generally Thayer Scudder, The Need and
Justification for Maintaining Transboundary Flood Regimes: The Africa Case, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 75 (1991).
141. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20 & 22, 36 I.L.M. at
710.
142. See Charles M. Carvell, The North Dakota Garrison Diversion Project and
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 60 N.D. L. REV. 603 (1984).
143. See SAN PEDRO EXPERT STUDY TEAM, SUSTAINING AND ENHANCING RIPARIAN
MIGRATORY BIRD HABITATION ON THE UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (Commission on Envtl.
1999)
Cooperation
< http://www.cec.org/pubs-info resources/publications/mandate-pubs/sanped.cfm?varlan
=english>.
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 18.
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growth in the region146 through land retirement and the acquisition of
conservation easements to prevent the potential expansion of irrigated
agriculture.
3. Preservation of the Flow of Rivers for Ecosystem Maintenance is
Problematic
General duties to protect ecosystems will not be effective because
downstream states lack effective control of both the rate and quality of the
flow of international rivers under international water law. Upstream states
do not need to seek the consent of downstream states to make a diversion
because they have a right to a fair share of the river. In short, international
law does not provide a natural flow rule.1 47 The material injury rule,
which is at the heart of equitable apportionment, allows upstream states to
progressively use water, which creates the risk of environmental damage,
but not legally cognizable damage. For example, upstream diversions may
generally increase the salinity of rivers by allowing salt water to migrate
upstream. In addition, pollution is often limited to serious and identifiable
pollution rather than less visible, cumulative impacts from environmentally
destructive watershed land use practices. The presumed remedy is post
hoc mitigation rather than prevention. 4'
Flow control is limited because the rules appear to adopt the
conventional, narrow definition of harm as a demonstrated injury. The
rules do not include any concept of future environmental risk, making it
difficult to prevent harm. The controversy over the proposed Windy
Craggy mine on the Tatshenshini River in British Columbia, Canada,
which is upstream from two national parks in Alaska and one in Canada,
illustrates the limits of a simple harm prevention standard and the need for
the inclusion of risk analysis and prevention in international water law. In
1988, the Geddes Resources, a mining company, applied to the government
of British Columbia to open a copper mine on the river.1 49 Intense
environmental opposition to the mine arose from the risk of long term acid
drainage and consequent damage to salmon fisheries, which led British
Columbia to scrub the mining plan and to preserve the Tatshenshini as a
UNESCO World Heritage Site. 5 °
Windy Craggy illustrates the potential value of applying the principles of
international water law to resolving international water controversies.
The Windy Craggy controversy also suggests that there are ways in which
146. Id. at 17-18.
147. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957)

(widely read to reject any right to the undiminished flow of an international stream);
Charles B. Bourne, The Right to Utilize Waters of International Rivers, 1965 CAN. Y.B.

L. 187, 190- 203 (1965) (providing a full exposition of the rise and fall of the theory
of natural flow).
INT'L

148. See Toru Iwama, Emerging Principles and Rules for the Prevention and Mitigation
of EnvironmentalHarm, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

107 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992).
149. Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 11, at 114.
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150. Id. at 117.
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international water law could be made more useful to decision-makers.
Among the limitations to existing international water law is its inability to
deal with situations where risk of international water pollution is the
issue. A partial solution might be to extend international water law to
include a principle of informed negotiated consent that would build on the
foundation set by the principle of equitable utilization and reasonable use
in the Helsinki Rules and help to meld the Helsinki Rules to the ILC Draft
Rules. 151

Finally, flow protection requires continuous management. However,
the rules do not promote management because they assume that mitigation
is a single, final solution. Article 17 requires that a notifying state
negotiate with a potential victim state if the proposed use will be
inequitable."5 2 The purpose of the negotiation is to arrive at "an equitable
resolution of the situation."' 5 3 An adaptive management regime could be
an equitable resolution of many conflicts, but the resolution connotes a
final mitigation solution. As discussed in the next section, environmentally
sustainable use requires the development of continuous management
regimes rather than on time, often poorly implemented and assessed
mitigation solutions.
V. THE ELEMENTS OF A MANAGEMENT REGIME
A. THE LEGAL BASIS OF SHARED MANAGEMENT

The future of international river basin use will be increasingly based on
the environmentally sustainable management of the total system. Existing
facilities may have to be re-engineered and re-operated to simulate pre-dam
flows to promote sustainable river and river corridor uses. New facilities
will be subject to more stringent flow maintenance and monitoring
conditions and will incorporate the ability to respond more flexibly to
environmental problems. Environmental sustainable use and management
recognizes that most artificial systems are permanent landscape features,
but seeks to use adaptive management to achieve use patterns that start
from the assumption that the historic hydrographic of the river becomes the
norm, and inconsistent uses the exception.
The shared use principle of international water law can incorporate the
idea of ecosystem protection and management because both international
water and environmental law rest on the law of state responsibility for
transboundary harm.' 54 The law is evolving toward the recognition of more
permanent ecological risk protection duties beyond the foundation principle
that states have a duty not to allow state agencies and private parties,

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 131.
International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, 36 I.L.M. at 709.
Id.
Dante A. Caponera, The Role of Customary International Water Law, in WATER

RESOURCES POLICY FOR ASIA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON WATER
RESOURCES POLICY IN AGRO-SOCIo ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 365 (Mohammed Ali et al.

eds., 1987).
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subject to the state's regulatory jurisdiction,"' to use their territories in 156
a
manner that causes substantial harm to other states and their nationals.15 7
The basic duty seems firmly grounded in modern international practice,

but the actual deterrence effect of the rule is minimal. To complicate
matters, no consensus exists as to the scope of the duty and the standard of
liability. 58 For example, liability rules exist for environmental damage
resulting from inequitable uses of water,"5 9 but no broad recognized right of
compensation for general environmental degradation exists in the absence
of demonstrable injury to specific consumptive and non-consumptive
uses. 16° Moreover, a post hoc duty to compensate is, in and of itself, an

inadequate incentive for states to engage
in meaningful cooperation,
161
sharing, and environmental management.
155. State responsibility for the conduct of private parties who cause injury to the
territory of another state is widely asserted in international law, although the basis for the
duty and its scope are disputed. The basic principle is that a state must exercise due
diligence to prevent conduct, if performed by the state, which would breach its primary
international duties. This is thought to include the duty to regulate and to enforce
regulations. Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1494-96 (1991).
Section 601 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations of the
United States endorses this duty to regulate and enforce regulations and limits the state duty
to take necessary environmental protection measures to "the extent practicable under the
circumstances." David D. Caron describes this standard as conservative compared to the
fault-based, due diligence standard of international law. David J. Caron, The Law of the
Environment:A Symbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528, 535 (1989)
156. The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. (1938), is the basis for the two
most authoritative statements of state liability which extends to the failure to police and
regulate those acting within a state's territory. State liability for acts which injure the other
is re-enforced by the Corfu Channel decision. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). Given the paucity of precedents and the great diversity in state practice
in response to environmental insults, the international community continues to debate the
issue of whether substantive duties on states, which make trans-frontier pollution a wrongful
act, exist. See e.g., Karl Zemanek, State Responsibility and Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

157.

187-88 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).

Johan G. Lammers, International and European Community Law Aspects of

Pollution of International Watercourses, in ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).

PROTECTION

AND

158. The issue is whether states are absolutely (strictly) liable or whether they are only
liable for intentional environmental insults and the failure to use due care. The argument
for a fault-based regime is that this is most consistent with the principle of sovereignty and
past practice. The International Law Commission has divided international law into the old
state responsibility and the new international liability to broaden the debate to include
"absolute" or strict liability, but the consensus is that this is a distinction without a
difference.
Francisco Orrego Vicufla, State Responsibility, Liability, and Remedial
Measures Under International Law: New Criteria for Environmental Protection, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS,

supra note 146, at 139. The strict liability rule is criticized, in part, because it discourages
serious negotiations. Merrill, supra note 12.
159. Paul R. Williams, Can International Legal Principles Play a Positive Role in
Resolving Central and East European Transboundary Environmental Disputes?, 7 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 438 (1994).
160. See William Bush, Compensation and the Utilization of International Rivers and
Lakes.: The Role of Compensation in the Event of Permanent Injury to Existing Uses of
Water, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 309, 315 (Ralph
Zacklin et al. eds., 1981). In contrast to the prior Helsinki Rules, the Convention does not
provide for compensation. Helsinki Rules, supra note 66, art. V, sec. 20).
161. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water, Politics and International Law, in WATER IN
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The idea of shared resource management, as opposed to use, is a less
developed international law principle. Yet, shared resource management is
a logical extension of the duties to inform and consult as well as a liberal
reading of the law of state responsibility for transboundary damage. These
duties are intended to facilitate mitigation of adverse environmental
impacts. Mitigation is expanding from a single and final action to on-going
management. International environmental law principles developed since
the 1972 Stockholm Conference have influenced the progressive expansion
of international water law to include cooperation and prevention duties.
The Convention incorporates four primary harm prevention duties when
states exercise their sovereign right to develop their water resources.
States have a corollary duty to inform, consult, engage in good faith
negotiations, and to repair or compensate for any damages caused by the
inequitable use of water. 162 However, only a breach of the duty to
compensate is universally considered wrongful and the remaining duties are
relatively weak. For example, the duty to inform was dropped from the
1972 Stockholm Conference resolution at the insistence of Brazil, although
this defect was cured by Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration which includes
a good faith duty to consult at the early stages of a project. 163
A widely recognized duty of consultation on international rivers
exists, 164 although many nations continue to object to the principle and
refuse to consult. 65 The duty to inform does not include the duty to
forego. The Convention includes a duty to notify,' 66 exchange information,
and consult with other riparian states about the possible effects of planned
activities.167 A potential victim state has "six months within which to study
and evaluate the possible effects" 68 and the notifying state must supply
"any additional data and information that is available and necessary for an
accurate evaluation" of the activity. 169
Management duties can also be derived from the emerging
precautionary principle 7 ° which posits that states have the power, if not the
CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 92 (Peter Gleick ed., 1993).
162. An exhaustive study of the influence of hard and soft international environmental
law on the right to develop water resources observes that modern sharing rules are premised
on the assumption that "the elasticity of the equitable utilization principle leads to a whole
series of procedural rules because, without such rules, States often recognize the limits of
their rights only when they unintentionally deprive another State of its equitable share."
PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES
HAROLD HOHMANN,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 116 (1994).

163.

AND

PRINCIPLES

OF

MODERN

Rio Declaration, supra note 59, princ. 19, 31 I.L.M. at 879.

164. See Charles B. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage
Basins, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 172, 191 (1972).
165. For a history of Brazil's objections to the duty to consult (written by an Argentinian
scholar) see Guillermo J. Cano, Argentina, Brazil, and the de laPlata River Basin: A
Summary of Their Legal Relationship, in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 126
(Albert E. Utton & Ludwik Teclaff, eds., 1978).
166. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, 36 I.L.M. at 707-08.
167. Id., art. 11, 36 I.L.M. at 707.
168. Id., art. 13, 36 I.L.M. at 708.
169. Id., art. 14, 36 I.L.M. at 708.
170. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 312-18 (1991). For

Volume 3

WATER LAW REVIEW

duty,"' to prevent serious risks from materializing in the absence of
provable environmental harm, if evidence of significant environmental
risks exists. While the principle is still vague,172 it probably includes a
duty to avoid foreseeable, significant risks, although issues regarding the
burden of proof remain unresolved.' 73 The precautionary principle both
reinforces and expands the duties to consult and inform. Precaution
projects the substitution of risk for provable harm that underlies United
States and European toxic pollutant regulation, as an international duty
among states and erga omnes. 74
'
Precaution is a logical response to a science-based legal regime such as
international environmental law. 175 As the international response to ozone
depletion illustrates, the precautionary principle works best when two
factors reinforce each other. First, the risks of the activity must be
sufficiently understandable and severe to pose political liabilities on
governments that ignore them. Second, as has been the case with ozone
but less so in global climate change, subsequent science must confirm the
seriousness of the identified risk. The usual remedy is to prevent or limit
the use of substances that pose environmental risks, but adaptive
management with feedback mechanisms is an equally possible application
of the precautionary principle. Precaution and the emerging duties to avoid
conflicts by advance notice could expand to include a full environmental
impact assessment. 76 A full environmental impact assessment can lead to
example, in 1983, the German government took the position that regulation of pollution in
the North Sea- was not dependent upon the proof of harm. The Second North Sea
Declaration reflects the view of Germany. In addition, other marine conventions, United
Nations sustainable development declarations, the ozone convention, and regional hazardous
waste treaties reflect this view. However, the idea of ecological risk prevention remains
underdeveloped.
171. See Gunther Handl, Environnental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
InternationalLaw, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1990).
172. See id. at 22-24 (providing a skeptical view of the precautionary principle).
173. James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining The Precautionary Principle in
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 424 (1995).
174. See HOHMANN, supra note 160 (arguing that the precautionary principle is a logical
product of the trend toward planned environmental management and that it has been so
widely adopted in binding and non-binding agreements that it has become an "instant"
customary doctrine of international law).
175. Environmentalism derives its primary force from the universal warning messages of
elite science. As James Rosenau has written:
Politicians cannot exercise control over environmental outcomes without recourse
to scientific findings. They may claim that the findings are not clear-cut or
remain subject to contradictory interpretations, but they are nonetheless dependent
on what practices of science uncover about the laws of nature ... [C]riteria of
proof are at the heart of environmental politics ... the outcomes of environmental

issues depend as much on the persuasiveness of evidence as on the various criteria
of power-superior resources, greater mass support, skill at coalition formationthat sustain or resolve other types of issues.
James N. Rosenau, Environmental Challenges in a Global Context, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: MOVEMENTS,

PARTIES,

ORGANIZATIONS,

AND

POLICY 257, 258 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed., 1993).
176. Gunther Handl, The Principle of "Equitable Use" as Applied to Internationally
Shared Natural Resources: its role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over
Transfrontier Pollution, 14 Revue Beige De Droit 40 (1979). Article 12 of the Convention
includes as part of the duty to notify other riparian states of possible significant adverse
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management because it identifies a range of alternatives and identifies gaps
in scientific knowledge that must be filled for effective management to
succeed. This link was made in the decision of the ICJ in the GabcikovoNagymaros dam case discussed above in Part III.C. 177 In his separate

opinion, Vice President Weeramantry

observed that the emerging

precautionary principle supports the imposition of a continuing duty of

environmental assessment and monitoring of both the construction and
operation of large water and other development projects. 178 "EIA, being a
the
specific application of the larger general principle of caution, embodies
179
larger obligation of continuing watchfulness and anticipation."
The implementation of the ecological integrity model in international
water law requires the formulation of the standards informed both by new
scientific and ethical paradigms. The new science of river management
can be informed by the ethical assumption of an obligation to future
generations, which reflects the twentieth century's humility toward
nature. 8 ° The underlying philosophical principle of much environmental
management is inter-generational equity.' l The basic idea is that "[w]e as
a species, hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet, both
with members of the present generation and with other generations, past
and future," and the principle has been rapidly adopted as an ethical norm

against which major international agreements and mandates must be

tested."8 2 The precise contours of intergenerational duties are not self-

defining, but the core idea that each generation has a duty to manage its
common patrimony for the benefit of the next generation rejects both the
prevailing ethic that resources should be' immediately consumed because
their future versus present value is likely to be low, and the more "radical"
ecological visions
of the restoration and maintenance of pre-human
83

environments. 1

Adoption of intergenerational equity fundamentally changes the nature
effects, the duty to include "the results of any environmental impact assessment" that was
done by the notifying state. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 12,
36 I.L.M. at 707-08.
177. See discussion supra Part III.C.
178. See id.
179. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 113 (Sept. 25).
180. "[P]eople around the world in the 1990s are perceiving the earth as more than a
globe to be surveyed, or developed for the public good in the short term, or to be protected
from threats to its well-being both human and natural. It is all of these in some degree, but
has additional dimensions. People in many cultures accept its scientific description as a
matter of belief. They recognize a commitment to care for it in perpetuity. They accept
reluctantly an obligation to come to terms with problems posed by growth in numbers and
appetites. This is not simply anxious analysis of economic and social consequences of
political policies toward environmental matters. The roots are in a growing solemn sense of
the individual as part of one human family for whom earth is its spiritual home." Gilbert F.
White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENERGY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1994).
181. Weiss, supra note 24, at 238 (arguing that present generations owe conservation
duties to future generations and that "[c]onservation of quality ... cautions against water
withdrawals that may result in pollution of water supplies . . . that will be expensive or
impossible for future generations to repair").
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id. at 22-24.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

of the water resource decision-making process and allocation norms,
regardless of the precise content of the duty. Present actions must be
evaluated in terms of the long-term consequences. All present value
economic calculations of commodity values must be weighted against
calculations that estimate the future value of the resource and incorporate
the assumption that environmental quality is the marginal value of natural
or non-degraded resources which is likely to increase over time. This is
the essence of the difference between the economics of sustainable
development and traditional cost-benefit calculations.184 One example of
the application of intergenerational equity is the incorporation of non- or
passive use values into decision-making. Passive use values are, in effect,
a proxy to measure the aggregate value of natural resources over time. If
the passive use values are evaluated over a longer period of time and over
a broader community, they more accurately measure changing preferences.
B. THE SCIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM RIVER
MANAGEMENT

The primary objective of modern river management is the sciencebased practice of adaptive management. Glen Canyon Environmental
Studies ("GCES"), a National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council committee, provides the scientific basis for the re-operation of the
Glen Canyon Dam to provide for a flow regime that is less environmentally
disruptive and for beach building flood flows which attempt to restore the
sediment balance in the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon.185
After a decade of monitoring, the GCES articulated a possible new
management vision:
A different kind of management principle, which might be called the
principle of naturalness, applies to national parks.
Management is
minimized, and where it must occur, it is directed toward the maintenance
of environmental regime that as nearly as possible resembles the natural or
undisturbed condition of the environment.
It seems unreasonable to
consider the future operation of Glen Canyon Dam without also
considering the principle of naturalness as it might
apply to the Grand Canyon National Park. 186
The non-equilibrium ecology, which rejects the earlier ecological
theory of a balance of nature and the associated romantic idea that nature
should be a place without humans, provides the basis for the vision of
modern river management and theories of biodiversity conservation. In his
path-breaking book, Discordant Harmonies, Daniel Botkin has
"deconstructed" the equilibrium paradigm as a misguided effort to match

184. See DAVID PEARCE ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
185. NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN
CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO ECOSYSTEM (1999).
186. Id. at 56. (unfortunately, "[t]o date, the Adaptive Management Program has not
produced a scientific and stakeholder-based consensus regarding the desired state of the
ecosystem ....").
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science to theological and scientific visions of a perfect universe."8 7
Botkin's basic argument is that the images of nature that have influenced
ecology are static when in fact the kinds of problems that we face require a
dynamic view of nature. He argues that the dynamic view of nature starts
from the premises that human action is one of the principal forces
operating on ecosystems and that system disturbances are both predictable
and random. 8 8 A new regulatory science, conservation biology,189 is
emerging to deal with the persistent problem of generating scientific
information that can inform management decisions by designing research
agendas tailored toward specific management issues. Examples of specific
management issues include determining the minimum viable habitat for an
endangered species or the disturbance regimen necessary to sustain the
ecosystem. By focusing on the integration and progressive nature of
scientific research, management regimes can adjust to new information and
changed ecological conditions.
Ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite
periods of time. As a leading aquatic ecologist has written, water resource
systems are "inherently variable, patchy, and often require disturbance to
persist." 1" This has three consequences that are partially reflected in the
Glen Canyon Dam experience. The first is that all future management
"Adaptive planning and management invoke a
must be adaptive."'
decision-making process based on trial, monitoring, and feedback" so that
goals can be modified, as necessary, in light of new information.192 The
second is that management objectives, or baselines, must be consistent with
the idea of altered systems. The accelerating interaction between humans
and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state
of nature.193 At best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or
preserved. Third, all management will be a series of calculated risky
"[N]ature moves and changes and involves risks and
experiments.
uncertainties and ... our own judgments of our actions must be made
against this moving target. ' 94

187. See Botkin, supra note 23.
188. Id.
189. See Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 84-86.
190. Meyer, supra note 27, at 78.
191.
COMMITTEE ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL,
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 357

(1992).
192. Id.
193. The philosophical basis for the new ecology can be found in Bill McKibben's widely
read, The End of Nature, which argues the modern mind separates humanity from nature
and thus, the romantic visions of harmony between humanity and nature are impossible.
See BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and
the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995)

(book review of Jonathan Baert Weiner,
IN OUR TIME (1994)).

194. Botkin, supra note 23, at 190.
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VI. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL FLOW RESTORATION
EXPERIMENTS
Integration of adaptive management into existing and future
international water regimes will be extremely difficult, but not impossible.
The root of the difficulty is that water management has been traditionally
conceived as part of the process of protecting vested entitlements by
ensuring that they will be satisfied in times of scarcity. Firm allocation
treaties build up strong expectations that existing entitlements will continue
in perpetuity and create strong, and partially legitimate, fears among all
participants that any change would make them worse, not better off. The
continued protection of vested and potential entitlements in international
watercourses must be an essential element of any environmental
management strategy, but protection duties under the Convention, treaties,
and domestic and customary international law should not operate to
preclude the consideration and adoption of innovation management
strategies. Innovation is not necessarily incompatible with the protection of
vested entitlements. This is especially important because in the future, a
major river management task will be the restoration of degraded rivers.
Major river systems such as the Colorado, Columbia, 9 5 Missouri, and Nile
are facing substantial environmental problems due to the construction of
large dams. These projects were built for three primary purposes, water
supply, power, and flood control, but they are now being modified to
satisfy new and additional objectives, primarily environmental and
recreational.' 96 Experiments are now underway on many river systems,
large and small, to restore the system to a baseline that reverses the most
harmful effects of human use and alteration of natural system functions.1 97
These changes can be accommodated with vested entitlements because
it is possible to achieve the objective of the entitlement through new
management regimes that have a risk-sharing component. The rhetoric of
water rights based on priority has obscured the risks inherent in all water
rights and created an unjustified illusion of firm water rights. Ultimately,
water rights can be better understood as a practical, intuitive response to
the seasonable unreliability of supplies. The construction of large carryover storage reservoirs, which reduce but do not eliminate the inherent
risks, has worked to mask these risks. Water rights are subject not only to
the fixed risks of priority but also to the new risks created by new demands
on the system. This is not an argument for wholesale reallocation. It
asserts only that because risk is inherent in water entitlements, there are no
inherent legal barriers to the adoption of management solutions that
equitably reassign the risks of water shortages to accommodate all relevant

195. Literature concerning the principal environmental problem, the loss of historic
salmon runs, is vast. See e.g., Michael C. Blumm, et al., Beyond the Parity Promise:
Struggling to Save the Columbia Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21 (1997);
William Stelle, Jr., Overcoming the Seven Myths of Columbia River Salmon Recovery, 28
ENVTL. L. 493 (1998).
196. See Michael Collier, et al., DAMS AND RIVERS: A PRIMER ON THE DOWNSTREAM
EFFECTS OF DAMS 3 (1996) (U.S.G.S. Circular 1126).
197. See generally RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 189.
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users and nations in a basin. Thus, the focus should be on the actual
expectations that lie behind a use, rather than the perpetual enforcement of
the entitlement, so that alternative ways of satisfying those expectations in
ways that accommodate new uses can be found.'9
The potential to integrate management into existing allocation regimes
and the constraints that property rights-based regimes pose is illustrated by
a number of on-going international and domestic river restoration efforts.
For example, a large-scale systematic experiment is underway in the
Florida Everglades to restore the slow moving, seasonable north-south
sheet flows disrupted by the development of urban areas and agricultural
districts above the Everglades.' 99 The United States and the state of
Florida will spend up to $8 billion dollars over a twenty year period to
recapture and store water diverted from the north-south flow and
discharged into the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. 2°° Another
experiment is underway in California to preserve the fresh-salt water
balance in the San Francisco Bay Delta 211 in a way that engages all
stakeholders in the search for non-zero sum solutions. Further, the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation released its Factual Record on
the under-enforcement of Canadian fish protection legislation by BC
[British Columbia] Hydro on the Upper Columbia River System in June
2000.202

A. THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN
An important flow maintenance and ecosystem restoration experiment
is underway on Australia's largest river system, the Murray-Darling
Basin.20 3 While the population of the basin is relatively small, it contains
198. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes:
The Case of the Truckee-CarsonSettlement, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 674 (1999).
199. See William K. Stevens, Putting Things Right in the Everglades, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1999, at DI.
200. Id.
201. After the 1996 completion of Phase I by the identification of three alternative
restoration and protection strategies, the process progressed to Phase II, the identification of
a preferred alternative. Phase II will end in late 1999 with the preparation of the Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact State/Environmental Impact Report. The Revised
Phase II report outlines the draft preferred alternative. CALFED Bay-Delta Program,
Revised
Phase
1H
Report
(June
1999)
<http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov/adobe_pdf/revised-draft eis-eir>.
Eighteen
characteristics such as in and out of Delta water quality, operational flexibility, fisheries
impacts, and risk to export water supplies were identified to assess three synthesis
alternatives. The Report recommends a preferred alternative, which is the adoption of
adaptive management to implement eight strategies over a 30 year period. Id. at 25, 28.
The eight strategies are: (1) long-term levee protection; (2) a water quality program to make
significant reductions in point and non-point source pollution; (3) ecosystem restoration; (4)
increased water use efficiency among all state water users; (5) the development of "an
active and properly regulated water market which will allow water to move between users;"
(6) locally-led watershed management activities; (7) new storage, including groundwater
options; and (8) a through-Delta conveyance based on the existing Delta configuration. Id.
at 25, 27-28.
202. Commission on Environmental Cooperation, FACTUAL RECORD SEM 97-001 (BC
Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al, June, 2000).
203. See MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1998-99 (1999)
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forty-two percent of Australia's agriculture, most of the country's major
24
small inland cities, and the Australian capital territory, Canberra. 0
Australia is a federal state and the Murray-Darling Basin is an interstate
river system.2 °5 The Darling River originates in southern Queensland and
the River Murray and its major tributaries originate in the Snowy
Mountains of New South Wales and Victoria." ° The Darling joins the
Murray near Mildura, Victoria, where the American Chaffee brothers
established an irrigation colony, and empties into the Pacific Ocean near
Adelaide, South Australia." 7 The system has experienced a great deal of
ecosystem degradation, especially salinity, due to diversions and dams. 0
In 1992, the federal government and the basin states agreed to the MurrayDarling Basin Initiative ("Initiative") to conserve the ecosystem of the river
system. 209 The Initiative led to the adoption of the federal-state MurrayBasin Agreement2 10 ("Agreement") and the creation of the Murray-Darling
Basin Commission ("Commission"), a joint federal-state commission
overseen by a federal-state ministerial council. Unlike an interstate
compact in the United States, or an international treaty, the Agreement
imposes much more detailed management duties on the parties and new
agreements constantly amend it. The Agreement both allocates the flow
among the basin states 21I and vests the Commission with the power to
control releases from specified upstream storage facilities.
The
Commission now runs the river, overseen by the ministerial council and a
stakeholder advisory board.21 2
The most important potential international precedent is the
Commission's adoption of a base flow regime and the imposition of the
regime on existing users throughout the basin. The Commission has
initiated a process to set environmental or base flows for ecosystem
restoration based on the impacts of different flows on the riverine
environment.2 13 On developed river basins, the problem with establishing
new flow or hydrographic regimes is that vested rights have been
< http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/index.html > [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
204. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, The Murray-Darling Basin: An Introduction <
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Introduction/MDBIntroduction.html > ;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
Agriculture
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Resources/Agriculture/Agriculture.html >;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
Detailed
Statistics:
Agriculture
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Detail-Stats/Agriculture.html >.
205. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, History of the Murray-DarlingBasin Agreement
< http://www.mdbc.gov.au/Initiative/Agreement/History.html >.
206. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, The Murray-Darling Basin: An Introduction <
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Introduction/MDB Introduction.html >;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
The
River
Murray
System
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/RMS/RMS.html >.
207. Id.
208. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 200, at 19-20, 32-34.
209. Id. at 7; see also Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, June 1992 (with additions to
July 1999), Austl.-N.S.W.-Vict.-S. Austl., <www.mdbc.gov.au>.
210. Murray-DarlingBasin Agreement, supra note 206.
211. Id., pt. X.
212. Id., pts. III & IV.
213. Id., pts. V & VI.

Issue 2

SAFEGUARDING INT'L RIVER ECOSYSTEMS

previously acquired, or at least users claim them. Both the federal and
state governments recognized the need to limit water withdrawals, establish
base flows, and to stabilize and restore productive agricultural areas,
especially those degraded by salinization.214 In 1996, the Commission
announced the Cap, which is the "cornerstone of a number of policies
designed to manage water resources for scarcity: water trading,
environmental flows and the security of property rights." 2" 5 The Cap
imposes yearly diversion limits on the four basin states and the Australian
Capital Territory.21 6 New South Wales agriculture accounts for many of
the stresses on the system, and the Commission imposed a state Cap based
on 1993-94 withdrawal levels. 217 The Caps will vary from year to year
according to the supply. Each state administers the Cap, which will
require aggressive management as agricultural water diversions increase in
both New South Wales and Queensland. 1 8
Australia is prone to prolonged periods of severe drought which
alternate with wet years. 219 Diversions are increasing upstream in
Queensland as well in many of New South Wales inland irrigated
agricultural districts. 220 In 1996-97, three major sub-basins in New South
Wales exceeded the Cap. 22 Achievement of the Cap will require many
innovative management strategies such as conjunctive use of ground and
surface water, an abandonment of the "use it or lose it" administration of
water licenses, and the implementation of an accounting system to balance
water use over a period of time. 2 Still, the Commission predicted that all
states would meet the Caps, except New South Wales.223 Only one basin,
the Lahlan, clearly exceeded the Cap in its first years of implementation,
1997-98, but usage in other major basins is approaching the Cap,
especially if development is allowed to increase. 224 The ability of the Cap
to help restore the Murray-Darling Basin will not be known for years.
However, the initial experience suggests that plans, which first try to
maintain the status quo and then promote gradual and modest rollbacks in
existing uses, can be both fair, efficient, and promote environmental
214. Id.
215. Annual Report 1998-1999, supra note 200, at 24. The ministerial council has
commissioned a five year review of the Cap to "identify any impediments and constraints to
its full operation."
MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE CAP
IMPLEMENTATION 1997-1998, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDIT GROUP (1998)
[hereinafter REVIEW OF THE CAP IMPLEMENTATION].
216. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 200.
217. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CAP ON DIVERSIONS:
WATER YEAR 1997/98 STRIKING THE BALANCE (1998) [hereinafter MURRAY-DARLING BASIN
CAP ON DIVERSIONS].

218.
219.

Id.
See generally MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, WATER AUDIT MONITORING
REPORT 1996/97 (1998).
220. Id. at 11-13, 17-19.
221. Id. at 10.
222. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CAP ON DIVERSIONS, supra note 214, at 10.
223. Id.
224. Water diversions in the Murrumbidgee Valley are approaching the upper confidence
levels of the Cap irrigation is projected to increase. REVIEW OF THE CAP IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 212.
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objectives. In major river systems, wasteful agricultural water use and use
in excess of legal entitlements almost always exist. This provides river
managers with some flexibility to experiment without the undue dislocation
of legitimate user expectations.
B. RE-ENGINEERING GLEN CANYON DAM ON THE COLORADO RIVER

Re-engineering international rivers will be especially challenging due
to the high level of scientific, cross-national, and financial cooperation
required; the reluctance of nations to change shared control of
transboundary water; and because new flow regimes may conflict with
entitlements based on prior use established under the equitable
apportionment rules. Although modern international law is moving toward
creating agreements that are open to change, treaties are viewed as eternal
compacts. Efforts to revise the operating regime for Glen Canyon Dam on
the Colorado River, an international river, illustrate that efforts to restore a
shadow of a pre-dam flow on the Colorado are possible, but can be
impeded by the entitlements generated by multiple purpose development.
Re-engineering possibilities exist to improve the Canyon ecosystem, but
resistance exists because they may frustrate the expectations of the basin
generated by the entitlement regime.
The construction of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado, and its
operation for hydroelectric power generation, has altered the downstream
environment through the Grand Canyon. 225 The net result of the
construction of Glen Canyon Dam and other carry-over storage and
hydroelectric generating dams is that the Colorado has permanently become
an artificial river.226 Ecosystems often require disturbance cycles to sustain
them, and Glen Canyon Dam altered the natural hydrographic of the
Colorado.227 In the. early 1980s, a number of consequences of the
substitution of an artificial disturbance regime began to surface. Beaches
eroded; the endemic fish were jeopardized by the substitution of colder
clear water for the warm, more turbid natural flow regime; and rafting
trips were subjected to pulsating flows from the daily power release cycle.
In 1986, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Western Power Administration
began to collect information about these changes and after initial resistance
agreed to prepare an environmental impact statement. 22' Four National
Academy of Sciences reports assess the policy utility of this research.229
Congress intervened in the process with the passage of the Grand
225. See

PHILIP

184 (1981).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See U.S.

L.

FRADKIN,

DEP'T

OF

A

RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST

INTERIOR,

OPERATION

OF

GLEN

CANYON

DAM,

FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 73-76 (1995).
229. COMMITTEE TO REV. THE GLEN CANYON ENVTL. STUD., NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL,
RIVER AND DAM MANAGEMENT:

A REVIEW OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S GLEN

CANYON ENVTL. STUD. 3 (1987); COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT 1
(1991); RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND CANYON x-xi (1996); DOWNSTREAM:
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM viii

(1999).
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Canyon Protection Act of 1992 ("the Act").23 ° Section 1802 of the Act
requires that the Secretary of the Interior operate the dam in a manner
consistent with the "Law of the River," including the Endangered Species
Act, to "mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which the
Grand Canyon National Park and the Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area were established, including, but not limited to natural and cultural
resources and visitor use." 23 1 The Act is a direct outcome of the
identification of the need for a different release pattern from the Glen
Canyon Dam both to build beaches and to retard beach erosion. In 1990,
the GCES scientists proposed a research flow program to test the impacts
of less fluctuation and the spring beach building pulses on the corridor.232
Initially, the Department of Interior opposed the legislation because the
research flows had not been implemented and evaluated, but this opposition
ended after Bureau of Reclamation and the Western Area Power
Administration agreed to an experimental interim flow regime in late
1991.233
Research indicates that ecosystem management does not necessarily
require a fundamental change in reservoir operations and thus may not be
inconsistent with equitable entitlements. When the GCES began, many
scientists and others thought that the Glen Canyon Dam had trapped the
sediment necessary to sustain the beaches of the Canyon.234 Sophisticated
sediment transport research done by the United States Geological Service
("USGS") and other federal agencies demonstrated that tributaries entering
the mainstem below Glen Canyon Dam contain a sufficient amount of sand
to maintain beaches and backwaters. 235 The problem was not the mass
balance of sand in the system but the way in which it moved post-dam.236
The alteration of the pre-dam hydrographic eliminated seasonable floods,
except when the reservoir could not contain the run-off, and replaced them
with a combination of steady and fluctuating flows produced by the
generation of peaking power that eroded the beaches.237 The scientists
recommended controlled floods (or beaching building flows, as the Bureau
of Reclamation prefers to call them) and reduced ramping rates (the decline
in the rate discharge from the turbines) to reduce beach loses.238 The
Bureau of Reclamation now operates Glen Canyon Dam to limit upramp
rates to 4,000 c.f.s. per hour and maximum allowable releases to 25,000
c.f.s. with an understanding that flows above 20,000 c.f.s. will be
infrequent.239 In 1996, the Bureau of Reclamation released a beach
240
building flood flow, and the studies on the effects of the flow continue.
230.

Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4699 (1992).

231.

Id. § 1802.
See U.S. DEP'T
Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

OF INTERIOR,

supra note 225.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR,

supra note 225..

Id.
Id.

Id.
See U.S.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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Historically, the "Law of the Colorado River," which is a permanent
inter-basin mass allocation scheme, did not include the idea that the flow of
the river was a use to be protected. Both the Upper and Lower Basins are
entitled to 7.5 million acre-feet per year and Mexico is entitled to 1.5
million acre-feet per year.241 Subsequent legislation, Supreme Court
decrees, and a compact fix individual state shares. Large mainstem and
tributary storage reservoirs secure the delivery obligations of the Upper
Basin. States and other water right holders view any change in the
operating rules for these dams and reservoirs as violations of the "Law of
the Colorado River" due to the potential decrease in carry-over storage
although the mass allocations remain unpaired. There is a need to
recognize that all entitlements have an element of risk and that adaptive
management can act as a risk minimization mechanism.
C. RESTORING THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA
The efforts to restore the Colorado River Delta ("Delta") illustrate the
potential role that the Convention could play in reinforcing the nascent
restoration regime. Along with the Nile River, the Delta is one of the
great desert estuaries in the world.242 Today, the Delta's 150,000 acres are
only a remnant of its original 1,930,000-acre area.24 3 Nonetheless, the
Delta remains an important biodiversity reserve for a large number of
endangered and non-endangered species, as the Mexican government
recognized in 1993 when it designated the Biosphere Reserve of the Upper
Gulf of California and the Colorado River Delta. 244 The nub of the
problem is that the Colorado is almost entirely diverted and consumed in
the both United States and Mexico by the time it empties into the Delta.
Thus, the area receives insufficient, unreliable flows. Today, only twenty
to twenty-five percent of the Colorado's flow reaches the Delta, and this
water comes from flood releases, return irrigation flows, and municipal
wastewater. 245 Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams severely damaged the
ecosystem because no freshwater reached the Delta in the years required to
fill the reservoirs.24 6 Since Glen Canyon Dam was filled in 1981, the Delta
is slowly rebounding in spite of erratic
flood flows and the poor quality of
247
much of the water that reaches it.
Experts estimate that the Delta could still survive "through some level

241. See Meyers, supra note 63; see also, Paul L. Bloom, Law of the River: A Critique
of an Extraordinary Legal System, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 139 (Gary
Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1983) (providing an introduction to the "law of the
river").
242. CARLOS VALDES-CASILLAS ET AL., INFORMATION DATABASE AND LOCAL OUTREACH
PROGRAM FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE HARDY RIVER WETLANDS,
RIVER DELTA, BAJA CALIFORNIA AND SONORA, MEXICO (North

Conservation Council, 1998).
243. DANIEL F. LUECKE ET

LOWER COLORADO

American Wetland

AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND
WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 1 (1999).

244.
245.
246.
247.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
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of protection for flows that are presently occurring but are not

mandated" 24 ' because "large, continuous flows of water in the river are not
necessary to support the remaining delta riparian habitats.,

24 9

The Delta

needs a scheme of perennial flows of 32,000 acre-feet per year and flood
or pulse flows of 260,000 acre-feet approximately every four years.250
Flood flows occur as part of the variable water supply of the region. 5
The real problem is how to maintain flood flows in periods of prolonged
drought.
Water supplies during prolonged drought can come from

reservoir releases consistent with the Bureau of Reclamation's annual
operating plan, the purchase of compact entitlements from states with a
surplus, or the purchase of existing water rights.
The federal government controls all water stored in the Lower
Colorado mainstem dams. 2 Thus, the first option would ultimately
require federal authorization and an amendment to the 1944 Water
Treaty. 5 3 In effect, this would be a re-negotiation of the 1922 and 1948
compacts, which makes the task difficult to accomplish, since the 1922
Compact allocated the Colorado in perpetuity.
The Colorado is fully
allocated, if not over-allocated, among the seven basin states and between
the United States and Mexico. As is much of water allocation, the "Law
of the Colorado River" is a hypothetical risk allocation scheme in a worstcase scenario- prolonged extreme drought. The existing treaty is as rigid
a risk allocation scheme as exists in the world and contains no provision

for any permanent dedication of water to the Delta.255 Mexico is further
handicapped in any efforts to take exclusive responsibility for the Delta
because it is entitled to only 1.5 million acre-feet compared to the 15
million acre-feet that the two United States basins share. 256 The Delta gets
only what Mexico does not use or returns. However, the Glen Canyon
"beach building flow" release experiment, described in the previous
248.

Id. at 12.

249.

LUECKE ET AL.,

supra note 240, at 20.

250. Id. at 42.
251. Id.
252. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 546-47 (1963), supplemental decree, 376
U.S. 340, 340 (1964).
253. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 113.

254.

LUECKE ET AL.,

supra note 237, at 12.

255. The precarious position of the Delta is reflected in Mexico's comments to the final
Department of Interior rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,006 (1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt.
414), which allows voluntary transfers of surplus Colorado River entitlements among
Lower Basin states. Mexico expressed concerns that the storage of surplus entitlements
prior to transfer would result in a 1% annual decrease of the total quantity of water
projected to reach Mexico between 1999 and 2015. The Department of Interior responded
that there could be a decrease in flood control releases reaching the Delta and stood on the
legal position that "[a]t present, Reclamation has no authority or discretion over the type of
use or location of use of Colorado River water once it reaches Mexico." 64 Fed. Reg.
58,992-58,993 (1999).
256. Mexico's share is a first priority because Article X of the 1944 Water Treaty
guarantees her this amount subject to an "extraordinary drought" or serious damage to
upstream irrigation systems. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 63. Article Ill(c) of the
Colorado River Compact provides that any (then) future Mexican allocation be supplied (1)
from any surplus waters and, "if such surplus shall prove insufficient" (2) the deficiency
should be borne equally by the two basins. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1973).
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section Part VIII.B, suggests that a schedule of flow releases need not be
constant or permanent and thus "interruptible" restoration flows can be
consistent with the satisfaction of all entitlements. Nevertheless, some
"safety net" must be created to deal with sustained droughts when no
temporary surplus exists and the ecosystem has exceeded its capacity to
rebound from a period of water deprivation.
Voluntary transfers from existing agricultural uses to Delta
conservation and restoration may prove feasible. However, the real and
imagined legal barriers are considerable and thus the transaction costs of
any transfer would be high. Water marketing has been proposed as a
restoration strategy because transfers in treaty states may not require a
compact or treaty amendment.257 Economists and many western water
critics have long criticized western water law because it ignores higher,
alternative values of water. Critics assert that too much water is used to
grow surplus or low-valued crops, too much water is used in a wasteful
manner, and that increased transfers are desirable. Prior appropriation
allocates the risks of shortages by a simple principle-priority of use. The
question is how flexible the water transfer system will be in the future.
Two sets of problems, one institutional, the other distributional, must be
addressed.
The first question is whether water users will respond
sufficiently to market incentives. The second and more difficult question is
whether the redistributions commanded by the market are fair and
consistent with ecosystem sustainability in both the short and long run. 5 8
International water transfers face a number of barriers that differ in
degree, if not in kind, from those faced by domestic water transfers. The
first barrier is conceptual or physiological. In order for water to be
transferred, it must be perceived as a commodity. Domestic legal systems
that allow the creation of semi-exclusive water rights solve this problem.
Once a property right to a share of a resource exists, the major step toward
commodification has been taken. Alienability is a standard (but not
inevitable) attribute of property rights. The first problem with cross-border
water transfers is that many countries will exhibit a dual attitude toward
water. Water will be recognized as a commodity within, but not outside,
the countries' borders. Countries will invoke state sovereignty as the basis
for the right to keep water out of the market. Canada has taken this
position with respect to its waters as a result of the possibility of the
transport of bulk water from the Great Lakes and other waters for resale in
arid countries. Classic international law gives a country complete control
over the development and use of its resources so long as the country does
not cause or allow transboundary pollution. No dormant commerce clause
exists in international law that requires a country to share its resources with
other countries. The only possible check on state sovereignty are GATT or
among Canada, Mexico and the United States, the NAFTA.2 9 However,
257. See David J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: Transferring Upper
Basin Water to the Lower Colorado River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25, 36 (1991).
258. Tarlock, supra note 111, at 173-78; A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global
Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 979, 998-99 (1991).
259. See supra note 104.
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GATT and NAFTA only embody the principle that if a country decides to
turn a natural resource into a commodity, it must permit trade in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, the issue is political, not legal.
The dichotomy between water as a sovereign resource of national
patrimony and a commodity runs through water allocation agreements.
Transfers of compact surplus entitlements between the Upper and Lower
Basin and among Lower Basin states have been proposed to accommodate
new environmental and urban needs. In 1999, the Bureau of Reclamation
authorized voluntary transfers of surplus entitlements among Lower Basin
states,2' but the idea has been fiercely opposed by many stakeholders in
the Basin as inconsistent with the "Law of the River." Articles 3 and 8 of
the Convention have been cited for the proposition that the Compact
precludes inter-state, inter-basin, or international water transfers. 261 Article
3(a) gives each basin a perpetual right to "the exclusive beneficial
consumptive use" of 7,500,000 acre-feet and Article VIII provides that all
rights, except 5,000,000 acre feet of present perfected rights, shall be
satisfied "solely from the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are
situated. ' 262 Too much is read into these words. The provisions were
primarily intended to preserve the Upper Basin's future rights against the
faster growing Lower Basin. In addition, the provisions were intended to
block an appropriation of surplus waters beyond those expressly allocated
by the compact and to limit any future Lower Basin rights to the 7,500,000
acre-feet plus the hypothetical 1,000,000 acre-feet surplus.
These
provisions should be waivable by the intended beneficiaries if no other state
right holders or a federal interest is injured.
The Colorado River Basin states and stakeholders must ultimately come
to the realization that the scientific and economic assumptions behind the
Colorado River compacts must be adjusted to the changing demands on the
river both in the United States and Mexico. The 1944 Water Treaty
between Mexico and the United States has been amended to incorporate
salinity levels into the Mexican delivery obligation 21 setting the precedent
to address environmental problems on the Mexican reach of the Colorado.
Voluntary transfers among basin states and between the United States and
Mexico are a fair way to address environmental problems. 2 6 Any water
transfer must be consistent with the "Law of the River," federal
Reclamation law, and state transfer law. 265 The Convention cannot
overcome the many legal obstacles to an international transfer, but its new
focus on the protection of aquatic water quality and ecosystem integrity
suggests that international water marketing consistent with its objectives
should be presumed legal under the domestic law of the transferring nation.
260. 64 Fed. Reg. 59,006 (1999) (to be codified as 43 C.F.R. pt. 414).
261. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, arts. III & VIII, 36 I.L.M. at
704-07.
262. Id.
263. International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 242, 12 I.L.M. 1105
(1973).
264. See DALE PONTIUS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN STUDY 24 (Western Water Pol'y Rev.
Comm'n 1997).
265. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983).
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VII. CONCLUSION
International water law is in the middle of a paradigm shift from
multiple-use to environmentally sustainable development and management
to promote aquatic biodiversity. Principles developed between the 1972
Stockholm and 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations environmental
conferences provide the legal norms for environmentally sustainable river
management. Both science and ethics must be applied to the international
law of river use and management to adapt international water law to
ecosystem protection.
Historically, post-project damage payments or
minor project modifications in the name of mitigation have dealt with
environmental problems. In contrast, international environmental law
increasingly approaches pollution and environmental destruction from the
front end through the precautionary or prevention principle. States are
encouraged to prevent environmental destruction by addressing the
problems before, not after, development occurs through cooperative, ongoing management regimes. This approach is partially reflected in the
Convention and the ICJ Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision but needs
further development.
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Acting in conformity with Colorado's Open Meetings Act' and Open

Records Act,2 the so-called "government in the sunshine laws," provides
the best defense to claims of improper conduct brought against water
conservancy district boards, an important protection against unnecessary
litigation. The laws are also important for the simple, every-day dealings
of local water conservancy districts: the Water Conservancy Act expressly
subjects water conservancy districts to these two laws.3
In the post-Watergate era, many Americans are suspicious of the
workings of all levels of government. Challenges to and efforts to change
the method of selecting water conservancy district board members
demonstrate the increased public interest in the decisions of local water
conservancy districts.
The introductory note to a 1993 publication
discussing Colorado's Open Meetings and Open Records Acts illustrates

the general suspicion with which many Americans, including members of
the news media, treat government decision-making. The introductory note
states: "Officials are a tricky bunch and you have to watch them all the
time. They will disregard the law, disobey the law, look for loopholes, or
push new laws that favor secrecy." 4

A water conservancy district that conducts its affairs in the open and

readily provides documents it is obligated by law to provide eliminates the
intrigue for the reporter or citizen activist, and, simply put, removes the
fun from the investigation, causing a loss of interest. Additionally, the
district limits its exposure to litigation, and, if sued, eliminates some oftenused procedural challenges to its actions. This article will discuss the legal

requirements regarding public access to water conservancy district board
meetings and records.
I. OPEN MEETINGS ACT

A. WHAT ISAMEETING AND WHO MAY ATTEND?
Most business conducted by a water conservancy district begins at a
district's board of directors meeting. Colorado case law makes clear that
under the Open Meetings Act, "citizens, ' including the media, 6 may
1. Open Meetings Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-401 to -402 (1999).
2. Open Records Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-201 to -206 (1999).
3. See Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-116(1) (1999) (requiring
the boards of directors of water conservancy districts to comply with the Open Meetings
and Open Records Acts); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(1)(a) (1999) (defining local public
body as any board "delegated a governmental decision-making function"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24 -72-202(6)(a)(1) (1999) (defining public records as any writing "made [and]
maintained ... by any local government-financed entity for use in the exercise of functions
required or authorized by law or administrative rule or involving the receipt or expenditure
of public funds.").
4. T.B. KELLEY & J.R. MANN, TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS: THE DOOR TO OPEN
GOVERNMENT IN COLORADO iii (Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press 1993). See

also Miller, supra note t.

5. See generally Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist., No. 6, 553
P.2d 793, 798 (Colo. 1976).
6. See Gosliner v. Denver Election Comm'n, 552 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1976).
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attend water conservancy district meetings. A "meeting" occurs any time
three or more district board members (or a quorum of the board,
whichever number is fewer)7 gather for the purpose of discussing public
business' or public employment. 9 The Open Meetings Act makes no
distinction between regular and special meetings of the district. '0
B. EXEMPTIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF MEETING
1. Social Gathering Exemption
The Open Meetings Act provides a number of exemptions to the
definition of a "meeting." Colorado Revised Statute section 24-6-402(2)(e)
exempts "social gathering[s]."" For many, if not most, water conservancy
districts' board members, participation on the district board is simply one
of many activities in which they engage with the neighbors or colleagues
with whom they share their responsibility. Board members and potential
board members may feel constrained by the Open Meetings Act, wrongly
believing that they will no longer be able to engage in social activities with
friends who also serve on the board. This simply is not the case.
However, board members do need to understand the limited nature of the
social gathering exemption. The mere labeling an event a social gathering
does not ensure compliance with the exemption where the intent or the
result of the gathering is that board members carry on district business. 12
When labeling an event a social gathering, the responsibility rests on all
board members in attendance to ensure that social activities are the order of
the day.
2. Executive Session Exemption
Another Open Meeting Act exemption provides for holding discussions
in an "executive session." 3 Generally, an executive session is a closed
meeting attended by the water conservancy district board. In some cases,
the district's attorney, staff members, witnesses offering relevant
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2)(b) (1999).
8. Id. § 24-6-402(l)(b). Meeting is defined as "any kind of gathering, convened to
discuss public business, in person, by telephone, electronically, or by other means of
communication." Id.
9. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(f).
10. Id. § 24-6-402(1)(b). See supra note 8.
11. Id. § 24-6-402(2)(e). "This part 4 does not apply to any chance meeting or social
gathering at which discussion of public business is not the central purpose." Id.
12. Id.
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(3) (1999).
The members of a state public body . . . upon the announcement by the state
public body to the public of the topic for discussion in the executive session and
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the body after such
announcement, may hold an executive session only at a regular or special meeting
and for the sole purpose of considering any of the matters enumerated in ... this
subsection ... except that no adoption of any proposed policy, position, rule,
regulation, or formal action shall occur at any executive session that is not open to
the public[.]
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information for the board's consideration, persons who are the subject of
the executive session or action to be taken by the board, or other
individuals invited by the board may attend executive sessions.14 The
holding of an executive session requires a two-thirds vote of the quorum
present.15 The water conservancy district must announce the general topic
for discussion before convening the executive session. 16
Although statute permits the water conservancy district board to hold
discussions and deliberations in an executive session, the board must make
final decisions in an open session, not in an executive session. 17 Holding
an executive session is an exception to the general rule that meetings will
be open; therefore, only business specified in the statute may be conducted
in an executive session. The water conservancy district board may meet in
an executive session only to consider: (1) the purchase or sale of property;
(2) legal advice; (3) matters required to be kept confidential by federal or
state law or rules; (4) security information; (5) employment negotiations;
and (6) documents prohibited from disclosure by the Open Records Act.
a. Purchase or Sale of Public Property
Discussions regarding the purchase or sale of public property may be
held in an executive session if the premature disclosure of information
gives an unfair advantage to any person whose private interest is adverse to
the interests of the district.18 For example, suppose the water conservancy
district negotiated the purchase of land to construct a new office building.
The potential seller attended the district's board meeting and discovered
that the district was willing to pay an amount up to $50,000 for the
property. The seller previously considered $35,000 a princely offer. The
seller would gain an advantage by attending the meeting and learning of the
district's negotiation strategy. The developer might then ask for $50,000
for the land. While the statute permits holding such discussions behind
closed doors in an executive session to avoid this type of situation, no
board member may request an executive session for the purpose of
concealing the member's personal interest in the transaction.19 Further, the
district risks litigation if it uses, or is perceived as using, an executive
session as a way of funneling inside information to particular prospective
buyers or sellers. 2 °

14. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Board of County Comm'rs, 667 P.2d 775, 777-78 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983); Einarsen v. City of Wheat Ridge, 604 P.2d 691, 693 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(3)(a) (1999). See supra note 13.
16. Id. § 24-6-402(4).
17. Id. See also Hudspeth, 667 P.2d at 778.
18. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(a).
19. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(a). A water conservancy district may hold an executive session
to discuss "[tihe purchase, acquisition, lease, transfer, or sale or any real, personal, or
other property interest; except that no executive session shall be held for the purpose of
concealing the fact that a member of the [water conservancy district] has a personal interest
in such purchase, acquisition, lease, transfer, or sale[.]" Id.
20. Id. § 24-6-402(3)(a)(I).
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b. Legal Advice
The water conservancy district board may meet with its attorney in an
executive session for the purpose of receiving legal advice on specific legal
questions. 21 Therefore, the board is on equal footing with private
individuals in its right to the attorney-client privilege.22 However, the
mere presence or participation of the district's attorney at an executive
session does not validate the executive session if the discussion in that
session should appropriately be held in an open session. 3 For example, if a
district board considers a special assessment for unanticipated operations
and maintenance costs and knows that the special assessment proposal will
be unpopular with the public, it is inappropriate conduct for the board to
invite legal counsel to an executive session in order to hold the initial
discussions in private. In this situation, legal counsel's participation would
not validate the executive session.
c. Matters Required to Be Kept Confidential by Federal or State Law or
Rules
A water conservancy district board may meet in an executive session to
discuss matters required by federal or state law or rules to be kept
confidential. 24 The National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA") provides
a good example of a statute potentially necessitating the water conservancy
district's reliance upon this exemption. 5 The NHPA prohibits publicizing
or releasing information regarding the specific site of archeological
artifacts when a federal agency deems such a prohibition appropriate. 26
For example, in efforts to expand or repair an existing facility, the district
may discover Native American artifacts during construction. The board
may need to hold discussions of alternatives for addressing the implications
of the discovery in an executive session to avoid disclosing the specific
location.27 The board may address the specific issues regarding the facility
construction affected by the historic resource in an executive session;
however, the board may not continue holding all discussions regarding the
facility construction in an executive session. Discussion of those matters
not affected by the NHPA considerations must continue in an open session,
unless another exemption applies.28

21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(4)(b) (1999).
22. See Denver Post Corp. v. University of Colo., 739 P.2d 874, 880 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that Colorado's Open Records Act incorporates the attorney-client
privileges).
23. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(4)(b) (1999).
24. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(c). "The local public body shall announce the specific citation of
the statutes or rules that are the basis for such confidentiality before holding the executive
session." Id.
25. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470mm (1994).
26. See id. § 470w-3(a).
27. See, e.g., Gillies v. Schmidt, 556 P.2d 82, 84-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
28. Id.
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d. Security Information
A water conservancy district board may meet in an executive session to
discuss specialized details of security arrangements that, if revealed, could
be used to violate the law.29 At first blush, security arrangement
considerations do not seem to be an area of major concern for the average
water conservancy district. However, with the increased computerization
of district operations and the integration of information into network
systems accessible from remote locations, this exemption may become an
important tool for protecting the district's resources.
e. Employment Negotiations
A water conservancy district board may discuss positions or strategies
regarding negotiations with employees or an employee organization in an
executive session.30 However, the statute limits this exemption to the
board's position in an employment negotiation and permits the discussion
of other employee matters in an open session. 1
f. Documents Prohibited From Disclosure by the Open Records Act
The water conservancy district board may hold an executive session to
discuss documents that the
mandatory non-disclosure provisions of the
32
Open Records Act protect.
C. MEETING NOTICE

According to the Open Meetings Act, a water conservancy district
board must give "full and timely" notice of a meeting.3 3 As a local
governmental entity, the water conservancy district provides full and timely
notice of its meeting if the district posts notice of the meeting in a
designated place within the boundaries of the district no less than twentyfour hours before the meeting. 34 The district must designate the place for
posting its meeting notices annually at the first regular board meeting of
each calendar year.35 To be valid, the posting place must be open to public
view. 6

29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(4)(d) (1999).
30. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(e).
31. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(f). A water conservancy district board involved in an issue
regarding the conduct or actions of a district employee, may discuss the matter in an
executive session unless the employee who is the subject of the session has requested an
open meeting. Id. The provision appears to presume that the district will notify the
employee that he or she will be the subject of the executive session, so that the employee
may exercise his or her right to request an open meeting. Id.
32. Id. § 24-6-402(4)(g). See discussion infra Part II.
33. Id. § 24-6-402(2)(c). "Any meetings at which the adoption of any proposed policy,
position, resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action occurs or at which a majority or
quorum of the body is in attendance, or is expected to be in attendance, shall be held only
after full and timely notice to the public." Id.
34.

Id.

35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2)(c) (1999).
36. Hyde v. Banking Bd., 552 P.2d 32, 33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).

"At the very
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Although notice under the Open Meetings Act must be full, this does
not require that the notice designate with specificity the precise agenda for
each meeting.3 7 However, the posting must include specific agenda
information where possible.38 Posting of specific agenda information
includes items that the board intends to discuss in an executive session,
where the board knows the agenda advance.
In addition to the public posting, individuals or entities may request
that the secretary or clerk of the board notify them of all of the district's
board meetings where the board will discuss certain specified issues or
policies. 39 The lists of individuals or entities the board must notify are
sometimes referred to as "sunshine lists." 40 The secretary or clerk must
provide reasonable advance notification to all individuals or entities on the
list. 4 It is important to note that the notification of individuals or entities
on the sunshine list does not replace the requirement for a public posting.42
The failure to give full and timely notice of a meeting, including the failure
to provide reasonable advance notification to the sunshine list, renders any
action taken by the board at that meeting invalid.43
D. MEETING MINUTES
The Open Meetings Act and the Water Conservancy Act both govern
the preparation of meeting minutes following a board meeting. The Open
Meetings Act provides some specific guidelines regarding the preparation
of the minutes, while the Water Conservancy Act provides the legal effect
of the minutes."
The Open Meeting Act requires that the board "promptly" prepare
meeting minutes and make the minutes open to public inspection.4" Neither
the statute nor case law specifically defines promptly. Common sense
requires preparation of minutes to occur in time for adequate review by the
board so that it may approve the minutes at the next board meeting.
minimum, full and timely notice to the public requires that notice of the meeting be posted
within a reasonable time prior to the meeting in an area which is open to public view." Id.
37. Benson v. McCormick, 578 P.2d 651, 653 (Colo. 1978).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2)(c) (1999).
39. Id. § 24-6-402(7).
40. See, e.g., Hyde, 552 P.2d at 33.
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(7) (1999).
The secretary or clerk of each state public body or local public body shall
maintain a list of persons who, within the previous two years, have requested
notification of all meetings when certain specified policies will be discussed and
shall provide reasonable advance notification of such meetings, provided,
however, that unintentional failure to provide such advance notice will not nullify
actions taken at an other wise properly published meeting.

Id.
42.
43.
44.

Hyde, 522 P.2d at 33.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(8) (1999); see also Hyde, 522 P.2d at 33.
Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-116(3) (1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-6-402(2)(d) (1999).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402(2)(d)(II) (1999). "Minutes of any meeting of a local
public body a at which the adoption of any proposed policy, position, resolution, rule,
regulation, or formal action occurs or could occur shall be taken and promptly recorded,
and such records shall be open to public inspection." Id.
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Executive session minutes shall reflect the general topic of the executive
session.46
The Water Conservancy Act provides that the minutes, as approved by
the board, shall constitute prima facie evidence of the acts of the board.47
When properly certified by the president or secretary of the board, a court
must receive copies of the minutes as evidence of the acts of the board.48
E. RECORDING AND BROADCASTING OF MEETINGS

In general, the particular water conservancy district has the discretion
to determine whether a meeting is capable of being recorded or broadcast,
and by whom.
The Open Meetings Act contains no guarantee or
prohibition regarding the recording or broadcast of public meetings. With
regard to the media, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has held that neither the Open Meetings Act nor the First
Amendment of the United States' Constitution guarantees the media any
right to broadcast a public meeting. 4 9
II. OPEN RECORDS ACT

While most of the work of a water conservancy district occurs at the
district's board meetings, the district's records provide the history of the
methods and reasons behind the work. The Open Records Act applies to
any document maintained for the use of the district in the exercise of its
functions required or authorized by law, required or authorized by
administrative rule, or involving the receipt of public funds.5 ° Some of the
records that a water conservancy district likely maintains in its files include
meeting minutes; 5' lobbyist disclosure statements; 52 and employment
records concerning the terms of employment and employee compensation,
including agreements made in the settlement of a disputed employment
claim.5 3
As with the Open Meetings Act, the Open Records Act provides
numerous exemptions. Exemptions from the Open Records Act occur in
two forms: (1) documents for which withholding disclosure is mandatory;
and (2) documents that the water conservancy district may withhold in its
discretion to avoid "substantial injury to the public interest." 54 In applying
these exemptions, it is important to remember the broad legislative

46. Id.
47. Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-116(3) (1999).
48. Id. The statute provides in relevant part that copies of "minutes ... duly certified
by the board's president or ... secretary . .. shall be received as evidence of the acts of
the board in all courts." Id.
49. Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818, 821 (10h Cir.
1982).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I) (1999).
51. Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-116(3) (1999).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-301, -302, -304 (1999).
53. Denver Publ'g Co. v. University of Colo., 812 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990).
54. Id.
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declaration of the Open Records Act that all public records shall be open
for inspection unless excepted by the statute itself or by 56
other law,55 and

that "exceptions to the Act should be narrowly construed."
Among the records that a water conservancy district typically
maintains, it must not disclose: (1) personnel files; (2) trade secrets; and

(3) any customer's personal information. A water conservancy district has
discretionary authority to withhold: (1) documents containing real estate
appraisals; (2) documents relating to the district's deliberative process on
certain matters; and (3) documents whose disclosure might affect the public

interest.
A. PERSONNEL FILES

The custodian of records of a water conservancy district may not

release the "personnel file" of any employee to a requester.57 The Open
Records Act defines "personnel files" as files that include home addresses,

telephone numbers, financial information, and other information
maintained because of the employer-employee relationship, including other
documents specifically exempt from disclosure by law. 5 s Letters of
reference are also exempt.59 Personnel files, as defined in the Open

Records Act, do not include employment applications of past or current
employees,' performance ratings, and any records of the employee's
compensation, benefits, expense allowances, and termination benefits. 6
Further, the exemption applies only to documents actually present in an
employee's personnel file.62 A district may not avoid disclosure to a

requesting member of the public, however, by placing non-exempt
documents in a personnel file.
In a recent case, Commerce City asserted that public records relating
to complaints of sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliations
were personnel files exempt from disclosure under the Act. 6' Commerce

55. See Daniels v. City of Commerce City, 988 P.2d 648, 650 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Denver Publ'g Co. v. Dreyfus, 520 P.2d 104, 106 (1974)).
56. Id. at 650-51 (citing Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Tollefson, 961 P.2d 1150, 1154
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998)).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-202(4.5), -204(3)(a)(II)(A) (1999).
58. Id. § 24-72-202(4.5).
59. Id. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(III); see City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d
585, 592 (Colo. 1997) (holding that the City could withhold, as statutorily exempt from
disclosure, written results of telephone interviews memorialized in notes on preprinted
questionnaire forms containing references to the bidder on a municipal construction project
as "letters of reference concerning employment").
60. An employer cannot request an applicant to waive his or her rights to information
concerning the denial of an employment application because employment applications are
public records. See Carpenter v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 813 P.2d 773, 777 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-202(4.5) (1999).
62. See Daniels v. City of Commerce City, 988 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Denver Post Corp. v. University of Colo., 812 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 650.
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City asserted that, although it did not maintain the requested information in
a specific personnel file, the records constituted personnel files exempt
from disclosure because the city "maintained [the records] because of the
employer-employee relationship." 65
The Colorado Court of Appeals
rejected Commerce City's assertion, holding that the list of specific types
of personnel information, such as addresses and telephone numbers,
modified the phrase "maintained because of the employer-employee
relationship." 66 The court concluded that the phrase at issue required the
information to be of the same general nature as an employee's home
address and telephone number or personal financial information.67
B. TRADE SECRETS
The custodian of a water conservancy district may not release to a
requesting individual any confidential commercial, financial, geological, or
geophysical data furnished by or obtained by any person; any trade secrets;
or any privileged information. 68 The law appears to provide a relatively
straightforward exemption. In actuality, however, this exemption is one of
the most complex of all the exemptions to the Open Records Act.69 While
the Open Records Act provides no definition of a trade secret, Colorado
statutes dedicate an entire section to the enforcement of trade secrets.7 ° A
water conservancy district custodian of records faced with a question of
disclosing or withholding a document pursuant to this exemption should
seek legal assistance before proceeding.
C. ANY CUSTOMER'S PERSONAL INFORMATION

Similar to the types of information withheld from disclosure in a
personnel file, the custodian of records for the water conservancy district
should not disclose records of addresses, telephone numbers, and personal
financial information of past or present users of public utilities, public
facilities, or recreational or cultural services owned and operated by the
district.7" However, a document that would otherwise be subject to
disclosure but for the inclusion of some information that is exempt from
disclosure under the Open Records Act may still be disclosed provided any
exempt information is redacted. 72

65. Id. at 651.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(IV) (1999).
69. See OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 147-69 (1998) (discussing the

definitions of trade secret and commercial or financial information under FOIA).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (1999).
71. Id. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XI).
72. A water conservancy district should redact information not subject to disclosure so
that the information cannot be seen and then should copy and release the document to the
requester. Cf. International Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 68 v. Denver Metro. Major
Baseball Stadium Dist., 880 P.2d 160, 165-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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D. REAL ESTATE APPRAISALS
For reasons substantially similar to those discussed concerning
executive sessions, the water conservancy district's custodian of records
has the discretionary authority to deny inspection of real estate appraisals
made for the water conservancy district concerning acquisition of property
for public use until the title to the property has passed to the water
conservancy district.7 3 Public interest concerns provide the basis for the
real estate appraisal exception.74 One exception is that the contents of an
appraisal are available to the property owner if the condemning authority
determines that it intends to bring an eminent domain proceeding.75
However, if the owner receives a copy of the appraisal, he or she must
make available to the district a copy of any appraisals the property owner
obtained relative to the proposed acquisition of property. 76
E. DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
In 1999, the legislature enacted an additional exemption giving the
water conservancy district's custodian of records the authority to deny
inspection of records protected by the common law governmental or
"deliberative process" privilege, "if the material is so candid or personal
that public disclosure is likely to stifle honest and frank discussion within
the government, unless the privilege has been waived." 77 The additional
exemption represents a legislative reaction to City of Colorado Springs v.
White,78 decided by the Colorado Supreme Court on November 23, 1998.
As a qualified privilege, the deliberative process privilege applies only to
an action that furthers the purposes of the privilege.7 9 The Colorado
Supreme Court found that "[t]he primary purpose of the privilege is to
protect the frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the
government's decisionmaking process where disclosure would discourage
such discussion in the future." ' Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he
privilege rests on the ground that public disclosure of certain
communications would deter the open exchange of opinions and
recommendations between government officials, and it is intended to
protect the government's decisionmaking process, its consultative
functions, and the quality of its decisions.""' The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, upon whose decisions the Colorado
Supreme Court heavily relied in the White decision, held that the privilege
stems from "the common sense-common law privilege,8 2 i.e., the
recognition that the Government cannot operate in a fish bowl."
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(IV). See also discussion supra Part I.A. l.a.
Id. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(IV).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XIII).
City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1998).
Id. at 1051.

d.
Id. at 1047.
d. at 1048 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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The deliberative process privilege protects only material that is
"predecisional" and "deliberative." The Colorado Supreme Court defined
predecisional as the generation of materials occurring prior to the adoption
of an agency policy or decision being deliberated, and defined deliberative
as "reflective of the give-and-take of the consultative process. ' 83 The
privilege does not protect any document that is postdecisional, but material
that is predecisional may retain its protection even after the water
conservancy district makes its decision. The Colorado Supreme Court held
"the government need not be able to point to a specific decision or policy
in connection with which the material was prepared in order for the
material to be considered predecisional." 4 However, even predecisional
material can lose its protected status where the final decision refers to, or
otherwise incorporates, the material.85
Courts distinguish between "advisory materials which truly reflect the
deliberative or policy making processes of an agency" and "purely factual,
investigative material" in determining whether materials are deliberative. 6
Advisory materials are deliberative, while factual materials are not.
However, a water conservancy district should exercise care when applying
this "advisory versus factual" test, because it is not always determinative. 7
For example, even factual material that is "so inextricably intertwined with
the deliberative sections of the documents that its disclosure would
inevitably reveal the government's deliberations" is protected as
deliberative material.88
Courts have also drawn another distinction for determination of
deliberative documents. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that "[d]ocuments representing the ideas and theories that go into the
making of policy, which are privileged, should be distinguished from
'binding agency opinions and interpretations' that are 'retained and referred
to as precedent' and constitute the policy itself." 89 The identity and
authority of a person issuing the material influences the determination as to
whether the privilege protects a document. 9° For example, documents
from a subordinate to a superior official are more likely to be
predecisional, while documents from a superior to subordinates often
contain instructions describing a decision previously made. 9' A final
consideration under both case law and the statutory provision is whether a
document "is so candid or personal in nature that public disclosure is likely
in the future to stifle honest and frank communication within the agency." 92
83. Id. at 1051.
84. City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1057 (Colo. 1998).
85. Id. at 1052.
86. Id. (quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973)).
87. Id. (citing Wolfe v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
88. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
89. City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1052 (quoting Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XIII) (1999); White, 967 P.2d at 1052-53

Issue 2

OPEN MEETINGS AND OPENRECORDS LA WS

The privilege likely will protect a document meeting the above criterion.
The water conservancy district asserting the deliberative process
privilege has the initial burden to assert the privilege and the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the privilege applies to requested documents.93
Somewhat similar to the procedural requirements of other privileges, the
technical requirements are intended to: "(1) assure that the party's interest
in the information is not 'submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and
mischaracterization,' and (2) allow the courts to effectively and efficiently
evaluate the nature of the disputed documents." 94 Specifically, the district
must assert the privilege in the form of a sworn affidavit describing each
document claimed as privileged and asserting why disclosure would cause
substantial injury to the public interest. 95 The description should include
each document's author, recipient, and subject matter, and should explain
why each document qualifies for the privilege. 96 The explanation should
also include a description of the deliberative process to which the document
is related and the role the document played in that process. 97 For large
documents, the government must identify those portions, which are capable
of disclosure, and those portions that are not98
The statute provides that the party requesting information may require
the custodian to apply to the district court for an order permitting the
custodian to restrict disclosure of the documents. 99 The board must give
notice to all persons entitled to claim the privilege with respect to the
records in issue, who then have the right to appear and be heard at the
district court hearing. 1" "In determining whether disclosure of the records
would cause substantial injury to the public interest," the statute requires
the court to weigh, "based on the circumstances presented in the particular
case, the public interest in honest and frank discussion within government
and the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the quality of
governmental decision-making and public confidence therein."'lO Due to
the complicated nature of this exemption, a water conservancy district
faced with a question of disclosing or withholding a document pursuant to
this exemption should seek legal assistance before proceeding.
F. PUBLIC INTEREST PERMISSIVE WITHHOLDING

A water conservancy district may withhold documents in its discretion
to avoid "substantial injury to the public interest," in addition to those
(quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
93. White, 967 P.2d at 1053.
94. Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XIII) (1999).
96. White, 967 P.2d at 1053.
97. Id.
98. Id. "[E]specially in the case of a large document, the government should distinguish
between those portions of the document that are disclosable (such as purely factual data) and
those that are allegedly privileged." Id.
99. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(XIII).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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documents the district must withhold.' 0 2 However, it is unlikely that a
situation will arise where a water conservancy district will be involved in a
situation where it may withhold a document to avoid substantial harm to
the public interest.
The decision to withhold a document based upon public interest
concerns is driven by a fact-specific analysis. The district is required to
weigh the Open Records Act's general presumption in favor of public
access against the privacy interests at stake.10 3 An agreement made by a
water conservancy district that information in public records will remain
confidential
is insufficient to transform a public document into a private
1
one. 04
In Daniels v. City of Commerce City, Commerce City asserted that
public records relating to an employment dispute were exempt from
disclosure under the public interest exception. 0 5 Commerce City relied on
the fact that a confidential reporting system for "the [] fact-finding and
investigation of complaints" had been implemented for City employees.' °6
The Colorado Court of Appeals found this reason insufficient to overcome
the general presumption to release public documents.' °7
Given the
uncertainty of the application of this exception, a water conservancy
district faced with a question of disclosing or withholding a document
pursuant to this exemption, again, should seek legal assistance before
proceeding.
III. CONCLUSION

The most cost-effective method for water conservancy district boards
to avoid litigation and adverse publicity concerning the handling of its
affairs is to ensure that board members and staff are familiar with the Open
Meetings and Open Records Acts. The district should consult with legal
counsel when difficult questions concerning the Acts' provisions arise.
While the district will not avoid every problem, it will at least limit the
number and types of problems the district faces.

102.
103.
104.
(Colo.
105.
106.
107.

Id. § 24-72-204(6)(a).
Daniels v. City of Commerce City, 988 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 651 (citing Denver Post Corp. v. University of Colo., 739 P.2d 874, 879
Ct. App. 1987)).
Daniels, 988 P.2d at 651; see also discussion supra Part II.
Id. at 651.
Id.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Every river system,
from its headwaters in the forest to its mouth on the coast,
is a single unit and should be treated as such.'

In the American West-as historians reported Will Rogers to say"whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting over." 2 If any place in
the West deserves the title of the O.K. Corral of water fights, it is

Colorado. With the headwaters of at least seven major rivers originating in
the heart of the Rocky Mountains, 3 Colorado is and has been the epicenter

of groundbreaking shifts in western water management, law, and policy.4
Colorado became the first state to formally adopt the prior appropriation
doctrine.5 Likewise, the state joined the first interstate water compact,
which apportioned the Colorado River among seven states and two
nations. 6 Along with several other progressive reforms,7 Colorado also

1. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, United States President, to the Inlands Waterways
Commission (1908), quoted in DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE
WATERSHED LEVEL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN THE EMERGING

ERA OF COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT A-15 (1997).

2. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Introduction to
CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW

TRADITION,

INNOVATION AND

at vii (Lawrence J. MacDonnell ed.,

1985).
3. These rivers include the Animas, the Arkansas, the Colorado, the Rio Grande, the
South Platte, the Yampa, and the San Juan. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Settle a New
Land: An HistoricalEssay on Water Law and Policy in the American West and in Colorado,
in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 1, 2 (David H. Getches ed., 1988).
4. Id.
5. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). The prior appropriation
system embodies three main rules: the first person in time to divert water is the first person
in right to use the water; the person must divert the water for a beneficial purpose as
defined by state law; and if the person does not use that water, he looses his right to use it.
See David H. Getches, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 75-76 (3d ed. 1997).
6. See generally David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 413 (1984).
7. For example, Colorado became one of the first states to conjunctively manage
groundwater and surface water. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (1973). Likewise,
Colorado law requires senior appropriators to take reasonable measures to improve their
irrigation methods to ensure the "optimum use" of water. See Alamosa-La Jara Water
Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983). See also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-501(2)(e) (1999).
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became one of the first states to recognize through legislation the need for
instream flow rights to protect aquatic ecosystems.'
In recent years, another potentially groundbreaking shift in western
water management has developed in the form of community-based
watershed initiatives, which are now in widespread use throughout the
West, including in Colorado. Community-based watershed initiatives
attempt to solve water management problems by encouraging greater
collaboration between regulating agencies and the members of the public
with a stake or interest in management decisions. Since 1994, the Animas
River Stakeholders Group ("Stakeholders Group") has conducted an
experiment with community-based watershed management in Southwestern
Colorado. The State of Colorado and several federal agencies 9 support this
effort with the hope that it might serve as a model for other communitybased watershed initiatives.'°
In many instances, advocates of community-based watershed initiatives
praise such efforts without applying much critical analysis to the
substantive progress, or lack thereof, of these groups. This lack of "honest
self-appraisal" has undermined the legitimacy of the growing communitybased watershed movement." This article will provide a critical analysis
of the Stakeholders Group's effectiveness at implementing a communitybased watershed management initiative in the Upper Animas River basin.
First, the article will explore water quality problems and their origins
in the Upper Animas River basin to provide a historical context for the
Second, it will discuss the traditional
Stakeholders Group's work.
regulatory system's shortcomings, which led to the Stakeholders Group's
creation. Third, the article will examine the broader community-based
watershed movement to describe the current array of praise and criticism
leveled against this new form of citizen participation in environmental
decision-making.
Last, the article will describe Stakeholders Group's progress and future
prospects. Many community-based watershed groups do not significantly
restore or improve the watersheds in their respective regions. Likewise,
the Stakeholders Group has made slow and limited progress at achieving
restoration in the Upper Animas basin. However, the Stakeholders
Group's mission is not at an end; thus, it still has an opportunity to be one
of the rare groups to fulfill the promise of community-based watershed
Given that possibility, the article recommends several
management.
changes to the current institutional structure that may allow the
Stakeholders Group, and other watershed groups, to play a more
meaningful role in achieving conservation strategies. If the Stakeholders

8. See Act of April 23, 1973, ch. 442, §1, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521, 1521
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999)).
9. The United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the
Interior continue to watch and to participate in this effort. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at
14.

10.
11.

Id.
See Douglas S. Kenney, Are Comnunity-Based Watershed Groups Really Effective?,
3 CHRON. OF COMMUNITY 33, 37 (1999).
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Group fails, its failure will not represent an indictment of the communitybased watershed movement; rather, it will represent a societal and
institutional failure to implement this worthy idea.
II.

POLLUTION IN THE SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: MINING'S
LEGACY

And when the throng of eager menMen of heroic mould and trueWrought mines that silver might be had
They builded better than they knewThese men now gone. 2
The Animas River 3 originates in the high San Juan Mountains just
above the historic mining town of Silverton, Colorado, in the Southwest
portion of the state. It is the largest remaining free-flowing river in the
dam-abundant West.' 4 The Animas River's water flows uninhibited nearly
100 miles south to its confluence with the San Juan River and ultimately
feeds into the Gulf of California by way of the Colorado River.15 In total,
the Animas River watershed pulsates through 700 square-miles of the heart
of the San Juan Mountain.

Driving south on U.S. 550 out of Ouray, Colorado, the San Juan
Mountains dominate the scenery with numerous, rugged, high-altitude

peaks. 16 The San Juans contain "hundreds of peaks over thirteen thousand
feet and nearly one fourth of all the peaks in North America over fourteen
thousand feet high."' 7 The sublimely scenic San Juan Mountains are the
byproduct of massive geologic forces that sculpted Southwestern Colorado
over the last 1.8 billion years. 18

12. Untitled Poem, SILVERTON STANDARD (Jan. 3, 1903), reprinted in Duane A. Smith,
The Miners: "They Builded Better Than They Knew," in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN
MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY 234, 245 (Rob Blair et al.
eds., 1996).
13. Spaniard settlers originally named the Animas River the El Rio de las Animas
Perdidas, which means "[t]he River of Lost Souls." See Rob Blair, Points of Interest Along
the San Juan Skyway, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY,
AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 254.
14. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm >.
15. The river's flow fluctuates between 400 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) in the fall and
5,000 c.f.s. in the spring. See Blair, supra note 13, at 254.
16. Red Mountain pass is a particularly impressive spectacle from the car seat. At
11,018 feet above sea level, Red Mountain pass is a massive outcropping of mineralized
rock that nearly glows red like a mountain on Mars.
17. ROBERT L. BROWN, AN EMPIRE OF SILVER 13 (1984).
18. See Douglas C. Brew, Paleotectonic History, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN
MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 18.
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A. A HISTORY OF SETTLEMENT IN THE SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS
The San Juans' mineral riches resulted from the collapse of an ancient
volcano that produced a large concave depression in the land, known as the
Silverton Caldera. 1 9 The volcano's collapse allowed "hot, acidic, mineralladen waters" to disperse through the land that now forms the San Juan
Mountains.20 This process left copious deposits of gold, silver, lead, zinc,
and copper. 21
Human occupation of the San Juans occurred recently in geologic time.
The region's earliest known inhabitants began living there about 12,000
years ago. 2 There is little evidence that the native peoples who first
19.

See Scott Fetchenhier, Ore Deposits and Minerals, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN

MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY 80, 80-81 (Rob Blair et al.

eds., 1996).
20. Id. at 81.
21. Miners unearthed these minerals from some of Colorado's most famous mines
including the Sunnyside Mine, the Camp Bird Mine, and the Idarado Mine. Id. at 80.
22. The Anasazi or the Ancestral Puebloans are the earliest known inhabitants of the
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inhabited the San Juans ever knew about, or valued, the mineral riches
beneath their feet before the arrival of Europeans.23
In 1765, the first European, Spaniard Don Juan Maria de Rivera,
explored the San Juans.24 The wave of Spanish explorers who followed
Rivera never discovered the copious mineral wealth within the San Juan
mountains. 5 It wasn't until 1860 that Captain Charles Baker discovered
gold in the Upper Animas basin, triggering the first boom and bust cycle of
European settlement.26

By the summer of 1861, "several hundred [white] men were en route

to the San Juans. '' 27 After enduring the long, treacherous trail to Baker's
camp, the gold rushers were not welcomed by the local Ute Indians, who at
the time held treaty rights to the area. 28 By the summer's end, the San
Juans' extreme elevation and the lackluster initial findings convinced most
fortune seekers to return home. Critics called Captain Baker "almost a
lunatic" for his promotion of the area.29

Anglo settlers returned to the area, however. By the 1870's, with the
American Civil War resolved, anxious miners demonstrated a renewed
interest in the exclusive use and possession of the San Juans.30 In
response, the United States government negotiated the unscrupulous Brunot
Agreement with the Utes in 1873, which removed the heart of mining
country in the San Juans from Indian control. 31 Additionally, the first
railroad's arrival in Silverton in 1882 signaled the end of all major barriers
to white settlement of the Upper Animas basin.32
The town of Silverton lies in the heart of San Juan County and takes its
name from the abundant silver deposits in the surrounding area. 33 Thirty
mills and two smelters had been built in and around Silverton by the turn

Four Corners Region.

See CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND
ENDURANCE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 262 (1999). Since the 1200's, the Ute, Apache,

and Navajo Indian Tribes also inhabited the region. Id. at 258.
23. See Smith, supra note 12, at 234.
24. See BROWN, supra note 17, at 17.
25. See Richard N. Ellis, The Spanish, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR
GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at 215-18; see also Smith,
supra note 12, at 234-35.
26. S.B. Kellogg and Company paid for Baker's exploration of the San Juans. BROWN,
supra note 17, at 18. The Upper Animas basin occupies approximately 200 square-miles
beginning at the Animas River's headwaters at Animas Forks and extends a few miles south
of Silverton, Colorado. See supra fig. 1.
27. BROWN, supra note 17, at 19.
28. See Smith, supra note 12, at 236-37.
29. BROWN, supra note 17, at 19.
30. See id. at 59-60.
31. See Smith, supra note 12, at 237. Historians have called the Brunot Agreement
"blatantly fraudulent" in that government made the Utes believe they were ceding the
mines, not the underlying land. See also Ellis, supra note 25, at 229. See generally
WILKINSON, supra note 22, at ch. 7.
32. See Smith, supra note 12, at 238-39.
33. Silverton was originally named Baker's Park after Captain Baker's mining camp.
Legend dictates that the name Silverton came from a local miner who said "[w]e may not
have much gold, but we've got silver by the ton." See Blair, supra note 13, at 275.
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of the century.34 Mining reached its apex between 1900 and 1912, when
the population of San Juan County peaked at an all-time-high of 5,000
people. 3

The Upper Animas basin continued to steadily produce silver, zinc,
and other valuable minerals throughout the twentieth century.36 However,

of the hundreds of mines in the area, only about a dozen brought profits to
the owners."

Most mining took place near the three main tributaries of the

Upper Animas basin-the Upper Animas River, Cement Creek, and
Mineral Creek. The area's last major mine, the Sunnyside Mine, near
Cement Creek's headwaters, closed down in 1991.38

B. MINING POLLUTION IN THE UPPER ANIMAS BASIN
By 2001, San Juan County expects to have a population of fewer than

500 people.39 The town of Silverton remains cluttered with mining era
relics that draw hordes of tourists who support the local economy.4° Other
than tourist nostalgia for the "old west,"'" it appears mining's only lasting
legacy in the Upper Animas basin will be pollution.
Until 1934, most mining operations around Silverton dumped their
mine wastes directly into the Animas River.42 Other mining companies

continued this practice well into the 1970s.4 3 Over-grazing of cattle and
34. See Silverton Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Out & About (last modified Feb. 11,
2000)
< http://www.silverton.org/about.html >.
35. See id.
36. See Smith, supra note 12, at 242.
37. See Electra Draper, Silverton at the Heart of Reclamation Project: Old Mining
Operations Left Cleanup Legacy Along Animas River, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Oct.
20, 1996, at A14.
38. Id. The closing resulted in job loss and overall population reduction. Currently,
San Juan County has one of the highest numbers of people with doctorate degrees of any
county in Colorado. In addition, observers have connected the difficulty of making a living
in the area with the area's serious problems with domestic violence. Telephone Interview
with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (Apr. 28, 1999).
39. See Silverton Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Relocation (visited Feb. 11, 2000)
< http://www.silverton.org/relocation/population.html >.
40. On Silverton's one paved road stands the town's main attraction-the San Juan
County Historical Society Museum, better known as the mining museum. See Silverton
Chamber of Commerce, Silverton Visitor's Events & Attractions (last modified Dec. 31,
1998) <http://www.silverton.org/visitors.html>.
Many attractions focus on mining
activities: touring gold mills, touring gold mines, and panning for gold. Id. Likewise,
buildings in town reflect mining's influence, including the Miner's Union Hotel, the
Miner's Union Hospital, as well as a variety of mining memorabilia shops. A good
demonstration of the battles over environmental pollution in the basin, at least one bumper
sticker in town reads: "Eat an Environmentalist."
41. The term "Old West" is really a commercialized concept that fits fictitious
stereotypes and distorts historical reality. See Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Shadows of
Heaven Itself, in ATLAS OF THE NEW WEST: PORTRAIT OF A CHANGING REGION 151, 154-55
(William E. Riebsame et al. eds., 1997).
42. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 6, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa0l .htm>.
43. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River Stakeholders
Group (Apr. 12, 1999).
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sheep caused further water quality degradation in the watershed." Today,
an estimated 2,000 abandoned and inactive mines continue to leak acid
mine drainage into the watershed. 45 As a result, scientists have called the
Upper Animas basin the most severely mining-impacted watershed in
America.46
The San Juan Mountains contain high concentrations of sulfur
interspersed with valuable mineral deposits.47 When locked in the ground,
these sulfur-laden rocks are essentially harmless to the surrounding

ecosystem.

However, the process of mining creates waste rock piles

known as tailings, which contain sulfur. When rainwater falls on waste
rock, it combines with air and sulfur to produce
sulfuric acid, a product
48
referred to as acid mine drainage ("AMD").
When AMD flushes into rivers, such as the Upper Animas River, it
causes significant damage to aquatic life. 49 AMD from a single site can
continue to disrupt the natural ecology of a riparian area for thousands of
years.50 Unfortunately, untreated AMD can also jeopardize human health5
and water supplies due to high concentrations of various toxic metals.52

As a result of mining and other natural sources of acid runoff, " the
44. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>.

45. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. See also KENNEY, supra
note 1, at 11-12.
46. In addition, if the currently postponed Animas-La Plata dam project is ever built,
massive additional impacts may occur on the Animas River. The prospect of the AnimasLa Plata project being built led one organization to call the Animas River one of the
Nation's most endangered and threatened rivers. See Four Southwest Rivers Named Among
Nation's Most Endangered and Threatened Rivers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 16, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 5712057; see Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
47. See Preston Somers & Lisa Floyd-Hanna, Wetlands, Riparian Habitats, and Rivers,
in

THE WESTERN

SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS:

THEIR GEOLOGY,

ECOLOGY,

AND HUMAN

supra note 12, at 182.
48. Id.

HISTORY,

49. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING
TIlE FUTURE OF THE WEST 49-50 (1992).

THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND

50. See Colorado School of Mines, AMD Chemistry, Environmental Chemistry in
Colorado, Toxic Mine Drainage Chemistry and Treatment (visited Feb. 11,
2000)
< http://www.mines.edu/fshome/jhoran/ch 126/amd.htm >.
51. See Paul Stokstad, Structuring a Reclamation Program for Abandoned Noncoal
Mines, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 121, 128 (1998). In addition to the hazards of AMD, mines emit
toxic gases. At least sixteen poorly informed adventurers have died in Colorado in the last
fifty years by wandering into inactive mines and inhaling the toxic gases that are present in
the abandoned mine shafts.
52. These toxic metals include lead, arsenic, and zinc. See Colorado School of Mines,
AMD Chemistry, Environmental Chemistry in Colorado, Toxic Mine Drainage Chemistry
and
Treatment
(visited
Feb.
11,
2000)
< http://www.mines.edu/fshome/jhoran/chl26/amd.htm >.
53. Acid drainage also occurs when natural processes expose sulfur-laden rocks to air
and to water. This process, known as acid rock drainage, contributes to the water quality
degradation in some areas of the Upper Animas basin. See U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY,
NATURAL AND MINING-RELATED SOURCES OF DISSOLVED MINERALS DURING Low FLOW IN
THE UPPER ANIMAs RIVER BASIN, SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO 29 (Oct. 1977). The presence

of substantial amounts of acid rock drainage has led some commentators to suggest that the
focus on mining pollution alone reflects modern humans' inability to deal comprehensively
with these types of problems. See generally Robert Frodeman, A Sense of the Whole:
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upper Animas basin is devoid of significant aquatic life.54 Stream segments
in the basin run yellow to orange from the AMD. The banks of Cement
Creek are stained bright orange and bear an unsettling resemblance to the
lips of a child after drinking too much Kool-Aid. However, due to the
contribution of water from several cleaner tributaries south of Silverton,

the Animas River below Durango is well-known for its excellent trout
habitat."
Mining pollution is not unique to the Animas River. In Colorado,
nearly 1,300 river miles56 suffer from contamination attributable to an
estimated 22,000 abandoned mines.57 Nationwide, more than 12,000 miles

of American rivers and streams and 180,000 acres of lakes and reservoirs
have been polluted by approximately 557,000 abandoned hardrock mine
sites. 58TIn ttl
total, mining activities in the United States have deposited
around 50 billion tons of waste rock and other wastes as a monument to the
"goldrush lust" sanctioned by the General Mining Law of 1872.' 9 The
estimated national clean-up cost for the abandoned mining sites lies
somewhere between $32 billion and $72 billion.'
III.

REGULATORY RESPONSES TO POLLUTION IN THE ANIMAS
RIVER

[Firagmentationof institutionsis inevitable
in a Nation that embraces decentralizedgovernment and diffused power
that encourages individuals, interest groups, and even agencies
to pursue different objectives
derivative of distinct ideologicalperspectives and self-interests.6'
Until the 1970's, neither government nor miners knew of or
understood the negative effects of AMD. 62 As a result, almost no state or
Toward an Understandingof Acid Mine Drainage in the West, in EARTH MATTERS: THE
119 (Robert Frodeman
ed., 2000).
54. Upstream from Silverton, Colorado, some microinvertibrates, insects, rainbow
trout, and brook trout still exist. See Somers & Floyd-Hanna, supra note 47, at 187.
55. See id. at 185-86.
56. See WILKINSON, supra note 49, at 49.
57. WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, CLEANING UP ABANDONED MINES: A WESTERN
PARTNERSHIP 4 (1998). It should be noted that more than 80 percent of abandoned mine
sites create little or no environmental or public health dangers. Id. at 5, 7. In Colorado,
while the state safeguarded nearly 5,000 abandoned mine openings, it has reclaimed only
approximately 1,500 acres of abandoned mine land under the Inactive Mine Reclamation
Program. See Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board, Colorado'sMinerals & Geology,
Abandoned Mines, Inactive Mine Reclamation Program (visited Feb. 11, 2000)
< http://www.dnr.state.co.us/geology/inactivemine.html >.
58. See Mineral Policy Center, EnvironmentalImpacts, Mining's EnvironmentalImpacts
(visited on Feb. 11, 2000) < http://www.mineralpolicy.org/Environment.html >.
59. Refer to the following source for an excellent discussion of the General Mining Law
of 1872. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 49.
60. See Frodeman, supra note 53, at 121 & n.4.
61. KENNEY, supra note 1, at A-39.
62. See Burt Hubbard, Gold Rush Hangover: Coalition Tackles Breckenridge Mining
EARTH SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY
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federal laws regulated mining waste throughout the twentieth century.6 3
The one potential avenue for the control of AMD pollution before the

1970s was common law nuisance suits. 4 However, nuisance suits were
brought only infrequently to address problems from AMD and were rarely
brought by average individuals.65
By the 1970's, the federal government began passing bold new laws
dealing with environmental problems. 6 Unfortunately, these laws only
indirectly dealt with AMD; 6? therefore, as currently formulated, federal
and state laws fail to address adequately the complex water quality

problems attributable to abandoned mines and to AMD.
A. FEDERAL PROGRAMS DEALING WITH ACID MINE DRAINAGE
Some federal laws can potentially deal with AMD, including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") and the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
These laws are
ineffective for the reasons discussed below.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 69 in 1980 "in response to
increasing concern over the severe environmental and public health effects
from improper disposal of hazardous waste and other hazardous
substances. ' 70 The law has two primary purposes. First, it gives "the
federal government the means to effectively control the spread of

hazardous materials from inactive and abandoned waste disposal sites ....
Second, it ...

affix[es] the ultimate cost of cleaning up these disposal sites

Pollution, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Feb. 9, 1998, at A10.
63. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
64. Nuisance suits have their foundations in English common law. Private individuals
can still bring these suits to abate nuisances associated with pollution. See Caroline
Henrich, Acid Mine Drainage: Conunon Law, SMCRA, and the Clean Water Act, 10 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 235, 236-39 (1995).
65. Id.
66. These laws include but are not limited to the Clean Water Act at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (1994); the Clean Air Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994); the National Environmental Policy Act at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994); the National
Forest Management Act at 16 U.S.C. § 471-498 (1994); the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994); and the National Historic Preservation
Act at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1994).
67. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, BARRIERS AND INCENTIVES TO
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP OF ABANDONED HARDROCK MINE SITES 5-9 (1998).
68. See Alison Barry, Mining and Water Quality Under the Clean Water Act, COLO.
LAW., Sept. 1996, at 93, 98.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
70. B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D. Utah
1986).
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7
to the parties responsible for the contamination." '

CERCLA is commonly known as "Superfund," due to a provision that
establishes a trust fund that pays the costs associated with the clean-up of
certain contaminated sites designated by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") as national priorities.72 At these sites, the EPA has the
authority to take direct remedial actions funded by the Superfund. 73 In

addition, the federal government can sue responsible parties to recover the
clean-up costs.74
The EPA regulates AMD under CERCLA. 75 The agency has used the

Superfund to clean up a few of the Nation's worst hardrock mines, such as
the Summitville Mine in the Eastern San Juan Mountains. 76

However,

barriers, such as the corporate form, have prevented the federal
government from recovering the clean up costs from the responsible parties
at many abandoned mine sites.77 In addition, financial barriers have
restricted Superfund designation. Currently, the EPA maintains seventeen
Colorado sites on the Superfund list. At these sites, clean up efforts have
already exceeded $4 billion dollars, "with the final bill expected to reach

$12 billion. '78
EPA has considered, and continues to consider, declaring the Upper
Animas basin a Superfund site if Colorado fails to act. 79 The state
government, local governments, and private representatives in the Upper
Animas basin generally oppose this designation for fear that an' EPAimposed solution would cost too much, both socially and economically. 8 °

71. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340
(9th Cir. 1992).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a), (c) (1994). EPA has primary authority to implement the
act pursuant to an executive order. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
73. Congress authorized the EPA to act if there is a "release" or substantial threat of
release of a hazardous substance from a "facility." A "release" is defined broadly to
include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dum.ing, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. §
9601(9) (1994). "Facility" is also broadly defined to include "any site or area where a
hazardous substance has ... come to be located." Id. § 9601(22).
74. See id. § 9607(a).
75. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (E.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that whether AMD was a hazardous substance regulated by CERCLA was
an issue of material fact). See also Barry, supra note 68, at 93.
76. Luke J. Danielson, et al., The Summitville Story: A Superfund Site is Born, 24
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,388, 10,388 (1994). Only fifty-two abandoned mine sites currently
occupy CERCLA's National Priority List. See Stokstad, supra note 51, at 134.
77. See Danielson, et al., supra note 76, at 10,398.
78. See Burt Hubbard, Superfund May Tackle Supermess, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver),
Apr. 6, 1998, at A4. Sixty percent of Superfund costs arise from litigation.
79. See id. at A12. See also Animas River Stakeholders Group, Animas River
Stakeholders Group, Meeting Summary, November 19, 1998 (visited May 12, 1999)
< http://www.waterinfo.org/Stakeholders Group/mtgsummary.html >.
80. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. Under CERCLA, the EPA
can recover costs from potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"). PRPs include present and
past operators and owners, persons who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances, and
persons who transported hazardous substances to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). If
EPA enforced this rule to the letter in the Upper Animas basin, the costs of cleanup could
fall on many small landowners not responsible for the pollution.
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They point to Summitville residents' unproductive experience as proof that

the Superfund process is contentious and dismissive of local concerns. 8

Most of the basin's abandoned mines are located on land currently
owned by parties who did not cause the mining pollution that still exists
there. 82 While the EPA could hold current owners liable for clean up
under state and federal law, most owners are judgment-proof due to their
lack of financial resources. 3 However, the EPA believes that it could
trace some of the pollution to corporations that still exist in order to
recover some clean up costs. 84 The EPA's inability or failure to do so

results in the federal government's bearing the burden of costs not
recovered from responsible parties.85 Based on these financial barriers,
state and local interests recently succeeded in getting the EPA Region VIII

Administrator to promise not to list the Upper Animas basin as a Superfund
site until Colorado has had an opportunity to address the problem.86
2. Clean Water Act
In 1972, the federal government enacted what is now commonly

referred to as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 8 7 The goal of the CWA is to
make the waters of the United States fishable and swimmable by limiting
the discharge of pollutants into these waters.88 Unfortunately, the CWA
81. At Summitville, Colorado, a Latino community-based group wanted to participate in
the Superfund process. However, the state and federal government denied them the
opportunity. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, Southwest Circuit Rider for Mineral
Policy Center (Apr. 12, 1999). Yet, local communities do not always oppose Superfund.
In Clear Creek, Colorado, the community-based watershed group welcomed the Superfund
listing as a way to obtain additional funds to support remediation work. Telephone
Interview with Doug Kenney, Research Associate for Natural Resources Law Center (May
12, 1999).
82. See Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
83. Provisions of the CWA allow the state to force landowners to obtain national
pollution discharge elimination system permits for the abandoned mines located on their
land. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). However, given that these mines do not
produce a revenue stream, and given that taking this action would be politically unpopular,
the state has refrained from this course of action. See Telephone Interview with Greg
Parsons, Watershed Section Manager for Colorado Water Quality Control Division
(Apr.14, 1999).
Under CERCLA, there is retroactive strict liability for potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs"). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (establishing who constitutes
PRPs); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 460, 466-67 (D.
N.J. 1998) (dictum stating that CERCLA section 107 imposes strict liability on PRPs);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 220 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(concluding that CERCLA's applies retroactively and its retroactivity meets the threshold
for facial constitutional validity).
84. See Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
85. See generally Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1524-25, 1530 (1986).
86. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Aninas River Stakeholders Group, Meeting
Summary,
November
19,
1998
(visited
May
12,
1999)
< http://www.waterinfo.org/Stakeholders Group/mtgsummary.html >.
87. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
88. See id. § 1251(a)(1)-(2). Twenty-seven years after the enactment of the CWA,
"[fjorty percent of rivers, lakes, and estuaries in the United States are too polluted for these
basic uses. Furthermore, drinking water systems serving twenty percent of the U.S.
population are in violation of health based requirements." See Dianne K. Conway, TMDL
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only partially and indirectly regulates AMD problems. For the most part,
the CWA, like CERCLA, has proven to be an ineffective means for
dealing with problems associated with AMD.
a.

Setting Water Quality Standards

The CWA allows each state to set its own water quality standards,
which the EPA must approve.89 To begin this process, the states must set
"use designations" for major rivers and tributaries.' The CWA requires

states to attain as many uses as possible for each river segment for
activities such as water supply, industrial uses, recreation, and fish and
wildlife habitat.9" These use designations serve as the baseline by which

agencies set and revise water quality standards on a triennial basis.'
Two methods for setting water quality standards exist: narrative and
numerical.

Narrative standards do not provide any specific quantifiable

pollution limitations for specific river segments.

Rather, they simply

explain with descriptive words that each river shall attain various uses.93

Consequently, states can create narrative standards as unimposing as
requiring "the maintenance of present stream conditions."'
In contrast, numerical standards define specific concentrations of
pollutants that may be present in a river segment while maintaining the
segment's use designations.95 Thus, numerical standards can require
stringent and affirmative pollution control measures, while narrative
standards generally do not.' States enforce these water quality standards
on particular river segments by requiring point source and nonpoint source
polluters 97 to alter their behavior according to the promulgated standards.9 8

Litigation:So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 83-84 (1997).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(b) (1994).
90. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(a) (1999).
91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994).
92. Id. § 1313a.
93. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons From the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 211 (1999).
94. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manager for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (May 3, 1999).
95. See Adler, supra note 93, at 211 & n.46. When a state lacks detailed pollution data
for a specific river segment, it will often use the EPA's Gold Book to set numerical
standards. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38. The Gold Book
contains standardized information on the levels of various pollutants allowable to achieve
desired use designations, such as aquatic habitat. Id. However, aquatic life in areas with
high levels of naturally mineralized waters, such as the Animas River, will often adapt to
above average concentrations of these toxins. In tiese places, the Gold Book may overlyrestrict the protection of certain uses and thus be overly-burdensome on regulated polluters.
See also COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 6.
96. See Adler, supra note 93, at 211.
97. Point source pollutants come from a pipe, culvert, or similar conveyance while
nonpoint source pollutants come from diffused sources such as agricultural runoff. Drew
Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,574, 10,575 (1997).
98. Id. at 10,582 & n.115.
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b. Regulating Point Sources
While the CWA does not directly regulate AMD, it does prohibit the

discharge of pollution into the United States' waters without a national
pollutant discharge elimination system permit ("NPDES permit"). 99 The
EPA requires NPDES permits when a person discharges"° pollution into

the navigable waters'0 ' from a point source such as a pipe or culvert.

Commentators have credited the regulation of point sources with02 the
majority of the pollution reduction that has occurred under the CWA. 1
CWA regulations and judicial precedents considered AMD a pollutant

under the CWA and usually considered mines point sources. 03 New or
active mines almost always must obtain NPDES permits.

However, in

places like the Upper Animas basin where no abandoned mines have
discharge permits, the point source regulation of mining waste is largely
ineffective. " For example, in the Upper Animas basin, only three
landowners hold NPDES permits under the CWA.' °5
Even if the

government closed these three sources, the basin would remain polluted by
2,000 other abandoned mine sites.
Some states have chosen to tighten regulation on point sources rather°6
than address nonpoint source pollution such as abandoned mines.'
Focusing on point sources alone will not help to clean up watersheds in
many areas of the country. Experts estimate that nonpoint source pollution

causes ninety-nine percent of sediment, eighty-eight percent of nitrates, and
eighty-four percent of phosphates in the United States' waters. 107
c. Regulating Nonpoint Sources
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to address nonpoint source
pollution. However, those amendments failed to fix the AMD problem.
Under the revisions, the CWA requires states to regulate diffuse and
disparate sources of pollution, known as nonpoint sources. 0 8 States must
99. See33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1994).
100. See id. § 1362(12).
101. See id. § 1362(7). Courts have interpreted the words "navigable waters" to include
riparian zones or areas where water either collects or drains. United States v. Phelps
Dodge Corp. 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975).
102. Caputo, supra note 97, at 10,575.
103. See Barry, supra note 68, at 93, 95. New or active mines are considered point
sources subject to regulation under the CWA. Id. at 96. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL.
MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 7.
While states have authority to impose permit
requirements on landowners who own abandoned mines on their land, they generally avoid
that solution due to enforcement costs and other factors. Id.
104. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
105. Permit holders include the Sunnyside Gold Corporation, the Silverton wastewater
treatment facility, and the Pride of the West Mill, which is the only operative floatation mill
in the basin. However, the mill, which extracts base and precious metals from mining rock,
is inactive. Id.
106. See Conway, supra note 88, at 106.
107. See id. at 87.
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). Nonpoint source pollution comes primarily from
agriculture, silviculture, mining, construction, and urban sewage runoff. See id. §
1288(b)(2)(F)-(K).
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first identify nonpoint sources of pollution and then devise strategies to
control them by using best management practices." ° Next, states must
develop a total maximum daily load ("TMDL") of pollutants that each

river segment can absorb without violating the water quality standards.'
Finally, states must adopt a "continuing planning process," which explains
the states' procedures to achieve water quality standards.'
Unfortunately, the CWA only encourages states to attain the designated

water quality standards using nonpoint source regulation "to the maximum
extent possible."

112

Thus, the CWA does not contain any enforceable

obligation on the part of states to link their nonpoint source regulation to

States can choose to
the attainment of water quality standards." 3
with water quality
to
comply
sources
point
exclusively regulate
4
to impose reductions
the
authority
lacks
the
EPA
addition,
standards." In

of nonpoint source pollution if a state fails to do so. 1 5 Thus, because state
or EPA control of nonpoint source pollution is not mandatory" 6 or
universal under the CWA, it has been ineffective.

Congress considered abandoned mines a type of nonpoint source that

states should address in under their TMDL programs." 7 However, states
reluctantly impose the non-obligatory TMDL program on financially

vulnerable people, such as small landowners with abandoned mines on

their property." 8 Likewise, the EPA has been unwilling to force states to

implement TMDL programs through a more rigorous interpretation of the
CWA." 9 Instead, the EPA has turned to a community-based watershed
approach to develop TMDL programs on a consensus basis.' 20

Environmental groups have sued the EPA to force states to establish
TMDLs.

121

As a result of these lawsuits, the EPA must promulgate

109. Best management practices mean "[miethods, measures or practices selected by an
agency to meet its nonpoint source control needs," which "can be applied before, during
and after pollution-producing activities to reduce or eliminate the introduction of pollutants
into receiving waters." 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(m) (1997). See also Conway, supra note 88, at
87.
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
111. See id. § 1313(e)(3).
112. See id. § 1329(b)(4).
113. See Adler, supra note 93, at 220 & n.108.
114. See id. at 264. See also Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1528
(9th Cir. 1995) (upholding this one sided approach).
115. See Adler, supra note 93, at 228.
116. Id.
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(2)(G)(i)-(ii) (1994).
118. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, Watershed Section Manager for Colorado
Water Quality Control Division (Mar. 15, 1999).
119. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973, 995 (1995).
120. See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Total Maximum Daily Load
Program, Draft TMDL Program Implementation Strategy, Executive Summary (last
modified Feb. 12, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/strategy/execsum.html>.
121. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California (Newport Bay), Delaware,
Georgia, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See Lee A. DeHihns III,
Suits Over Water Quality Spark Action: Challenges to EPA's Failure to Establish 'Total
Maximum Daily Loads' for States Have Prompted New Policy and Renewed Activity,
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TMDLs in nine states, unless the states set these standards first. In
addition, similar lawsuits are pending or impending against the 22EPA on the
same issue in eighteen other jurisdictions, including Colorado. 1

It remains questionable whether merely requiring a state or the EPA to
develop a TMDL program will actually facilitate a reduction in nonpoint
sources of pollution. With neither mandatory language in the CWA nor an
EPA regulation strictly interpreting the CWA, the TMDL program will
continue to fail. Conversely, if the EPA or Congress changes the TMDL

program to force reductions in nonpoint sources, the program
23 could
emerge as a major regulatory tool to address problems like AMD. 1
These CWA provisions continue as the driving force behind the
attempts of the responsible agencies in Colorado to regulate AMD in the

Upper Animas basin. However, Colorado eventually concluded that the

CWA alone cannot deal with the AMD problems in the basin. For the
reasons set out below, Colorado has settled on an alternative approach of
addressing the mining waste in the Upper Animas basin.
B. COLORADO'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWA IN THE UPPER
ANIMAS BASIN

In Colorado, the Mined Land Reclamation Board and the Office of

Mined Land Reclamation 124 regulate active mines under the authority of the
Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act.125 However, only one mine
causing water quality problems in the Upper Animas basin is still active.
Colorado does not have a comprehensive state legislative or regulatory
program for abandoned mines.' 26 Therefore, the state must deal with these
problems indirectly through the CWA. 27
In Colorado, the Water Quality Control Commission ("Commission")
implements the CWA by "sett[ing] water quality standards and issu[ing]
regulations for all surface and groundwater in the state." 128 The

Commission, which is comprised of citizens appointed by the Governor of
Colorado, sets standards based on suggestions from the public and on
NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 16, 1998, at B12.
122. See id. These states include Alabama, California (Los Angeles), Colorado, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. "In
no other environmental regulatory area has so much of litigation erupted over a single
program." Id.
123. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, supra note 67, at 8.
124. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-105(1) (1999).
125. See id. §§ 34-32-101 to -127.
126. The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board does have an Inactive Mine
Reclamation Program that receives "fund[ing] entirely through the Department of the
Interior by reclamation fees paid by current coal mining operations." See Colorado Mined
Land Reclamation Board, Colorado's Minerals & Geology, Abandoned Mines, Inactive
Mine
Reclamation
Program
(visited
Feb.
12,
2000)
<http://www.dnr.state.co.us/geology/inactivemine.html>.
However, because the
program has minimal funding, it has only reclaimed 1,500 acres. Id.
127. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
128. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Helping Communities Protect Rivers (visited Apr. 10,
1999) <http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>.
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recommendations and studies of the professionals at the Water Quality
Control Division ("Division"). Both the Commission and the Division are
subdivisions of the Colorado Department of Public Health and the
Environment.
The Commission first promulgated use classifications and water quality
standards for the Animas basin in 1979.129 At that time, the Division
concluded that few fish species lived in the Upper Animas River's main
that did
tributaries. Therefore, the Commission set water quality standards
130
not require meaningful clean up of the Upper Animas basin.
Throughout the 1980's, the Upper Animas basin's water quality
standards remained the same; the state took little initiative to address the
mining pollution in the region."' However, by the decade's end, local
citizens successfully reintroduced a small population of reproducing trout
the
into the Upper Animas River.' 32 As a result of this reintroduction,
33
Division began to rethink the basin's use classifications. 1
From 1991 to 1993, the Division performed extensive "chemical,
biological, and physical" studies of the Upper Animas River to determine
"the potential for water quality improvement sufficient to allow naturally
reproducing trout populations.' ' 134 The study sought to prioritize the
estimated 1,500 abandoned mining sites on the Animas River's various
state, local,
tributaries above Silverton for clean up. 3 ' Numerous federal,
36
and private interests cooperated or assisted with the study. 1
As a result of the study, the Division confirmed that serious levels of
contamination plagued the river. The Division attributed the pollution to a
variety of heavy metals that resulted from a combination of historical
mining operations and from naturally high background levels of these
pollutants.'37 Based on this information and on consultation with local
water
citizens through public meetings, the Commission determined that
38
quality in the Upper Animas basin "can and should be improved.'

129. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, ANIMAS RIVER COLLABORATIVE WATERSHED
PROJECT: 1995 STATUS REPORT 35 (1996).
130. Id.
131. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. Basically, the state decided to
deal with more manageable problems occurring in other watersheds. The state saw the
Upper Animas basin as too difficult a problem to deal with at the time. Id.
132. Id. See infra Part V.C.1.
133. The state is required to attain the best water quality possible in each river segment.
Thus, when the small trout population began to reproduce in the Upper Animas basin, it
became obvious that the state's water quality standards were insufficient under the CWA.
Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
134. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(A) (1997).
135. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33; 5 COLO. CODE
Prioritization was based on relative "loading,
REGS. § 1002-34.23(A)(1997).
environmental impact, feasibility, cost, and benefits." Id.
136. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(A)(1997).
137. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGIC SURVEY, supra note 53, at 30. For example, in the
Middle Fork Mineral Creek, natural sources contributed to 33 percent of the heavy metal
concentrations, while mining sources contributed to 67 percent. Id. The metal pollutants
include but are not limited to zinc, copper, iron, aluminum, iron, and cadmium. See

supra note 129, at 35.
See 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.23(B)(1997).

COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT,

138.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

However, the Commission found that "[t]he imposition of effluent
limits required under the Federal [Clean Water] Act for point sources and
cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint
sources are not likely to lead to the establishment of aquatic life in these
segments [of the Upper Animas basin]."' 3 9 In addition, the broad
distribution of pollution sources from abandoned mines, the potential
complexity of the clean up effort, and the large number of affected
landowners convinced the Commission that it needed to formulate a
collaborative solution derived from a community-based process. 140
C. CREATION OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

To facilitate the creation of a community-based collaborative process in
the Upper Animas basin, the Division turned to the Colorado Center for
Environmental Management ("Center").14 ' Former Colorado Governor
Roy Romer created the non-profit Center to seek pragmatic alternatives to
environmental management problems. 142 The Center's first project was to
develop a model of collaborative environmental management under a grant
from the United States Department of Energy ("DOE"). 143 The Center, at
the request of the Division and with the approval of the DOE, agreed 144
to
demonstrate the usefulness of this model in the Upper Animas River.
The Center's efforts resulted in the formation of the Animas River
Stakeholders Group in early 1994.14
Before discussing the details of the Stakeholders Group's activities and
progress, it is necessary to view the group in relation to the watershed
movement in general. The following explanation discusses academic
support and criticism of the idea of community-based watershed
management. As the following section demonstrates, the Stakeholders
Group remains both typical and atypical of conventional community-based
watershed groups.
IV.

THE WATERSHED MOVEMENT: POWELL'S PROPHECY
FULFILLED

This, then, is the proposition I make:
that the entire arid region be organized into natural hydrographic
districts ....
The plan is to establish self-government by hydrographicbasins.4 6

139. See id.
140. See generally id.
141. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33.
142. Id. at Forward.
143. Id. at 38.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 33.
146. See J. W. Powell, Institutionsfor the Arid Lands, THE CENTURY, 111, 114 (MayOct. 1890). The arid region John Wesley Powell referred to is the American West where
hydrographic districts are synonymous with watersheds. Id. at 111.
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To those familiar with the history of Anglo-American settlement in the
arid Southwestern United States, John Wesley Powell is many things-an
explorer, a geographer, a geologist, an ethnographer, a bureaucrat, a failed
politician, and, to some, a visionary. Historians often credit the one-armed
Civil War veteran with first recognizing the American West's need for

coordinated management of water resources based on hydrographic
boundaries or watersheds.' 47 To the detriment of western watersheds,
western politicians' and profiteers' pro-expansion
fervor jeered Powell's
148
revolutionary ideas off of the public stage.

From 1890 to 1980, various legislative and government agency
initiatives considered the concept of coordinated governmental watershed
management,
implemented with meaningful citizen participation.
However, the government never actually acted on these ideas.1 49 Instead,
Congress divided the responsibility for water management among nearly
forty federal agencies in addition to the state and local agencies with
similar responsibilities.' 50 According to one commentator, this
fragmentation of management responsibility resulted in the production of
"management anarchy" in the West's water resources field.''

While the major environmental laws and amendments of the 1970s and
the 1980s significantly improved the Nation's water quality in some

respects, these same laws have serious flaws that render them impotent in
certain contexts.' 52 In the 1980s, a political movement developed favoring
smaller government and federal devolution of power and responsibility to
state and local entities. This trend helped to create a climate where local

control over watershed management gained renewed attention and

147.

See

KENNEY,

supra note 1, at A-13. Mormons' and Hispanics' communal water

systems heavily influenced Powell's ideas for watershed management. Id.
148. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN
WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (1954). Powell espoused many

influential ideas. See generally JOHN WESLEY

POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID

REGION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH

(Wallace Stegner, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1879).
149. Regional water resource management has a history in the American West.
generally KENNEY, supra note 1, at app. A.

See

150. Id. These agencies include, but are not limited to, the Environmental Protection
Agency , the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation,
the Corps of Engineers, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and the Bureau of

Indian Affairs. Id. Further, more than thirty-five substantive federal laws deal with mining
alone. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
151. See Adler, supra note 119, at 1006. Adler calls the current system "management
anarchy" only in response to the agencies' lack of a unified agenda or goal and the existence
of varying biases and interests. See generally id.
152. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, THE BIG KILL: DECLINING BIODIVERSITY IN
AMERICA'S LAKES AND RIVERS 35-68 (David S. Wilcove & Michael J. Bean, eds., 1994)
(suggesting that the states' governments and the federal government fail to sufficiently
implement environmental laws in a manner that protects threatened and endangered
species). Likewise, nonpoint source pollution is a major source of watershed pollution yet
is essentially uncontrolled under the current state and federal regulatory regimes. See also
Christina M. Shriver, Note, Is it Safe to Drink? The Problem of Contaminated Water and

the Need for FederalAction, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 547, 548 (1998) (suggesting that the
federal government must become more involved in water pollution control).
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support. 153
The community-based watershed movement's growth would shock
even the unflinching John Wesley Powell.' 54 In 1990, possibly a handful of
community-based watershed groups existed throughout the West. Today,

by one estimate, the West can boast of at least 400 well-developed groups
that allow varying degrees of citizen participation in watershed
management activities.' 55 Others estimate that nearly 5,000 groups exist

across the entire United States. 156
What may be more shocking is that many "economists, ranchers, tree-

huggers, sociologists, lumber company employees, and even some federal
land managers" are unabashed proponents of this concept.'5 7 Nearly every
western state either legislatively or administratively adopted a watershed
approach with varying degrees of community participation. 5 ' In addition,
both the President and the EPA unequivocally embraced community-based
collaborative processes as part of their new Clean Water Initiative.'S9 With
support from such varied interests, many people now ask difficult
questions, such as "what is community-based watershed management?"
and "does it work?"

153. See generally WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE
WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-38, 3-40 (1997). The trend toward
devolution of power to local interests began during the Reagan presidency and re-ignited
after the 1994 Republican congressional victories.
154. Powell is unflinching because, according to legend, he ran every rapid in the Grand
Canyon's heart on the formerly wild and dam-free Colorado River.
155. Telephone Interview with Douglas Kenney, supra note 81. In Colorado alone, the
number of community-based watershed groups increased from six in 1996 to thirty in 1998.
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, THE STATE ROLE IN WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES

40 n.54 (1998).
156. Telephone Interview with Douglas Kenney, supra note 81.
Much of the
determination of the number of existing community-based watershed groups depends on
how you define the terms. Each word in "community-based watershed management" can
be interpreted in numerous ways that affect the number of groups included. Some
commentators only consider those groups that directly participate in decision-making forums
to be watershed initiatives. Other commentators include all groups that have any water
resources focus, including groups that merely educate or lobby on water issues. Id.
157. George Cameron Coggins, "Devolution" in Federal and Land Law: Abdication by
Any OtherName. . ., 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 211, 212 (1996).
158. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY CENTER, supra note 155. In addition,
the Western Governors' Association calls for new methods of environmental problem
solving.
This new program, called Enlibra, "speaks to greater participation and
collaboration in decision making, focuses on outcomes rather than just programs, and
recognizes the need for a variety of tools beyond regulation that will improve environmental
and natural resource management."
Western Governors' Association, Enlibra (last
modified Jan. 28, 2000) < http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/enlibra/default.htm >.
159. The Clean Water Initiative "envisions a new, collaborative effort by federal, state,
tribal, and local governments; the public; and the private sector to restore and sustain the
health of watersheds in the Nation. The watershed approach is the key to setting priorities
and taking action to clean up rivers, lakes, and coastal waters."
UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

PROTECTING AMERICA'S RIVERS ii

(1998).

CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND
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A. WHAT IS COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT?
No matter what policies exist at any level of government,
1
they will fail without the support of local communities and citizens."

Community-based watershed initiatives have their foundation in a
larger movement known as community-based conservation ("CBC"). In
6
the abstract, CBC attempts to harmonize utilitarian and preservationist1 1
interests in natural resources management. 162 Moreover, as the above
quote suggests, it is believed that conservation efforts are more effective
when the citizens who are affected by the decisions support the plan.163 As
a matter of on-the-ground pragmatism, CBC often takes the form of an
open public forum through which disparate communities of place and of
Collaborative learning
interest" engage in "collaborative learning. '
embodies the idea that when people put forth an effort to problem-solve,
they can effectively deal with complex issues and reach consensus
solutions. "

A brief survey of the CBC movement over the last ten years reveals a
variety of strengths and weaknesses, many of which have manifested
themselves in the Stakeholders Group's history. The following section
serves as an introduction to various CBC concepts that apply to the
Stakeholders Group.

160. BOB DOPPELT ET AL., ENTERING THE WATERSHED:
AMERICA'S RIVER ECOSYSTEMS 62 (1993).

A NEw

APPROACH TO SAVE

161. Utilitarianists, most personified by Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the Forest
Service, believe that natural resources should be managed to provide the greatest good to
the greatest number of humans. The preservationists, most personified by John Muir,
founder of the Sierra Club, desire to protect wilderness and wild places based on their
intrinsic values. See David Western, Linking Conservation and Community Aspirations, in
NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION 499, 500
(David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994).
162. See David Western & R. Michael Wright, The Background to Community-Based
Conservation, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED
CONSERVATION 1, 1-4 (David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994).
163. See id. at 4; see generally Sean T. McAllister, Community-Based Conservation:
Restructuring Institutions to Involve Local Communities in a Meaningful Way, 10 COLO. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 225 (1999).
164. The phrase "communities of place" refers to the most common conception of
community-a group of people living in a geographically defined area. On the other hand,
the phrase "communities of interest" refers to geographically disperse people who share
common interests or beliefs, for example, Sierra Club members. See generally Western &
Wright, supra note 162, at 8 (addressing the difficulty of defining community).
165. See Sara F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a Community of Values,
14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 107 (1993).
166. See HARINA J. CORTNER & MARGARET A. MOOTE, THE POLITICS OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 91 (1999). See also Bates, supra note 165, at 107.
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B. DOES IT WORK? STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED EFFORTS

Collaborativeefforts are largely unproven experiments,
bolstered more by desperate enthusiasm and unsubstantiated
generalizations
167
than by real and documented results.

Direct civic participation in regulatory decisions is a defining element

of democracy. 16'

Alexis de Tocqueville recognized it as the essential

characteristic of American society. 161 Today, however, Americans display
widespread dissatisfaction with and distrust of government. Some people
claim that the populace is apathetic; others suggest America's
governmental system compels belief in the futility of participation.17 A

brief look at the normative assumptions of CBC and the factors related to
its successes and failures suggests that CBC has the potential to ignite
meaningful public participation in environmental decision-making.
1. Normative Assumptions Behind CBC

a. Consensus Is Desirable
CBC's basic premise-that consensus solutions are desirable-is not
necessarily intuitive.
Multiple negotiators cannot always reach
consensus.17 1 Agreement becomes difficult when parties take absolute or

uncompromising positions. 171 Continued disagreement may not represent

bad faith negotiating; rather, it may reflect different value judgments and
incentives. ' Further, consensus problem-solving can actually become anti-

democratic if carried out in a manner that excludes interested parties or
suppresses dissent.
However, CBC's proponents act inappropriately if, in order to further
174

consensus, they suppress dissent or disallow faction representation.

Rather, CBC promises that competing factions can forge workable and
167. DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST
WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE IN
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2 (2000).
168. See CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 91.
169. Id. at 92.
170. See id. at 93.
171. This challenge is magnified as the number of negotiators increases. See generally
Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and Pitfalls, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
172. For example, Earth First! promises no compromise in defense of Mother Earth.
173. See Amy, supra note 171, at 226.
174. See generally Jane Braxton Little, Quincy Library Group Bars Outsiders, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 26, 1999, at 4.
Perhaps these proponents would accept limited
representation and dissent in the name of on-the-ground pragmatism. Recently, the Quincy
Library Group, one of the most famous community-based natural resource management
initiatives, decided to exclude disruptive dissenters. This move led to increased criticism of
the group by environmental groups. See id.
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cost-effective

solutions through purely democratic

processes

which

encourage dissent and debate. If communities can work in a "climate of
tolerant discourse toward a set of shared goals," then democracy gains
strength.175 Further, unlike litigation or top-down legislation,' 7 6 CBC
processes allow those directly affected by management decisions to fashion7

their own arrangement rather than have one imposed by government.17
This more idealistic formulation of the issue is the intuitive principle that
attracts so many supporters to CBC.
b. Empowering Communities Is Important
CBC's disciples claim that these participatory measures empower
stakeholders l1 8 and interested citizens to involve themselves in making

decisions that affect their lives.' 79 This process can help reestablish trust
among previously antagonistic stakeholders and can contribute to a
renewed sense of community.'
This concept of community-building
through consensus-based decision-making commonly occurs in many
cultures and disciplines.' 8 ' In the natural resources context, some
commentators call this concept the " 'hot-tub' school of mediation"
because it embraces collaborative processes as a "cooperative,
communitarian, and even spiritual alternative to adversarial politics."" 2

CBC's efforts do not invariably create community empowerment and
trust. In fact, in some instances, consensus processes only further polarize
communities. 8 3 Some people attribute these failures, however, to external

factors such as a lack of funding or of leadership

84

rather than to an

intrinsic attribute of community-based efforts.

175. See Peter R. Decker, The New West, Ground Zero: Re-creating Community in
Ridgway, Colorado, 3 CHRON. OF COMMUNITY 43, 50 (1999).
176. See Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1998). Topdown legislation refers to Congress' or to a federal agencies' creation of new regulations or
laws without the participation of effected citizens. Law created in this manner derives from
a top-down or hierarchical manner. Conversely, grassroots or bottom-up legislation derives
from a process of community led decision-making. Id. at 1374-75.

177. See

LAWRENCE

S.

BACOW &

MICHAEL WHEELER,

ENVIRONMENTAL

DISPUTE

18-19 (1984).
178. See Nickelsburg, supra note 176, at 1371. A stakeholder has an interest in the
decision's resolution. This stake can consist of an array of interests including but not
limited to economic interests or environmental preservation interests. The breath of
shareholder's definition rendered the term nearly meaningless in the CBC context. Id. at
1372. Thus, the CBC movement defines itself by those who invest time and energy in the
process.
179. See id. at 1372-73, 1392-93.
RESOLUTION

180.
181.

See
Cf.

CORTNER

& MOOTE, supra note 166, at 97.

J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 83 (1987)
(suggesting that Quaker and Shaker societies exemplify the "communitarian" vision).
182. Id. at 85.
DOUGLAS

183. See SERGE MOSCOVICI & WILLEM DoISE, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: A GENERAL
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS 14 (W.D. Halls trans., 1994).
184. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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Broad Community Involvement Is Better

A third commonly cited virtue of CBC is that these efforts receive
input from a much broader array of community members and interests than
do the normal top-down regulatory processes.'
This conclusion assumes
that CBC efforts include broad community representation."' Many dispute
this assumption; they claim that CBC projects often lack strong
environmental representation, a quality that undermines the process's
legitimacy. 87
"It is no coincidence that environmental groups tend to be the biggest
opponents of these efforts."' 8 In the CBC context, environmentalists often
feel outnumbered by adverse interests and unwelcomed in the process.
Indeed, some commentators argue that industry groups favor this type of
dispute resolution because they believe that they can outmaneuver
environmentalists. Environmentalists complain that industry uses these
processes to play on local citizens' sympathies in order to avoid compliance
with strict federal laws. Other commentators deny the existence of
industry dominance and claim the best CBC examples have strong
representation from all interested parties.
The inclusion of a broad variety of interests often depends on an
effective leader. In most successful CBC projects, the personality of a
non-biased leader enables participation of a variety of interests. 8 9 Keys to
successful leadership include facilitating information exchange and
maintaining an open process that empowers participants with real decisionmaking authority."9 Other smaller things, such as holding meetings at
convenient times for all participants, help keep people involved.
Therefore, to remain effective CBC must create incentives for participants
to stay involved.' 9'
d. CBC Remains More Efficient than the Current System
A fourth common assumption is that CBC is worthwhile because the
traditional regulatory system either fails or is too costly, both socially and
financially, to implement. 92
CBC supporters feel that traditional
regulatory approaches are comprised of inadequate, draconian qualities.
For example, many watershed groups form in response to concerns over
the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act or other strict federal

185. It is commonly believed that traditional mechanisms of law or of rulemaking are
dominated by discrete special interests that produce an "iron triangle," which is comprised
of the regulators, the regulated, and the legislators; thus, it excludes the general populace.
WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 153, at 3-39.
186. A prerequisite to including a community is defining a community. This process is
not as simple as it might seem. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 203.
187. See Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaborationhas its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 28.
188. Telephone Interview with Doug Kenney, supra note 81.
189. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 49.
190. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 202.
191. CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 101.
192. DOPPELT ET AL., supra note 160, at 42-45.
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laws. 9 3 In contrast, the guarantees of traditional regulatory structures
convince some that involvement in CBC efforts is unwise or unnecessary.
While many people point to the remarkable improvement of the
nation's environment over the last thirty years as proof of the regulatory
system's success,194 others believe the system's utility may soon be
exhausted. 195
Ironically, the traditional regulatory system provides
conflicting incentives to participate in and to opt out of CBC efforts. Game
theorists believe that negotiators will opt out if they feel they achieve
success outside of the consensus forum.196 Additionally, stakeholders may
choose not to participate in such efforts "because they do not wish to
recognize the legitimacy of other parties, because they seek delay, or
because the costs of negotiating seem to outweigh any expected
benefits." '1 97 Where stakeholders may reluctantly negotiate, government
should foster incentives to conducting negotiations in good faith. 98 The
traditional regulatory system's attraction may explain why many large
environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, often opt out of CBC
efforts.
Commentators disagree about whether the government or community
groups should be given ultimate decision-making authority in these
situations. Some commentators believe that giving direct decision-making
authority to CBC groups is the only way to keep interested parties from
opting out of these efforts."9 Those who support this position believe that
with governmental agencies' assistance and support, citizens can find
common grounds and workable solutions. °° Conversely, some worry that
this devolution of decision-making authority will return America to the
days when locals made unsustainable decisions that other citizens were
forced to subsidize. 2 °' Very few, if any, CBC projects hold direct
management authority over the resource in question. Rather, CBCs
generally play an informal advisory role to the various government
agencies who make the final decision.
2. Defining the Success of CBC
The word "success" is comprised of value judgments and unspoken
assumptions. Thus, the goal of developing an all-inclusive and objective

193. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 62. The CWA and CERCLA are also common
reasons for the creation of CBC groups in the United States. Id. at 65.

194. See generally GREGG

EASTERBROOK,

A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF

ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM (1995).

195. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE
U.S. SYSTEM WORK? 31, 48 (1997).
196. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 108-10 (1981). The premise turns on the assumption that negotiation
or consensus will occur only after parties exhausted their the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement. Id. See also BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 177, at 26.
197. See BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 177, at 28.
198. See id. at 339. Incentives might include paying people. Id.
199. CORTNER & MOOTE, supra note 166, at 102-03.
200. Id. at 97.
201. Id. at 102-03.
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definition of success for every watershed initiative may be impossible or
inappropriate.
Each CBC effort focuses on very unique situations.
Success in one initiative may equal failure in another. Thus, the only
useful measurement of success in this context may be to compare the onthe-ground results of restoration efforts in two different settings: (1) when
communities use watershed initiatives and (2) when they use the traditional
regulatory system.20 2
This inquiry is fraught with difficulties. Government implements the
traditional regulatory system with varying degrees of rapidity and success.
Asking regulators or researchers to compare the effectiveness of the
traditional system and the community-based watershed initiatives will likely
produce only educated guesses. On the other hand, many regulatory
schemes do contain objective implementation timelines that are useful for
comparisons.
Some commentators claim that a successful effort exists if a "diverse
group of participants has gained a better understanding of each other's
concerns, and the level of trust has increased." 20 3 Others claim the creation
of community trust measures success insufficiently. This debate is moot if
the CBC established creation of community trust as a project goal;
establishment of trust meets one of the CBC's goals. Conversely, if the
CBC established water quality remediation as its goal, then creating
community trust remains insufficient to rise to the level of a successful
effort.
Remember that many problems, such as those in the Upper Animas
basin, took decades or centuries to evolve.
To expect immediate
remediation of long-term problems may be unrealistic for both CBC
initiatives and traditional regulatory approaches. Therefore, efforts that
create a viable process through which average citizens and stakeholders
feel more empowered could be considered successful in the short-run. 2°4
Of course, "over the 2long-term,
these efforts must be evaluated in terms of
05
resource conditions."
Reaching a goal requires setting a goal. The goal setting process
requires people to define their vision of success at the beginning of the
community-based watershed initiative. 2° In this light, if a CBC effort
merely facilitates agreement on the initiative's goals, observers could deem
the effort a success. Thus, a rigid characterization of success in the CBC
context is inappropriate.2 7

202. See generally Kenney, supra note 11, at 34.
203. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 14. In fact, this is the most commonly cited
justification for the utility of community-based watershed initiatives.
See Telephone
Interview with Douglas S. Kenney, supra note 81.
204. Id. at 60.
205. See id. Telephone Interview with Jim Martin, Attorney for Environmental Defense
Fund (Apr. 6, 1999).
206. See KENNEY, supra note 167, at 7-10.
207. Id. at 10.
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3. Barriers to Success of CBC Efforts
CBC efforts face at least three substantial barriers:2 °. (1) acquiring the
funding necessary to carry out a project; (2) implementing a comprehensive
solution despite the fragmentation of governmental management; and (3)
avoiding the negative consequences of at least one federal law. 209

Acquiring the necessary funds is always a main concern and funding
has posed substantial problems in the past.

Very few CBC efforts can

survive solely on volunteer labor. Inadequate and inconsistent funding
sources hinder the creation and the utilization of CBC approaches. At a
minimum, CBC efforts require a paid coordinator to maintain the group.210
Most CBC efforts "are highly, if not completely, reliant on [flederal funds,
successful efforts typically do not wean themselves from
and even the most 211
support."
[flederal
At least one state created a special agency to facilitate and to fund
community-based watershed initiatives.2 2 In 1987, the Oregon legislature
created the Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board to improve
watershed health and to provide resources for education about watershed

issues. 2113 Funding for the program has increased from $500 thousand to
$21 million.214

As a result, Oregon has the most highly developed

community-based watershed program in the West.21 5

Governmental decision-making fragmentation is also a true barrier to
success. Even a well-funded CBC effort may lack a pragmatic solution due
to state and federal management agencies' unwillingness to harmonize their
activities.
Often, various governmental agencies have conflicting or

See Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the
See generally McAllister,
supra note 163, at 202-03.
209. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Rules and
Executive Orders: Judicial Interpretations and Suggested Revisions 4 (May 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Natural Resources Law Center, University of
Colorado).
210. See KENNEY, supra note 1, at 64.
208.

Environment, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 683, 703-07 (1992).

211.

Id. at53.

212. OR.

REV. STAT.

Enhancement

Board,

§ 541.360 (1995). See For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed
GWEB

Funding

Program

(visited

Feb.

15,

2000)

< http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebfund.html >.
213. The Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board is now known as the Oregon
A watershed council means "a voluntary local
Watershed Enhancement Board.
organization, designated by a local government group convened by a county governing
body, to address the goal of sustaining natural resource and watershed protection,
restoration and enhancement within a watershed." See OR. REV. STAT. § 541.350 (1995)
amended by 1999 Oregon Laws Ch. 1026 (H.B. 3225). Watershed councils "develop plans
and projects to protect or improve watershed conditions, educate people about watershed
conditions and functions and to monitor the projects and conditions of the watershed." See
For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board, Program Overview
(visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebprogram.html>.
214. See For Sake of Salmon, Governor's Watershed Enhancement Board, GWEB
Funding Program (visited Feb. 15, 2000) < http://www.4sos.org/group/gwebfund.html >.
215. More than ninety watershed groups occur in Oregon. Governor's Watershed
Enhancement Board, Locally Organized Watershed Councils in Oregon (last modified Aug.
12, 1999) <http://es54071.easystreet.com/group/gweb-wscs.htm>.
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inconsistent goals. 16 Unless the CBC can convince these agencies to adopt
the community's solution, a comprehensive solution may never
materialize." 7

Federal agencies tend to be leery of directly adopting

CBC's recommendations.
The most commonly cited legal reason for federal agencies' hesitance
to participate in CBC efforts is the Federal Advisory Committee Act

("FACA").218 Federal agencies and community groups often overestimate

the restrictions imposed by FACA, largely due to numerous lawsuits
219
against federal agencies that have led to "FACA-phobia."
Environmentalists sued the federal government alleging that various
community-based collaborative groups are "utilized by" federal agencies in
violation of FACA. 220 The major lawsuits dealing with this issue should
provide the vast majority of community-based watershed groups with the
assurance that FACA does not cover their activities. 221 However, many

observers call for the law's revision to ensure it does not inhibit the
development of collaborative community-based forums.
In summary, the current understanding of CBC efforts reveals that
these efforts may not offer an appropriate solution for every community or

situation. CBC is not a panacea for every environmental ill. 23 Rather, it
is a movement in its infancy. It must withstand continual, rigorous
reevaluation to verify that CBC's promise is synonymous with its reality.
V.

A CASE STUDY OF THE ANIMAS RIVER STAKEHOLDERS
GROUP

People are more willing to take costly actions
and to make personalsacrifices to protect and restore a specialplacelike the ... ColoradoRiverthan to promote the abstractidea of environmentalquality.224
The Stakeholders Group also must withstand continual reexamination if

216. This does not suggest that the government agencies' conflicting goals represent a
bad faith effort by the agencies. Rather, Congress dictated different legislative mandates
for each agency. In addition, these agencies must respond to different constituents. Thus,
if agencies disagree it could be caused by their constituents' disagreements.
217. This is particularly true in the case of the Stakeholders Group. If the Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management, or other state or federal agencies, are unable or unwilling
to coordinate their efforts, a comprehensive solution may be impossible.
218. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1994); see Thomas Brendler, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act: What You Need to Know, CHRON. OF COMMUNITY, Autumn 1996, at 44,
44.
219. See Brendler, supra note 218, at 46.
220. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1996). See also Rieke, supra note 209, at 3-6.
221. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 461 (1989)
(stating that FACA applies only to groups "organized by, or closely tied to, the [flederal
[glovernment, and thus enjoying a quasi-public status.").
222. Rieke, supra note 209, at 7.
223. See McAllister, supra note 163, at 224.
224. Robert W. Adler, Managing Colorado Watersheds for Riparian and Wetland
Values, 1997 COLO. RIPARIAN ASS'N 6.
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it wants to continue working to improve water quality in the Upper Animas
basin during the next century. As mentioned above, the Division requested

that the Center facilitate the creation of a community-based watershed
group in the Upper Animas basin in early 1994. The Center began this
process by interviewing "various mining, federal land management, local
government, environmental, and related interests" to determine their
willingness to participate in a collaborative process to resolve the mining
contamination in the Animas Basin. 2' From the beginning, people in the

Upper Animas basin indicated that they did not want an externally
imposed, top-down regulatory solution.226
The Center found that this sentiment originated in two sources. First,
locals worried that the Commission would proceed "with or without their
involvement in initiating clean up." 227 Second, locals saw the collaborative
approach as an opportunity to avoid the stigma of Superfund designation
that would inevitably bring a greater federal role in the clean up. 228 In fact,
the local distrust of EPA ran so deep that EPA officials in the area actually
received death threats warning against their involvement in the basin.229
As a result, during the first several Stakeholders Group meetings,

participants observed an "acrimonious mood" created by the private

participants' distrust of both the Commission and the Center.23 ° In these

initial meetings, the private participants took a reactive role by responding
to the Commission's direction and concern. However, by mid-1994, a
core group, consisting of approximately thirty people, emerged and began
to "work diligently in [proactively] identifying and addressing pertinent
issues.,21
The Stakeholders Group's core participants are private citizens and
representatives from nearly every federal, state, and local government
agency with management responsibility over the area. 32 Given that eighty-

225. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 33.
226. See id. at 40.
227. See id.
228. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 13.
229. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, Director of Friends of the Animas River
(Apr. 26, 1999). The person making the threats turned out to be a local man who ironically
wound up attending some Stakeholders Group's meetings. After he found that government
officials and other participating parties actually listened to his complaints and concerns, he
claimed that his faith in government had been restored. Telephone Interview with Carol
Russell, supra note 38.
230. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 40.
231. Id.
232. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Animas River Updates (visited Feb. 26,
2000) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/arupdate.html>.
The entities listed as official
participants include: the Colorado Division of Public Health and the Environment; the
Colorado Division of Minerals and Geology; the Colorado Division of Wildlife; the
Colorado Geological Survey, the Colorado River Watch; the City of Durango; the Durango
and Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad; the Echo Bay Mines Company; the Friends of the
Animas River; the Gold King Mines; the Little Nation Mining Company; the Mining
Remedial Recovery Company; the OSIRIS Gold Company; the River Watch Network; the
Root and Norton Assayers; the St. Paul Lodge; the San Juan County Commissioners; the
San Juan County Historical Society; the Silver Wing Company; the Town of Silverton; the
Southern Ute Tribe; the Southwest Colorado Water Conservation District; the Sunnyside
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three percent of San Juan County is public land, broad representation from

governmental sources is particularly important.23 3 The Stakeholders Group
agreed on a mission of "improving water quality and aquatic habitats in the
Animas River watershed through a collaborative process designed to
encourage participation from all interested parties."234 Due to a variety of
legal and logistical concerns, the group chose to depend on consensusbased decision-making and to avoid any formal voting procedures.2 35 The
Stakeholders Group holds meetings on the third Thursday of every month
at the Silverton town hall. Involvement by any interested party is
encouraged through community outreach.236

Based on the Division's recommendation, the Commission quickly
challenged the Stakeholders Group's sophistication and cohesiveness by

adopting strict numerical water quality standards for the Upper Animas
River in early 1995.237 These standards would have required a significant
water quality improvement to make the river hospitable to aquatic life." 8
The Stakeholders Group opposed these standards because they would not

allow the flexibility necessary to fashion their own solution.
At the Stakeholders Group's request, the Commission agreed to

suspend the new standards'

implementation until March 1998; the

Stakeholders Group agreed to develop their own management
recommendations.239 In the interim, the Commission retained the basin's

narrative standard to ensure that no further water quality deterioration
would occur. 240 From 1995 to 1998, the Stakeholders Group accomplished
enough progress to convince the Commission's majority that this CBC
experiment remained a worthwhile pursuit.

Gold Corporation; the Tusco Company; the United States Bureau of Land Management; the
United States Bureau of Reclamation; the United States Corps of Engineers; the United
States Environmental Protection Agency; the United States Forest Service; and the United
States Geologic Survey. See id.
233. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Hi[sftory and Stakeholder Process (visited
Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/history.html>. A detailed discussion of
the representation on the Stakeholders Group follows. See infra Part V.C.2.
234. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Mission Statement & Goals, (visited Feb.
26, 2000) < http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/mission.html >.
235. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 14. These concerns included concerns with FACA and
with creating a voting system that fairly represented all interests. Id. See also Telephone
Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator of Animas River Stakeholders Group (May 10,
1999).
236. See Animas River Stakeholders Group, Hittory [sic] and Stakeholder Process
(visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/history.htmi>.
237. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
238. Id.
239. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 42. This decision
included provisions requiring the Stakeholders Group to maintain current ambient standards
in the Upper Animas basin, to develop a strategy for cleaning up mine-related pollution, and
to work within the commission's target set for eventual water quality improvements that
would allow a sustainable brown trout fishery upstream from Silverton. Id.
240. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
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A. STAKEHOLDERS GROUP ACTIVITIES, 1995-1998
The Stakeholders

Group began with a three-phase

strategy

to

accomplish the goals set by the Commission. First, the Stakeholders
Group planned to conduct extensive water quality studies to establish
baseline chemical, physical, and biological conditions in the Upper Animas
basin. Next, it attempted to determine the most serious contamination
Finally, its strategy
sources and to prioritize sites for clean up.
"'
contemplated the initiation of on-the-ground remediation projects.24
In 1995, the Stakeholders Group, with extensive assistance from the
Colorado Division of Mining and Geology, conducted detailed

investigations of the mine sites and of the stream quality in Mineral Creek,

which feeds into the Animas River.242 The EPA funded 243 the research,
which also required technical assistance from the United States Forest

Service and the Colorado Geologic Survey.244

Early in 1996, the

Stakeholders Group collected similar data in Cement Creek, another
Animas River tributary.245 Finally in 1996, the Stakeholders Group
evaluated the Animas River Canyon to determine the habitat limitations for
aquatic life in general, and in particular, for brown trout.246
Multiple state and federal agencies worked with the Stakeholders

Group to collect the data for clean up prioritization of pollution sites. 247
Based on the data, the Stakeholders Group isolated five areas within the
basin that suffer from major contamination. The group felt that these sites
should receive the highest clean up effort priority.2 48 Several stakeholders

initiated remediation projects for these sites including: the Mining
Remedial Recovery Company at Placer Gulch; the Sunnyside Gold
Corporation at several locations; the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") at Forest Queen, Mayday, Joe and John, and Lark Mines; Salem
Minerals Company at Mammoth tunnel; the Office of Surface Mining at
the Galena Queen Mine; and the Silver Wing Mining Company at Silver
Wing Mine. 249

241. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 36.
242. Id. at 43.
243. See id. The Stakeholders Group relies on EPA's section 319 nonpoint source
funding. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(b)(2)(E), 1329(h), 1329(i) (1994).
244. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 43.
245. Id. at 36.
246. Id. at 44.
247. For example, using Clean Water Act section 319 grant money from EPA, the
Stakeholders Group contracted with the Colorado Division of Minerals and Geology to
conduct most of the characterization work. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra
Throughout this process, the Division collected and managed the data
note 235.
accumulated by the Stakeholders Group. However, the Division recently relinquished this
responsibility to the Stakeholders Group because the Division lacked adequate staff and
funding. Further, the Division feels that the Stakeholders Group needs to handle this
function itself. Id.
248. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 42. These priority
areas include: the California Gulch in the Upper Animas basin; the Kohler area on the
North Mineral Creek; the Middle Fork of Mineral Creek; the Prospect Gulch in Cement
Creek; and the Upper Cement Creek. Id.
249. Id. at 36. Other remediation projects are currently underway. See inifra Part V.D.
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Funding and technical support for these efforts came from a variety of
sources, including the EPA, the BLM, the Department of Interior, private
mining companies, Stakeholders Group participants, the Office of Surface
Mining, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the United States Geological
Survey. These remediation projects tested new forms of controlling AMD,
which varied from controlling waste runoff to treating runoff with lime
additives.250 The Stakeholders Group estimated that $20 million has been
spent on monitoring, feasibility studies, and remediation projects in the
basin. Unfortunately, much more needs to be spent.251 However, fears of
incurring liability prevented the Stakeholders Group from conducting more
remediation work. This holds particularly true for AMD, which the
Stakeholders Group considers the most significant pollution source.252
B. THE INITIAL REVIEW OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP IN 1998
When the Commission initially reviewed the Stakeholder's Group's
progress in 1998, it was obvious that the Stakeholder's Group needed more
time to gather data that could serve as a guide for setting use designation
standards under the CWA. 5 3 The Stakeholders Group asked for a threeyear extension to complete this work. At least one Commission member
believed that the Stakeholders Group's progress failed to justify an
extension. 54 Yet, after further discussions, the Commission concluded that
the Stakeholders Group made significant progress at acquiring data for the
Upper Animas River and that their efforts would eventually lead to new
use designation standards.5 5 Therefore, the Commission unanimously
agreed to grant a three-year extension to the Stakeholders Group.256
The Stakeholders Group now has until March of 2001 to complete its
recommendations for water quality standards in the Upper Animas River. 25'
Until that time, the Commission retained the relatively unimposing
narrative standard to protect fish habitat under the CWA. The Commission
stated it felt that this would prevent further water quality deterioration
while allowing the maximum flexibility for the Stakeholders Group to
develop a workable solution.5 8
The Commission admitted this additional delay would likely be

250. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 47.
251. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
252. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 6, 1999)
<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa01.htm>. See also infra Part V.C.3.
253. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
254. Telephone Interview with Peter Nichols, Former Chairman of Colorado Water
Quality Control Commission (Apr. 19, 1999).
255. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
256. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
257. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998). In reality, the Stakeholders Group only
has until the fall of 2000. Then the Commission will hold its public hearings on the Upper
Animas basin's water quality standards. At that time, the Commission expects the
Stakeholders Group to present its plan. The Commission will set water quality standards in
February of 2001 based on the recommendations of the Division and the Stakeholders
Group. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
258. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-34.27 (1998).
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inadequate for the Stakeholders Group to achieve water quality
improvements that satisfy the more stringent numerical standards passed
and deferred by the Commission in 1995.259 However, the Commission
expects that the Stakeholders Group will present its recommendations for
the appropriate water quality standards in the basin. The Stakeholders
Group expects to make recommendations based on all available data they
have gathered.2 6 If the Commission rejects the Stakeholders Group's
recommendations, it intends to reinstate strict numerical standards to
provide a legal stimulus for further action.26
Bureaucratic difficulties surround the Commission's decision to
delegate to the Stakeholders Group the authority to set water quality
standards. In 1998, EPA rejected the Commission's decision to defer
EPA rejected these
setting numerical standards for three years. 262 The EA
narrative standards because they claim Colorado lacks an adequate system
for setting narrative standards.263 However, the EPA agreed not to set its
own standards during this three year period in deference to the
Stakeholders Group. 2" While the EPA supports the Stakeholders Group
process through grants and technical support, the Commission admits that
the Stakeholders Group process does not fit within the CWA's regulatory
framework that the EPA must enforce.265
In the past, state water quality standards set under the CWA took effect
as soon as the state submitted them to EPA for approval. If EPA rejected a
state's submission, then the state's last approved standards remained in
effect until EPA promulgated its own standards.2 6 When, as in this case,
EPA rejected a state's proposed standards, but declined to set its own
standards, then the rejected standards remained in place until EPA
approved new standards.267
However, if in 2001 the Commission decides to defer the standards
again, the outcome may yield a different result due to a recent federal
district court case.
In Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clarke, the
Washington federal district court found that the CWA's plain language
revealed that state water quality standards could not take effect until the
EPA actually approved them.2 68 EPA subsequently endorsed this opinion
by suggesting that this CWA interpretation applied nationwide, despite the
fact that the case only bound the federal district in Washington.269 One

259. Id.
260. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 256.
261. Id.
262. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manager for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (Mar. 17, 1999).
263. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
264. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
265. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 262.
266. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
267. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Watershed Assessment Unit Manger for
Colorado Water Quality Control Division (Apr. 26, 1999).
268. Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clarke, No. C96-1762R, 1997 WL 446499, at *34 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 8, 1997).
269. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 262.
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Division employee described the EPA interpretation as a "bombshell"
because EPA remains notoriously slow at approving standards.27 °

Requiring EPA to approve state water quality standards before they
take effect could leave numerous river segments unregulated. Responding
to this concern, EPA is attempting to speed up its approval process.271 In
the alternative, EPA could unilaterally set state water quality standards
based on generalized scientific information, which may be inappropriate or

unnecessary for some river segments.272 However, as a practical matter,

EPA has too few resources to set water quality standards in every state
where it rejected proposed standards.273
This new interpretation puts more pressure on the Stakeholders Group
to produce concrete results. Colorado wants to avoid a situation where the
EPA unilaterally sets inappropriate standards for the Upper Animas basin.
If the Stakeholders Group asks for another deferral in 2001, that request
will likely fall on the deaf ears of both the Commission and the EPA.274
While the Stakeholders Group does not intend to ask for another extension
in 2001,275 it remains questionable whether the EPA will embrace the
Stakeholders Group's water quality standards recommendations.
While the Stakeholders Group has provided a new avenue for solving
water quality problems in the Upper Animas basin, it has a lot left to
complete. The Stakeholders Group's progress with collecting pollution
data and creating goodwill among locals led some commentators to call the
Stakeholders Group a success.276 In reality, it remains too early to declare
victory. However, by at least one estimate, the upper Animas basin is

closer to being cleaned up today than it would be had the Stakeholders
Group not existed.277

C. THE PEOPLE AND THE ISSUES BEHIND THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

A variety of individuals and government agencies support the
Stakeholders Group's continuing activities.
To understand the
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. The EPA's "Gold Book" sets generalized numeric concentrations of pollutants that
river segments can handle and still achieve various designated uses such as fishable or
swimmable. However, these standards do not reflect the actual on-the-ground conditions of
many river segments. Therefore, these standards may impose unnecessary restrictions on
some sources while ignoring other sources. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra
note 67, at 6.
273. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 267.
274. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
275. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River Stakeholders
Group (Apr. 13, 1999).
276. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 129, at 49.
277. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader for United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 26, 1999).
Russell argues that the
Stakeholders Group helped to convince the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
that these agencies could be liable under the CWA if they fail to help cleanup the mining
waste in the basin. As a result, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management helped
to secure a pilot project in the basin, the Abandoned Mined Land Initiative, that will
eventually help to clean up several more sites. Id.
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Stakeholders Group's dynamics, six particular participants and their efforts
must be discussed.
1. Bill Simon and the Animas River Stakeholders Group
A selection committee, consisting of mining representatives,
environmental groups, county officials, state officials, and federal
officials,278 chose Bill Simon as the Stakeholders Group's coordinator. By
all accounts, and consistent with the academic writings on the subject, Bill
leadership is one of the major reasons for the group's
Simon's 27effective
9
success.

Observers attribute Simon's effectiveness to two main characteristics.
First, people from both the environmental groups and the industry groups
trust Simon. Simon grew up on a farm in Loveland, Colorado, but has
lived in Silverton since 1970.280 He obtained a biology degree from the
University of Colorado and an evolutionary ecology doctorate from the
University of California at Berkley. The tall, slim, pony-tailed Simon also
served as a San Juan County commissioner from 1984 to 1988.281
Simon makes a living helping to design and reclaim mines in an
environmentally responsible way in the Upper Animas basin. During the
1980's, Simon "worked for probably every big mining company in
America. 282 He still runs an environmental consulting business and a
mining construction business. While his mining construction business
remains essentially dormant today, he continues to work as a consultant for
mining companies, focusing on minimizing mining's environmental
impacts and navigating various mining permitting processes.283
During the 1980's, the Sunnyside Gold Corporation, a company that
historically allowed high concentrations of toxic pollutants to flow directly
into the Animas River, 284 hired Simon to conduct consulting work. Simon
helped the mining company implement new storm water controls that
reduced these emissions dramatically. Almost immediately, the water
quality in receiving streams improved.285
After being elected county commissioner in 1984, Simon wanted to
capitalize on the improved water quality by reintroducing a viable fish
population into the Upper Animas River. Shortly thereafter, Simon
assembled a group of citizens to restock river segments with trout. 286 The
experiment successfully reintroduced a reproducing trout population in
portions of the river that had been declared inhospitable to aquatic life.
278. Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, Former Project Manager for Colorado
Center for Environmental Management (Apr. 8, 1999).
279. Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, President of Stewardship Initiatives
(Mar. 15, 1999).
280. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43.
286. Id.
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When the Commission found out about the trout populations living in
the Upper Animas River, it realized that it insufficiently classified the
stream under the CWA.287 As a result, the Division conducted experiments
that eventually led to the current CBC process. Thus, ironically, Simon's
experiment actually started the process that spurred the Stakeholders
Group's creation.
His extensive knowledge of water quality problems in the Upper
Animas basin earned Simon the respect and the trust of both environmental
groups and mining companies.
He cogently conveys the processes'
complicated scientific details to both scientists and laypeople.
More
importantly, Simon remains deeply committed to a collaborative decisionmaking process based on informed consensus. 288 As one participant said,
"when [the Stakeholders Group participants] come to the table together, we
are equals. If it wasn't that way, I wouldn't participate.289
The second reason that the Stakeholders Group made progress is
because Simon is a "workaholic." 21
Simon acts as the group's
spokesperson by answering questions from journalists, researchers, and
locals who seek information about the process. He arranges the monthly
meetings and agendas.
He coordinates the Stakeholders Group's
fundraising.
Furthermore, the Division recently turned over the
Stakeholders Group's entire information database for Simon to manage.
In addition to these administrative tasks, Simon also directly
participates in the on-the-ground research and data collection. He directs
the use attainability analysis development and the TMDL framework.
Each must be submitted to the state in 2001.
With all these
responsibilities, Simon admits he is beginning to be "spread a little thin. ,291
Eventually Simon will need staff support to continue effectively managing
the Stakeholders Group. But for now, Simon does it all.
One commentator said, "if you are lucky enough to have a Bill Simon,
you will succeed. If you don't, you won't., 29 2 When a potentially
controversial issue arises, Simon gets on the phone and begins the process
of building consensus with the fellow Stakeholders Group participants.
Usually, Simon calls Peter Butler and Steve Fearn first.
2.

Peter Butler and Environmental Representation

Peter Butler was the Commission's only person from Southwestern
Colorado and first person involved in the process with an environmental

287. Id. The CWA requires that a state has to attain the best water quality feasible in
each river in its state. When Simon and the citizens reintroduced the trout and the trout
reproduced, it became obvious that it might be feasible to improve the Animas River's
water quality and to change the river's classification. Id.
288. Id.
289. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, President of Silver Wing Mining Company
(Apr. 5, 2000).
290. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
291. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 43. One part-time volunteer from
Ft. Lewis College assists Simon. Id.
292. Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.
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In addition, he is one of the few environmentalists who has
consistently participated in the Stakeholders Group process since its
foCUS.

inception.

Butler lives in Durango and runs the environmental group

named Friends of the Animas River (FAR).294

Butler admits he's "a little uncomfortable" when called the main
environmentalist representative on the Stakeholders Group. 95 With a
masters degree in economics from the University of Colorado and a

doctorate in natural resources policy from the University of Michigan,
Butler concedes that his economist background and his general philosophies
might lead some environmentalists to consider him too moderate to
effectively represent their concerns. 2 6 While Bulter recognizes a lack of
environmental group representation on the Stakeholders Group, he
concludes that the absence should not concern people.
The first and perhaps the most important factor is that Silverton is a

small community that ties its economic prosperity to mining.

Despite

anecdotal evidence, it is hard for many people in the community to believe
or to imagine that the Upper Animas River ever looked different.297 In
addition, social concerns, such as securing adequate schools and medical
facilities, weigh more heavily in the local residents' minds than the river's
water quality problems.298
The second factor interrelates with the previous point. Most major
environmental groups work fifty miles south in Durango. 299 Locals have

not asked for the environmentalists' help. 3° Moreover, for these activists,

a pressing environmental problem that requires their attention does not

293. Butler recently lost his position on the Commission because Colorado's new
republican governor holds different values than Butler's. Telephone Interview with Peter
Butler, supra note 229.
Others suggest that Governor Owens appointed some right-wing "crazies" to change the
dynamics of the commission. Interview with Peter Nichols, supra note 254. However,
Butler and others from the Stakeholders Group doubt that the Commission will be any less
supportive of their activities. Id.
294. In 1993, FAR formed to fight several development proposals along the Animas
River in Durango. However, FAR defeated those proposals rendering itself relatively
inactive other than its involvement in the Stakeholders Group process. Telephone Interview
with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275. Simon explains that reports
from the beginning of the century prove that people used water from the Cement Creek for
irrigation and for other domestic uses. However, in 1903, inhabitants discontinued these
uses of the Animas River's tributary due to water quality degradation. Id.
298. Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
299. These groups include: the Friends of the Animas River (development around
Durango); the Taxpayers for the Animas River (Animas-La Plata); Mineral Policy Center
(mining all around the West); the Sierra Club (all public lands issues); the Southern Ute
Grassroots Organization (Animas-La Plata); and the Pine River Watershed Group (Pine
River east of Durango).
300. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, Southwest Circuit Rider for Mineral
Policy Center (Apr. 13, 1999). Dan Randolph of the Mineral Policy Center in Durango
would prefer that local citizens take the lead. He would participate more if asked to, but up
until now that request has not been forthcoming. Id.
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exist in the Upper Animas basin.3"' The Stakeholders Group's work does
not affect any endangered species. Further, there are no new proposals for
large-scale mining.
The mere logistics of driving to Silverton dissuades many interested
people from getting involved. In addition, understanding and meaningfully
participating in the Stakeholders Group requires a long-term investment of
time that many people cannot afford to make.30 2 Several local residents did
show up to the first
few Stakeholders Group meetings; however, they
"vented and left. 30 3
The lack of representation by environmentalists and by average citizens
remains a serious concern for many critics of community-based watershed
initiatives. At least one person claims that Colorado's community-based
watershed management efforts are a disguise for alternative forums of
intergovernmental cooperation that parade under the banner of community
involvement. '3° To a certain extent, these criticisms remain valid.
In 1995, locals criticized the Stakeholders Group for what they
perceived as overrepresentation of government agencies within the
group.3 5 Indeed, most major players in the Stakeholders Group came from
either government agencies with management responsibilities directly
implicated by the Stakeholders Group's process or mining interests that
have a direct economic stake in the process outcome. In response, Bill
Simon made some changes to make the process more attractive to locals.
First, he began to hold informal meetings with locals at the Silverton
library. In this informal setting, he would explain the Stakeholders
Group's progress and would ask active participants to present results of
their studies. 30 6 Next, Simon excluded the highly technical data from the
meetings and instead focused on broader policy concerns in order to keep
more local citizens interested. 3 7 Finally, the Stakeholders Group agreed
that "any construction activities evolving from the process must be
reviewed by the San Juan County Commissioners and the County
Historical Society" to ensure such activities did not compromise the
considerable historical value of the mines.30 8
Others argue that the group sufficiently represents interested parties
and that no one can create public interest where none exists.30 9 In addition,
the many government agency participants who live and work in the basin
would likely resent the suggestion that they only reflect the agencies'
viewpoints and do not reflect the community's values. 3'0 Regardless of
representation, the Commission still retains ultimate control over the water

301.
302.
303.
304.

Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, supra note 278.
Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.

305. See COLORADO
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT,

supra note 129, at 46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
Telephone Interview with Larry MacDonnell, supra note 279.
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quality standards implemented in the basin. If the Stakeholders Group did
put forth a plan that environmentalists or others opposed, then those
dissatisfied parties could still lobby the Commission or sue the state.
Either way, environmentalists and other interested parties have an
opportunity to influence the process.
3.

Steve Fearn and Small Landowners

Steve Fearn works as the president of Silver Wing Mining Company, a
small privately-held company with a currently inactive mine in the Upper
Animas basin.3 1
In addition, Fearn serves on the Southwest Water
Conservation District's ("SWCD") board,31 2 which is an association of
water rights holders that seeks to coordinate the development of water
resources in Southwest Colorado.3 3 Fearn, one of the Stakeholders
Group's initial organizers, represents a few similarly situated landowners
who would consider remining abandoned mine sites located on their lands
if they did not face grave legal liability.
In the Upper Animas basin, all but two of the major metalscontributing abandoned mine sites sit on private land.31 4 Under the CWA,
Colorado has the power to impose NPDES permits on landowners who
have abandoned mines on their lands. 3 5 However, the state will not pursue
this route for two reasons. First, it would impose permits on landowners
who did not directly cause the pollution problem, which would be
politically unpopular. Second, since these mines remain inactive, no
revenue stream exists from which to force compliance with a permit.31 6
Moreover, these same landowners could face liability under CERCLA
for the abandoned mine waste on their land. However, CERCLA liability
requires EPA to list the Upper Animas basin as a national priority. 3 7 In
addition, the political and the financial concerns that exist with CWA
liability also arise from CERCLA liability. The EPA simply has bigger
problems to address before going after small landowners.
EPA may not impose liability as long as landowners leave their
abandoned mines alone. Once these landowners begin trying to remine or
to reclaim the land, EPA will require a NPDES permit. Currently,
landowners have two remedies for the mining waste located on their land.
First, they can focus on hydrologic controls of runoff from existing mine
waste piles. Second, they can cap mine portals to avoid additional runoff
from these sources.
Landowners and third parties, such as the Stakeholders Group, can
generally work on the hydrologic controls without acquiring liability under
CWA.31 8 Yet, as soon as they touch discharging mine portals with the
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 264.
Id.
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1999).
Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
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intention of cleaning them up, they become subject to liability under the
CWA and CERCLA. 319 This disincentive to remediate abandoned mines,
even partially, has Fearn and his colleagues calling for changes in the
existing law.
Fearn argues that, under the current regime, the unregulated
abandoned mine sites continue to pollute the Animas River. If the
regulatory agencies lowered the permit standards to make remining
profitable for Fearn, he could afford to clean up some of the waste from
his land. This partial clean up, while less than law currently requires,
would arguably be better than the current unregulated situation.
While environmentalists from Durango and from elsewhere sympathize
with the landowners, they worry that fashioning a "small landowner"
definition would prove difficult. 320 Fearn claims that this opposition
represents
"misinformed
bomb
throwing"
from
Durango
environmentalists. 32 He also claims that the fear that "someone might get
away with something" remains unfounded.322 Additionally, Fearn feels
that groups like the Mineral Policy Center and the Sierra Club do not
understand the problems actually occurring in the Upper Animas basin.
The Stakeholders Group has not yet seriously considered Fearn's idea
of allowing him to remine his land. 3 3 First, Fearn is, perhaps, the only
small landowner in the basin for whom remining might be feasible under
such an exception. Second, the Stakeholders Group does support the same
exception from liability for third parties and for government agencies who
want to clean up abandoned mine sites. Last, Bill Simon admits that the
issue would become the most contentious and difficult issue the
Stakeholders Group ever had to reconcile.324
Currently, if a third party or a government agency attempts to clean up
an abandoned mine site, EPA can hold these "good samaritans" liable in
perpetuity for the discharges from these sites. 32 ' The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld such liability against a city and a regional water
authority that voluntarily cleaned up an abandoned mine site.326 In

working on hydrologic controls is premised on the assumption that such runoff is not
considered a point source under the CWA. Yet, the EPA has indicated that it considers
such runoff as a point source; however, it has never pursued an enforcement action based
on this interpretation. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
319. Stokstad, supra note 51, at 163-64.
320. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, supra note 81.
321. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
322. Id.
323. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
324. Id.
325. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 7.
326. See Committee to Save the Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d
305 (9 "hCir. 1993). In this case, an environmental group sued the East Bay Municipal
Utility District and the members of the California Regional Water Quality Control Board
claiming that the agencies' cleanup efforts lead to AMD discharge into a river without a
discharge permit under the CWA. Id. at 307. The court found irrelevant the fact that the
mine discharged less pollution than before the voluntary cleanup. Id. at 309. A concurring
opinion lamented that this case tells good samaritans to "[I]et the water degrade, let the fish
die, but protect your pocketbook from vast and unnecessary expenditures." Id. at 310.
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response to this barrier to clean up, the Stakeholders Group supports a
good samaritan provision ("GSP") that would amend the CWA to exempt
from liability state agencies and entities like the Stakeholders Group that
wish to voluntarily clean up abandoned mine sites.327
The Western Governors' Association lobbied Congress to enact the
GSP.328 In 1994, the Western Governors Association succeeded in having
the GSP introduced into Congress.32 9 While the initiative passed the
House, no one introduced the corresponding bill in the Senate.33 °
Subsequently, California enacted a law that provides an exemption from
state liability for voluntary clean-up of abandoned mine sites in California,
but federal liability under the CWA remains.331 The legislative lobbying 33
on2
this issue continues; proponents call it a common sense reform.
Environmentalists again hold mixed feelings about this idea.
Some environmentalists would prefer a new state or federal program
dealing directly with hardrock abandoned mine problems, rather than a
provision that provides exceptions to current law.333 As a model,
environmentalists would use the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act
("SMCRA"), 334 which deals only with abandoned coal mines. SMCRA
establishes a tax on all active coal mines that is then used to finance
remediation and clean up of abandoned sites.335 In addition, SMCRA
precipitated reforms in
the coal mining industry that observers "widely
336
regarded as positive.
Some environmentalists fear that the GSP would exempt third parties
from liability forever and would cost taxpayers millions. Supporters argue
that the GSP's current and past versions would not permit such results.
However, environmentalists point to a recent consent decree between
Colorado and the Sunnyside Gold Corporation as proof that these ideas are
liability limiting measures.
4. Larry Perino and Sunnyside Gold Mining Company
Larry Perino works as the reclamation manager for the Sunnyside Gold
Mine Company
("Sunnyside"), which is a subsidiary of Echo Bay Mining
331
Company.
Perino has lived his entire life, other than his college years,
327. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASs'N, supra note 57, at 8. See also Telephone
Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 118.
328. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 57, at 8
329. Telephone Interview with Steve Fearn, supra note 289.
330. Id.
331. See COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 17.
332. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
333. Telephone Interview with Dan Randolph, supra note 81.

334. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
335. See id. §§ 1231(c)(1), 1232(a).
336. Robert J.Uram, Prospectsfor Mining Law Reform, 12

NAT. RESOURCES

& ENV'T

191, 193 (1998).

337. Echo Bay Mining Company leased Summitville, Colorado, land when Galactic
Resources, the subleasing operator, released pollution that contaminated the site. Echo Bay
sued Colorado claiming that the state's failure to regulate Galactic Resources led to a
diminution of Echo Bay's property values. The reviewing court dismissed the suit based on
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in Silverton, Colorado. He received a civil engineering degree from the
University of Colorado at Boulder and paid his college tuition by working
in Silverton mines.338 Perino now oversees a unique consent decree's
implementation that will eventually release Sunnyside from liability under
the CWA.
During the late 1980's, "Sunnyside produced more than 800 tons of
ore a day., 339 In 1991, when the load paid out, Sunnyside closed.
Sunnyside considered retiring its discharge permit under the CWA.
Therefore, Sunnyside proposed a variety of measures that would end its
liability from its mining operations. However, the Division, the state
agency that oversees active mining permits, rejected Sunnyside's proposal
to retire its discharge permit. Sunnyside then sued the agency, seeking
declaratory judgment on its permit's retirement application. The case
never went to court.
Colorado and Sunnyside signed a consent decree requiring Sunnyside
to perform a variety of remediation measures in order to relieve it of its
liability and discharge permit. 340 To improve the Animas River's water
quality, the remediation measures require work on the actual Sunnyside
mining site. Additionally, Sunnyside agreed to remediate non-Sunnyside
mines in the surrounding area. 34' In total, the remediation work will likely
exceed $22 million.
Bill Simon called this agreement "a precedent nationwide."3 4 2 Simon
believes that third-party clean ups remain integral to abandoned mine
reclamation. 4 Environmentalists warn that limiting Sunnyside's liability
creates "[a] huge experiment."3 44 Environmentalists worry that if anything
goes wrong thirty years from now, taxpayers will have to pay for the clean
up. 34 5 Long-term considerations aside, the consent decree with Sunnyside
constitutes an immediate improvement in water quality throughout the
Upper Animas basin. Perino remains proud of the remediation work he
and Sunnyside conduct in the basin. Likewise, the Stakeholders Group
appreciates having Sunnyside participate in the CBC effort.
The
Stakeholders Group hopes to continue this collaboration in the future.346

sovereign immunity grounds. See generally Summitville Story, supra note 76.
338. Telephone Interview with Larry Perino, Reclamation Manager for Sunnyside Gold
Mine Company (Apr. 16, 1999).
339. Fetchenhier, supra note 19, at 82.
340. See Christopher G. Hayes & William C. Robb, Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement
Under the Clean Water Act-The Sunnyside Experience, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 95,
98-99.
341. COLORADO CTR. FOR ENVTL. MGMT, supra note 67, at 19. This approach is called
pollution trading. Pollution trading allows a discharger to get some regulatory relief at their
own site in exchange for cleaning up sites where the discharger has no legal liability. See
id. at 18.
342. Ray Ring, A Radical Approach to Mine Reclamation, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan.
19, 1998, at B2.
343. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
344. See Ring, supra note 342, at B2.
345. See id.
346. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 275.
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5. Carol Russell and the Environmental Protection Agency
Carol Russell works as the EPA's main liaison with the Stakeholders

Group. Russell has a lot of experience with rural western communities and
with their mining problems. After growing up on Colorado's Western
Slope near Silverton, Russell earned undergraduate degrees in both biology
and geology, as well as a masters degree in environmental policy. "

Following her education, Russell worked as a consultant for a mining
company in Nevada. Russell also worked for Colorado on mining
problems and for the State of Arizona on nonpoint source pollution

problems.34
Currently, Russell works as the EPA's team leader for the Animas
River. In this capacity, she attempts to coordinate all of EPA's regulatory
activities in the Animas River basin.349 In addition, she co-chairs the
EPA's National Hardrock Mining Framework, which is a project the EPA
created to coordinate its regulatory activities under the thirty-seven
different laws that deal with mining. The Animas River project serves as a
pilot for this coordinating effort.35 °
Russell, the self-proclaimed cheerleader for the Stakeholders Group,
believes the only way to protect the environment is for citizens to take

personal responsibility for its maintenance and improvement. She believes
that the Stakeholders Group, while not perfect, made some noteworthy
progress. 311 While the EPA has signaled its support for community-based
approaches, Russell suggests that EPA's patience is running thin.
Over the last few years, the EPA pushed the concept of communitybased environmental protection as a way to solve difficult environmental
problems. 352 Through this program, the EPA "integrates environmental

347. Russell grew up in Montrose and Durango. She received her biology degree from
the University of Oregon and her geology degree from Purdue University. She earned her
masters degree in environmental policy, focusing on abandoned mine problems, from the
University of Denver. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, Animas Basin Team Leader
for Environmental Protection Agency (May 3, 1999).
348. Russell worked on remediating mines for the Colorado Division of Minerals and
Geology. In Arizona, she headed an aquifer protection program and the state's nonpoint
source program. Id.
349. These regulatory activities include, but are not limited to: oversight of the proposed
Animas-La Plata Dam project; regulation of various gravel mining activities; regulation of
agricultural pesticide; regulation of coal bed methane mining; and mediation between the
government and Indian tribes. Id.
350. Id.
351. Russell points to several achievements: the community's empowerment; the increase
in the local community's involvement in the regulatory process; the increased information
sharing between private and governmental actors; and the Forest Service's and Bureau of
Land Management's reluctant recognition that they need to participate in the remediation
efforts in the basin because they could be held liable for pollution originating from their
land. Id.
352. Six main principles create the community-based environmental protection program.
These include: "(1) [flocus[ing] on [g]eographic [a]rea; (2) [w]ork[ing] [c]ollaboratively
with [s]takeholders; (3) [p]rotecting and [r]estor[ing] [q]uality of [a]ir, [wiater, [l]and, and
[hliving [riesources in a [pllace as a [wlhole; (4) [i]ntegrat[ing] [e]nvironmental, [e]conomic
and [slocial [o]bjectives; (5) [tiake [aiction [u]sing [m]ost [aippropriate [t]ools; (6)
[u]se[ing] [aldaptive [m]anagement." See United States Environmental Protection Agency,
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management with human needs, considers long-term ecosystem health[,]

and highlights the positive correlations between economic prosperity and
environmental well-being." 353 The EPA implements this agenda through
appropriations for various programs that support community-based
environmental protection.
For the first few years of the Stakeholders Group's existence, its
funding relied on the EPA's Rocky Mining Headwaters Mine Waste
Initiative. However, for the last three years, EPA reduced the Mine Waste

Initiative's funding from approximately $1.5 million to less than $100
thousand dollars. In addition, this program lacks a statutory basis;
therefore, long-term funding from this source remains uncertain.354 Russell
attributes the decline in funding to concerns held by the upper levels of
management in EPA that community-based groups do not actually achieve
on-the-ground success.355
The EPA's section 319 nonpoint program 35 6 also constitutes a key

funding source for the Stakeholders Group. For 1999, the Stakeholders
Group received thirty-five percent of Colorado's section 319 grant money
from the EPA.
The approximately $450 thousand went directly to
remediation projects.357 In addition, section 319 funding has doubled over
the last three years.35 8
These developments intimate that EPA will not perpetually fund
watershed initiatives through the section 319 program because local
funding is more appropriate.35 9 While the EPA does not want the
Stakeholders Group to fail, it does want someone else to pick up the bill. 3"
Russell explains that states and individuals need to take responsibility for
old mining pollution.361
However, not many local sources of funding exist. The Stakeholders

Community-Based Environmental Protection, About CBEP (last modified Sept. 30, 1998)
< http://yosemite.epa.gov/osec/osechome.nsf/All/AboutCBEP/>.
353. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Community-Based Environmental
Protection (last modified Dec. 21, 1999) < http://www.epa.gov/ecocommunity/>.
354. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 16.
355. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
356. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(b)(2)(E), 1329(h), 1329(i) (1994). Under section 319 of the
Clean Water Act, states, territories, and tribes can receive grants to support a wide variety
of activities including: technical assistance; financial assistance; education; training;
technology transfer; demonstration projects; and monitoring to assess the success of specific
nonpoint source implementation projects. The division actually receives the section 319
grants on behalf of the Stakeholders Group because the group is not a legal entity.
Meanwhile, the San Juan County RC&D actually holds the money for the Stakeholders
Group. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
357. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
358. Colorado's section 319 funding has risen from $1 million three years ago to more
than $2 million today. The increase in funding may represent EPA's recognition that total
maximum daily loads could be getting more serious. Id.
359. Telephone Interview with Gary Broetzman, supra note 278.
360. Telephone Interview with Peter Butler, supra note 229.
361. Russell points out that Americans wear gold, drive cars, and use computers that
depend on mining. As a result, society benefited from historical mining practices. Thus, in
her view, Americans must contribute to remediating some of the damage caused by mining
in the United States. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 38.
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Group receives some funding from Southwestern Water Conservation
District. Additionally, local volunteers and San Juan County provide some
services. Local sources will provide significantly more of the Stakeholders
Group's funding in the near future. As a result, the Stakeholders Group
must subsist on a sporadic diet of federal, state, and local funding to
survive.

Source of Funding

Used For

US EPA

Administration, Water
Characterization Studies
Assistance with data collection
and site characterization.
Biological Studies, Remediation
Biological Studies, Remediation
Biological Studies, Habitat
Administration, Gauging Stations

Volunteers
US Forest Service
US BLM
CO Dept. of Wildlife
Southwest Water
Conservation District
Mining Corporations

Administration

CO Dept. Public Health
and Environment
San Juan County

Water Characterization Studies

Town of Silverton

In kind services

Office Space

% of
Overall
Budget
25%
20%
20%
20%
5%
5%
Less than
2%
Less than

1%

Less than
1%
Less than
1%

6. Cal Joiner and the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management
Cal Joyner works as the associate forest supervisor for the Forest
Service's ("FS") San Juan-Rio Grande National Forest and as the field
office manager for the Bureau of Land Management's ("BLM") San Juan
Field Office.362 Remarkably, this means Joyner runs both the FS and the
BLM in San Juan County, an unusual melding of jobs resulting from a pilot
project. The project is the FS' and the BLM's attempt to reduce their
activities' redundancies and inefficiencies.
Under Joyner's watch the
Abandoned Mined Land Initiative ("AMLI") will occur in the Upper
Animas basin. The AMLI could either help or frustrate the Stakeholders
Group's progress based on the level of coordination these efforts achieve.
Cal Joyner, a Southern California native, received his masters degree
in watershed management from Humbolt State University. In 1980, in
Oregon, Joyner entered the FS as a hydrologist. He also worked as a
362. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, Associate Forest Supervisor for the San JuanRio Grande National Forest and San Juan Field Office Manager for the United States
Bureau of Land Management (Apr. 26, 1999).
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district ranger in Montana's Bitteroot National Forest. Joyner came to the
FS in San Juan County in 1995.363
Since 1995, Joyner has overseen San Juan County's Service First

program, which attempts to eliminate redundancies in FS and BLM
work. 3' These agencies chose San Juan County as one of two pilot sites
for this program. The program's mission creates "one stop shopping" for
the public-one permit structure for common activities including, but not
limited to, timber cutting permits for firewood and for Christmas trees.365
The agencies are not merging; they maintain separate budgets and staffs. 366
But, where necessary or appropriate, the program allows them to share
personnel and data.367 So far, the program saved an estimated $1 million at
the two pilot sites. 368 This new emphasis on coordination between the FS

and BLM remains important in the AMD context.
Soon after Joyner's arrival in San Juan County, the EPA and the

Stakeholders Group began talking to the BLM, the FS, and the other land
management agencies about their responsibilities in cleaning up the AMD

in the basin.369 Given that very few major sources of AMD are on federal

land, the federal agencies initially refused to believe that they could be
responsible for clean up. 370 However, after a slow discussion
education process, the groups convinced the FS and the BLM that
could be held liable for AMD waste occurring on private lands

held
and
they
that

negatively affects federal lands. 37' In San Juan County in 1995, the EPA
worked with BLM and FS to produce general discharge permits for all
their sites. EPA's Carol Russell claims that the fear of liability prompted
the FS and the BLM to request the AMLI from Congress.372
Also in 1995, the United States Department of Interior chose the Upper

363. Id.
364. Id. The Trading Post Program, now called Service First, began as an inter-agency
initiative between the FS and BLM. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Memorandum of Understanding, Feb. 14, 1997, between the United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service-Department of Interior Bureau of Land
Management, No. 95-MOU-056 (as amended).
367. Id.
368. See Bureau of Land Management, Cutting Red Tape and Improving Service: The
2000)
(visited
Feb.
11,
Post
Initiative
Trading
< http://www.lmOO05.blm.gov/nhp/NPR/ric/tp-initiative.html >.
369. Telephone Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277.
370. Only two or three major AMD sources exist on public lands in the Upper Animas
basin. Most of the mining sites on private land today were obtained by patent from the
federal government. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, Coordinator for Animas River
Stakeholders Group (Apr. 26, 1999).
371. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 362. Under CWA, federal land
management activities must ensure that chemicals discharged from public lands do not
degrade water quality. Id. If pollution from private land contaminates public land, the
federal agencies could be held liable for that discharge of pollutants even though it does not
originate on public lands. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal
Lands 11: Water Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 61 (1993). At the very
least, a citizen suit could force the FS and BLM to cleanup their lands at an accelerated
pace. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 362.
372. Interview with Carol Russell, supra note 277. Russell also credits the Stakeholders
Group for encouraging the FS and the BLM to obtain funding for the AML program. Id.
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Animas basin as one of two pilot sites for a demonstration project under
AMLI.3 73 The AMLI sought "to provide information for use around the
nation on the effects of acid mine drainage and the remediation of mining
sites. '' 74 However, the AMLI designation constituted "a top-down action
without consultation with the Stakeholders Group and many of the projects
375
are being developed without consultation with the Stakeholders Group."
Moreover, some Stakeholders Group members worried that AMLI-pursued
goals would conflict with the Stakeholders Group's efforts.376 Others
suggested that the FS and the BLM should share more of AMLI's funding
with the Stakeholders Group to help facilitate a comprehensive solution.377
According to the program's mandates, the AMLI can use its money on
private sites if it demonstrates that those sites clearly affect public lands;
however, this process requires local landowners' cooperation, which is just
beginning. 78 Meanwhile, the FS and the BLM attempt to conduct
successful remediation projects on public lands to show private landowners
the results and to foster trust between the landowners and the agencies.379
While the AMLI remains potentially useful and essential to any basin clean
up, political realities undermine the AMLI's potential.
380
Joyner noted that AMLI's appropriations exist only for five years.
Currently, the initiative receives nearly $1.6 million per year. However,
when the original appropriation ends in 2002, that number could sink
below a few hundred thousand dollars.38 ' While the FS and the BLM will
always cooperate in the Upper Animas basin's mining clean up, they will
loose efficacy with fewer resources. 2
The AMLI's short-term focus results from political realities and federal
budgeting constraints. Agency officials want instant results, without which
they will move on to other, arguably more pressing environmental
problems.3 3 In addition, the FS itself has tremendous forest maintenance
needs that will compete with AMLI. With the political motivation to
balance the federal budget and to create a smaller federal government,
Joyner does not see the AMLI competing well with public education,

373.

See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Animas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)

<http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foaOl.htm>;
FOR ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 129, at 36.

see also

COLORADO CTR.

374. See Colorado Rivers Alliance, Friends of the Anitas (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://www.coloradorivers.org/Status/Animas/foa0l.htm >.
375. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Upper Animas River Watershed
Stakeholders
Group
(last
updated
Mar.
1999)
< http://www.epa.gov/region08/crosslcbep/fact/ani.html >.
376. Id.
377. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, supra note 83.
378. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370. BLM actually created a
policy that allows them to spend their AMLI money on private sites that impact federal
land. While the FS does not have a similar policy, Joyner has committed the FS to this
same kind of action. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
379. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

Medicare, or social security.384
While the Stakeholders Group intends to continue working in the basin
on mining clean up for twenty years or more, 38 5 the federal agencies have a
much shorter outlook. This disjunction in perspectives and goals will make

a comprehensive, long-term, solution difficult to reach for the Upper
Animas basin. Nevertheless, Joyner remains committed to working with
the Stakeholders Group. In fact, he has referred to the Stakeholders Group
3 86
as "perhaps the best example of civic environmentalism in the country.
D. CURRENT GOALS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS GROUP

The Stakeholders Group's current goal remains to complete the
proposed water quality standards for the Upper Animas River by the 2001
deadline. 3" To this end, the Stakeholders Group has nearly fifty individual
site characterization studies currently in progress.388 In addition, the

Stakeholders Group currently conducts a basin-wide biomonitoring

program.389

The Stakeholders Group planned three major remediation projects for
1999: the Animas Mine Waste Control Project; 3 the Cement Creek Mine

Waste Control Project; 391 and the Mine Infiltration Identification and
Control Project. 2 In addition, the Stakeholders Group seeks to coordinate
at least two more remediation projects on private land.393 Money for these
projects comes from the EPA's section 319 nonpoint source pollution
grants.

Next, the Stakeholders Group plans to develop a framework for TMDL
regulation in the basin. 395 The TMDL developing process could constitute
the most challenging hurdle the Stakeholders Group has dealt with.
However, Simon does not worry about the TMDL impacts in the Upper

Animas basin. Simon claims that since natural or unavoidable background
384. Id.
385. Telephone Interview with Cal Joyner, supra note 370.
386. Id.
387. This study will be used by the Commission to set use designation standards.
388. Survey Questions for the Watershed Source Book Revision-Long Form, Data
Concerning Animas River Stakeholders Group, at No. 38(d) (on file with Natural Resources
Law Center, University of Colorado).
389. Id. at No. 38(d).
390. This project will focus on Carbon Lakes' hydrologic controls, which are controls of
water flowing into mines. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
391. This project give money to three to six private landowners to work on hydrologic
controls. Id.
392. This project works on hydrologic controls in a unique way to avoid liability under
the CWA. These projects attempt to intercept water infiltration before it hits abandoned
mines to prevent AMD production. In this way, the remediation project does not directly
work on the mine portal, which would create liability under the CWA. Id.
393. Steve Fearn's Silver Wing Company and Salem Minerals work on mine drainage
treatment at two separate sites with EPA section 319 money. Id.
394. First, the section 319 money goes to the Division. The Division, through grants,

chooses recipients. When the Stakeholders Group receives money from the Division, the
San Juan County RC&D actually holds the money for the Stakeholders Group. Id.

395. Id.
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contamination conditions remain exempt from the load reduction side,
TMDLs may not create as difficult a problem as imagined. 39 In addition,
the EPA "is in love with" the community-based watershed approach in the
TMDL context because the reforms required to achieve the TMDLs remain
politically difficult to implement without local support.397 Therefore, EPA
will likely support whatever standards the Stakeholders Group creates.
RECOMMENDATIONS
"Everything simple is wrong. Everything complex is useless. 398
"[A] general law should be enacted under which a number of persons
would be able to organize and settle on irrigabledistricts,
and establish their own rules and regulations
for the use of the water and subdivision of the lands,
but in obedience to the generalprovisions of the law. ,99
VI.

The implementation of any of the following recommendations might
facilitate a more successful venture for the Stakeholders Group. First,
Colorado needs to adopt legislation similar to the State of Oregon's
legislation that finances and supports the creation and the continuation of
community-based watershed initiatives. Considering that Colorado is one
of the nation's most politically conservative states,4 °° passing such a bill
will be difficult. In fact, a similar bill failed in the 1998 legislative
session.40 '
However, many conservatives hold libertarian or small government
sympathies that may ally them with the community-based watershed
movement. Lobbyists must argue that initiatives like the Stakeholders
Group have the potential to promote democracy and to produce equitable
solutions to serious environmental problems. Without more direct state
support of watershed initiatives in Colorado, average citizens will continue
to feel alienated from the current system of highly litigious water
management.4 °2
Second, Congress and many of the western states need to adopt a

396. Telephone Interview with Bill Simon, supra note 235.
397. Telephone Interview with Doug Kenney, Research Associate for Natural Resources
Law Center (Apr. 7, 1999).
398. Preface, in THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINS: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND
HUMAN HISTORY, supra note 12, at xi (quoting Paul Valeri).
399. POWELL, supra note 148, at 39.
400. Republicans control both houses of Colorado's legislature. Likewise, the newly
elected governor is republican. Both United States Senators and the majority of United
States Representatives vote republican. Recent conservative ballot initiatives originated in
the state.
401. See generally H.B. 1288, 61S" Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998).
402. Colorado adjudicates water rights in court, while all other states administer water
rights through executive agencies. In addition, by one estimate, nearly half of the water
lawyers in the country live in Colorado. This system of regulating water rights may
contribute to a feeling of disempowerment among average citizens who are otherwise
interested in water resource management. Telephone Interview with Charles F. Wilkinson,
Law Professor at University of Colorado (Apr. 22, 1999).
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comprehensive federal and state program to deal with abandoned mines on
private and public lands. A program modeled after the SMCRA could tax
mining operations to finance reclamation of abandoned mining sites. This
reform would require modification of the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872.
Prior attempts to reform this Act have proven unsuccessful. However,
recent developments suggest reform may be gaining momentum.4 °3 Any
program addressing abandoned mines should have a preference for
community-based solutions created from collaborative forums. In addition,
this law should attempt to minimize the fragmentation of management
authority over lands affected by abandoned mines by encouraging or by
requiring interagency cooperation.
Third, the Forest Service and BLM in San Juan County should
continue to increase their coordination with the Stakeholders Group. In
addition, funding for the AMLI program should extend beyond five years.
The FS and the BLM should recognize that problems like AMD cannot be
solved quickly. Rather, the agencies must make long-term commitments to
solving these problems. The FS should formally adopt a policy similar to
BLM's that allows its AMLI money to be used on private land. Both
agencies should then proactively use this policy to benefit all stakeholders
in the area rather than limiting their efforts to their respective bureaucratic
domains. Similarly, the FS and BLM should take more affirmative actions
to encourage small landowners with abandoned mines on their lands to
participate in the process. Because these landowners remain the key to
cleaning up the basin, they should participate throughout the process.
Last, Congress should adopt the good samaritan provision, which
would amend the CWA to exempt third parties from liability for
voluntarily cleaning up abandoned mine sites. Congress should adopt a
law that includes strong oversight provisions and reasonable limitations on
liability for groups like the Stakeholders Group. The theoretical possibility
that the state or the EPA can regulate abandoned mines on innocent
landowners' properties is insufficient. In reality, no regulation or clean up
occurs at these sites. The good samaritan provision would empower third
parties to tackle this challenge.
Accompanying this relaxation of liability, two actions must occur.
First, the state and federal governments should diligently pursue the
individuals or the corporations responsible for the pollution occurring at
the abandoned mines. When the government finds the PRPs, it should
require them to pay for as much of the remediation as equity allows.
Second, Congress should strengthen the CWA to require mandatory
403. The Western Mining Action Center recently began challenging mining claims based
on a provision in the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872 that only allows a minimal amount of
acres for mill sites on mining claims. In the past, this limitation on mill site claims had
essentially been ignored. However, the Department of Interior recently agreed with the
Western Mining Action Center's interpretation of the Act to limit mill sites. This
interpretation, if upheld in court, could mean that the Hardrock Mining Act is insufficient to
accommodate the large amounts of mill site area that are needed to run a modern mine. If
this is the case, then even the mining companies will be calling for reform. Telephone
Interview with Roger Flynn, Executive Director and Managing Attorney for Western
Mining Action Center (Mar. 14, 1999).
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regulation of nonpoint source pollution. Despite Congress' recognition of
the importance of regulating these sources, the CWA remains impotent in
this regard.
VII.

CONCLUSION

"[W]ithout the torment of the ideal,
there is little hope for significant and enduring change.
"In general, this effort is viewed favorably as a pragmatic mechanism
for integratingnational regulatory goals
within a grassroots watershed managementframework.
The approachhas potential applicationto many other sites throughout
the West,
by abandonedmines. "405
burdened
those
particularly
The community-based watershed movement has emerged from a sea of
paradoxes in the American West. While the West remains a bastion of
rugged individualism, the West was built and sustained by cooperation
among neighbors and friends. 4°6 Though a staunch anti-government
contingent exists in the West, many rural ranchers and farmers in the
region depend on state and federal subsidies for their livelihood.4 °7
Mining, too, began as an individualist's enterprise, but now consists of
multinational corporations dependent on whole communities to operate.
The Upper Animas basin's AMD problems create a paradox. The
pollution that remains belongs to people long since gone. Yet, people
singled out for liability under the current regulatory structure are usually
called "innocent landowners." In fact, almost everyone in the United
States shares some responsibility for mining pollution. Nearly everyone
drives a car or uses a computer that contains some mined metals. Others
continue to inherit wealth derived from the exploitation of minerals from
public lands. Colorado, itself, with its state seal emblazoned with a
miner's pick and shovel, was built on mining. Along with accepting the
benefits, local, state, and federal actors must accept their appropriate
degree of responsibility for the problems created by unregulated mining.
To see local, state, and federal entities taking responsibility for the
mining pollution in the Upper Animas basin is refreshing and inspiring.
The Stakeholders Group disproves those who claim that community-based
groups never accomplish anything. At the same time, perhaps its greatest
challenges lie ahead.
It is refreshing and inspiring to see local, state, and federal entities
taking responsibility for the mining pollution in the upper Animas basin.
The Stakeholders Group is disproving those who claim that community404. FRANK POMMERSHIEM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 135 (1995).
405. KENNEY, supra note 1, at 15.
406. See generally PETER R. DECKER, OLD FENCES, NEW NEIGHBORS (1998).

407.

See generally

LAW

AND

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS

DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).
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based watershed groups are ineffective. At the same time, perhaps its
greatest challenges lie ahead. If the Stakeholders Group fails, it may not
be clear why. It could fail from lack of effort, though that is unlikely.
More likely, it could fail due to institutional factors, such as lack of
funding or insufficient governmental coordination. However, if groups
like the Stakeholders Group can produce solutions in a democratic manner,
then Congress, the legislature, and government agencies should give them
every opportunity to succeed while retaining mechanisms to ensure
accountability.
Democratic values and civic participation reverberate with people's
deepest intuitions of fairness. The Stakeholders Group is striving for
fairness and equity. While it has the wind at its back, it should be given
every opportunity to succeed, remembering that without the risk of failure,
success is never possible.

ARTICLE UPDATE
In Volume 2, Issue 2 of the Water Law Review, we introduced the Article Update section, which has allowed us to provide our readers with updated information from previously published Water Law Review articles.
The first Article Update we published provided excerpts from Colorado
Supreme Court decisions that brought Justice Hobbs' survey of Colorado
water law published in Volume 1, Issue 1 up to date. The next Article
Update, which appeared in Volume 3, Issue 1, presented the resolution of
an unresolved dialogue between two attorneys about the Animas La-Plata
project that appeared in Volume 2, Issue 2 of the Water Law Review.
The Water Law Review dedicated Volume 3, Issue 1 to Mr. Felix
Larry Sparks for his consistent and monumental work as a Colorado water
attorney. During the course of the interview, Mr. Sparks revealed that in
1976, while Director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, he authored an article that surveyed some important provisions of the "Law of
the Colorado River." We are pleased to present as an Article Update Mr.
Sparks' survey and an introduction to this survey authored by Mr. James S.
Lochhead.
This issue's Article Update differs from its predecessors. It arose from
the Volume 3, Issue 1 dedication to Mr. Felix Larry Sparks as opposed to
from an article, and, therefore, continues to tell a history rather than update a legal issue. Although Mr. Sparks' piece provides a historical perspective, we have included an introduction authored by Mr. James S.
Lochhead which explains the current significance of Mr. Sparks' survey.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO MR. FELIX LARRY SPARKS'
SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR DOCUMENTS AND EVENTS
RELATING TO THE COLORADO RIVER
JAMES S. LOCHHEAD

Seven major western rivers originate in Colorado's mountains, one of
which is the Colorado River, a river fraught with allocation controversies
governed by state and federal statutes, interstate compacts, court decisions,
and even an international treaty. This regulatory scheme is called the
"Law of the Colorado River," and its ramifications are not limited to Colorado; it affects all states with an interest in Colorado River water.
$ Senior Counsel, Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C., Denver and Glenwood Springs, Colo-

rado. Mr. Lochhead was the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources from 1994 to 1998. He served on the Colorado Water Conservation Board from
1983 to 1998. From 1988 to 1999, he was the lead representative for Colorado concerning
interstate Colorado River issues, and Colorado's Commissioner on the Upper Colorado
River Commission. He is currently a Special Assistant Attorney General for Colorado on
interstate Colorado River matters.
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The State of Colorado has been fortunate-its representatives have assumed a leadership role in the development of the "Law of the Colorado
River." Mr. Felix Larry Sparks is one of those leaders. As the Director
of the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), Mr. Sparks was
instrumental in the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act negotiations.
From the perspective of the Upper Basin, Section 602 contains the Act's
key language, written in large part and strongly endorsed by Mr. Sparks.
This law provides protection for water to be held over in Upper Basin reservoirs in order for the Upper Basin to meet its obligations under the Colorado River Compact.
Mr. Sparks had a firm grasp of the history of, and legal and policy reasons for, Colorado's positions in the negotiation of the Colorado River
Compact. He was able to use that understanding to further the protection
of Colorado's water entitlement for future generations. He was careful to
pass along that knowledge to those of us who followed in his footsteps.
This survey, written in 1976 when Mr. Sparks was still Director of the
CWCB, was part of his continuing effort to inform Colorado water users of
the legal underpinnings of the protections afforded to Colorado under the
"Law of the River," and of the issues remaining to be resolved.
Mr. Sparks' survey is still relevant because Colorado's current positions on the Colorado River are based on the historic principles argued by
Mr. Sparks and his predecessors. First, Colorado has sought assurance
that it could develop a specified share of the Colorado River in perpetuity,
as need and economic conditions dictated. Second, Colorado has sought
the elimination of the doctrine of prior appropriation as applied on an interstate basis, the application of which would give the faster developing
Lower Basin a preferred share of the River. Third, Colorado has sought to
preserve state autonomy in water resource management and the intrastate
operation of the prior appropriation doctrine. Fourth, while strongly protecting its interests, Colorado has sought negotiated solutions to avoid interstate litigation. Finally, Colorado has advocated for comprehensive development and operation of reservoir regulation, in both the Upper and
Lower Basins, in a way that would assure the protection of Colorado's
entitlement to develop its share of the River. These principles are reflected
as themes in Mr. Sparks' outline, and continue today as the foundation for
Colorado's positions in its relationships with the other states and the federal
government.
The last 100 years in the development of the "Law of the River" can
be divided into three "eras." In the first era, the states and the federal
government established the entitlements that laid the foundation for later
development of the River. The Colorado River Compact,' the Boulder
Canyon Project Act,2 the Mexican Water Treaty,3 and the Upper Colorado

1. Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-61101 to 104 (1999).
2. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1998)).
3. February 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994, 3 U.N.T.S. 313.
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River Basin Compact4 were the important documents that established these
allocations.
In the second era, in which Mr. Sparks played a key role, the states
and federal government developed the river with a vast system of reservoirs and diversions, and negotiated the legislation that provided the financial wherewithal and operating rules for that system. Important elements
of this era included the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act,5 the
United States Supreme Court decree in Arizona v. California,6 the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act,7 and the 1970 Operating Criteria for
Colorado System Reservoirs.
The third era, in which we now find ourselves, may be termed the era
of limits, an era that will test the system put in place by Mr. Sparks and his
peers. In this era, many things are happening in response to the foundation
already laid. First, quantification issues have arisen. California consistently uses water in excess of its entitlement under the decree in Arizona v.
California. For the last nine years, the states of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming have been engaged in negotiations
with California and the Secretary of the Interior to develop criteria for the
operation of Colorado River reservoirs for an interim period that will allow
California time to implement a plan to reduce its use of Colorado River
water to its basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet per year in years
in which a normal declaration is made by the Secretary of the Interior under the decree. The states and the federal government also have developed
interstate water banking regulations in the Lower Basin that allow Nevada
and California access to surplus water stored underground in Arizona, and
provide some flexibility in the use of water in the Lower Basin. California's overuse is not the only quantification issue that remains controversial.
The quantification of Native American reserved rights claims, an issue expressly reserved in the Colorado River Compact, must continue toward
resolution.
Second, the states and the federal government are working hard at
solving environmental problems without disrupting the framework of water
allocation and management established under the "Law of the River." This
is a time in which the states, the federal government, and other interested
parties are struggling to deal with the environmental impacts of the development of the reservoirs and diversions in the Basin. The condition of the
Colorado River Delta in Mexico and the Salton Sea in California, along
with salinity in the River, are critical environmental issues. Also, fluctuating water releases have had detrimental effects on aquatic ecosystems, resulting in states' negotiation and support of the Grand Canyon Project Act.
The Grand Canyon Project Act changed the operation of the power plant at
Glen Canyon Dam in order to reduce the adverse impacts of fluctuating

4. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-62101 to 106 (1999).
5. Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (1994)).
6. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
7. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 82 Stat. 886, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501 to 1556 (1994).
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water releases in the Grand Canyon. Additionally, the states are undertaking active and expensive endangered species recovery programs in both the
Upper and Lower Basins.
As Mr. Sparks writes at the end of his survey, the final chapter in the
continuing struggles over the waters of the Colorado River may never be
written. However, if Colorado is fortunate to have in its future the kind of
principled, dedicated, and intelligent leadership as that provided by Mr.
Sparks, then its interests will be well served, and the historic principles
under which Colorado has consistently negotiated will be maintained.
II.

SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR DOCUMENTS AND EVENTS
RELATING TO THE COLORADO RIVER
MR. FELIX L. SPARKS
1. THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT'

During the period 1905-1907, a series of disastrous floods occurred in
the Colorado River's Lower Basin. A considerable portion of the Imperial
Valley was inundated and the Salton Sea was created. Nature made it quite
obvious that settlement along the lower reaches of the Colorado River was
fraught with uncertainty. In the years following these floods, plans for
controlling the Colorado River gathered momentum in the Lower Basin,
spearheaded by private and public organizations of the State of California.
The residents of the upper reaches of the Colorado River had no consuming interest in the Lower Basin's problems. Colorado and Wyoming
were busily engaged in disputing each other's water rights concerning the
North Platte River, which is a tributary of the Missouri River. The resulting decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wyoming v.
Colorado9 established the legal principle that the doctrine of prior appropriation controls regardless of state boundaries. When the full import of
this decision began to sink in, the other Colorado River Basin states realized that the already rapidly growing State of California was presented with
an opportunity to grab off the lion's share of the Colorado River flow.
At this time the State of California was already vigorously pressing
Congress for authorization of a federally financed Lower Basin project on
the Colorado River. As a result of the Wyoming v. Colorado'l decision,
the Upper Basin states were now openly hostile towards storage or diversion facility construction on the lower river that would place that area in a
position to monopolize the waters of the river through prior appropriation.
Therefore, it did not appear possible that Congress would approve lower
basin projects without an adequate guarantee that Upper Basin water resources would have some protection. In such a climate, the Colorado
River Compact Commission ("Commission"), authorized by Congress the
8. Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684; COLO.
101 to 104 (1999).
9. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
10.

Id.

REV. STAT.

§§ 37-61-
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previous year, began its deliberations in January of 1922. Herbert Hoover,
who represented the United States, chaired the Commission.
It soon became obvious that no water division among the respective
seven states could ever be accomplished. Agreement was then reached that
the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries would be apportioned
between the "Upper Basin" (Colorado, Wyoming, parts of New Mexico,
Utah, and Arizona), and "Lower Basin" (California, Nevada, parts of
Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona).
However, the Commission then became deadlocked on the question of
how much water each basin was to receive. A handy solution was provided by the Bureau of Reclamation, which had conducted studies to determine each basin's possible future water requirements. The Upper Basin's requirements were figured at 6,500,000 acre-feet of water annually.
The requirements of the Lower Basin from the main stem of the Colorado
River were estimated at 5,100,000 acre-feet. The total future consumptive
use of water from the Gila River in Arizona was computed at 2,350,000
acre-feet. This latter sum, when added to the 5,100,000 from the main
stem of the Colorado, came to 7,450,000 acre-feet. This figure was
rounded out to 7,500,000 acre-feet.
At this point the situation existed whereby the total Upper Basin present and future requirements were computed at 6,500,000 acre-feet of water annually, and the Lower Basin requirements, including the Gila River,
were computed at 7,500,000 acre-feet annually. Since over 80% of the
Colorado River flow originates in the "Upper Basin" states (Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), the Upper Basin commissioners were
hardly in a position to return home and inform their constituents that they
had bargained away over half of the Colorado River to the Lower Basin.
At this point, a successful compromise almost occurred, whereby the
Upper Basin would be allowed another million acre-feet of water in order
to bring its total allocation to the same figure agreed on for the Lower Basin. The result would have been a neighborly 50-50 split of the Colorado
River waters. The Arizona commissioner, however, insisted that if the
Upper Basin was to get another million acre-feet of water, then the Lower
Basin must have another million acre-feet of water also. Thus, the matter
was thrown out of balance again.
Since the Arizona commissioner was adamant on the point, a rather
devious solution was finally worked out. The compact was written so that
it would appear that the waters would be divided on a 50-50 basis. Article
Ill(a) carried out this theme by providing for the apportionment of
7,500,000 acre-feet of water annually to the Upper Basin and Lower Basin
respectively "in perpetuity." However, in Article 111(b) the Lower Basin
was "given the right" to increase its consumptive use of water by one million acre-feet annually. This latter provision would have been relatively
innocuous had it not been followed by Article Ill(c) concerning future deliveries of water to the Republic of Mexico, which were subsequently established by treaty at 1,500,000 acre-feet of water annually. In computing
any deficiency in deliveries to Mexico, the Lower Basin is entitled to compute the total of its use as being both Ill(a) and (b) (i.e., 8,500,000 acrefeet of water), while the only use accorded to the Upper Basin is in Article
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III(a) (i.e., 7,500,000 acre-feet of water).
It should be noted that the commissioners calculated the average annual
virgin flow of the river at Lee Ferry at approximately 17,000,000 acre-feet
and the virgin flow of the lower tributaries at about 4,000,000 acre-feet,
making a total water supply of about 21,000,000 acre-feet annually. Presently, the Colorado River and its tributaries have not exceeded 18,000,000
acre-feet annually. Total river allocations are 17,500,000 acre-feet annually (1 1/2million to Mexico, 8 1/2million to the Lower Basin, and 7 1/2
million to the Upper Basin).
A further compact provision provides that the Upper Basin shall not
cause the flow of the river to be depleted below 75,000,000 acre-feet in
any consecutive ten-year period reckoned in continuing progressive series.
This amount of water, together with tributary inflow below Lee Ferry, has
historically been sufficient to satisfy both the Lower Basin and the Mexican
Treaty allocations.
The completed compact was signed by the respective commissioners of
each of the seven Colorado River Basin States and by Herbert Hoover as a
representative of the United States at the Palace of Governors in Santa Fe,
New Mexico on November 24, 1922. In historical sequence, the compact
was ratified by the Legislatures of the respective states as follows: Wyoming-February 25, 1925; Colorado-February 26, 1925; New MexicoMarch 17, 1925; Nevada-March 18, 1925; California-March 4, 1929;
Utah-March 6, 1929; and Arizona-February 24, 1944.
Of particular importance is the fact that for many years the Arizona
legislature refused to ratify the compact, despite urging from its commissioner. This refusal caused considerable consternation among the other
states, since the compact by its explicit terms provided that it would not
become effective until approved by the legislatures of each of the signatory
states. The Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 resolved this problem.
2.

BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT OF 192811

After the signatory states executed the Colorado River Compact, the
State of California renewed its battle to obtain congressional authorization
for construction of the Boulder Dam project. At the time this battle was
renewed, the Arizona, California, and Utah legislatures had not yet ratified
the compact. However, it was anticipated that both California and Utah
would ratify the compact, but that Arizona would not. This problem was
neatly solved by a provision of the Boulder Canyon Project Act passed by
Congress in 1928 that specified that the Colorado River Compact would
become effective when ratified by the legislature of six states. 12 Almost
immediately after the passage of that Act, the States of California and Utah
ratified the compact, bringing the total number to six, making the compact
a reality.
The Act specifically states that it is "subject to the terms of the Colo11. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1998)).
12. See 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a).
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rado River compact." 13 In order to placate the State of Arizona, the Act
provided that it would not become effective until the State of California,
via legislative action, had irrevocably agreed to limit its consumptive water
use from the Colorado River to 4.4 million acre-feet annually. 14 Reluctantly, the California legislature did this. However, Arizona was not satisfied by this provision and fought the Boulder Canyon Project Act's passage. The Act was supported by all other Colorado River Basin states.
The principal purpose of the Act was to authorize the Boulder Canyon
Dam construction on the lower Colorado River.
An extremely significant section of the Act authorized the States of
Arizona, California, and Nevada to enter into an interstate compact that
would divide among those states the 7.5 million acre-feet ("m.a.f.") of water apportioned annually to the Lower Basin by the Colorado River Compact.' 5 The apportionment suggested by Congress was 2.8 m.a.f. to Arizona, 4.4 m.a.f. to California, and .3 m.a.f. to Nevada. 16 Furthermore,
Congress suggested that Arizona should have exclusive beneficial
consumptive use of that part of the Gila River and its tributaries within the
boundaries of the State of Arizona, and Congress recommended that the
Gila River should never be called upon to satisfy any agreement with Mexico concerning Colorado River waters. 7 In recognition of article Ill(c) of
the Colorado River Compact relating to a future potential agreement with
Mexico, Congress further suggested that Arizona and California should
mutually agree to supply the Lower Basin half of any deficiency from the
main stream of the Colorado River.' 8
Arizona adamantly refused to enter into the compact Congress suggested and presently still refuses to do so. Nonetheless, this issue was at
least partially laid to rest by the Supreme Court decision in the case of Arizona v. California'9 and by certain provisions of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of 1968.20
A further provision of the Boulder Canyon Project Act gave congressional approval for the Upper Basin states to negotiate a compact among
themselves, dividing among the respective states the 7.5 m.a.f. apportioned
to the Upper Basin by the Colorado River Compact. 2' The Upper Basin
states did this via the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948.2

13. 43 U.S.C. § 617.
14. See 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
101 to

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468 (1963).
Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501 to 1556 (1994).
See 43 U.S.C. § 617r.
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-62106 (1999).
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MEXICAN TREATY AND PROTOCOL OF 19443

On February 3, 1944, at Washington, D.C., a treaty was executed between the United States and Mexico concerning the Colorado River and the
Rio Grande. The United States subsequently ratified this treaty on April
18, 1945. The most significant provision of that treaty relating to the
Colorado River is Article 10.
Article 10. Of the waters of the Colorado River, from any and all
sources, there are allocated to Mexico: (a) A guaranteed annual quantity
of 1,500,000 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) to be delivered in
accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of this Treaty. (b)Any other
quantities arriving at the Mexican points of diversion, with the understanding that in any year in which, as determined by the United States
Section, there exists a surplus of waters of the Colorado River in excess
of the amount necessary to supply uses in the United States and the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) annually to Mexico, the United States undertakes to deliver to Mexico, in
the manner set out in Article 15 of this Treaty, additional waters of the
Colorado River system to provide a total quantity not to exceed 1,700,000
acre-feet (2,096,931,000 cubic meters) a year. Mexico shall acquire no
right beyond that provided by this subparagraph by the use of the waters
of the Colorado River system, for any purpose whatsoever, in excess of
1,500,000 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) annually. In the event
of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the
United States, thereby making it difficult for the United States to deliver
the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) a year, the water allotted to Mexico under subparagraph (a) of this
Article will be reduced in24the same proportion as consumptive uses in the
United States are reduced.

While a treaty with Mexico apportioning Colorado River waters to

Mexico had long been expected, it was never regarded as being a serious
threat to the operation of the Colorado River Compact. Actually, the
treaty has proven to be extremely vexatious to all of the Colorado River
Basin states and probably will become the subject of protracted future liti-

gation among the seven Colorado River Basin states. There is not ever
likely to be any agreement between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin
concerning the "deficiency" in deliveries to Mexico as defined in article III
(c) of the Colorado River Compact.
It is interesting to note that only the State of California opposed the
ratification of the Mexican Treaty. Ratification was supported by the other
six basin states. It appears at this point in history that California's fore-

sight was much better than that of the other states.
The treaty was executed in the height of World War II. Since most of

the United States' total energies and resources were being devoted to the
prosecution of the war at that time, the events of that era provided a
strange setting for the execution of a treaty relating to the waters of the
Colorado River and the Rio Grande. While it is difficult to deny that the
23. February 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994, 3 U.N.T.S. 313.
24. Id.
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treaty was equitable, the treaty language makes no mention of the true reasons for which it was executed.
The actual trigger for the execution of the Mexican Treaty of 1944 was
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This attack
produced hysteria in the United Sates to the extent that it was believed that
the Japanese might attempt a United States invasion through either the west
coast of the United States, or the west coast of Mexico, or both. One
tragic example of this hysteria was the forced evacuation of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the west coast to interior areas of the
United States, including Colorado.
It was a fact that Mexico could have offered no serious resistance to a
Japanese invasion of the United States that might have occurred through
Mexico. Consequently, the questionable opinion of people in high places,
for example, the President, was that an accommodation with Mexico was
necessary in order to permit the employment of United States military
forces on Mexican soil to resist any Japanese invasion from that source.
Mexico had a price for such accommodation. The water treaty of 1944 was
a part of that price. Ironically, World War II was over within a few
months after the United States ratified the treaty.
4.

UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT25

It should be noted, again, that the Colorado River Compact of 1922 did
not apportion water to the respective states, but only to the Upper and
Lower Basins of the Colorado River. Twenty-six years after the Colorado
River Compact was signed, the Upper Colorado River Basin states through
their various commissioners signed the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on October 11, 1948. This compact was
subsequently ratified by all five Upper Colorado River Basin state legislatures, including Arizona, which had at long last ratified the Colorado River
Compact in 1944.
5.

COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT26

Like all western rivers, the Colorado River's annual flows are highly
erratic. In recent history, the annual flow of the river at Lee Ferry has
fluctuated from a high of about 23 million acre-feet to a low of about 5.6
million acre-feet. Without holdover storage above Lee Ferry, there have
been years in which no water would be available to the Upper Basin if a
delivery of 75,000,000 acre-feet in every consecutive ten-year period were
made at Lee Ferry. This fact was fully recognized when the Colorado
River Compact was negotiated in 1922. The solution discussed during the
compact deliberations was the construction of a major reservoir or reservoirs above Lee Ferry, which would then permit a relatively equalized annual flow at Lee Ferry.
25. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-62-101
to 106 (1999).
26. Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (1994)).
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In addition to the problem of making the specified Lee Ferry water deliveries, the Upper Basin was faced with the major financial task of financing Upper Basin projects that would permit the Upper Basin to utilize its
apportioned share of water. After the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact was signed in 1948, the unified Upper Basin states began a concerted
effort to obtain congressional authorization of legislation that would make
it possible for the Upper Basin states to utilize their total allocated water
supply governed by the Colorado River Compact. The result was the enactment of the Colorado River Storage Project Act in 1956.27
Early in the game, it was perceived that the Upper Basin would need
considerable financial assistance if it were to develop its apportioned waters. Since large reservoirs have the capability of generating considerable
electrical energy, the obvious solution to the financial problem was an apportionment of power revenues to the Upper Basin states. There was some
disagreement among those states, however, as to how these revenues
should be apportioned. One suggestion was that an Upper Basin fund be
created from which the Upper Basin states could draw revenues in accordance with their needs. The idea of a common fund did not appeal to
Colorado, and it insisted that the revenues be apportioned on the basis of
water allocations under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. New
Mexico, which has the smallest water allocation, objected to this method of
apportioning power revenues.
The dispute over the apportionment of power revenues threatened the
unity of the Upper Basin states for a while. Eventually, a compromise was
reached by which revenues were specifically apportioned to the respective
states, but on a basis which differed slightly from the water allocations.
Colorado agreed to a revenue reduction of 5.75 per cent, which went to increase New Mexico's allocation, and Utah agreed to a reduction of 1.5 per
cent, which went to Wyoming's allocation. The resulting allocation of
power revenues to the respective states was as follows (water allocations
shown in parentheses):
State
State
State
State

of Colorado
of New Mexico
of Utah
of Wyoming

46 percent (57.75 per cent)2829
17 per cent (11.25 per cent)
3°
21.5 per cent (23 per cent)
3
15.5 per cent (14 per cent) '

In the early 1950's, the Upper Basin states began an intensive effort to
secure congressional authorization of the Colorado River Storage Project
Act. This effort was strenuously opposed by various congressmen from
southern California, but had some support by congressmen from northern
California. Arizona and Nevada also supported the passage of the legisla-

27. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 620- 620(o).
28. See 43 U.S.C. § 620d(e).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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tion. The act was passed in 1956. The three major provisions of the act
are as follows: First, it provided for the construction of the Glen Canyon
Dam on the Colorado River in Arizona a few miles above Lee Ferry, the
Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah on the Green River, the Navajo Dam in New
Mexico on the San Juan River, and the Curecanti Dams in Colorado on the
Gunnison River. The total combined storage capacity of these four major
projects is in excess of 30 million acre-feet.32 Second, it authorized the
construction of participating projects in the Upper Basin, subject to a finding of feasibility. 33 Third, it established the Upper Colorado River Basin
Fund from apportioned power revenues to assist in the repayment of participating projects. 34 To date, approximately two billion dollars have been
authorized as expenditures to further the purposes of the Colorado River
Storage Project Act.

6.

THE SUPREME COURT CASE OF ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA 35

As has previously been stated, the State of Arizona stubbornly refused
to ratify the compact for over twenty years after the signing of the Colorado River Compact in 1922. The primary reason for its refusal was the
fact that the waters of the Gila River in Arizona were clearly subject to apportionment pursuant to the terms of the compact. Arizona argued during
the compact negotiations that the Gila River should not be considered as
part of the Colorado River System for compact purposes. The compact became such an explosive political issue in Arizona that no political candidate
dared run for public office without condemning the Colorado River Compact. At least one governor threatened to use the Arizona National Guard
to prevent the reservoir constructions on the Colorado River that would
benefit California.
The substantial agricultural industry of Arizona is sustained almost entirely by diversions from the Gila River and by heavy ground water withdrawals, the latter constituting the major source. Aggravated by the
drought period of the 1930's and the expanded agricultural production of
the World War II period to the present, the State of Arizona had become
increasingly alarmed about its rapidly dwindling ground water supply. In
such a climate, the State of Arizona began a massive effort to import waters from the Colorado River to the Central Arizona Basin. That effort finalized into the project now known as the Central Arizona Project.
The authorization and construction of the Central Arizona Project
posed a formidable legal dilemma to the State of Arizona. Arizona had not
ratified the Colorado River Compact and had refused to enter into a compact with the Lower Basin states as Congress suggested in the Boulder
Canyon Project Act. Arizona attempted to solve this sticky problem by
asking the United States Supreme Court to determine its rights regarding
the Colorado River. The Supreme Court originally refused to accept juris-

32.
33.
34.
35.

See 43 U.S.C. § 620.
See id.
See 43 U.S.C. §620d(a).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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diction. Arizona finally decided that it had to ratify the Colorado River
Compact if it were to have any standing in court or in Congress. This it
did during World War II by legislative action on February 24, 1944.
After this ratification, Arizona renewed its efforts to get congressional
authorization of the Central Arizona Project, which would export water
from the lower Colorado River into the Central Arizona Basin. Since there
was still no agreement among the Lower Basin states as to how their apportioned waters would be divded among those states, the Arizona effort was
strenuously opposed by California and to varying degrees by the other
states of the Colorado River Basin. As a result of this opposition, the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs adopted a resolution on
April 18, 1951, to the effect that it would not consider any legislation authorizing the Central Arizona Project until the Lower Basin states' rights to
the Colorado River waters had been determined either by litigation or by
voluntary agreement. Faced with this political reality, the State of Arizona, again, invoked the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court by filing a complaint against the State of California in 1952. This
time the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction.
The suit requested adjudication between the States of Arizona and California as to the division of the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries between those two states. After the complaint was filed, the United
States and the States of Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah were joined as
parties. The Supreme Court referred the case to Mr. George I. Haight as
Special Master. Mr. Haight died in 1955 and the case was then referred to
Mr. Simon H. Rifkind as successor to Mr. Haight.
In January of 1961, the Special Master reported his findings, conclusions, and recommended decrees to the Supreme Court. Subsequent oral
arguments and briefs were presented to the Court attacking, or in some
cases supporting, the Master's findings and decree. On June 3, 1963, the
Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case.
In its decision the Supreme Court stated that "[a]s we see this case, the
question of each State's share of the waters of the Colorado and its tributaries turns on the meaning and the scope of the Boulder Canyon Project Act
passed by Congress in 1928. ,36 In support of this line of reasoning the
Court held that there was nothing in the Colorado River Compact which
purported to divide water among the Lower Basin states and that, therefore, the Colorado River Compact did not control. 3' This conclusion is
somewhat baffling since the Project Act makes repeated reference to the
Colorado River Compact. To put it another way, the Project Act cannot be
interpreted without first interpreting the Compact.
That portion of the Boulder Canyon Project Act 38 that apparently controlled and determined the Court's decision reads as follows:
The States of Arizona, California, and Nevada are authorized to enter into
36. Id. at 551-52.
37. Id. at 566.
38. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1998)).
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an agreement which shall provide (1) that of the 7,500,000 acre-feet annually apportioned to the lower basin by paragraph (a) of Article III of the
Colorado River compact, there shall be apportioned to the State of Nevada 300,000 acre-feet and to the State of Arizona 2,800,000 acre-feet for
exclusive beneficial consumptive use in perpetuity, and (2) that the State
of Arizona may annually use one-half of the excess or surplus waters unapportioned by the Colorado River compact, and (3) that the State of Arizona shall have the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of the Gila River
and its tributaries within the boundaries of said State, and (4) that the waters of the Gila River and its tributaries, except return flow after the same
enters the Colorado River, shall never be subject to any diminution whatever by any allowance of water which may be made by treaty or otherwise to the United States of Mexico but if, as provided in paragraph (c) of
Article III of the Colorado River compact, it shall become necessary to
supply water to the United States of Mexico from waters over and above
the quantities which are surplus as defined by said compact, then the State
of California shall and will mutually agree with the State of Arizona to
supply out of the main stream of the Colorado River, one-half of any deficiency which must be supplied to Mexico by the lower basin, and (5)
that the State of California shall and will further mutually agree with the
States of Arizona and Nevada that none of said three States shall withhold
water and none shall require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses, and (6) that all of the
provisions of said tri-State agreement shall be subject in all particulars to
the provisions of the Colorado River compact, and (7) said agreement to
take effect upon the ratification of the Colorado River compact by Arizona, California, and Nevada.39
In order to make the foregoing division of water fully effective, Congress further provided in the Project Act that the act would not take effect
until the State of California, by act of its legislature, shall agree irrevocably and unconditionally with the United States and for the benefit of the
States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming,
as an express covenant and in consideration of the passage of this subchapter, that the aggregate annual consumptive use (diversions less returns to the river) of water of and from the Colorado River for use in the
State of California, including all uses under contracts made under the
provisions of this subchapter and all water necessary for the supply of any
rights which existed on December 21, 1928, shall not exceed four million
four hundred thousand acre-feet of the waters apportioned to the lower
basin States by paragraph (a) of Article III of the Colorado River compact, plus not more than one-half of any excess or surplus waters unapportioned by said compact, such uses always to be subject to the terms of
said compact.4 °
In order to get the Boulder Canyon Project constructed, the State of
California at this point had little alternative except to agree to the Project
Act's terms. This was done by the California legislature in 1929. The
Lower Basin states, however, never entered into the agreement suggested
by the Project Act.
Stated in its simplest terms, therefore, the Supreme Court arrived at its
39. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a).
40. Id.
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decision, as did the Special Master, by applying the Boulder Canyon Project Act's terms (as referred to above). There was one significant departure, however, from the Master's decision. The Master held that in times
of shortage, the shortage should be apportioned using a mathematical formula in proportion to each state's share of the allocated waters. The Supreme Court disagreed with this method of apportioning shortages on the
basis that neither the project act nor the water contracts required the use of
any particular formula for apportioning such shortages. The Court reasoned that since the Boulder Canyon Project was constructed for irrigational and other purposes, such as flood control, navigation, regulation of
flow, and generation of electrical energy, the Secretary should not be tied
to a rigid formula that would force him to distribute water for irrigation
purposes only. Following this line of reasoning, the Court held that the
Secretary of the Interior "is free to choose among the recognized
methods
41
of apportionment or to devise reasonable methods of his own."
The entire essence of the Supreme Court's decision was that since the
Lower Basin states had failed to agree among themselves as to a division of
the Colorado River waters, Congress had done this for them via the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Of particular interest to the Upper Basin states is the fact that Arizona
contended that the Colorado River Compact apportioned only the waters of
the main stream, not the main stream and the tributaries. In view of the
express Colorado River Compact wording, this appears to be a ridiculous
contention. The Supreme Court, however, pacified itself on this point by
stating: "We need not reach that question, however, for we have concluded
that whatever waters the Compact aportioned the Project Act itself dealt
only with water of the mainstream."'
There is nothing in the Project Act which states that Congress was
speaking only of the waters of the main stream. The Project Act, as already quoted, speaks of "the 7,500,000 acre-feet annually apportioned to
the lower basin by paragraph(a) of Article III of the Colorado River compact."4 3 Article Ill(a) of the Colorado River Compact, as referred to above
within the project act, reads as follows:
There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity
to the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin respectively the exclusive
beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre feet of water per annum,
which shall include
all water necessary for the supply of any rights which
44
may now exist.
Article 11(a) of the Compact defines the Colorado River System as "that
portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the United States of

America. ,41

41. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 593.
42. Id. at 568.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (emphasis added).
44. Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684; COLO.
101(1999) (emphasis added).
45. Id.
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Using the Colorado River Compact as the basic document in this case,
an entirely different interpretation than that made by the Supreme Court
can be made of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. It should be pointed out
that there are Lower Basin tributaries, other than the Gila River, which enter the Colorado River below Lee Ferry, above the Boulder Dam, and below the Boulder Dam.
In his decision, the Master held that his water apportionment applied
only to the waters available from Boulder Dam. This decision, in effect,
would have allowed the use of those tributaries entering the Colorado River
between Lee Ferry and the upper end of Lake Mead without charge to the
user state. The Supreme Court corrected this obvious error by stating that
such use would be charged to the user state as a part of the apportionment
from Lake Mead.
The United States intervened in the action for the purpose of claiming
main stream and tributary waters for use on Indian reservations, national
forests, and other federal lands. The Master declined to make a finding
concerning tributary waters but followed the prevailing federal theory on
main stream waters pertaining to the federal government's reservation of
water supplies. The principal issue at stake was the amount of water
needed "to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations."46 The Master determined this future need by considering the
number of irrigable acres within each Indian reservation. The total amount
of water allocated to the United States in the decision was about 1,000,000
acre-feet annually.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Master's conclusions and findings
on this point. A very significant part of the decree that is of particular interest to the Upper Basin states reads: "[flinally, we note our agreement
with the Master that all uses of mainstream water within a State are to be
charged against that State's apportionment, which of course includes uses
by the United States.""
Throughout its decision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court was preoccupied with "main stream" water. In order to justify this preoccupation,
the Court had to interpret the Boulder Canyon Project Act as only dealing
with main stream water. The Boulder Canyon Project Act, however, was
based upon the Colorado River Compact. The Colorado River Compact
obviously and expressly deals with the waters of the Colorado River System as therein defined. If such were not the case, probably none of the
signatory states would have executed the Colorado River Compact, most
certainly not the Upper Basin states. The most disconcerting feature of the
decision is the definition of the 7,500,000 acre-feet of water apportioned to
the Lower Basin as defined by the Supreme Court via the Boulder Canyon
Project Act. This definition is wholly inconsistent with the plain terms of
the Colorado River Compact. It is a very neat trick to say Article Ill(a) of
the Compact has one meaning for the Lower Basin and another meaning
for the Upper Basin. Notably, it has been said.

46.
47.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600.
Id. at 601.
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With regards to the Upper Basin, however, it must be pointed out that
the Supreme Court was quite careful in conveying that the case before it
involved only an apportionment of waters among the Lower Basin states.
The Court did not attempt to define or ascertain any obligation of the Upper Basin states with respect to either the delivery of water to the Lower
Basin or to the Republic of Mexico.
The litigation lasted approximately ten years. Buoyed by its apparent
victory, Arizona renewed its efforts to secure authorization of the Central
Arizona Project in the United States Congress.
7.

COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECT ACT'

The latest chapter in the long struggle over Colorado River waters began after the decision in the Arizona v. California"9 case. While the decision was greeted with great enthusiasm in Arizona, the other six basin
states were considerably less enthusiastic. Immediately after the decision
was announced, Arizona, again, introduced legislation in order to authorize
the Central Arizona Project in Congress. Much to Arizona's dismay, it
quickly became apparent that such legislation would not pass without the
other basin states' support. Negotiations among the seven states then
started in an attempt to resolve the many issues. Representatives of the
varied states' water resource agencies were the principal negotiators, and
they conducted numerous meetings at various locations in an attempt to arrive at some legislative compromise.
The Upper Division states feared that authorization of the Central Arizona Project would impede further water resource development in the Upper Basin. This fear was based on the fact that a full water supply for the
Central Arizona Project could not materialize without using waters allocated to the Upper Division. California, learning from its defeat in the
court case, opposed the legislation for the reason that it would reduce the
amount of water that California had previously been diverting. The climate for the negotiations was not good and the meetings among the negotiators were often stormy. Eventually, however, it became apparent that
future water resource development in each of the seven states would be seriously jeopardized if such accommodations were not reached. An accommodation was reached and resulted in the passage of the Colorado
River Basin Project Act, which was approved by the President on September 30, 1968. Some of the principal provisions of that Act include the following important premises:
a.

Authorization of the Central Arizona Project

°

This project, now under construction, involves the construction of
pumps, canals, and reservoirs that will convey water from Lake Havasu on
the lower Colorado River into the Central Arizona area (Phoenix area, and,
perhaps, the Tucson area also). While the legislation does not expressly say
48.
49.
50.

Colorado River Basin Project Act, 82 Stat. 886, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501 to 1556 (1994).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(a).
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so, the amount of intended water to be diverted is 1.2 million acre-feet annually, if this amount is available. It is doubtful that this amount will ever
be available, and it most certainly will not be available when the Upper Basin reaches its fully authorized depletion.
b. As against the Central Arizona Project, a Quantity Guarantee to the
51
State of California of 4.4 Million Acre-Feet of Water Annually
This guarantee was California's price for supporting the legislation.
Through this provision, California avoids the most serious effects of the
Supreme Court decision. As matters now stand, the State of Arizona
gained little, if anything, as the result of the Supreme Court decision, in
terms of ultimate water supply.
c.

52
Authorization of Construction Projects

These projects include five participating projects in Colorado and one
in Utah, which were all authorized for construction. For the Colorado projects, the legislation prescribes that "as nearly as practicable" they shall be
completed not later than the date of the first delivery of water from the
Central Arizona Project.
d. Clarification of the Colorado River Compact
Subchapter V of the Act contains various provisions that the Upper Basin states insisted upon in an attempt to clarify some of the ambiguous provisions of the Colorado River Compact. A principal provision of that subchapter is contained in Section 1552(a)53 as follows:
In order to comply with and carry out the provisions of the Colorado
River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and the Mexican Water Treaty, the Secretary shall propose criteria for the coordinated
long-range operation of the reservoirs constructed and operated under the
authority of the Colorado River Storage Project Act, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, and the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act. To effect in
part the purposes expressed in this paragraph, the criteria shall make provision for the storage of water in storage units of the Colorado River storage project and releases of water from Lake Powell in the following listed
order of priority:
(1) releases to supply one-half the deficiency described in article III
(c) of the Colorado River Compact, if any such deficiency exists and
is chargeable to the states of the Upper Division, but in any event
such releases, if any, shall not be required in any year that the Secretary makes the determination and issues the proclamation specified in
section 1512 of this title;

51.

See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b).

52.

See id. § 1521(a).

53.

Id. § 1552(a)(l)-(3).
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(2) releases to comply with article III (d) of the Colorado River Compact, less such quantities of water delivered into the Colorado River
below Lee Ferry to the credit of the States of the Upper Division
from other sources; and

(3) storage of water not required for the releases specified in clauses
(1) and (2) of this subsection to the extent that the Secretary, after
consultation with the Upper Colorado River Commission and representatives of the three Lower Division States and taking into consideration all relevant factors (including, but not limited to, historic
stream-flows, the most critical period of record, and probabilities of
water supply), shall find this to be reasonably necessary to assure deliveries under clauses (1) and (2) without impairment of annual consumptive uses in the upper basin pursuant to the Colorado River
Compact: Provided, That water not so required to be stored shall be
released from Lake Powell: (i) to the extent it can be reasonably applied in the States of the Lower Division to the uses specified in article III (e) of the Colorado River Compact, but no such releases shall
be made when the active storage in Lake Powell is less than the active storage in Lake Mead, (ii) to maintain, as nearly as practicable,
active storage in Lake Mead equal to the active storage in Lake Powell, and (iii) to avoid anticipated spill from Lake Powell.
The final chapter in the continuing struggle over the waters of the
Colorado River has not yet been written-and may never be.
FELIX L. SPARKS
Director
July, 1976
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I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBLE REALLOCATION OF EXISTING
WATER SUPPLIES

As urban areas, industry, and recreational and environmental uses of
water expand, the issue of reallocation of existing supplies of water

expands with them.
Indeed, in light of the high economic and
environmental costs of developing new water supplies, reallocation may be
a necessary condition for further economic development of semi-arid

f Charles W. Howe is Professor of Economics and Professional Staff, Environment
and Behavior Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

regions.'
This article focuses on the potential usefulness of extended water
markets in which public values are adequately protected.
It will
concentrate on the issues of economic efficiency and fairness of water
markets in regions that have adopted the appropriations doctrine, typically
semi-arid regions where irrigated agriculture accounts for a large part of
consumptive use.
The concept of economic efficiency refers to allocating scarce
resources to maximize the net value of all useful products and services,
marketed or non-marketed. 2 At the individual project or policy change
level, economic efficiency is reflected in a cost-benefit analysis that
calculates
the present values of marketed and non-marketed outputs and
3
costs.

The definition of "fairness" or "equity" is far more subjective.
However, the public places great weight on some perception of equity in
judging programs or projects. No matter how one defines equity, the
distribution of benefits and costs across affected parties can be estimated as
part of the cost-benefit analysis. This distributional analysis is especially
important in designing policies and projects aimed at disadvantaged groups.
In the longer term, the perceived fairness of the distribution of benefits and
costs can affect the economic efficiency of projects through public
reactions and project participation.4
Markets provide flexible and voluntary ways of reallocating resources
under the right circumstances, therefore, water markets have been strongly
advocated for many years. 5 The major advantages of water markets over
other methods of allocation are: (1) they provide for flexible reallocation
1. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, Water Challenge and Institutional Response (A
Cross-Country Perspective), in POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2045-THE WORLD
BANK 40-43 (1999); Charles W. Howe, Socially Efficient Development and Allocation of
Water in Developing Countries: Roles for the Public and Private Sectors, in MANAGING
RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Charles W. Howe ed.,
1982).
2. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
22, 22-25 (1992).
3. See RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR. & DWIGHT D DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit
Analysis
(last
modified
April
1999)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tarabstract id = 164902>.
Some advocate a multiplecriteria approach in which impacts on more esoteric non-market services (e.g. biodiversity)
are simply described as information for the decision-making process. See INTERNATIONAL
HYDROLOGICAL PROGRAMME OF UNESCO, MULTICRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS IN WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, U.N. Doc. SC.94/WS.14 (Janos J. Bogardi & Hans-Peter
Nachtnebel eds., 1994); see also U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES
IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES (1983).

4. See Charles W. Howe, Water Resources Planning in a Federation of States: Equity
versus Efficiency, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29-30 (1996); see also H. PEYTON YOUNG,
EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).
5. See L;M. HARTMAN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS (1970); WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1983); SHARING
SCARCITY: GAINERS & LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994).
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over time in response to economic, demographic, and social-value changes;
(2) they involve only "willing seller-willing buyer" transactions; (3) due to
the nature of "willing seller-willing buyer" transactions, they provide
security of tenure of property rights; (4) by providing market evidence of
the value of water, they continually confront the water user with the real
"opportunity cost" of the water being used, regardless of the oftendistorted prices charged by water distribution agencies; and (5) the
transaction costs of market transfers can be kept low under the right
circumstances.6
Examples of functioning water markets are found in the 100-year
history of water rights trading in Colorado.7 A particularly interesting and
well-known example is found in the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District of Colorado ("NCWCD"). 8 The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, a water project that the Bureau of Reclamation began in
1937 and completed in 1957, delivers water acquired from the western
slope of the Rocky Mountains to the NCWCD on the eastern side of the
mountains. In turn, NCWCD delivers water to agricultural and urban
users on the basis of ownership of shares in the NCWCD. These shares
are readily tradable in an active market to any user able to demonstrate the
ability and intent to put the water to "beneficial use." The NCWCD
facilitates trading by maintaining a bulletin board for offers to buy and sell.
Brokers also play an indirect role, although they must avoid the "beneficial
use-speculation" conflict. Transaction costs are very low.
Another example, the California Water Bank operated in the latter
parts of the extended drought of 1986-1991. 9 The California Water Bank
was a State of California and Bureau of Reclamation sponsored program
intended to bring buyers and sellers together during the severe drought.
Transfers were for one year only, 1991, and, during this period,
approximately 800,000 acre-feet changed hands.
In the western United States, one finds some significant barriers to the
reallocation of water in general and to water markets in particular. First,
although various parties proposed interstate water market arrangements,
there are no interstate water sales." ° Many vested interests oppose
6.

Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential

for Water Markets, 22

WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH

439 (1986).

7. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Water Transfer Process as a Management Option for
Meeting Changing Water Demands, report to the U.S. Geological Survey, No. 14-08-0001G1538, Nat. Resources L. Ctr., U. Colo. (April 1990); Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa
A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 2
HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27 (1994).
8. See DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST: THE COLORADO-BIG
THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT

(1992); Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural Characteristics of
an Active Water Market, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 971 (1994); Charles W. Howe et
al., Innovations in Water Management: Lessons from the Colorado-Big Thompson Project

and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, in

SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL

171-200 (Kenneth D. Frederick ed., 1986).
9. Ray Coppock et al., California Water Transfers: The System and the 1991 Drought
Water Bank, in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN CALIFORNIA WATER
MARKETING 21-40 (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 7.
CHANGE

10.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

CONCEPTUAL

APPROACH
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interstate water markets for fear of permanently losing water allocated to
the state by compact. Water districts that receive water from federal and
state projects generally restrict water sales and leases to district boundaries
on the ground of protecting the financial base for repayment of project
costs."1 Arizona allows the sale of groundwater only with the sale of the
overlying land.' 2 California water market transactions are complicated by
water laws that combine the appropriation doctrine, the riparian doctrine,
old Spanish law,' 3 and the large amounts of state and federal project water
that are distributed under contract.
Several studies focused on the economic costs of the inability to
reallocate existing water supplies on an intrastate basis. H. J. Vaux and
Richard Howitt estimated for California that an annual savings of $200
million could be achieved through interregional (North-South) reallocation
of water from agriculture to urban areas, and that these savings could rise
to nearly $3 billion by 2020. "
Richard Wahl described numerous
opportunities within California and elsewhere for highly beneficial
reallocation. "
On an interstate basis, J. F. Booker and R.A. Young found in their
study of the allocation of Colorado River water between Upper and Lower
Basins that the institutional inability to account for values created by nonconsumptive instream uses (hydro-power, recreation, and salinity dilution)
resulted in excessive Upper Basin consumption from an economic
efficiency point of view.' 6 Others have estimated that instream values lost
on the Colorado River due to Upper Basin consumptive uses ranged from
$99 per acre-foot for the Green River sub-basin of the Upper Colorado
River Basin to $341 per acre-foot for the Upper Main Stem sub-basin.' 7
These impediments to water transfers are due in part to the slowness of
institutions to change in response to economic and social value changes.
Laws, regulations, and administrative policies often lag behind the

AGREEMENT
ON INTERIM OPERATION OF COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS,
CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER ABOVE ITS BASIC APPORTIONMENT, AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER BANK (prepared for the Colorado River Basin
States Meeting, Colorado River Board of California (August 28, 1991)); RICHARD W.
WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF

RECLAMATION

11.

271-92 (1989).

RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS,

AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 127-44

(1989).

12. See Gary C. Woodard & Elizabeth Checchio, The Legal Framework for Water
Transfers, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 721 (1989).
13. See Brian E. Gray, A Prineron California Water Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV.
745, 745-82 (1989).
14. H.J. Vaux, Jr. & Richard E. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of
InterregionalTransfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 785 (1984).
15. See Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1 HASTINGS WESTNORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49 (1994).
16. J.F. Booker & R.A. Young, Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for
ColoradoRiver Water Resources, 26 J. ENVTL. ECONS. & MANAGEMENT 66 (1994).
17. Charles W. Howe & W. Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper Colorado

River Basin: Problems and Policy Alternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 169, 193-98 (Mohamed T. EI-Ashry & Diana C. Gibbons eds.,
1988).
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changing economic, demographic, and technological scene, resulting in
patterns of water use that become increasingly inefficient. Large intrastate
and interstate water use inefficiencies present unique opportunities for
"win-win" resolutions, i.e., situations in which water transfers could
produce sufficient benefits from which all affected parties could profit (in
economic jargon, a so-called "Pareto improvement"). Unfortunately, it is
frequently not practicable to compensate the losers from water transfers
due to difficulties in identification and their potential existence in different
legal jurisdictions."8 The real and perceived existence of significant
uncompensated losses in areas-of-origin has stimulated resistance to large
(and especially out-of-basin) water transfers generally, and to the water
market process in particular.
II. PUBLIC VALUES THAT ARE INADEQUATELY PROTECTED UNDER
CURRENT WATER MARKET PROCEDURES

Public values are values that are unlikely to be taken into account by
private transactors in the market process. In the water resources area,
these values include the unique importance of social and cultural values
generated by water, the important instream values that are not protected by
property rights, external costs imposed directly on other parties due to
jurisdictional boundaries that relieve water users of liability for damage,
and the "secondary economic impacts" imposed on areas-of-origin,
especially agricultural communities when agricultural water use is
substantially reduced. The importance of these values, in the case of water
transfers, implies that market-based transactions in water are likely to
generate inefficiencies and inequities to a greater extent than market-based
transactions in other sectors of the economy. Ignoring or under-weighting
these values can occur for various reasons as discussed in detail below.
Due largely to these highly visible, negative impacts on public values,
there has been increasing resistance to water marketing and, in particular,
to out-of-basin transfers of water. Recent newspaper citizen letters have
expressed concerns.19 In Colorado, legislation has been introduced in
several recent legislative sessions to prohibit or constrain out-of-basin
transfers.2" It is worthwhile, therefore, to identify these public values, to
determine the extent to which they warrant protection, and to explore ways
in which this protection might be provided without foregoing the
advantages of water markets.
A.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES GENERATED BY WATER.

Many community values cannot be captured in monetary terms but
warrant consideration in decisions about water transfers. A recent study
18. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, RETHINKING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 26
(John M. Olin Law & Econs. Working Paper No. 72 (2d Series), 1999) (This paper may
also be downloaded at <http://papes.ssrn.com/paper.tafrabstract_id = 164902>).
19. See Nancy Strong, Enjoy Cantaloupes While You Can, THE DENVER POST, Sept. 19,
1999, at H5.
20. H.B. 97-1286, 61" Leg. 1", Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997); H.B. 95-1240, 60"h Leg., 1St
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1995); S.J. Mem'i 96-2, 60th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1996).
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points out that water is one of the most attractive visual elements of the
landscape and that in arid landscapes, especially, there is a wide range of
cultural, spiritual, and religious values related to water. Current policies
for water management address only a few of the relevant human values.21
This is particularly true in traditional, low-income communities in which
In the
water often plays an important symbolic, cultural role.
Southwestern United States, the acequia system not only supports local
agricultural needs, but also maintains social cohesion because maintenance
of the canals and distribution of the water are community efforts.2 2 Costilla
County, Colorado, provides a good demonstration of the acequia
community's cohesion: the village of San Luis, Colorado has banded
together to fight the degradation of its waters caused by logging on the
adjacent Taylor Ranch. 23
In these old systems, the water rights typically belong to the
community, so that community-wide decisions have to be made if water is
to be sold and transferred outside the community. While this appears to
require a consensus on water sales, the low-income levels and the
seemingly high prices offered for water make such decisions difficult,
requiring a tradeoff not only between the level of agricultural activities and
alternatives made possible by the proceeds from water sales but between
lifestyles and cultures. In a well-known New Mexico water rights case, the
judge is said to have stated: "[I]t is simply assumed by the applicants that
greater economic benefits are more desirable than the preservation of
cultural identity. This is clearly not so ...I am persuaded that to transfer
water rights, devoted for more than a century to agricultural purposes, in
order to construct a playground for those who can pay is a poor trade
indeed." 24 Although this decision was reversed on appeal, it stands as a
classic statement of the importance of historic patterns of water use. 5 In
another New Mexico case, the state engineer negotiated a compromise
between the acequia and industry that sought to purchase and transfer
45.35 acre-feet of surface rights from one of the acequia landowners on the
historic Anton Chico Land Grant. 26 The judge stated that "the thirty to
forty-five acres of land that would have gone fallow might not seem
significant to the outside observer, but within the acequia system, custom
and tradition require that all water users participate in the upkeep and
maintenance of the entire system. ,27
Cultural values associated with water are not confined to particular

21.

Shmuel Burmil et al., Human Values and Perceptions of Water in Arid Landscapes,

44 LANDSCAPE& URB. PLAN. 99 (1999).

22. See STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO: CHRONICLE OF AN ACEQUIA IN NORTHERN
NEW MEXICO (1988).
23. See Peter McBride, Chaos Comes to Costilla County, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 9,

1997, at 1.
24.

JOSE

A.

RIVERA,

ACEQUIA CULTURE:

SOUTHWEST 161 (1998) (citing

RA 84-53(C)
25. Id. at
26. Id. at
27. Id. at

WATERS,

LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN THE

In re Howard Sleeper et al., Rio Arriba County Cause No.

(N.M. Div. 5, First Judicial Dist. April 16, 1985)).
158.
162-64.
164.
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ethnic groups. Farm families place a high value on the farm or ranch
lifestyle. Kenneth Weber interviewed farmers engaged in agriculture in the
Arkansas Valley of Colorado, farmers who "stick it out" on marginally
profitable farms because they value the farm lifestyle. 2' Even after selling
the water from their lands, many farmers retain their farm homes. Weber
found that of thirty-six Crowley County, Colorado farmers who had sold
their water,2 9 thirty-four remained in the county. This is not to argue that
traditional societies should forever remain unchanged, but it is to argue that
the economic "playing field" is uneven between low-income traditional
societies and the more advanced sectors, and that maintenance of these
cultures is of concern to society at large.
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL, RECREATIONAL, AND ECOSYSTEM VALUES
GENERATED BY WATER SYSTEMS: THE PROBLEM OF "PUBLIC

GOODS"
Some of the undervalued services provided by water systems, like the
environment and recreation, share two unique characteristics: (1) the
benefits can be enjoyed by many people without diminishing the quality of
the benefit for others; and (2) it is impractical to require people to pay for
the benefit. An example would be an improvement in water quality that
can be enjoyed by many downstream parties including recreationists, urban
utilities, agricultural irrigators, and all parties who value healthy riparian
ecosystems. Such a benefit or good is called a "public good" in economic
jargon, not that it is necessarily publicly provided, but that it provides
widespread, non-rival benefits.3 ° Public goods are significant because
private parties tend not to provide for or be concerned about them. 31 For
these reasons, public good values associated with instream flows are likely
to be slighted by private water rights owners and even by public agencies
that cannot gain revenues from their provision.
It is clear that water transfers can affect water quality, instream values,
and riparian habitat. It is axiomatic that out-of-basin transfers will have a
negative effect on the basin-of-origin and a positive one on the basin-ofdestination. Diminished flows in the basin-of-origin eventually affect the

28. See Kenneth R. Weber, Comment, Effects of Water Transfers ol Rural Areas: A
Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13-15 (1990); see
also Kenneth R. Weber, What Becomes of Farmers Who Sell Their Irrigation Water?: The
Case of Water Sales in Crowley County, Colorado (Nov. 16, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author); Kenneth R. Weber,
Irrigation Water Sales in Crowley and Otero Counties, Colorado: Social and Historical
Context (Sept. 2, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file
with author).
29. See Kenneth R. Weber, What Becomes of Farmers Who Sell Their Irrigation
Water?: The Case of Water Sales in Crowley County, Colorado (Nov. 16, 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author) (finding that
many shares in the Colorado Canal were sold to Aurora and Colorado Springs, however,
thirty-four shares remained in Crowley County).
30. See CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 94-95 (2000).
31. The economically efficient price for a true "public good" is zero because it is
desirable that anyone who can benefit from it should do so, even if their valuation of the
good is quite low.
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streambed and riparian vegetation, which in turn affect wildlife dependent
on certain bank and vegetation conditions. 32 This is only an example of the
negative effects.
A highly visible negative effect occurs when irrigated land is dried up.
If revegetation is not undertaken, noxious weeds and blowing dust are
likely to result. Revegetation of long-irrigated land has proven to be very
difficult due to the changes in the composition of the soil. In the case of
the Rocky Ford minority transfer, the water court required that part of the
water not be removed from the land until revegetation had been
successfully carried out.
C.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VALUES LOST THROUGH "JURISDICTIONAL
EXTERNALITIES"

In all water administration systems, there remain unrecognized
"opportunity costs" of water abstraction.33 These are downstream benefits
that are lost by virtue of upstream abstraction. At the intrastate level, one
can again cite the Vaux and Howitt study of transfer opportunities in
California as evidence of institutional barriers to water transfers; barriers
that obfuscate the true opportunity costs of the water being used in different
parts of the state.3 ' A current case in Colorado exhibiting the same
shortcoming is the Eastern Slope's rapidly-growing Arapahoe County's
application for the import of 60,000 acre-feet per year from the headwaters
of the Gunnison River on the western slope.35
While there is
"unappropriated water" in the Gunnison system, large downstream values
are generated by every acre-foot of water left in the stream. As noted
earlier, Howe and Ahrens have estimated that these values for the
Gunnison are at least $140 per acre-foot.36
A prime example of losses occasioned at the interstate level due to
failure to recognize downstream costs is the increase in salinity caused by
the Grand Valley Irrigation Project in Western Colorado. Prior to the
Bureau of Reclamation's salinity control program for the Project, G.W.
Skogerboe, R.L. Walker, and Leathers estimated that the Grand Valley
Project was contributing ten (short) tons of salt to the Colorado River per

32.

WARREN VIESSMAN,

JR. & CLAIRE WELTY, WATER MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGY

AND INSTITUTIONS 164-83 (1985).

33. The expression "opportunity cost" refers to the benefits relinquished elsewhere
when resources are consumed by some application. It is thus the true measure of cost, as
opposed to monetary costs, that frequently fail to reflect the real sacrifices made through
resource use. Opportunity costs ("real costs") may be difficult to determine.
34. H.J. Vaux, Jr. & Richard E. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of
Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 785 (1984).
35. See Katrina M. Ohman, Federal Public Land Agencies and Watershed Protection:
The Upper Gunnison Basin (1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Colorado
(Boulder)) (on file with the Political Science Department at the University of Colorado
(Boulder)).
36. See Charles W. Howe & W. Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper
Colorado River Basin: Problems and Policy Alternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 169 (Mohamed T. EI-Ashry & Diana C. Gibbons eds.,
1988).
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irrigated acre per year.37 This addition of salt occurs just before the River
flows out of the State of Colorado and hence through Utah to the Lower
Basin. Since 10,000 tons of salt added to the Upper Basin results in an
increase in a Lower Basin Imperial Dam total-dissolved-solids
concentration of approximately 1 mg/l, it has been estimated that each ton
of salt in Upper Basin return flows results in Lower Basin damages in the
range of $16 to $48 per ton. 38 Thus, one acre of irrigated land in the
Grand Valley has historically contributed damages between $160 and $480
to Lower Basin.
These patterns continue not from illegal activity or ill intent but from
the institutional framework for water administration. The Colorado River
framework is divided into Upper Basin and Lower Basin state-by-state
areas, with each assigned allowable uses under existing compacts and state
laws. These jurisdictions were established to solve various political and
equity problems in water administration, such as a fair, reliable sharing of
water. However, the lack of coincidence between political boundaries and
river basins has allowed decision-makers to ignore downstream opportunity
costs. The resultant downstream externalities can be called "jurisdictional
externalities." As a consequence, while the resulting patterns of water use
may be considered fair in an historical context, they have become
increasingly inefficient from an economic point of view. The implication
is that the geographical extent of the markets is not great enough to allow
the markets to reflect total system opportunity costs.
D. THE PROBLEM OF "SECONDARY ECONOMIC IMPACTS" OF WATER
TRANSFERS

The phrase "secondary economic impacts" of water transfers refers to
changes in the levels of economic activity experienced by those who supply
inputs to or process the outputs of the seller or the buyer in a water
transfer. Since the majority of transfers in the Western United States are
from agricultural to urban uses, the negative secondary impacts associated
with the sale of irrigation water would consist of the reduced sales of
agricultural inputs like seed, fertilizer, chemicals, and equipment, and
In
reduced levels of further processing of agricultural products.39
economic terminology, these activities are said to be either "backward
linked" (suppliers) or "forward linked" (processors) to the water selling
and buying activities. The positive side of the transfer provides the

37. G.W. Skogerboe & W.R. Walker, Salt Pickup from IrrigatedLands in the Grand
Valley of Colorado, 2 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 377, 377-82 (1973); R.L. Leathers, The

Economics of Managing Saline Irrigation Return Flows in the Upper Colorado River Basin:
Case Study of Grand Valley, Colorado (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado
State University) (on file with the Colorado State University Library).
38. Jay C. Anderson & Alan P. Kleinman, Salinity Management Options for the
Colorado River, in WATER RESOURCES PLANNING SERIES REPORT P-78-003, 33-37 (Utah
Water Research Laboratory, June 1978).
39.

See Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural Characteristics

WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 971 (1994);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).

of an Active Water Market, 30

see also
EQUITY,
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benefits generated by new urban supplies.
The usual economic view of secondary impacts is that they are simply
the way the market works to withdraw or supplement resources at the two
ends of a resource transfer. In the private sector, businesses are not held
liable for losses imposed on forward or backward linked firms, so why pay
attention to these effects when evaluating resource transfers that are under
public sector jurisdiction? Furthermore, the secondary economic gains at
the buying end presumably more than offset the secondary losses at the sale
end.
Thus, the usual practice in cost-benefit analysis is to omit
consideration of secondary impacts.4"
This attitude ignores the uniqueness of water as a social and
environmental value, especially in rural areas.
It also ignores the
following: (1) that the secondary losses are felt in one location, while the
secondary gains are generally felt elsewhere; (2) that the transfers of
human and other resources away from the point of sale often take many
months at the cost of job search, moving expenses, and social disturbance;
and (3) that the timing of the gains and losses differ since the losses occur
either prior to or during the water transfer while offsetting gains are
typically in the future since cities and industry typically buy water in
anticipation of future needs.
Sale of water is most frequently from marginal, depressed agricultural
areas, 41 often resulting in long-term unemployment of human and nonspecialized resources. From the point of view of economic efficiency, the
idleness of resources that would otherwise have been employed constitutes
a real economic cost. Especially in the case of large water transfers, the
negative secondary impacts in the area-of-origin are highly visible and
attract public opposition to transfers. The absence of compensation and
assistance to the area of origin exacerbates the malaise.
The analysis of data on historical transfers from the Arkansas River
Valley in Colorado illustrates the negative impacts of transfers on the area
of origin. The city of Pueblo, Colorado, annexed land and received water
transfers from nearby horticultural operations.
Table 1 exhibits the
estimated negative impacts of these transfers directly on agriculture and
indirectly on the forward and backward linked activities of the Arkansas
Valley.

40. It is the loss of net incomes and not the total loss of sales that is the relevant measure
for these secondary impacts. There are also non-monetary environmental and social losses
and gains that stem from the secondary impacts.
41. Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water
Transfers in the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1200 (1990); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 7.

Issue 2

IMPROVING WATER MARKETS

Table 1
Estimated Negative Impacts of Older Historical Transfers
from Irrigation to Local Municipal and Industrial Use:
Arkansas River, Colorado.42
1971-1972
Direct and Indirect Reductions in Employment:
total reduction = 157 jobs
1 job per 73 acres (29 ha.)
Direct and Indirect Reductions in Regional Net Income:
$5,290,000 per year (1988 dollars)
$229 per acre-foot of consumptive use.43

These transfers, however, supported the growth of new industry in the

same economic area, probably leading to net gains for the regional
economy. Later transfers were larger and came from more marginal lands
that had grown mostly feed and forage crops. However, these later sales
were to points outside the Arkansas River Valley economic area.44 While
the reductions in regional employment and income per acre were lower
than for the earlier transfers, the later transfers had noticeably larger

aggregate impacts. See data in Table 2.

42. The historical transfers analyzed were (1971) Las Animas town Ditch to Pueblo
West, 10,000 acre-feet; (1971) Highline Canal to Pueblo, 2,600 acre-feet; (1972) BoothOrchard to Pueblo, 9,000 acre-feet; (1972) Holson Ditch to Pueblo, 1488 acre-feet. Total
acre-feet = 23,088. Total acres = 11,500.
43. Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water
Transfers in the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 120 (1990); see also author's background working papers.
44. Colorado Springs and Aurora were important purchasers. While Colorado Springs
is technically in the Arkansas River drainage, its economy is widely separated from that of
the Valley.
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Table 2
Estimated Negative Impacts of 1984-1991 Arkansas River Transfers
from Irrigation to Out-of-Basin Municipal and Industrial Use:
45
Arkansas River, Colorado
Reductions in Employment:
total reduction = 59 jobs
1 job per 1142 acres
Reduction in Regional Net Income
$6,740,200 per year
46
of consumptive use
acre-foot
$50 per

In Crowley County, Colorado, the sale of over 100,000 acre-feet of
water from 40,000 acres of land under the Colorado Canal resulted in
large-scale, negative impacts, including a drop in the County's tax base at a
time when increased social services were badly needed. 47 If further large
water sales take place, it seems likely that some of the superior acreages
growing the high value crops will be lost, and that impacts will be more
severe.

III.

How SHOULD PUBLIC VALUES BE PROTECTED?

Once it is observed that there are important public values that are
unique to water resources that are not adequately protected in water market
transactions, the issue arises as to how to protect the values in an
economically efficient manner, i.e. at the least cost to the rest of the
economy. Water markets will, and should, continue to play a major role in
the allocation of water. However, the functioning of markets needs to be
strengthened through institutional reform and constrained where it fails to
account for important social values. Western United States water policy
analyses suggest that the following steps warrant serious consideration.

45. The transfers included were: (1984) Las Animas Consolidated Extension to Public
Service Company, 10,186 acre-feet, (1985) Colorado Canal to Colorado Springs, 43,180
acre-feet, the 1974 sale of Twin Lakes shares to Pueblo, Colorado Springs and Aurora,
57,000 acre-feet, (1990) Rocky Ford to Aurora, 18,770 acre-feet, (1986) Highline Canal to
Aurora, 2,250 acre-feet, and the (1991) Keesee Ditch, 3,500 acre-feet. Total acre-feet =
134,886. Total acres = 67,400.
46. Howe et al., supra note 42.
47. Kenneth R. Weber, Irrigation Water Sales in Crowley and Otero Counties,
Colorado: Social and Historical Context (Sept. 2, 1988) (unpublished manuscript,
University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author).
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A. PROTECTING SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

Great complexities are involved in protecting cultural values of lowincome, culturally differentiated communities (i.e. old Hispanic
communities of the Southwest) within the broader market framework of the
rest of the economy. While ruling out transfers from such communities
would protect one set of values, it would deny the members of the
The main
community opportunities to profit through water sales.
protective step in such situations is to vest the water rights in the
community and not in individuals, necessitating community-wide decisions
to sell water. The community-wide tradeoffs between funds raised through
water sales and the continuation of traditional activities can then be
addressed fully.
The protection of environmental and aesthetic values requires collective
action. Since individual water users will not be able in most cases to
acquire sufficient water rights to protect instream flows or to offset
decreases in water quality, public entities (local, county, state, or special
district) should be allowed to hold water rights for instream protection
purposes. An example of instream flow protection is found in a recent
dedication of $12 million worth of water rights to protect late season flows
Under Colorado law, the Colorado Water
in Boulder, Colorado.
administers instream flows. The CWCB is
("CWCB")
Board
Conservation
charged with enforcement of the instream rights. The process can be
simplified and streamlined by allowing local and county governments and
special districts to hold water rights for instream protection.
Protection of the broader range of social and environmental values
requires a broadening of the "no injury" concept. The States of California,
Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah require the water transfer review
process to take into account a range of community values.48
B. MITIGATING "JURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES" THROUGH THE
GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF WATER MARKETS

Many of the external costs imposed on other water users mentioned
earlier stem from the existence of political sub-divisions that differ from
the river basins being administered. Since water law in the United States is
mostly a state matter, and since the historical creation of water rights could
not anticipate the future values of various water uses like instream values,
the rules by which water is allocated are frequently myopic from a river
basin point of view. Even the interstate compacts that divide water among
states become outdated from an economic point of view due to differing
growth rates, economies, and demographics.49
48. MacDonnell, supra note 7; see also Brian E. Gray, A Priner on California Water
Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 745 (1989); Mark Squillace, Water Marketing in
Wyoming, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (1989); Charles T. DuMars & Michele Minnis, New
Mexico Water Law: Determining Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 817 (1989); Ray Jay Davis, Utah Water Rights Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 841 (1989).
49. Lynne L. Bennett et al., The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation
Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. (forthcoming November, 2000)

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

One way of mitigating jurisdictional externalities would be to establish
river basin authorities or commissions with the power to consider the entire
river basin in the planning process. This was, in fact, undertaken in the
Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 ("1965 Act"), which authorized the
establishment of river basin commissions for planning and management
purposes. 50 Seven commissions were subsequently established: New
England, Great Lakes, Ohio, Upper Mississippi, Pacific Northwest,
Souris-Red-Rainy, and the Missouri. A member from each riparian state,
the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation (in the West)
comprised each commission.5 While some of the commissions were able
to coordinate water policies, including water quality programs, others were
largely ineffective due to a unanimity requirement for all decisions. The
commissions established under the 1965 Act were dissolved during the
Reagan administration. Other types of river basin commissions have been
established under congressional approval that have been effective in dealing
with basin-wide problems. The Potomac and Delaware Commissions stand
out in this regard. 2
Another step toward overcoming jurisdictional externalities would be to
extend water markets to encompass larger parts of or entire river basins.
At the intrastate level, better informational systems for offers to buy and
sell water rights could be organized, similar to the simple bulletin board
approach of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. 3 The
information could be computerized on a basin-wide scale. At the interstate
level, there are significant opportunities for efficient reallocations. In
1991, the State of California proposed the establishment of an "interstate
water bank" on the Colorado River for organizing annual interstate water
leases. 54 The trades were to have taken place through each states' water
agencies so that broader public interest issues would be taken into account.
While the proposal was quickly vetoed by several states, interest in
interstate water markets has continued. The Bureau of Reclamation has
assisted the three Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada) in
arriving at an exchange and storage agreement that has many of the
features of a market.55
The effectiveness of extending the geographical scope of water markets
depends in part on broadening the concept of "beneficial use" and the
broadening of the "no injury" requirement. Since many of the values that
are currently ignored in water allocation and reallocation are instream
(manuscript on file with author).
50. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
51. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS
(Richard L. Dewsnut et. al. eds., 1973).
52. See U.S. COUNCIL OF ENVTL. QUALITY, THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THREE CENTURIES OF CHANGE (1975).
53. Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential
for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 439, 443 (1986).
54. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 10.
55. Robert Macy, 77ree States Bank on Water Pact to Quench Future Needs, DENVER
POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at A37; Robert Macy, Interior Green Lights Water Banking Plan,
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 29, 1999, at BIO.

Issue 2

IMPROVING WATER MARKETS

values, extending a water market to encompass downstream areas where
many instream values are generated would accomplish little in a system
where instream values are not uniformly recognized as "beneficial" and to
which the "no injury" requirement is not extended.
C. MITIGATING THE REAL COSTS OF ADJUSTMENT FOR BASINS-OFORIGIN

Real economic efficiency costs are caused by the secondary impacts
imposed on largely agricultural areas from which large quantities of water
are transferred. These costs are imposed during the transition period on
activities that are "backward linked" (supplying inputs) or "forward
linked" (processing outputs) to agriculture and related populations.
Communities absorb these costs, often with great hardship. Since these
costs are not likely to be taken into account by buyers and sellers in water
markets, excessive transfers will occur.
It would be appropriate, therefore, from both efficiency and equity
viewpoints that buyers and/or sellers make compensatory payments to
public authorities in the area-of-origin.5 6 This compensation should be in a
form that will meet the priority adjustment needs of the area-of-origin. An
example of inefficient compensation to areas-of-origin is found in the
Colorado Water Conservancy District Act of 1937, which requires projects
exporting water from the Colorado River Basin to another part of Colorado
to provide "compensatory storage" within the Colorado Basin. 7 For
example, the compensatory storage provided by the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project took the form of GreenMountain Reservoir on the Blue
River below the Lake Dillon site that was built far ahead of any need for
flow augmentation.
The suddenness of some transfers leaves little time for adjustment in
the exporting region and increases the severity of the impacts. Thus, a
second method for mitigating the negative effects on the area-of-origin
would be to require a spreading of the withdrawals over a period of years.
This is frequently required by Colorado water courts for purposes of
revegetating lands dried up by water transfers. Spreading the transfer over
time can probably be done with little damage to the buyer of the water
because cities typically buy in advance of actual need.
The negative impacts of large water transfers on areas-of-origin could
be further mitigated by encouraging the lands from which senior water is to
be transferred to acquire other, more junior water to keep the land in
production. In water transfer cases involving ditch company shares,
Colorado water courts can require lands from which the water has been
sold to remain dried up in perpetuity to protect against the possibility that
the ditch company might "expand its rights" by calling for water in excess
56. Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in
Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV. 527, 536 (1986); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Water Transfer Process as a
Management Option for Meeting Changing Water Demnands, report to the U.S. Geological
Survey, No. 14-08-0001-G1538, Nat. Resources L. Ctr., U. Colo. (April 1990).
57. See H.B. 714, 31St Leg. (Colo. 1937).
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of the remaining historical share.58 In the case of direct transfer of state
water rights, it makes sense to let the farmer sell senior rights, and then
buy junior rights to maintain some form of farming operations. Depending
on the reliability of the rights purchased, the cropping pattern might have
to be changed but may still be profitable given the lower investment in
water rights. The secondary effects on the community will be less severe
than with the permanent drying up of the land. Since the purpose of water
administration is "to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of this
state," such re-watering of the land should be facilitated. 59
IV.

CONCLUSION

An evaluation of alternative water allocation mechanisms has shown
that water markets play an important role, and will play an increasing role,
in the allocation and reallocation of water. While markets perform the
allocative role quite well within the framework of the private values of the
buyer and seller, important public values are likely to be overlooked in the
process. Thus, the water market process needs public attention. The
positive features of water markets can be expanded in use and the
weaknesses can be mitigated to maximize the social utility of these valuable
social mechanisms.

58. See e.g. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996) (City of
Thornton purchased Water Storage and Supply Company shares).
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (1999).
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In Colorado, as in many arid western states, the need for limited water
resources continues to escalate as the state's growing population and
economy demand reliable water supplies for both a greater amount and
diversity of uses. When water users seek to develop new water rights,
conflicts over the allocation of these scarce resources arise. The forum for
resolving water rights conflicts is most often Colorado's water court,'
* Daniel Young is a civil engineer at the engineering firm of Helton & Williamsen,
P.C. and a third year e-!ening student at the University of Denver College of Law.
t Duane Helton is the President Helton & Williamsen, P.C. Mr. Helton has worked
as a water resource engineer in Colorado for over thirty years and has testified as an expert
in more than fifty water right cases, including hearings before the Special Masters in
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982);
In re Water Rights of the Bd. of County Comm'rs, Nos. 86-CW-226 & 88-CW-178 (Water
Div. No. 4, Colo. 1991) rev'd in part, aff'd in part, and rein'd, 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995);
and In re Water Rights of the Bd. of County Conm'rs, No. 88-CW-178, appeal filed,
98SA327 (Water Div. No. 4, Colo. 1998).
1. Colorado statute divides the state's water administration system into seven water
divisions, each of which houses one of the state's seven major river basins. See COLO.
Water court decisions are appealed directly to the
REV. STAT. § 37-92-201 (1999).
Colorado Supreme Court. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-102(1)(d) (1999); COLO. APP. R.
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which has exclusive jurisdiction over matters regarding the use of the
state's water resources. 2 Although disputes between water users are often
settled before reaching trial, water users generally approach conflicts over
the development of new water supplies planning for litigation.
Consequently, the water users seeking to develop water supplies, in
addition to hiring water attorneys, typically employ water resource
engineers as consultants to provide technical guidance. These engineers
also testify before the water court as experts.
Although the nature of water-related conflicts in Colorado is as diverse
as the interests of the water users themselves, most water disputes are
initiated when a water user plans to establish or expand its water supply
and files the required application with the water court. Once an application
is filed, interested parties,3 including the state, 4 can file statements of
opposition with the Court and become objectors in the case. In most
situations, the applicant hires an engineer to evaluate the applicant's water
needs and potential water resources, to provide assistance in preparing for
trial, and to testify before the water court in support of the applicant's plan.
Objectors will also employ engineers to evaluate the proposed plan and
ensure that their interests will not be impaired. This article focuses on the
engineer's role in developing a water supply plan for the applicant and
serving as an expert in guiding the plan through the water court process.
Part I of this paper provides a brief summary of Colorado water law as
it defines the general concepts affecting an engineer's water supply analysis
and expert testimony before the water court. Part II discusses the
approaches generally used by an engineer when quantifying the applicant's
water needs. Part III details how the engineer typically evaluates the
potential water resources available to the applicant and recommends a plan
that prevents injury to existing water rights. Part IV explains the role of an
engineer in assisting the attorney in drafting the water right application and
preparing for trial. Finally, Part V discusses the general type of testimony
given by an expert in a water court trial.
I. BACKGROUND 5

The basic foundation for Colorado water law is found in the state
constitution, which declares that all unappropriated water within the state is
the property of the public, 6 and the right to appropriate such water for
I (a)(2).
2. See id. § 37-92-203(1). However, the water court does not preside over water
disputes between states. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) (involving a
dispute between Kansas and Colorado over the administration of the Arkansas River under
the Arkansas River Compact codified in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-69-101 (1999)).
3. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(b) (1999).
4. Id.
5. See generally, Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical
Overview, 1 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 1 (1997) (providing an in-depth review of the
history and development of Colorado water law); Jill C. Harris, Introduction to Colorado
Water Law, COLORADO WATER WORKSHOP (July 1999) (providing an outline of the
principles of Colorado water law found in the state's constitution, statutes, and case law).
6. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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beneficial uses shall never be denied.7 As Justice Gregory J. Hobbs of the
Colorado Supreme Court once wrote, these two Constitutional provisions
established three basic tenets that govern the use of water in Colorado:
First, and foremost, the doctrine of prior appropriation is the exclusive
method for allocating rights to use quantities of stream water in Colorado.

Sections 3 and 6 [of the Colorado Constitution] are clear in this regard.
The application of riparian or reasonable use doctrines to the allocation of
water has been expressly rejected in Colorado. Second, the right to
appropriate water is only for beneficial uses. Finally, conflicts between
mutually exclusive demands for the right to use water quantities are to be
resolved by reference to the priorities of the competing uses.

Simply stated, the doctrine of prior appropriation gives "the party who
first puts water to a beneficial use the right to use the water to the
exclusion of others." 9 The detailed principles and structure of Colorado
water law have been codified in the Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969.1o
In order to acquire a water right with a legally enforceable priority
under Colorado law, a water user must put water to beneficial use and have
that appropriation adjudicated in the water court.' The water court issues
a decree for the water right that provides the water user with a priority for
a particular use and amount based on both the adjudication and
appropriation dates."2 As the Colorado Supreme Court summarized:

7. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
8. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water
Quality Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 878 (1989).
9.

SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

28-29 (2d ed. 1998). Contrary to the doctrine of prior appropriation, riparian rights
doctrine simply allows "all surface owners adjacent to a flowing stream [to] have a right to
use the water." Id. at 28.
10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 et seq. (1999).
11. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Five Principles that Define Colorado Water Law, 26
COLO. LAW. 165, 165-67 (1997). This water right is known as an absolute water right.

Another type of water right recognized by the water court is a conditional water right. A
conditional water right can be decreed in situations, for example, where an individual or
entity plans to put water to beneficial use, but requires additional time to construct the
required facilities. A conditional right secures the priority date and amount of the water
right until the water user can complete the project. See id. at 165. However, if the water is
not put to beneficial use before six years after the conditional decree is granted, the water
user must apply to the water court for a finding of diligence. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-301(4)(a)(I) (1999). If the water court does not grant diligence, the water right will be
abandoned. Id.
12. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(b)(II) (1999). The appropriation date refers
to the time when a bona fide interest to use water co-existed with action giving notice of that
intent provided that the water was beneficially used within a reasonable time, while the
adjudication date refers to the date the water right was decreed by the water court. The date
of the adjudication establishes the overall priority of the water right; however, the date of
appropriation is used to establish priorities within the same adjudication. Therefore, during
the first adjudication within each water division, the water right with the earliest
appropriation date possesses the first priority. See id. §§ 401(l)(b)(I)-(V). The oldest
water right in Colorado is the San Luis People's Ditch with an appropriation date of April
10, 1852 and an adjudication date of June 14, 1889.
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The law of prior appropriation in Colorado is well-settled. The first
person to divert unappropriated water and to apply it to a beneficial use
has a water right superior to subsequent appropriators from the same
water resource. Once a water right has been adjudicated, it is given a
legally vested priority date which entitles the owner to a certain amount of
water subject only to the rights of senior appropriators and the amount of
water which is available for appropriation.'
The court held that "to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him
of a most valuable property right. .

.

. A priority of right to the use of

water being property, is protected by our constitution so that no person can
be deprived of it without 'due process of law.' ""4 As a separate property
interest, a water right can be severed from the land on which it was
originally used and transferred separately.'"
Today, most rivers in Colorado are fully appropriated at least during
substantial parts of the year. New water rights decreed in more recent
water court adjudications rarely provide reliable, or firm, 6 water supplies.
Consequently, a water user seeking a reliable water supply usually has to
purchase a senior water right 7 and change its use or use it to augment a
junior water right. A change of water right must be adjudicated by the
water court and includes any change in the diversion location or in the
"type, place, or time of use."' 8 A plan for augmentation is a program
adjudicated by the water court that allows a junior water right to be
diverted out of priority, provided that any resulting effects are offset by a
substitute source.' 9 In some cases, reservoir storage may be necessary to
provide an alternative to the acquisition of a senior water right.2 °
In order to change a water right or obtain a plan for augmentation, the
water user must file an application with the water court,2' which will
approve the application if other water rights will not be injured.22 A water

13. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
14. Id. at 1378 (quoting Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893)).
15. See Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891).
16. Although more commonly used in connection with reservoir operations, the term
firm yield refers to the minimum amount of water that a water supply will produce in every
year. See RAY K. LINSLEY, JR. ET AL., HYDROLOGY FOR ENGINEERS 444 (3rd ed. 1982)
[hereinafter LINSLEY, ET AL.I.

17. Water rights are often referred to as being senior or junior depending on their
priority. A junior user will not be entitled to divert any water until all water rights in the
basin with a senior priority that could be affected by the junior right are satisfied. A water
right is generally considered satisfied when the water user is diverting the maximum amount
needed for the beneficial use and allowed by the decree, or the water right is not being used
voluntarily.
18.
19.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (1999).
See id. § 103(9).

20. Although the same watcr resource engineering concerns generally apply, this
possibility is not considered in this article. In addition, this article will not address the
engineering requirements needed to acquire a new appropriation. See generally City of
Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996); In re Water Rights of the Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995) (holding that requirements, such as antispeculation and "can and will," must be met in order to acquire a new water right).
21. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(l)(a) (1999).
22. See id. § 37-92-305(3).
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right is generally not injured if it is provided with the same stream
conditions that existed at the time of its appropriation.2 3 The amount of
water from a senior water right that can be changed or used for
augmentation purposes is limited to the historical amount consumed
pursuant to the right's decree, not the amount diverted or decreed. 4
Although the water court adjudicates new water rights and changes to
existing rights, the actual administration of water court decrees is the
responsibility of the state engineer. 5 The state engineer appoints a division
engineer to oversee the administration of water rights in each of the state's
seven water divisions.26 Within each water division, the division engineer
often has several water commissioners to assist in daily record keeping and
administration of the allocation of water between the various users.27
This brief summary of the very basic principles and provisions of
Colorado water law shows that the process required to either expand or
develop a water supply in Colorado can often be difficult. As a result, a
water user planning to file a water court application will generally enlist
the assistance of a water resource engineer. The water resource engineer
works closely with an attorney to develop a plan that provides a sufficient
water supply, satisfies the concerns of the objectors, and optimally, obtains
the approval of the water court.
II. QUANTIFYING WATER NEEDS
In many situations, the initial challenge faced by a water resource
engineer is to define the client's objectives and to quantify the amount of
water required to meet them. The objectives of a client are usually
determined by the proposed use of the water supply. It is necessary to
establish the client's proposed use or uses of the water because the size of
the required water supply is usually determined by the amount of water that
will be physically consumed, not actually diverted from a water source. 28
In many cases where a client seeks to establish a new water use, the
proposed change of water right, or augmentation plan, will provide water
to replace the amount of water physically consumed by the new use, not
the total amount of water needed for the use. For example, a typical
household may require 200 gallons of water per day; however, only ten to
twenty gallons are actually consumed, while the remaining water is
returned to its source through a septic system or water treatment facility.2 9
23. See City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 80.
24. See Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Colo. 1980); Santa Fe
Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 59 (Colo. 1999).
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-102, § 37-92-301 (1999). A detailed description
of the responsibilities of the State Engineer's Office ("SEO") can be found at the SEO
website.
See Office of the State Engineer (visited March 9, 2000)
<http://www.water.state.co.us>.
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-202(1)(a)-(b) (1999).
27. See id. § 37-92-202(3).
28. The water supply may be expanded from its initial amount in order to provide
additional water to replace delayed return flows and other needs to prevent injury to existing
water rights. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of the City of Westminster, Nos. 86-CW-397, 88-CW-
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Consequently, the water supply plan would typically need to replace only

the ten to twenty gallons of water consumed because the remaining water is
returned to the source for the use of downstream water users.
The amount of water consumed or depleted from a water source is
referred to as consumptive use, which is calculated based on the proposed
use of the water. As stated in a recent publication by the American Society
of Civil Engineers:
Knowledge of consumptive use is necessary in planning and operating
water resource projects. Consumptive use is involved in problems of
water supply, both surface and underground; water management; and in
the economics of multiple-purpose water projects for irrigation, power,
water transportation, flood control, municipal and industrial water uses,
and wastewater reuse systems.
Consumptive use of water is important in negotiating water compacts and
treaties and in the litigation and adjudication of water rights in major river
systems in which the welfare of people in cities, valleys, states and even
nations is involved. 3 °
Although there are numerous potential water uses,31 the most common
consumptive water uses are irrigation, domestic and municipal, and
recreational and environmental. 32
A. IRRIGATION USES
Today in Colorado new consumptive water uses are typically domestic,
municipal, recreational, and environmental. It is somewhat uncommon for
a potential water user to want to establish a new irrigation practice;
however, it is necessary for water resource engineers to understand
267, and 89-CW-129 (Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1990) (finding that five percent of indoor
domestic wastewater treated in a water treatment facility was consumed); In re Water Rights
of Evergreen West, No. W9270-78 (Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1984) (finding that not more
than ten percent of domestic sewage effluent is consumed through the use of septic tanks
and leaching fields).
30. COMMITTEE

ON IRRIGATION WATER REQUIREMENTS OF THE IRRIGATION AND
DRAINAGE Div. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, EVAPOTRANSPIRATION AND IRRIGATION

WATER REQUIREMENTS
ENG'RS].

3 (M.E. Jensen et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter

AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL

31. Technically, a water use is limited only by what is considered a beneficial use.
Beneficial use is defined as the "use of that amount of water that is reasonable and
appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose of
which the appropriation is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recreational purposes, including fishery
or wildlife."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999). This definition shows that
beneficial uses are not constrained to consumptive uses. The Colorado Water Conservation
Board has the authority to appropriate non-consumptive instream flow water rights to
.preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." Id. § 37-92-102(3). These
instream flow water rights are subject to all senior water rights, but also ensure that junior

water rights cannot divert from a given stream unless water is available in excess of the
instream flow amount. See id. § 37-92-102(3)(b).

32. Industrial use is another common consumptive water use. An explanation of how to
calculate the consumptive use from this type of water use is dependent on the specific
industry involved and is therefore beyond the scope of this article.
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irrigation usage in order to evaluate senior irrigation water rights for a
change in water right proceeding or to recommend ways to improve
existing irrigation practices. The initial evaluation of an irrigation water
supply system is for determining the amount of water that will be
consumed by the crop itself. Agricultural water supplies typically require
water from April through October. 3 While there are numerous ways to
calculate crop consumptive use, 34 the method most commonly accepted by
the water court is the Blaney-Criddle method.35
The Blaney-Criddle method is used to calculate the crop water
requirement, which is the amount of water consumed by a crop receiving a
full water supply. 36 Using this method, the crop water requirement for a
particular crop is calculated using an arithmetic equation that is dependent
on a number of factors including: precipitation, temperature, growing
season, amount of sunlight, and the stage of plant growth.3 7 The stage of
plant growth is reflected by a crop growth stage coefficient that has been
developed through research data for numerous crops including alfalfa and
pasture grass, which are common Colorado crops. 8 The crop water
requirement is expressed in acre-feet of water per acre of irrigated land.
Consequently, the total volume of water measured in acre-feet"' needed to
supply a particular crop is determined by multiplying the crop water
requirement by the number of acres of land irrigated. The water amount
that needs to be provided by the irrigation supply is the crop irrigation
requirement, which is the crop water requirement less the precipitation that
is available to meet crop water needs.4
An additional evaluation of an irrigation use is to determine the total
amount of water that needs to be diverted from a water source in order to
supply the crop irrigation requirement. This process requires an evaluation
of the efficiency of the system used to deliver water from the source to the
farm taking into consideration the water losses in the canals, ditches,
laterals, and on the farm itself. The efficiency of the farm's irrigation,
referred to as farm efficiency, is the percentage of water applied to a crop
33. In certain conditions, agricultural water users divert water outside the typical
irrigation season in order to build up the soil moisture in the irrigated land for the following
year.
34. See AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, supra note 30, at 6-8.
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., TECHNICAL RELEASE No.
21,IRRIGATION WATER REQUIREMENTS 5 (1970) [hereinafter DEP'T OF AGRIC.].

36. The crop water requirement is defined as the "amount of water potentially required
to meet the evapotranspiration needs of vegetative areas so that plant production is not
limited from lack of water." Id. at 2. "[T]he term evapotranspirationis more common
than consumptive use. [Evapotranspiration] is the same as consumptive use except the latter
includes water that is retained in the plant tissue, which is minor relative to the amount used
in [evapotranspiration]." See AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, supra note 30, at 3.
37. See DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 35, at 6-7.
38. Id. at 12, 66, 80. Numerous studies have been done by the Denver Water
Department and other organizations to modify the crop growth stage coefficients to evaluate
the vast daily temperature changes at higher elevations. See, e.g., NORMAN C. CARLSON ET
AL., EVAPOTRANSPIRATION IN HIGH ALTITUDE MOUNTAIN MEADOWS (1991).

39. An acre-foot of water is the amount of water required to cover one acre with one
foot of water. LINSLEY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 116.
40. See DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 35, at 2.
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that is actually consumed and is estimated by evaluating the type of
irrigation practice being used.

Farm efficiencies might range from thirty

percent for basic flood irrigation systems4 to seventy-five percent for
sprinkler irrigation systems. 42 The water not consumed by the crop returns
to the water source as either surface water runoff or deep percolation

through the groundwater system.43 Therefore, if the crop irrigation
requirement is 100 acre-feet of water and the farm efficiency is fifty
percent, the total amount of water that needs to be delivered to the
irrigation system to ensure a full crop water supply is 200 acre-feet.
The efficiency of the canals, ditches, and laterals that deliver water
from the source to the farm, sometimes referred to as conveyance
efficiency, is the percentage of the water diverted from the source that is

actually delivered to the farm. In gravity irrigation systems where water is
diverted from the source at a higher elevation than irrigated fields,
irrigation ditches can be several miles or more in length. 44 As a result, a
percentage of the water initially diverted from the water source is lost
through seepage into the sides and bed of the canal or ditch. The
conveyance efficiency of a canal or ditch can be calculated from records of
actual operation or using a number of different theoretical methods. 45 Most
of the theoretical methods use the structure's width, depth, length, and
Conveyance losses are typically calculated
underlying soil type.
somewhere between five to thirty percent. 46 Consequently, the typical

conveyance efficiency can range from seventy to ninety-five percent. In a
continuation of the above example, for a conveyance efficiency of eighty
percent, 250 acre-feet of water would need to be diverted from the water
source in order to supply 200 acre-feet to the irrigation system, of which
100 acre-feet would be consumed by the crop.

41. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., COLO. IRRIGATION GUIDE 6C-1, 6-C-4 (1978) (stating that irrigation efficiencies can range between 40 to 60 percent if
runoff is reused; otherwise, irrigation efficiencies will be lower). Flood irrigation is an
irrigation practice where water is distributed by gravity over the irrigated crop through a
series of small ditches.
42. See id. at 6-D-1.
43. A portion of the water not immediately used by the crop enters the root zone of the
crop and is contained in the moisture of the soil. The water contained in the soil moisture is
used later by the crop in times of water shortage. See generally LINSLEY, ET AL., supra
note 16, at 175-77 (providing an explanation of how subsurface water is generally
evaluated).
44. For example, the Fort Lyon Canal, located in the Arkansas River Valley, is
approximately 100 miles long. See hI re Water Rights of the Fort Lyon Canal Company
and the State of Colorado, Dep't of Nat. Resources, Div. of Wildlife, in the Arkansas
River, Nos. 79-CW-160, 79-CW-161, 79-CW-178, and 80-CW-51, 7 (Water Div. No. 2,
Colo. 1983).
45. See, e.g., Robert V. Worstell, Estimating Seepage Losses from Canal Systems, J. OF
THE IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DIV. , Mar. 1976, at 137 (describing one theoretical method
for evaluating canal losses).
46. See, e.g., In re Priorities of the Right to the Use of Water for Domestic and
Irrigation Purposes, 23 (Water Dist. No. 17, Colo. 1927) (finding conveyance losses
between fifteen and twenty-five percent for certain sections of the Fort Lyon Canal).
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B. DOMESTIC AND MUNICIPAL USES

As Colorado's population expands in both urban and rural areas, the
demand for residential water supplies continues to grow. In order to more
fully understand the quantification of municipal water supplies, it is helpful
to consider the water needs of an individual residence. The domestic water
use associated with an individual residence is divided into indoor and
outdoor use. Viewing the uses temporally, the occupants' water use for
indoor purposes (i.e., cooking, showers, toilets) is year-round whereas
water use for outdoor purposes (i.e., lawn and garden irrigation) parallels
the time of agricultural uses.
Although estimates vary, indoor water use is estimated between
seventy-five to one hundred gallons per day per capita, where the
occupancy rate is approximately two to four persons per household. 47 The
amount of consumptive use for indoor water use is generally estimated as
ten percent for septic systems4 8 and five percent for water treatment
facilities.49 Outdoor domestic water use consists primarily of lawn and
garden irrigation, which can amount to more than two acre-feet or more
per acre. 50 The amount of water that is consumed by lawn irrigation
depends on the location; however, the water court has found in several
cases that the consumptive use for outdoor residential use is approximately
eighty-five percent. 5' Generally, individual homeowners can get a permit
from the State Engineer's Office to drill a well for indoor uses without
having to augment consumptive use.5' On the other hand, any depletions
for outdoor use must be augmented unless the home is on a lot of at least
thirty-five acres.53
In determining the water supply needs for a municipality, a water
resource engineer can estimate water needs by using the guidelines for an
individual residence and applying them to the municipality's current size
and growth projections. 54 Many larger municipalities have historical water
use data that are used to develop more accurate water use estimates, which
can also be used to project future municipal water needs. In quantifying

47. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of Evergreen West, No. W9270-78, 3 (Water Div.
No. 1, Colo. 1984) (finding that in a particular area there was a 3.5 person average
occupancy and an average daily water use of eighty gallons per person per day).
48. See id. at 2 (finding a ten percent consumptive use rate for septic tanks and leaching
fields).
49. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of the City of Westminster, Nos. 86-CW-397, 88-CW267, 89-CW-129 (Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1990) (finding a five percent consumptive use
rate for water treatment facilities).
50. See FAIRBANKS MORSE PUMP, HYDRAULIC HANDBOOK 97 (15th ed. 1988) (stating
that turf generally requires one inch of water a week).
51. See, e.g., City of Westminster, Nos. 86CW397, 88CW267, 89CW129, at 25
(referring to an analysis that indicated eighty-three percent of outdoor water use was
consumed between 1984 to 1988 in the City of Westminster).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602(3)(b)(II)(A) (1999).
53. Id.
54. Water use guidelines for industrial, commercial, and alternative residential units,
such as apartment buildings, can be found in most water supply publications. See, e.g.,
WARREN VIESSMAN, JR. & MARK J. HAMMER, WATER SUPPLY AND POLLUTION CONTROL 38
(5 h ed. 1993) (providing an example of estimates for a variety of commercial water uses).
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the future water needs, it is helpful for the engineer to work with the
municipality's public works staff to determine accurate growth projections.
C. RECREATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL USES

Although there are a variety of recognized recreational and
environmental water uses, the one common consumptive use is evaporation
losses from man-made ponds built for aesthetic, fishery, and wildlife
purposes.
The State Engineer's Office has published guidelines for
estimating evaporation for gravel pits that expose groundwater. These
guidelines are based on an evaporation map developed by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"). 55
The NOAA
evaporation map shows the gross annual evaporation estimates for areas
throughout the entire state. 56 The gross evaporation rate is then allocated
based on monthly distributions developed either by NOAA57 or the State
Engineer's Office.58 Although evaporation losses are greatest during the
summer months, the distribution method supported by the State Engineer's
Office indicates evaporation losses occur year-round even though the ponds
might be frozen over during the winter months.
The monthly net
evaporation is determined by off-setting the gross evaporation by the
amount of the precipitation that is no longer consumed by the native
vegetation underlying the pond. 59 Finally, the actual consumptive use from
the pond evaporation is calculated by multiplying the net evaporation rate
by the total surface area of the pond.
III. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL WATER SUPPLY AND PREVENTING
INJURY TO EXISTING RIGHTS

Once the client's proposed water uses are clearly defined and the
amount of potential monthly consumption for each use is estimated, the
water resource engineer evaluates the potential water sources. 6° In order
for a water supply to meet the client's objectives, it must provide enough
water to meet the client's water requirements while not injuring existing
water rights.

55. See COLO. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, OFFICE OF THE STATE ENG'R, GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR SUBSTITUTE WATER SUPPLY PLANS FOR SAND AND GRAVEL PITS SUBMITTED
TO THE STATE ENGINEER PURSUANT TO SB 89-120 & SB 93-260 (Draft, Feb. 1996)
(referencing the evaporation analysis developed by the NOAA).
See RICHARD K.
FARNSWORTH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 33: EVAPORATION ATLAS OF THE CONTIGUOUS 48
UNITED STATES (June 1982); see also RICHARD K. FARNSWORTH & EDWIN S. THOMPSON,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TECHNICAL
REPORT NWS 34: MEAN MONTHLY, SEASONAL, AND ANNUAL PAN EVAPORATION FOR THE

UNITED STATES (June 1982) [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 34].
56. See TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 34, supra note 55, at 1.

57.
58.
59.
60.
water

See id. at 64.
See COLO. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 54, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Depending on the circumstances involved, an engineer may evaluate the potential
source before determining the client's exact water needs.
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A. EVALUATING A POTENTIAL WATER SUPPLY
In evaluating a water source, the engineer must understand the priority
system. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, a water user cannot
divert any water until all downstream senior water rights are satisfied.
Although the priority system is easily explained, its application in
administrating water rights in a given water basin or drainage that is overappropriated 6 can be complex.
The division engineer for each water division in the state publishes a
water rights tabulation that lists all the water rights and shows important
information such as allowable diversion rates and relative priorities. 62 The
water rights tabulation is a useful tool for the engineer because it lists water
rights that can affect, and be affected by, the client's water supply plan.
Typically, the Division Engineer's Office for each division also has "line
diagrams." These diagrams are useful in gaining an understanding of the
administration of water rights because they show the priority, decreed
diversion amount, and location of major water rights on each stream. For
example, a large senior right in the lower reach of a drainage will typically
control the allocation of water because upstream junior water rights must
pass enough water to satisfy the senior's decreed diversion amount.
However, the same water right located in the headwaters of a drainage may
have less impact because downstream junior rights can use both the water
that is not diverted by the senior right and water that returns to the stream
after it is used by the senior appropriator.
Another valuable source of information in determining how water is
allocated in a particular drainage is the local water commissioner. The
water commissioner for a particular drainage has the responsibility of
determining which water rights can divert, referred to as being "in
priority," at any given time. As a result, the water commissioner has
detailed knowledge of the location of the water rights, who owns the water
rights, and which water rights control the water allocation. A discussion
with the water commissioner can save a tremendous amount of time and
effort in determining how water rights in a particular drainage operate. In
addition, the water commissioner records the amount of water that is being
diverted daily by the major water rights. By examining the water
commissioner's diversion records, on file at both the Division and State
Engineer's Offices, it can be determined which water rights have been used
and if they have been diverting their full decreed amount.
The engineer will work with the client and the client's water attorney
to develop a plan to obtain the desired water supply once the client's water
supply needs have been quantified and the potential water sources have

61. A river or stream drainage is generally considered over-appropriated when the
decreed diversion rates of the existing water rights exceed the total natural flow in the
drainage; however, in evaluating the existence of unappropriated water for conditional
water rights, the courts consider actual existing uses, not decreed amounts. See In re Water
Rights of the Bd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 959 (Colo. 1995).
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(a) (1999). It should be noted that water
right tabulations are not always completely accurate; therefore, the original water right
decrees should be reviewed when evaluating particular water rights.
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been evaluated. Because there is little unappropriated water remaining in
most drainages within Colorado,63 typically the client will have to purchase

an existing water right and file a water court application to have it changed
to fit the client's water needs.'
Since agriculture remains the major
consumptive use of water in Colorado, irrigation rights are frequently

acquired in the development of new or expanded water supplies. An
irrigation water right is usually decreed to allow the owner to divert a
certain rate of water, measured in cubic feet per second, and irrigate land
in a specified location.
In evaluating a particular water right, not only are the right's priority

and decreed diversion rate important, but also important is the historical

use of the right. As explained above, the amount of water that can be
changed from a water right is usually limited to historical consumptive

use. 65 In addition to historical consumptive use, it is important to consider
other provisions and limitations that might exist in the decrees.

The engineer will first tabulate the historical diversions for the water
right from the water commissioner's records, and will determine the
amount and type of crop that was historically irrigated to determine the

amount of historical consumptive use attributed to an existing irrigation
water right. Historical irrigation practices can generally be evaluated

based on interviews with current and former landowners and the evaluation
of aerial photographs. 66 Once the historical diversion data and irrigation

practices, including conveyances and farm efficiencies, are determined, the
engineer will perform a Blaney-Criddle or other consumptive use analysis
using the historical data.

The amount of historical consumptive use will

then be limited to the lesser of either the crop irrigation requirement or the
amount of the historical in-priority diversions that went to meet crop
demands. 67 For example, if a water user diverted an average of 100 acrefeet of water to supply water to a crop with a crop irrigation requirement
of fifty acre-feet, the amount of consumptive use attributed to the water
right would be limited to fifty acre-feet. However, if the same water right

63. In cases where there is unappropriated water remaining in a particular drainage, the
client can simply put this water to beneficial use and have the absolute water right
adjudicated by the water court. If the project will take time to construct, the client can file
an application with the water court to receive a conditional water right decree. However,
whether the client has filed for a new absolute or conditional water right, existing water
users will likely object to the allegation that there is unappropriated water remaining in the
drainage. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of the Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 88-CW-178,
appealfiled, 98SA327 (Water Div. No. 4, Colo. 1998) (finding by the water court that the
applicant did not show that there was enough unappropriated water remaining in the basin
for its claimed conditional water rights).
64. Purchasing existing water rights usually involves valuing these rights. Water
resource engineers can be hired by clients to provide appraisals for water rights. The value
of a particular water right, in such an appraisal, typically reflects the priority, location,
amount, and historical use of the water right.
65. See Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Colo. 1980); Santa Fe Trail
Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 59 (Colo. 1999).
66. Aerial photographs for the majority of locations in Colorado are available at a
number of locations including the Aerial Photography Field Office of the Farm Service
Agency within the United States Department of Agriculture.
67. Total diversions are reduced to account for appropriate conveyance and farm losses.
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only diverted an average of thirty acre-feet of water that went to supply the

crop irrigation requirement after conveyance and farm losses, the amount
of consumptive use attributed to the water right would be limited to thirty

acre-feet.
If the diversions of the new water supply are going to occur upstream,
the engineer may have to evaluate the "exchange potential."

If the

potential for exchanges exists, upstream diversions can occur provided no
intervening water rights are adversely affected. 68 Although evaluating the

exchange potential can be complicated, the concept generally dictates that
water from a downstream source can be diverted at an upstream location

only to the extent that intervening water rights are still able to divert the
same amount and quality of water that they could historically. 69 In other
words, such exchanges would be limited to the minimum flow that was
passing the intervening points of diversion. ° For example, if the.

intervening water rights were using all the flow in the stream except for
five cubic feet per second, the amount of upstream diversions would be

limited to this amount.
For major water supply projects, a water resource engineer may
develop a computer model in order to help evaluate how much water a
certain project could expect to receive. 7' One type of computer model
commonly used is a simulation model. 2 In general, a simulation model
uses historical hydrologic7 3 and diversion data during a certain period to

determine the amount of natural, or virgin, flow available in a particular
drainage for a given study period. Natural flow is simply the amount of
water that a drainage would have produced during a given period of time
without any man-made interference. The model then allocates this natural
flow based on the priority system to the water rights in the drainage,
including the water supply project being evaluated, to determine how much
68. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-104 & 37-92-305(5) (1999).
69. "In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange, the supplier may take an
equivalent amount of water at his point of diversion or storage if such water is available
without impairing the rights of others. Any substituted water shall be of a quality and
quantity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has

normally been used ...." Id. § 37-92-305(5); see also id. § 37-80-120.
70. This assumes that there are not any instream flow water rights appropriated between
the two points. If instream flow appropriation were present, the exchange would be limited
to the amount of water in excess of the instream flow appropriations passing the intervening
points of diversion.
71. Computer models have also been used extensively to evaluate the allocation of water
in interstate compact disputes. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995)
(computer models were used extensively to quantify Colorado's potential injury to Kansas
under the Arkansas River Compact). In addition, the State of Colorado is developing its
own computer model, called the Colorado Decision Support System, to evaluate the water
allocations within the major drainages in the State. See Colorado Decision Support System
(visited March 9, 2000) < http://cdss.state.co.us>.
72. See generally LINSLEY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 339-42 (providing a description of
the various types of computer models used in different aspects of hydrology problems).
Simulation models are also referred to as deterministic models.
73. The United States Geological Survey ("USGS") records streamflow data at certain
locations on most major streams in Colorado and other states. These records are available
at the USGS web site. See United States Geological Survey (visited March 9, 2000)
< http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis-w/US >.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

water the project would have received had it been operated during the
given study period.
A simulation model is particularly helpful in
evaluating exchange potential.
B. PREVENTING INJURY TO EXISTING WATER RIGHTS

The water court is required by statute to approve any change of water
right or plan for augmentation that "will not injuriously affect the owner of
or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or decreed
conditional water right." 74 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a
change of water right or plan for augmentation does not cause injury to
water rights when these rights receive the same stream conditions that were
present at the time of appropriation.
Although there are numerous
considerations in an injury analysis, the basic consideration is the amount
and timing of historical return flowS. 76 Injury is prevented to existing
water rights when the new water supply plan makes up historical return
flows in time, amount, and location. In evaluating a new water supply
system, the engineer will typically propose terms and conditions that will
ensure that these return flow obligations are met and that other casespecific injuries do not occur. This discussion only addresses potential
injuries associated with water quantity, not water quality, constraints.
1. Historical Return Flows
Downstream water rights are entitled to return flows, the water that
was historically diverted under the water right being used for the new
water supply and then returned to the stream through conveyance and farm
losses.
Consequently, the engineer typically evaluates not only the
historical consumptive use of the water right being considered for a new77
water supply, but also the timing and amount of historical return

flows.

In evaluating the timing and amount of these return flows, surface water
and groundwater returns are normally treated separately.
As described above, a portion of farm losses are surface water returns
while the remainder of farm losses and conveyance losses are groundwater
returns. The amount of irrigation return flow is determined based on the
estimated amount of water that was diverted but did not go toward the crop
irrigation requirement.78 Logically, surface water returns are considered to
return to the water source promptly after diversion and application.
The timing of groundwater returns is typically estimated using a Glover
analysis.79 In general, the Glover analysis estimates how long it will take
for groundwater to travel through the soil and underlying geologic
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1999).
75. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d i, 80 (Colo. 1996).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4)(b)-(c) (1999).
77. It should be noted that not all water courts require the maintenance of historical
return flows in every case. The requirement to maintain historical return flows depends on
whether existing water rights will be injured by the applicant's proposed plan.
78. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
79. See ROBERT E. GLOVER, TRANSIENT GROUND WATER HYDRAULICS 141-44 (1974);
DEWAYNE R. SCHROEDER, ANALYTICAL STREAM DEPLETION MODEL (1987).
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formations and produce an increase in the flow of the original water
source. The amount of time it takes for groundwater to return to the water
source depends primarily on the distance of the irrigated land from the
water source and the physical characteristics of the underlying soils and
geologic formations.80
If the return flows historically returned to
somewhere other than the original water source, the evaluation will likely
be more complicated because water rights located where the return flows
accrued will likely be entitled to maintenance of the historical return flows.
After the monthly return flows are determined, the engineer will
typically summarize the monthly diversions, consumptive use, and return
flows of the water right in a water budget. In general, a water budget is an
accounting system that tracks all the inflows and outflows of a particular
water system. 81 This water budget will be compared to the applicant's
consumptive water needs to determine if the historical consumptive use
from the existing water right can be used to replace the consumptive use
from the new use, while still maintaining the historical return flow patterns
from the existing water right. If return flows are not maintained, an
additional water source, such as water from a reservoir, may be required in
order to ensure that existing water rights are not injured.
2. Proposed Terms and Conditions
The development of every new water supply presents its own unique
problems; thus, the engineer usually recommends terms and conditions 82 to
ensure the historical return flows are replaced in order to satisfy the
concerns of objectors and the water court. 83 Such terms and conditions
84
may include: volumetric limitations on diversions for new uses;
limitations in use to a certain time of the year;85 relinquishment of a portion
of the water right being changed; 86 or specification of procedures for
determining when exchange potential exists.8 7
Often the utility of
establishing a new water supply depends on the creativity of the client's
engineer and water attorney in developing terms and conditions that
prevent injury to existing water rights while still achieving the client's
objectives.
Normally after the engineer has quantified the client's water needs and
the client has obtained adequate water rights to supply these needs, the
engineer will prepare an engineering report. 88 The engineering report will
80. See

SCHROEDER,

supra note 79, at 1.

81. See VIESSMAN & HAMMER, supra note 53, at 84-85.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4) (1999).
83. Id. § 37-92-305(4)(b).
84. A volumetric limitation prevents the water right from diverting more than a specific
volume of water during a period of time. For example, a water right may be limited to
10,000 acre-feet of water during a ten-year period.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4)(c) (1999).
86. Id. § 37-92-305(4)(b).
87. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
88. Depending on the expected amount of opposition to the plan, a final engineering
report may not be completed until after the objectors' concerns have been determined. In
cases of minimal opposition, a formalized engineering report may not be needed.
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contain sections describing the applicant's water needs, acquired water
supply, and recommended terms and conditions to prevent injury to
existing water rights.
IV. THE WATER RIGHT APPLICATION AND PRE-TRIAL PREPARATION
The applicant's water attorney may ask the engineer to provide
assistance in preparing the change of water right application and in
preparing for trial in the event that the applicant and objectors are unable to
agree to a settlement.
A. WATER RIGHT APPLICATION

The water right application can be fairly general in nature or can
anticipate the likely concerns of potential objectors and provide a detailed
description of the overall water supply plan and proposed protections to
existing rights, although each attorney's style may vary. In either case, the
application needs to contain at least enough information to comply with the
standards set forth in the application forms developed by the various water
courts. 89 Each water court has a slightly different set of requirements, but
the water right application will generally require a description of the water
rights sought to be changed 9° and a complete statement of the plan.9' In
preparing the application, many water attorneys will have the engineer
assist in developing the technical description of the plan to ensure that it is
accurate and comports with the engineering report.
Once the applicant files the water right application with the water
court, a description of the application is placed in the resume for the water
court.9 2 The resume serves to notify potential objectors of the proposed
plan who then have until the "last day of the second month following the
month in which the application is filed" to file statements of opposition. 93
Objectors may hire their own water resource engineers to evaluate the
proposed plan and provide opinions as to its adequacy. After the filing of
statements of opposition, the attorney and engineer will attempt to meet
with objectors and reach a settlement. If an engineering report has been
prepared, the attorney will most likely send copies of it to the objectors.
The review by the objectors' engineers often develops many of the issues
in the case. One or more meetings may take place between the engineers
and attorneys for each side to attempt settlement or at least narrow the
issues. If the parties reach a settlement, the water judge will normally sign

89. COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-302(2)(a) (1999).

90. This description requires the applicant to state the decree in which the water right
was adjudicated, the decreed location, the amount of the water right, and the historical use
of the water right. Id.
91. Applications requesting plans for augmentation also require a copy of the historical
diversion records that are being relied on for the application and map showing the location
of the historical use. Id.
92. Id. § 37-92-302(3). The resumes for all the water courts, except Division 6, can be
viewed from the website for the Colorado courts. See Colorado Courts (visited March 9,
2000) < http://www.courts.state.co.us/sitemap.htm >.
93. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(c) (1999).
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a proposed decree drafted by the applicant's attorney. However, if a
settlement cannot be reached, then a trial date will be set and the engineer
and attorney for the applicant will begin preparing for trial.
B. PRE-TRIAL PREPARATIONS

There are two primary roles for an engineer in preparing for an
applicant's case for trial. First, the engineer typically prepares expert
opinions and provide bases for these opinions. The engineering report
provides the bases for the expert opinions but the opinions must be
modified to include any changes resulting from settlement negotiations with
the objectors' experts. In a heavily contested case, the objectors will likely
submit interrogatories, to which the engineer will assist in responding, and
will depose the applicant's witnesses.
In preparing for his or her
deposition, the applicant's engineer will thoroughly review the proposed
plan, including the data, assumptions, logic, and calculations. This is
important as a year or more may have passed since completion of the
original engineering analysis.
Second, the engineer can assist the applicant's attorney in thoroughly
understanding the technical aspects of the objections in order to assist the
applicant's attorney in preparing for the cross-examination of the objectors'
experts at trial. This process requires the engineer to analyze critically not
only the data, logic, and assumptions of the objections, but also to check
the actual calculations. A simple error in data entry or calculation can
affect the outcome of the litigation. The evaluation of the objectors'
engineering analyses is also important for identifying areas where
interrogatories or depositions by the applicant may be necessary to develop
a complete understanding of the objectors' factual and technical cases.
The engineer will normally assist in identifying and preparing technical
exhibits during this phase of the pre-trial preparation. Ideally, the exhibits
will be clear, straightforward, and will demonstrate the reasonableness of
the approach proposed in the application. Another objective of the exhibits
is to help demonstrate that the objections or additional provisions requested
by the objectors are either unfounded or unnecessary.
V. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The role of the applicant's engineer during trial is to testify to the
technical aspects of the proposed plan and express opinions concerning
historical use of rights and potential injury on direct examination, and to
respond to the challenges of the objectors on cross-examination. Before
the expert can express opinions, the engineer must be qualified as an expert
and the foundation must be established for the expert testimony. Typically,
an expert in water court will have experience specific to the Colorado
water adjudication and administration system. During direct examination,
the expert and attorney will likely go through the data, assumptions, and
logic used in the plan, hopefully in a manner that is clear and easily
understood by the water judge. Clear and straightforward exhibits will be
useful in conveying the engineering approach taken and the logic and
reasoning underlying it.
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During direct examination, the expert and the attorney must have a
mutual understanding of both the terms and phrasing of the questions in
order to ensure that the responses offered by the engineer are clear. The
attorney also needs to know the entire response that the expert intends to
provide for each question because the attorney will occasionally need to ask
follow-up questions to remind the expert of portions of the intended
testimony omitted in the initial response.
In addition to testifying, the applicant's expert will most likely answer
questions from the objectors' counsel on cross-examination and also will
listen to the testimony of the objectors' expert witnesses. Although crossexamination is a chance for the opposing side to draw into question the
approach presented by the expert on direct examination, it also presents an
opportunity for the expert to further convey to the water judge the merits
of the applicant's proposed plan.
Through testimony during crossexamination, the expert can sometimes further demonstrate that the
applicant's plan accounts for the objectors' concerns and that their
criticisms of the plan are unreasonable. Listening to the testimony of the
objectors' expert witnesses allows the applicant's expert to refine the
recommendations to the applicant's attorney for cross-examination of the
objectors' experts and to plan rebuttal testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of prior appropriation, as currently codified in the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 and as interpreted by
case law, has effectively allocated the scarce water resources of Colorado
since the state's inception. However, inherent in Colorado's water supply
system are countless legal and technical complexities. In addition to hiring
an attorney to handle the legal aspects of the system, an individual or entity
seeking to develop a water supply typically should hire a water resource
engineer to handle the technical aspects of the process. Although each
client's needs are unique, the engineer will typically quantify the client's
water needs, evaluate potential water supplies, develop a water use plan
that prevents injury to existing water users, and serve as an expert in
settlement negotiations and litigation. Although creating a water supply
can be a lengthy and, at times, frustrating process, the engineer can be a
valuable asset in developing a water supply plan that achieves the client's
objectives; addresses concerns of the objectors, if any; and complies with
the stringent requirements of Colorado's water allocation system.

POETRY
SELECTIONS OF POETRY BY JUSTICE GREG HOBBS
Throughout the Water Law Review's three-year existence, our
Advisory Board, numerous policy-makers, and legal practitioners have
provided invaluable input to help us decide how to improve the journal's
content and usefulness as a practitioner's tool. One of those people, Justice
Greg Hobbs, has been, and continues to be, a person who has
demonstrated an above and beyond the call of duty commitment to helping
the Water Law Review spread its wings.
Justice Hobbs is a prime example of Colorado's legal history coming
full circle. During his career as a water lawyer, he argued in front of the
Colorado Supreme Court. Some twenty years later, as a Colorado
Supreme Court justice, he relied for authority on an opinion from a case he
argued before the court.
When asked about what work best represents his contributions to the
legal profession, Justice Hobbs pointed to his participation while working
for his clients in such matters as the Northern Water District's Windy Gap
Project and Southern Water Supply Project, the Cache La Poudre Wild and
Scenic River Act, and the Colorado Wilderness Act. When asked a
question of that nature, it is common for one to focus on individual
achievements; however, Justice Hobbs points out that the work one is able
to accomplish in the profession is performed in community with others.
On May 1, 1996, Justice Hobbs was sworn in as an associate justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court. So moved by his appointment, he read a
letter he had written to his friends and the people of Colorado, in which he
described his view of his new position in service to the community:
Could there be a better place to air our differences, to breathe
the common air, to hear the waters sing? Each of you has
placed an item in my pack: map or compass, the fire starter,
poncho for the rains, a sturdy pair of boots, some funny
saying, and your strength. With gratitude, I cinch again my
shoulder straps. Please, may I hike with you? A mighty pass
awaits.
With this poetic flair, Justice Hobbs communicates his thoughts and
feelings. We are pleased to present in this issue of the Water Law Review
selected water poems from Justice Hobbs' extensive writings. We hope
you enjoy them as much as we do.
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SELECTED WATER POEMS
GREG HOBBS
One of the joys of being a natural resources lawyer is telling the story
of the resource at issue in the presentation of the client's case. Being a
water lawyer or a water judge is to experience a greater joy, for the story
of this resource is the stuff of life itself.
Born to an Air Force family, I had the great fortune of living all over
the West, including Alaska, California, and Texas. I grew up along the
shores and rivers wherever a fisherman father-and a mother who believed
in blessings-cared to take their sons and daughter. My wife appeared to
me at the National Boy Scout Camp, Philmont, of New Mexico's Sangre
de Christo Range where we both served on summer staff in the Sixties.
Her home was Colorado; she made it mine, too.
Streams, lakes, and oceans are blessings of water and the spirit. Many
times when I could not be near them, I asked Emily Dickinson, William
Stafford, and Thomas Hornsby Ferril to take me there.
When the Water Law Review editors asked for a submission of water
poems I had written, I asked them to choose what they willed. I hope you
take joy in these reflections.

ROCK CREEK
Good to see you mountains,
good to hear you streams.
I've been a long time comin'
you called me in my dreams.
Who says we need the city
and the dyin' midst the din?
When we're up on Rock Creek
we learn to live again.
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ACEQUIA MADRE
She is bubbling
when first she runs down
the arroyo sandals flopping
onto the sagebrush plain
waving and exclaiming about
The distant Rio Grande
and Taos Mountain gleaming back
hair, soles, toes, teeth,
harking time she digs in
finger-molded mounds
Bright green tendrils grow,
breasts and belly swelling
full like melting snow,
her voice sounds
High and pure.

YOUR SPECIAL MUSIC
When sun sets red
over the edge of reason
into the woods of faith
comes a time for cinching-up
for certain climbs ahead,
mountains do not hide,
Continents wander west into them.
Gather with some friends
in ever-widening circles
where water holes begin
to ripple on a rock,
for I have seen your
special music play.
No words or signs alone
can sing the truth
that love can bring
through river canyons
when rangering.

WATER LA W REVIEW

EVAPORATION
Simple truths
Water and the sun
That all is worn away
And taken up again
For blessed rain to send.

RED ROCKS
We gathered here for farming,
for mining and for trees,
came to work the traplines
and gold upon our knees,
we prayed to God for guidance
and mapped a thousand peaks,
built the gleaming cities
and plugged the wildest creeks.
The Rockies have a hold of us
and of our ancestry,
plains and rivers tell us
there's granite in the sea,
an ocean where the canyons are,
each rock a history,
Colorado is as old as us
as young as we might be.
Now each of us has had a day
we've done our best and worst,
said our share of lying
and placing mankind first,
we've but to see that lupine
is the future at our feet
and marmots running sprightly
over Rocky Mountain peaks.
Thunder's booming sharply
across the plains below,
we see the lightning flashing,
hear the wind begin to blow,
Mountains all are burning
in sunset's awesome glow,
it's all up there before us
in clouds piled up like snow.
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BY THE ROADSIDE
I'm hungry, tired, miss my dog,
goofy frantic kids are throwing
rocks from bridges, tourist jeeps
drive by. I'm casting this unknown
spinner to riffles below the Riverside
Hotel, Hot Sulphur Springs. It's May,
a week before Memorial Day, these drat
wetlands are seeping through trashed-out
Hi-Tec boots, dear wife is sitting in a lawn
chair gabbing with her friends. I pop a Pop.
How a river shines, dives behind a rotting shelter log,
hisses, spits, thrusts its tongue, coils into pools,
rears to strike, then unwinds, slithers darkly
down the bank, slides to dusk, slips
to crescent moon on speckled scales,
encircles earth, reappears at dawn
with jaws agape to swallow
fisher men.

EASY ON THE WATER
Easy on the water
flip a fly,
so from underneath
a graceful flight
appears
Worth a closer look,
no artifice must seem.
Slap a pool
with plated flashy spoon
and slackened line,
best to send a school
to scattering
A reel's worth of winding.
Easy on the water.
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TRAIL BUILDING
No Trail is the Work
Of One,
Each Length Builds
On the Length
Of Others,
Where a Trail May Lead
Is Spirit Vision
Stretched
Brow to Heel,
As
Trail
Leads on to Trail,
Where Aspen
Swim to Spruce,
Mountains
Fall Away To
the Great
Havens of the Lordly
Sky,
No Scar or Gouge
To Deluge
Ripped
How Your Turnouts
Hold
Through Contours
Of Life Zones
Habitat,
Rhythm,
Moment,
Valley,
Foothill,
Ridge
and Stream
Design,
Art and
Practice,
Dwells
Within.
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HUMID MORNING VAPOR SONG
Humid morning vapor song,
Dewy grass and marshy ground,
Tadpole, toad and crane, flex and swim,
Arise, fly up. You are called to worship shine,
Display your feathers, skin, and beak, your metamorphic tail,
Whistle, grunt, inhale, belly pull yourself to land, Flashing.

PEACE
Fishing is a point of view you have to want inside,
The Hope, the Fling, the Wait, the Zing, the Catch,
Peace releasing.

OLD PANTHERS
Old panthers, latch them to a swivel,
Let them fly. No need to hook a fish,
Just being on the water's fineIn every pool, a face you've loved
Is looking back. Linger for
A moment, then is gone
To ripples....
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CANOE
Help me summon up the strength
To do the good I can each day,
At least a little space with you
Between despair and opportunity
To dip my shiny stirring blade
In waters deep and welling full.
And let my muscle ache desist
To sit a-center my canoe,
Quiet would you spread to me
Hums and hums of sinewing,
Nimble tissues at their work
Of joining joy to drudgery.
Thank you for this resting me,
For the whys persisting me,
I take this heel to my hand
Paddle, Lord, this promised land.

A FOX IN ELDER BERRY RAIN
I would miss the trees
The most, how they talk
When the wind comes up
And bend their backs
For storms to pass,
Glisten for return
Of shine. Fishes, too!
I used to count them
Best on hook, remove
And fry, then I thought
To put them back, then
To leave them be
And think of streams
They like to dart within,
Glistening. I would
Listen more a fox
In elder berry rain
Passing in the grass.
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AN OLD COLORADO STORY
"A MAJOR MINING ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECT
IS AHEAD: As you travel along the next two miles of the San Miguel
Valley, you can see the mine remediation project-pioneering new
revegetation techniques and setting a nationalprecedentfor environmental
remediation. The process includes precise recontouring of the tailing
surface, amendment of the tailing surface with limestone and organic
nutrients, and seeding with specially selected grasses and forbs to
create an engineered vegetative cover."

Ouray and Telluride,
Within the mountains lie
An old Colorado story,
"There's money in those rivers,
Boys!" Vein on vein of twisted
Silver, slag of gold, is
Followed muck on spoil
Until the rivers bleed.
these
wooden shanty towns,
Then
With all their crimsonBeautied natives gone, Ute
And Southern/Mountain Ute,
Brilliant-bellied cutthroat
Trout, bosomed ladies
Laudanam-laced,
And all their sportsmen
Plaintiff cry "Repay, Repay!"
So the river's purified,
So mountain meadows sprout
These golfing greens,
These fly tie
Shops.
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LOVE'S RETURN
I've not missed you
MuchNot much moreThan a lung
Under waterMisses air
Or the sea run~
Steelhead-

Not much moreThan a nook
He cameFrom
Oh"
I've not missed youMuchNot much more
Than robin'sFood
Or the star runNightMisses gleamingThan a sprung
Upwelling"
Artesian
I've not missed youMuchNot much moreThan a lip
AloneMisses.
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JAMES LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE
PACIFIC SALMON CRISIS, Island Press, Washington, D.C. (1999);

317pp; $27.50; ISBN 1559633603, softcover.
REVIEWED BY JACK MCDONALD
In 1875, Spencer Baird, the first head of the United States Commission
on Fish and Fisheries, wrote a letter identifying the three major threats to
salmon survival: excessive fishing, dams, and alterations of the physical
habitat of the streams. Today, we refer to these threats as three of the
"four H's" of salmon decline: harvest, hydropower, and habitat. In his
letter, Baird made a pivotal decision, one emblematic of nearly every
decision made in American salmon policy since that time. Rather than
recommending regulations to reduce the identified causes of salmon
decline, Baird chose, instead, to address declining salmon runs using an
untested technical solution, the artificial propagation of salmon. This
solution is the "fourth H" in the perils of salmon: hatcheries.
James Lichatowich's new book Salmon Without Rivers: A History of
the Pacific Salmon Crisis examines the historical decline of salmon in the
Not only does the author provide an in-depth
Pacific Northwest.
assessment of the events and direct causes of salmon decline, but also he
examines the philosophies behind decisions such as Baird's that have had
seemingly everlasting effects on the health of salmon populations. The
policy and decision makers in the Northwest have known for over a
century that regional practices would drive salmon runs to ruins.
According to some estimates, three billion dollars have been spent
attempting to remedy the problem. Despite this huge monetary figure,
Lichatowich argues that the same misguided philosophies that created the
problem still dominate today. According to the author, until the region
transcends its industrial-age mentality, salmon restoration will remain
unsuccessful.
Baird made a gigantic leap of scientific faith in deciding to use the
hatchery solution because he felt harvest and habitat regulations were
politically untenable. In this decision, Baird avoided making a tough call
that would have displaced existing economic interests. However, he made
the decision with virtually no assurance of its effectiveness. Ultimately,
his decision was no decision at all, offering the region a plan where rivers
could "sustain" both large salmon runs and unlimited development. The
elements of Baird's decision became the heart of salmon policy decisions
made by individuals, states, and the federal government for the next
century, and continuing largely today.
A euphemism for eradicating salmon habitat, "river development"

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

implies a conversion from a natural to an industrial state.
The
unwillingness to compromise accelerating river development; the full
throttle development of hatcheries, a choice driven by an optimistic
confidence in technology and an unwillingness to alter industrial progress;
and the dams that use of this alternative allowed, ultimately led to the
reality of "salmon without rivers." Salmon production was moved from
the natural streams to feeding pens; rivers became mere transportation
corridors.

A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY INSPECTION OF THE SALMON CRISIS
Though trained as a biologist, Lichatowich wears numerous different
hats while explaining the decline in the Pacific Northwest salmon runs.
The author shines in this book as a historian, mining the past to build a
view of regional thinking at key points in the development of salmon
policies. Much of this way of thinking we recognize today either as
political and philosophical movements well known in American history or
as embedded present day ideology.
The history of the salmon decline is inextricably tied to the economic
situation at the time. Profiteers seeking short-term economic gains in
timber, mining, and grazing resources had no great interest in keeping
salmon habitat intact.
A laissez-faire political system passed little
regulation and enforced even less. The nearly free wealth of salmon as a
wild resource inevitably led to over-harvest despite the self-defeating
economic hardship on the pursuers. The early twentieth century utilitarian
ideology favored dams as helping a greater number of people through
power, irrigation, and navigation over the salmon fishing that the dams
would displace.
In presenting these driving philosophies in resource management,
Lichatowich develops a multi-disciplinary analysis of the salmon crisis.
Lichatowich first establishes the ecological history of salmon and its habitat
before proceeding to the cultural causes of salmon decline. The book's
structure serves as a metaphor for the solution that Lichatowich advocates:
unless the Northwest restructures its resource economy to first consider the
natural system that produced salmon, the species will not survive.
Lichatowich then switches hats to anthropologist, describing an
indigenous culture that thrived while working within the natural
parameters.
Next, he examines the salmon crisis as an economist,
comparing the industrial economy that predominates today to a natural
economy that must provide a source of values and balance in order to
restore salmon. A natural economy relies on interdependence, renewal,
dispersal of production, and diversity, as opposed to an industrial economy
favoring individualism, extraction, economies of scale, and a simplified
natural system. Without balancing industrial economic thinking with the
natural economic system, the timber industry will continue to see economic
loss in implementing a tree buffer along streams, and irrigators will see
forgone financial opportunity in instream flows.
According to
Lichatowich, balance is achievable only by acknowledging the natural
world's intrinsic, non-economic values.
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SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS - ARTIFICIAL PROPAGATION

Of the many culprits in the salmon decline, Lichatowich reserves his
harshest criticism for hatcheries. He faults hatcheries not only for their
responsibility in ecological damage, but also for the tough choices avoided
and reforms precluded by placing blind faith in the ultimate industrial
solution for declining salmon: growing salmon.
Lichatowich chronicles the unwillingness of American salmon
managers to support the effectiveness of hatcheries with sound science. In
a chapter-long comparison of the Canadian experience in the Fraser River
Basin, which largely avoided hatcheries, to the Columbia River Basin in
the United States, Lichatowich credits Canada's diligence in pursuing
sound science as making the difference in the Fraser's healthy salmon runs
today. The author gives short shrift to the notion that modern hatcheries
have reformed, dismissing the notion with a sweeping statement that the
past speaks for itself. This view might be more credible if the sentiments
were backed by further evidence of the continued failures of modern
hatcheries, but the author's skepticism in the principle of artificial salmon
propagation is well grounded throughout the book.
Most people place the critical period of salmon's decline at the
Depression-era development of the modern hydropower system.
Lichatowich spends remarkably little time here. Although the Fraser River
experience demonstrated that industrial progress was not inevitable, the
American patterhi of complete development with artificial propagation as
mitigation was already dead-set, linking hatcheries and dams in a
partnership, "forged deep inside the heart of the industrial economy."
CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE
Has the Northwest learned anything from its past? Is it willing to fuse
the natural economy with the industrial economy? The best example of this
struggle is the region's exploration of removing four mainstream dams on
the lower Snake River.. Ironically, those opposed to dam removal stress a
cautious approach with no removal before careful scientific study-an
approach not used when the dams were built. Lichatowich gives no
recommendation on removal, though he does slyly note that hatchery
managers on the Lower Snake River admit that even hatchery salmon
cannot flourish with the dams in place. The message of this book is that
policy decisions, such as dam removal, have become choices between
development or salmon, rather than development and salmon. All salmon
policy decisions, including the decision of delay, involve hard choices with
real consequences, for we cannot have salmon without rivers.
That the author can take a "feel-good" notion of balancing industry
with nature and ground it in a wide array of scientific and historical
evidence makes his arguments difficult to ignore. Add in a clear and
effective writing style, and the result is an important and readable book for
anyone concerned with the fate of Pacific salmon.

BOOK NOTES
JAMES N. CORBRIDGE JR. AND TERESA A. RICE, EDS, VRANESH'S
COLORADO WATER LAW, REVISED EDITION, University Press of

Colorado, Niwot, Colorado (1999); 628pp; $75.00; ISBN 0-87081543-1, hardcover.
George Vranesh authored the first edition of Colorado Water Law.
Published in 1987, the three-volume work contained materials current
through December, 1985. The long awaited second edition, authored by
Professor Jim Corbridge and Teresa Rice, differs from the original. It
compiles the numerous new cases, amended statutes, and doctrines into one
volume, which is current through July 1, 1999. Where the original
contained lengthy excerpts from judicial opinions, the new edition does
not. In addition, unlike the first edition, the new edition will include
annual supplements.
Chapter One, An Introduction to Colorado Water Rights, reviews the
basic doctrines of water right determinations, with an emphasis on prior
appropriation and its development in this West. No discussion of prior
appropriation in the West could occur without some detailing of the
settlement of the West, and this chapter provides a concise overview. The
chapter also discusses the interplay of federal issues and state water rights,
briefly describes Colorado water right administration and enforcement, and
examines different states' water allocation systems.
Chapter Two, The Nature of the Right, reviews the elements of a water
right: diversion, the application of water to beneficial use, the definition of
"any natural stream," the right to appropriate, a water right as a property
right, and water right limitations. Additionally, the chapter addresses
storage rights; ditch rights; groundwater rights (in great detail); conditional
decrees; and miscellaneous rights, which include salvaged and developed
water, waste water, and foreign water, among others. The chapter
provides a brief overview of the right to surface water use and ends by
briefly discussing weather modification.
At the outset, Chapter Three, Water Adjudication and Administration,
surveys the history of Colorado's water allocation system prior to the
enactment of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969 ("1969 Act"). A detailed analysis of the provisions of the 1969 Act
follows the historical section. The rest of the chapter explains the roles of
the integral parts of the system: the water courts, water administration
officials, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, the Colorado Water
Resources and Power Development Authority, and county commissioners.
Of timely importance for Colorado's growing urban populations,
Chapter Four, Transfer of Water Rights, covers the legal aspects of
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transfers and changes. The chapter begins with a history and background
section, discusses limitations on the right to transfer or change a water
right, and, in short form, covers exchanges. The chapter discusses transfer
and change procedures and concludes with temporary transfers.
Water use often occurs far from the source. In order to allow for
economically feasible delivery, early users joined together to construct
large ditches to carry water to their properties. Chapter Five, Water
Organizations, discusses the different methods used for delivery of water
to more than one user. The chapter examines joint ditches, the "primordial
form of the private water company;" mutual ditch companies, where
individuals unite to share in the construction and management of an
irrigation ditch; carrier ditch companies; irrigation districts; water
conservancy districts; water conservation districts; municipalities, who are
faced with the need to supply ever-growing populations with water; water
and sanitation districts; metropolitan districts; groundwater management
districts; and flood control conservancy districts.
Chapter Six, Federal-State Water Relations, addresses a continuing
controversy in Western water law, the conflict between the federal
government and the states. The controversy centers around: (1) federal
authority under the constitution; (2) the exercise of that authority; (3) the
effect of federal laws on state water use and administration laws; and (4)
the effect of federal law on state created private property rights. The
chapter sections contain the following topics: federal constitutional
authority, the Commerce Clause, federal reclamation law, federal
regulatory programs, federal reserved water rights, Indian reserved rights,
and sovereign immunity.
Chapter Seven, Protection of Water Quality in Colorado, covers water
quality protection mechanisms ranging from state common law protection
and state water quality statutes to federal water quality statutes.
Traditionally Colorado water law has not taken water quality into
consideration. We will soon see whether or not it will.
Chapter Eight, Transmountain and Interstate Waters, reviews the East
Slope/West Slope battles over Colorado's water, followed by a section on
interstate issues, two topics appropriately placed together for conceptual
reasons. It also addresses the United States' treaties with Mexico.
Chapter Nine, Condemnation of Rights, the final chapter of the treatise,
begins by discussing the need to bifurcate a discussion of condemnation
into two parts: (1) the right to condemn real property to move water,
"clearly present;" and (2) the right to condemn the water itself, "far less
so."
The chapter covers condemnation of ditch rights-of-way,
condemnation of reservoir sites, condemnation by governmental and quasigovernmental agencies, inverse condemnation, and eminent domain
proceedings.
The treatise contains an Appendix, replete with the addresses, phone
numbers, and fax numbers for each division engineer, water court, and the
relevant state offices. This book is a must-have for the Colorado water
lawyer.
Amy W. Beatie

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

ACTION PLAN FOR BEACHES AND RECREATIONAL WATERS; Cincinnati,

Ohio (1999); Environmental Protection Agency; 19 pp.; Doc #
EPA/600/R-98/079, softcover.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") produced this
document in order to establish a multi-year strategy for monitoring
recreational water quality and explain public health risks associated with
potentially pathogen-contaminated rivers, lakes, and ocean water. This is
the first plan of its kind prepared and published by the EPA.
The Beach Action Plan ("Plan") is a helpful tool for measuring
accountability and progress as it illustrates the timing of various products
of the EPA's recreational water efforts. In the Plan's Summary, the EPA
discusses a need for improved beach monitoring programs, water quality
standards, and public guidance relating to the use of national recreational
waters. The EPA prepared the Plan in order to help reduce risk of
infection to recreational water users through improved water quality
programs, risk communication, and scientific advances.
The Summary discusses the continued threat of contamination of
recreational waters, and the risk of exposure to waterborne microbial
pathogens, which many Americans face. Thus, the Plan's objective
requires consistent management of recreational water quality programs,
including EPA sponsored conferences and meetings with federal, state,
local, and tribal representatives in order to identify needs and deficiencies
of water quality monitoring programs.
Based upon the information
gathered at these meetings, the EPA will strengthen water quality standards
and programs through development of new policies. The EPA will also
create and issue guidance policies on managing risk and using newly
developed monitoring methods. As part of this program, the EPA plans to
require states and tribes to make the transition from monitoring total
coliforms or fecal coliforms to monitoring for E. coli and enterococci
indicators. In addition, the EPA intends to provide support and training on
an as needed basis.
In the Introduction, the EPA notes that increasing numbers of
Americans will risk illness from exposure to contaminated waters and
includes results from surveys indicating the number of national beach
closings and advisories in recent years. The agency also notes that despite
current monitoring programs to prevent exposure and illness, many of the
programs are inconsistent and do not utilize the best indicators of microbial
pathogens. In order to overcome these weaknesses, the EPA calls for a
scientifically based investigative process to determine potential health risks
and reduce the sources of such risks in order to foster consistent use of
indicators. An effective program calls for recognition by state and local
officials and flexibility in its implementation. In addition, research will be
required for improving the scientific basis of monitoring.
In sections 2.0 through 2.1, the EPA discusses the new Beaches
Environmental Assessment, Closure, and Health Program (BEACH) and
the Clean Water Action Plan (CWAP). The current Plan intends to
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implement the BEACH and CWAP programs. The EPA also notes that the
Plan only focuses on reducing the risk of exposure to pathogens and does
not address ecological impacts of pathogens. The agency also discusses
various other governmental agencies involved in this Plan, such as the
Office of Research and Development and the Office of Water. The EPA
also sets out its plans for enabling consistent management of water quality
and discusses a conference attended by federal, state, and local
representatives, in which changes were suggested for the manner of
adopting and applying the Plan. In order to develop an effective program,
more technical conferences and meetings will be arranged. In addition, the
EPA will issue guidance documents discussing recreational water quality
management, risk assessment and communication, and the incorporation of
the results of current research. On risk communication, the EPA discusses
its new Beach Watch Website and its National Beach Health Survey.
Further, the EPA will make efforts to make beach information available to
the public via a national inventory of digitized maps. The EPA also
discusses the fostering of strong regional and local partnerships, which will
be used to work with communities in collecting and reporting real-time
environmental information.
In section 2.2, the agency reviews its conclusions that an improvement
in scientific development of water quality indicator analytical methods is
necessary.
It discusses the work currently in progress in this area,
including creation of an appropriate sample protocol. This section also
includes discussion regarding field tests of current research in order to
validate the use by environmental risk managers. The EPA also lists the
current types of water quality testing indicators, including indicators of
fecal pollution, detection of the presence of intestinal pathogens, indicators
that distinguish between human and animal fecal coliforms, indicators of
pathogens causing non-enteric diseases, and tropical indicators. The
agency calls for an improvement in the current predictive models and for
the validation of some of these models. It also talks of the creation of an
international expert workgroup, which will make recommendations and
develop a testing protocol. The EPA reviews the various ways pathogens
enter into recreational waters, including through the discharges of sewer
overflows and by non-point contamination components, such as domestic
and wild animals and septic systems. The agency warns of areas posing
risks to recreational water users, especially children, such as interstitial
shoreline water. Last, the EPA discusses forms of exposure to pathogens,
such as ingestion, inhalation, and skin contact, and concludes that
additional research is necessary to characterize swimmer behavioral
patterns and typical exposures, in addition to epidemiological studies.
The Plan includes an Implementation Table, which gives the reader a
clear picture of when and how the EPA will apply the Plan. An Appendix
reviews the science and regulatory history of the laws protecting
recreational water quality. Finally, the Plan includes a list of various
agency contacts for receiving further information.
Stephanie Pickens
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The
American Heritage Rivers Initiative: A Magnificent Idea or the Great
Land/Power Grab? in BRIEFLY... PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION; National Legal
Center for the Public Interest, Washington, D.C. (December 1998);
Vol. II, No. 12; 52pp; ISBN 0-937299-77-4, softcover.

RAY CLARK, GEORGE C. LANDRITH, III, AND ROGER MARZULLA,

This publication presents a comprehensive overview of the American
Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI). The first chapter objectively defines the
AHRI and dedicates the remaining two chapters to arguments supporting
and opposing the Initiative. Overall, the publication successfully provides
an informative guidebook for new law that will impact the rivers of this
nation and their communities.
George C. Landrith, III, vice president and general counsel of the
National Legal Center for the Public Interest, authored Chapter One,
entitled "What is the American Heritage Rivers Initiative?" Landrith
explains the evolution of the AHRI from a proposal by President Clinton in
February 1997 to enactment into law by Executive Order No. 13,061 in
September 1997. The AHRI describes its objectives as "natural resource
and environmental protection, economic revitalization, and historic and
cultural preservation."
The Executive Order created the American
Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee to implement the Initiative. This
Interagency Committee consists of several federal departments and
agencies, and attempts to ensure that "their programs and actions do not
interfere with the historical, cultural, or environmental integrity of
riverfront areas and that the agencies coordinate their efforts to 'preserve,
protect, and restore rivers and their associated resources.' "
The Initiative faced both support and opposition since its creation. In
response to the negative concerns, the proposal made several changes
before the Executive Order issued the AHRI. Among these changes, the
revised proposal recognized the Fifth Amendment and rights of private
property owners, and allowed senators and representatives to exclude
rivers or portions of rivers within their states or districts from nomination.
Notwithstanding its uncertain beginning, the AHRI came into being and
implementation began. On June 16, 1998, fourteen rivers out of 135
nominated were designated by the President to be American Heritage
Rivers.
Ray Clark, Associate Director of the National Environmental Policy
Act Oversight Council on Environmental Quality, wrote Chapter Two,
entitled "American Heritage Rivers: A Community-Based Approach to
Economic Development and Environmental Protection."
The author
describes the AHRI as a positive measure by emphasizing the need to
preserve our nation's rivers and the role of the river community in the
Initiative's implementation. He particularly emphasizes that the Initiative
entails "no new regulatory requirements for individuals or state and local
governments."
Instead, "the goal of the American Heritage Rivers
Initiative is to support communities, within existing laws and regulations,
by providing them with better access to information, tools and resources,
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and encouraging private funding of local efforts deserving of special
recognition." The author then discusses the five major elements of the
Initiative: "participation is 100 percent voluntary, communities selfnominate, must have broad community support, federal agencies must
make information widely available, and Members of Congress can veto
nominations within their' district."
Finally, the author corrects several myths that have arisen about the
AHRI. First, he insists that the Initiative is not a "land grab" and that
private property rights are still protected. Secondly, he stresses that no
new funds have been apportioned for the AHRI. Instead, "this Initiative
proposes to assist these communities through better use of existing
programs and resources and coordinating the delivery of those services in a
manner designed by the community, or 'bottom-up.'
"
Last, this
community-based program has received a wide range of support and is
needed to help preserve and restore our nation's rivers.
Roger J. Marzulla, General Counsel for Defenders of Property Rights,
wrote Chapter Three, entitled "AHRI: This Baby Bureaucratic Monster is
Bad for Business, Undemocratic and Unamerican." The author views the
AHRI as "the greatest land grab since the founding of this nation." He
firmly believes that it "is just one more scheme of the Clinton
Administration for government to gain greater control over our lands, and
over the freedom of businesses, farmers, and ranchers to pursue their
professional endeavors unimpeded." The author argues this viewpoint and
supports his opinion by discussing approximately seventeen negative
constraints he has found the AHRI to pose for the American taxpayer and
landowner. He stresses that the AHRI is unconstitutional and a threat to
property rights, stemming from its creation by executive order and not
congressional approval, its vagueness concerning the extent and nature of
local government and community involvement, and its apparent disregard
for certain constitutional provisions affecting property rights, such as
Article IV of the Constitution and the Fifth Amendment. The author
suggests that contrary to proponents' claims that the AHRI has no agenda,
budget, authority, or employees, the AHRI in fact creates another layer of
unnecessary bureaucracy, spending, and federal intrusion by establishing
the Interagency Committee, the Advisory Committee, and appointing River
Navigators, federally appointed bureaucrats whose job involves guiding the
river community through the relevant federal programs. Finally, the
author argues that the AHRI duplicates the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
violates the Federal Land Management and Policy Act.
This publication offers an insightful look into the American Heritage
Rivers Initiative. It serves as a useful guidebook for this relatively new
law by providing an objective definition of the Initiative and viewpoints,
both supporting and opposing its implementation.
Vanessa L. Condra
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COLORADO WATER LAW, Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc.,

Denver, Colorado (1997); 104pp; $55 CBA members, $75 nonmembers; 3 ring binder.
Divided into six sections, this overview of Colorado water law contains
the points and topics taught in a continuing legal education course. The
first section, Successfully Prosecuting Water Augmentation Plans and
Changes of Water Rights, presented by Raymond Petros, Jr., Esq., begins
by outlining key definitions and citing relevant Colorado Revised Statutes.
This section clarifies the interrelationships between changes in rights and
augmentation plans, and summarizes pre- and post-1969 case law regarding
adjudications for changes of water rights. A detailed checklist for
practitioners covers everything from evaluation of water rights and prelitigation planning to terms and conditions necessary to avoid injury to
other water rights. The final portion of the outline discusses recent
developments in case law, including recovery of attorney's fees and costs.
The second section, Technical Considerationsfor Changes of Water
Rights and Augmentation Plans, addresses the same topics as above, but
from a scientific point of view. As an engineer, George M. Fosha
provides the necessary compliment to the litigator's viewpoint provided in
the first section.
This article explains some of the engineering
methodologies and technical issues that need addressing in order to
successfully prosecute change of water rights cases. After introducing
concepts, such as use and reuse in a stream system, and tributary and nontributary groundwater, Fosha delves into factors for defining the historic
use of a water right for purposes of determining injury to that right.
System and evaporation losses, crop consumptive use, Consumptive
Irrigation Requirement, irrigation efficiency, and return flows are all
implicated. The section includes helpful schematics and exhibits.
Section Three, Administrative Review of Changes of Water Rights,
Augmentation and Substitute Supply Plans, discusses some of the major
concerns that arise in water rights applications. In evaluating the historic
use claims, issues such as irrigation and dry up are examined, as well as
the limits placed upon the new proposed use. Considerations surrounding
adequate measurement provisions and accounting complexities are also
summarized.
The author, Richard Stenzel, explains how special
considerations such as transit losses, exchanges, evaporation rates,
modifications to existing structures, and groundwater table maintenance are
determined and viewed by the State Engineer's Office. In closing, Stenzel
emphasizes that plans for augmentation do not grant a water right to the
structures that are being augmented.
Section Four, Recent Challenges Facing Colorado Water UsersEndangeredSpecies and Compact Demands, changes direction by outlining
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and compact administration topics
river by river. Beginning with the Colorado River, moving to the Platte,
and ending with the Rio Grande, the authors, Jennifer L. Gimbel, Esq. and
Wendy Weiss, Esq., encapsulate the various challenges and issues involved
in this complex arena. This section ends with the interesting assortment of
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letters from the six state heads to the California Department of Water
Resources, Bruce Babbitt's 1996 address at the Colorado River Water
Users Association annual conference, and a copy of the important ESA
case, Bennett v. Spear.
The fifth section, The Intricacies of Administering the Waters of
Colorado Rivers, loses the breadth of the presentation of State Engineer,
Hal D. Simpson.
However, the outline does delineate the major
components involved in water rights administration. Simpson cites the
constitutional and statutory authority for water rights administration in
Colorado before moving on to a historical perspective of the functions of a
water commissioner. He lists the current duties of water commissioners,
charts the technology changes and current issues facing them, and
concludes with noting some future trends.
Section Six, a panel discussion on cooperative water-sharing plans,
contains the outlines of three speeches. The first presentation, given by
Lee Rozaklis, targets the areas of conjunctive use, effluent management,
system interconnections and Moffat Water Storage and the Chatfield
Reservoir. Within each area, Mr. Rozaklis depicts the likely players, the
options, the water supply potential, and the issues.
The second
presentation, given by William R. (Rick) McLoud, outlines the current
status of a joint water project by discussing the relevant geographical areas,
their common characteristics and the project concept.
The third
presentation, given by Hamlet J. (Chips) Barry III, Esq., narrates the
policy statements of the Denver Water Board ("Board"), issued October
15, 1996, regarding current water supply obligations, long-term strategies,
and cooperative actions with metropolitan water suppliers outside the
Board's service area.
In the final analysis, this manual provides important points and
checklists for the water law practitioner, even in the face of losing some of
the richness of the presenters and the courses themselves.
Susan Klopman
JAMES W. CONRAD: ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE DESKBOOK, West
Group, St. Paul, Minnesota (1999); $140.00; ISBN 0-8366-1220-5,
hardcover/binder.
The Environmental Science Deskbook provides environmental
practitioners, and anyone interested in environmental issues, an
understanding of the technical language, complex processes, and models
associated with environmental science. Despite focusing primarily on
scientific and technological aspects of environmental practice, each freestanding chapter begins with basic principles and proceeds to more
complex issues, with subsequent chapters building on earlier chapters.
The book's editor, James W. Conrad, is well-versed in
environmental science and environmental law. In Environmental Science
Deskbook, Conrad compiles the scientific and technical knowledge of
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authors with backgrounds that include law, chemistry, applied
mathematics, public policy, toxic substances, engineering, and botany, to
name only a few. However, the book provides plain-English explanations
of scientific environmental concepts, methods, applications, acronyms, and
terminology. The first four chapters introduce the fundamental concepts
that apply in Chapters Five through Nine in the context of groundwater,
solid waste, air, and wetlands.
Chapter One begins with an overview of statistical notation and
analysis, including several examples of computation.
The chapter
concludes with specific application to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, soil sampling, and risk assessment. Chapter Two provides
an overview of the basic principles and features of physics and chemistry
which apply in an environmental regulatory context. This chapter covers
concepts that underlie specialized areas of science and engineering involved
in environmental law. Chapter Three addresses a number of difficulties
involved in sampling and analyses and gives the reader an understanding of
the concepts and terms employed in this area. Chapter Four describes the
methods used to estimate the likelihood of adverse health outcomes from
exposures to chemicals in the environment. The author describes health
risk assessment in mathematic, graphic, and probabilistic terms, and
includes a newly revised table on substances that the National Toxicology
Program recognizes as known carcinogens.
Chapter Five covers the environmental aspects of groundwater from
the hydrologic cycle to the ineffectiveness of "pump and treat" for
groundwater remediation. The author includes a detailed explanation of
groundwater flow, contamination migration, groundwater analysis,
modeling, and investigations. Chapter Six covers surface water quality and
wastewater treatment.
This extensive analysis examines pollutant
classification, aqvatic ecosystems, and wastewater treatment operations.
Chapter Seven emphasizes the primary established treatment technologies
for hazardous solid wastes and contaminated soils: combustion, thermal
desorption, vapor extraction, bioremediation, immobilization, soil washing,
and solvent extraction. Chapter Eight defines and explains air pollution
terminology, air quality monitoring, and modeling specifically related to
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and details methods of air pollution
control. The author provides a thorough analysis of air pollution controls
for particulate matter, and for gases and vapors, including fabric filters,
wet scrubbers, incineration, adsorption, and condensation. The author also
includes a discussion on computerized air quality dispersion models used in
regulatory application. Chapter Nine covers wetland issues ranging from
regulatory definitions to mitigation and restoration.
This chapter
differentiates between wetlands functions and values, describes types of
wetlands, and explains the criteria used to identify and delineate wetlands.
The Environmental Science Deskbook also contains an index
referencing the book's various sections. The format of the Environmental
Science Deskbook allows an environmental practitioner to seek specific,
detailed knowledge of technical and scientific information, or to gain an
overview on a range of topics. This book can be used as a reference tool
to quickly retrieve a statistical formula by using the detailed section
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breakdown preceding each chapter. The book is a useful self-teaching aid,
as it provides a comprehensive explanation of environmental science
terminology, methods, and concepts.
Sommer Poole
KATIE LEE, ALL MY RIVERS ARE GONE: A JOURNEY OF DISCOVERY
THROUGH GLEN CANYON, Johnson Printing, Boulder, Colorado

(1998); 240pp; $18.00; ISBN 1-55566-229-3, paperback.
In All My Rivers Are Gone: A Journey of Discovery Through Glen
Canyon, Katie Lee takes us back to her days as a river runner on the
Colorado River. In the early 1950's, Lee spent most of her time as an
aspiring actress/singer/songwriter living in Hollywood. After a friend
convinced her to take a rafting trip through the Grand Canyon, her life
changed forever. She fell in love with the splendor, beauty, and isolation
of the Grand Canyon, and, subsequently, Glen Canyon. This book,
containing excerpts from a journal kept while on her raft trips, takes us
back to a time of innocence, beauty, and unwavering love of nature and
Glen Canyon. It is also a book about politics and compromises, and how
the two changed a canyon and lives forever.
In Part One: Two Opposing Realities, Lee recounts her introduction to
the Canyon and its people. Her daily entries show her unfamiliarity with
the ways of the Canyon and how she came to accept and be accepted by the
Canyon and the people who loved it. Lee introduces us to people who had
dramatic impacts on her life, and changed the way she looked at
Hollywood and her "other life." As Lee came to know and understand the
Canyon, the reader feels included in this experience through her explicit
descriptions and colorful prose.
Part Two: Getting in Step with the Stone, is devoted to Lee's "we
three" trips- trips she took down the Glen Canyon with her two close
friends Tad Nichols and Frank Wright. The three shared an unbridled
passion for the river and canyon. As talk increased about the "Wreck-thenation Bureau" building the dam, Lee and her friends explored areas of the
canyon that had never before been seen-hidden canyons with wondrous
natural pools, lakes, streams, and wildlife.
Part Three: The Wild Secret Heart Lee takes her on her final trip down
the river with her friends. Lee writes eloquently and passionately about the
death of her canyon, and her remorse shows clearly in her journal entries.
Lee finally has a great understanding of the river, the canyons, the hidden
pools, and deep crevices. Her words express clearly the change that has
taken place in her life and her peace with herself-peace that she found in
the Glen Canyon.
Part Four: Fighting the Upstream Wind concludes Lee's tribute to the
gone, but not forgotten Canyon, by chronicling her correspondence with
politicians and friends in her fight to save the Canyon. This final sections
deals with Lee's emotions as she visits the Canyon during the construction
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of the dam, and watches her Canyon drown. She visits the completed
project, now Lake Powell. Lee travels by boat to places that she once
knew and recognized, but now the heights of the stone pillars are deep
under water. Finally, Lee takes the reader from 1967 to 1997, when she
was invited to attend a seminar at the Glen Canyon Institute. Lee had
never heard of the Glen Canyon Institute, but she accepted the offer. She
was thrilled to discover a group of students and young people who wanted
to restore the canyon-her canyon-to its natural state. Her cause is
renewed.
All My Rivers Are Gone gives a compelling, vivid, colorful account of
life on Glen Canyon as told by a river-rafter who loved the Canyon for its
peace, solitude, and beauty. Lee's book takes the reader to the Canyon as
it was before the dam, and invites us to imagine a time when we can once
again return to that place of peace, solitude, and beauty.
Kimberley Crawford
COLIN MOORCRAFT, MUST THE SEAS DIE?, Gambit, Boston (1973);
194pp; $13.95, ISBN 0-87645-069-9; hardcover.
Must the Sea Die provides a comprehensive examination of the Earth's
still-living sea, the effect mankind has on marine life hidden beneath the
sea, and on the land humans inhabit. Each chapter explores different areas
of the world, the water pollution problems that effect that environment and
native species, and possible solutions to prevent or repair the damage
already done.
Chapter One discusses testimonies by professors, explorers, and
scientists regarding the significant decline of the Earth's marine life, and
the lack of serious attention it is given by the world. All comments from
the various experts in marine life agree that the biggest most significant
changes in the environment are those in the world's oceans and seas.
Chapter Two sets out the incredible picture that is the "world ocean."
Moorcraft describes the vast area of the world covered by water; however,
humans have not realized that more organisms share the same chemical
composition. This chapter lays out the interconnection between humans
and all the other organisms in the world, and the importance of
investigating the world ocean to come to a new respect and understanding
for the ocean as a complex system.
Chapter Three explores the problem humans have with overexploitation of the oceans. Examples of whaling, fishing, and hunting
shrimp demonstrate the human belief that we are superior and therefore are
entitled to take from the environment without putting anything back.
Moorcraft discusses some environmental treaties enacted to correct
damages caused by overhunting.
Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight describe the various
anthropogenic pollutants introduced into the marine environment. Chapter
Four explains how the agricultural revolution became the first introduction
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Moorcraft discusses how several
of pollutants into the environment.
different civilizations across the world polluted nearby waterways through
agricultural organic pollutants. Chapter Five explores, in further detail,
Chapter Six
other pollutants that affected the marine environment.
continues to describe other industrial contaminants introduced into the
environment such as copper, lead, and mercury and their effects on the
world ocean. Chapter Seven specifically addresses the severe effects oil
pollution has on the marine environment. Moorcraft uses the example of
coral contamination to show the grave consequences of oil spills and
improper handling on the tropical seas. Moorcraft also explores several
different solutions to the oil pollution crisis. Chapter Eight describes the
Moorcraft
unique effect radioactive waste has on the environment.
discusses the solutions to nuclear threats on the marine environment.
Chapter Nine segues from specific pollutants to specific forms of water
affected by those contaminants. Marginal seas are the areas of the world
sea most severely affected by fisheries and various pollutants. Moorcraft
uses the Baltic Sea to demonstrate the devastating harm contaminants has
on marginal seas.
Chapter Ten compares the effect pollutants and over-exploitation have
on the polar and coral seas. The author states that before humans have had
a chance to explore these seas, they are being destroyed. Moorcraft uses
the Great Barrier Reef to demonstrate the destruction of the coral seas,
specifically discussing the decline of coral and starfish.
Chapters Eleven and Twelve discuss the three main oceans. In Chapter
Eleven, Moorcraft explores the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He discusses
the destruction of the continental shelves around the United States and
Japan. In Chapter Twelve, Moorcraft pays special attention to the harm
done to the Atlantic Ocean because its health is declining at a rate far
Moorcraft discusses the
.greater than the rest of the world ocean.
devastation done to the Atlantic salmon by the oil industry. He also
investigates the effect air pollution has on the shores around the Atlantic
Ocean.
Chapter Thirteen shows the final grand picture of the world ocean after
discussing over-exploitation, pollutants, and industrial activities. The
author states that not all symptoms of decline are obvious and immediate.
Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen discuss the various programs and
treaties created to help repair the damage already done to the marine
environment and, more importantly, to prevent future destruction. In
Chapter Fourteen, Moorcraft investigates the method the Danish
government uses to repair the damage done to ocean water near Denmark.
In Chapter Fifteen, Moorcraft discusses technology used to prevent future
damage, such as computer research done to figure out solutions to the
depletion of food sources for marine life.
Sheela S. Parameswar
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ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, THE LEGAL REGIME FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER POLLUTION: BETWEEN DISCRETION AND CONSTRAINT,

Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, Massachusetts (1993); 327pp;
$134.50; ISBN 0-7923-2476-5; hardcover.
The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution analyzes the
international legal regime for transboundary water pollution, examining the
balance between the discretion of states to undertake economically
attractive activities and the need for constraint to protect the environment.
This book uses as a case study the regime for transboundary water
pollution as it applies to the Netherlands and how international
environmental law have sought to replace discretion with restraint and what
limitations have been encountered with that endeavor.
Chapter One introduces the problem of transboundary water pollution
and key variables of the international regime. First, the author reviews
previous studies of transboundary water pollution and then presents
research questions, methods of approach, and the scheme of the study.
The three objectives of the study are: (1) to analyze the theoretical
assumptions underlying the predominant regulatory approaches used to
limit the discretion of the states; (2) analyze the application of these
approaches to the Netherlands; and (3) examine the limitations encountered
in their application.
Chapter Two provides an overview of the principles and policies that
apply to the regime. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the sources of
those policies and an assessment as they apply to the different principles.
Chapter Three expands on Chapter Two, discussing the specific obligations
imposed by the international regime. This chapter begins with a discussion
of water quality standards and their transboundary application, followed by
discussions of emissions standards, percentage reductions, and best
available technology.
The author then assesses how these different
standards impact the discretion of the states.
Chapter Four outlines the procedural obligations states must follow to
prevent transboundary water pollution. The author describes what triggers
the obligation to cooperate with the regime and the consequences for noncooperation. Next, this chapter analyzes the specific obligations to notify
and consult when a state contemplates the initiation of a new use of an
international watercourse that may harm another state. This chapter
concludes by analyzing the obligation to conduct environmental impact
assessments for evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the
environment.
Chapter Five discusses the legally binding rules of the regime, as
evidenced by treaties and EEC directives contrasted with accepted nonlegally binding rules. This chapter addresses the distinction between legal
and non-legal rules, the criteria by which these categories are
distinguished, and types of legal and non-legal rules subject to analyses.
Finally, Chapter Five describes the advantage of legally binding rules, and
how non-legal rules can be changed to legal rules.
Chapter Six begins with an explanation of procedures applied in
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controlling state compliance with their obligations. This chapter explains
how procedures for compliance control can remove potentially adverse
This chapter explores how
effects of indeterminacy of obligations.
compliance control strengthens reciprocity between states and provides
incentives for states to comply with their obligations.
This book concludes with an exploration of the development of
international rules. These rules result in a large number of multifarious
procedures and rules that lead to the shift from discretion to restraint. This
technical book focuses on the issue of transboundary water pollution, but it
may be of interest to any person interested in international environmental
law.
Ryan 0. Reimers

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693
(2000) (holding that the lower court erred in concluding that a citizen suit
claim for civil penalties was moot when the defendant, after
commencement of the litigation, came into compliance with its National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit).
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("Laidlaw") bought a facility in
Roebuck, South Carolina which included a wastewater treatment plant.
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
("DHEC") granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The permit
authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water into the North Tygar River,
but limited the discharge of pollutants. Laidlaw began to discharge various
pollutants, particularly mercury, into the river in excess of the permit. In
April 1992, Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups
(collectively "FOE") sent Laidlaw a sixty-day notice letter notifying the
company of their intent to sue. Following receipt of the notice letter,
Laidlaw's lawyer contacted the DHEC to ask whether it would consider
filing a lawsuit against Laidlaw in order to bar FOE's proposed citizen suit
under the CWA. The DHEC agreed and the two entities reached a
settlement requiring Laidlaw to pay $100,000 in civil penalties and to make
"every effort" to comply with permit obligations. The facility later closed.
In June 1992, FOE filed a citizen suit under section 505(a) of the
CWA.
The district court determined injunctive relief inappropriate
because Laidlaw, after the institution of the litigation, achieved substantial
compliance with the terms of its discharge permit. However, the court
assessed a civil penalty of $405,800 and stated that Laidlaw could possibly
obtain attorney's fees. The court found that the total economic benefit to
Laidlaw, because of its extended period of noncompliance, equaled
$1,092,581. The appellate court vacated the district court's order when it
held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw fully complied with the
terms of its permit and FOE failed to appeal the denial of equitable relief.
The appellate court also held that FOE was not entitled to attorney's fees
because they did not receive relief on the merits. The main issues were
whether the case became moot once Laidlaw began to comply with its
permit and whether the plaintiffs had sufficient standing.
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The United States Supreme Court reasoned that Laidlaw's voluntary
cessation of its allegedly unlawful conduct did not suffice to moot the case.
It also found that the appellate court misperceived the remedial potential of
civil penalties. These penalties deter future violations and thereby redress
the injuries to the citizen. Additionally, the closing of the facility did not
moot the case because it was not clear whether it was reasonable to assume
that the permit violations would not recur.
Since the Supreme Court found that the case was not moot, it became
An
necessary to determine whether FOE had Article III standing.
the
members
when
on
behalf
of
its
to
bring
a
suit
has
standing
association
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. The
Supreme Court found that individual members who, if not for the pollution
would otherwise use the river, had sufficient standing.
The CWA allows citizens to file suits enforcing NPDES permits.
Citizens lack standing when the violations have ceased prior to the filing of
the complaint. Additionally, the CWA bars a citizen from suing if the
Environmental Protection Agency or the State has already filed suit. The
mercury violations continued after FOE filed the complaint. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court found that the DHEC did not diligently prosecute the
original action against Laidlaw.
The Court reversed and remanded because it found that the case was
not moot and that FOE had sufficient standing.
Kristen L. Cassisa

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
waterway was navigable for jurisdictional purposes based on the
waterway's current, not historical use).
LeBlanc and Ossen's kayak collided with a recreational motorboat
operated by Cleveland and owned by Grant on the Hudson River. LeBlanc
and Ossen filed suit in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction
alleging Cleveland and Grant negligently caused the accident and resulting
injuries. Cleveland and Grant then brought third-party complaints against
the business ("JRD") that had rented the kayak to LeBlanc and Ossen.
This allowed the case to proceed as if LeBlanc and Ossen also sued JRD.
JRD moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court granted this motion because it found that the Hudson
River, at the site of the accident, was not navigable in fact, and, thus, the
court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the lawsuit. LeBlanc and Ossen
then filed this appeal.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court. At issue was the proper standard, and its application, for
determining navigability necessary to exercise federal admiralty
jurisdiction. The court cited the test established by the United States
Supreme Court regarding whether a tort action falls within the federal
courts' admiralty jurisdiction. This two-part test required that "[f]irst, the
alleged tort must have occurred on or over 'navigable waters.' Second, the
activity giving rise to the incident must have had a substantial relationship
to traditional maritime activity such that the incident had a potentially
disruptive influence on maritime commerce." Since the United States
Supreme Court had declared that "pleasure boat accidents have a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity," LeBlanc and Ossen
assigned error only to the district court's definition of "navigable waters."
The court agreed with the district court's use of the basic navigability
test for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction as set forth in the Daniel Ball
case. The test designated those rivers as navigable in fact and in law when
they might be used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce
with other states or foreign countries. The district court found that the part
of the Hudson River where the accident took place was not navigable
because it was disconnected from any interstate or international waterway
by numerous impassable rapids, falls, and artificial dams. LeBlanc and
Ossen did not dispute the applicability of the Daniel Ball test. Instead,
they argued that the test required navigability to be determined by the
waterway's historic, unimproved state, rather than its present, improved
state. If the historic navigability test were applicable, then the logging
industry's regular use of the portion of the river at issue, use which
occurred prior to 1951 and the construction of several impassable dams,
rendered the district court's finding of non-navigability error.
The court rejected LeBlanc and Ossen's argument in light of
subsequent United States Supreme Court case law and the policies served
by federal admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, the court held that a waterway was
"navigable for jurisdictional purposes if it is presently used, or is presently
capable of being used, as an interstate highway for commercial trade or
travel in the customary modes of travel on water. Natural and artificial
obstructions that effectively prohibit such commerce defeat admiralty
jurisdiction." In applying this legal standard, the court found that the
Hudson River at the accident site did not support commercial maritime
activity, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over LeBlanc and
Ossen's claims.
Vanessa L. Condra
United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Clean Water Act allows the Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers to
delegate authority to issue discharge permits to district engineers in the
Corps).
The United States appealed a judgment by the Northern District of
New York dismissing numerous counts of an indictment. The United
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States brought the indictment pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
against defendants Mango, Austin, Dominske, and Phoenix Environmental,
Inc. (collectively "Mango").
The project at issue involved construction of a natural gas pipeline
running from Ontario, Canada to Long Island, New York. Mango
prepared an economic impact statement ("EIS") pursuant to regulations set
FERC
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC").
approved the project provided that Mango complied with certain conditions
involving stream and wetland construction, mitigation procedures, erosion
control, revegetation, and establishment of a maintenance plan for
disturbed areas. Mango also applied to the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") for a discharge permit pursuant to the CWA. The Corps issued
a discharge permit, signed by Lt. Col. Boston, acting on behalf of Col.
Danielson, the Corp's New York District Engineer. The permit required
Mango to implement the environmental mitigation measures contained in
the FERC permit.
The United States charged Mango with one count of conspiracy to
Counts two through thirty-one alleged
defraud the United States.
"knowing and negligent violations of the permit conditions." The district
court dismissed counts two through thirty-one on the grounds that the
CWA forbade delegation of permit issuing authority to anyone other than
the Chief. The district court indicated that even absent the delegation
problem, it would have dismissed counts eight through thirteen and twentysix through thirty-one because they did not relate to the discharge of dredge
or fill materials into navigable waters.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first considered the delegation
authority. It stated that by regulation, the Secretary clearly provided for
the delegation of his CWA permitting authority to district engineers and
their designees. The district court had concluded that the delegation was
invalid because the CWA "unambiguously demonstrates that Congress
intended to limit the Secretary's delegation authority to the Chief of the
Engineers." The court relied on principles of statutory construction and
found that if "congressional intent is not clear, we ordinarily will defer to
an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress."
The court of appeals then examined both the statute itself and several
cases interpreting the statute to determine congressional intent. It found
that: (1) the CWA did not specifically address delegation authority; (2) the
case involved internal rather than external subdelegation; (3) there was no
legislative history indicating that Congress expressly rejected
subdelegation; and (4) the overall intent of the CWA was consistent with
authority to subdelegate. Thus, the court held that the phrase "acting
through the Chief of Engineers" did not clearly indicate an intent to
prohibit subdelegation.
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the Secretary reasonably
interpreted the statute to allow for subdelegation. The court held the
Secretary's interpretation reasonable. First, the court stated that Congress
had used the same language in other statutes that contemplated
responsibility for a duty at a level below the Chief's. Second, the
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magnitude of the task of issuing permits suggested that Congress intended
to allow subordinate Corps officials to issue permits and specify permit
conditions. The court noted that the Corps processed approximately
11,000 permits per year, a task too daunting for one person. Finally, the
court stated that "when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a
longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the
congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by
Congress."
Finally, the court addressed whether the conditions imposed on the
permit were related to the discharge. The court noted that the CWA itself
did not specify how closely the conditions must relate to the discharge.
They held that permit conditions were valid if reasonably related to the
discharge, whether directly or indirectly. From the record, the court could
not determine with certainty whether the conditions adopted from the EIS
are reasonably related to the discharge.
The court held that the Secretary could subdelegate authority to issue
permits to agency officials. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the
case to determine whether the conditions of the permit were reasonably
related to the discharge.
Kimberley Crawford
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Kelly v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, No. 99-2496, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 1786 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2000) (holding that negligence
or knowledge was not required for civil or administrative penalties for
violations of the Clean Water Act).
Thomas Kelly bought property adjacent to Lake Koshkonong in
Jefferson County, Wisconsin with the intention of turning it into a
subdivision.
A 3.5-acre swale, or low-lying marsh, existed on this
property. As part of the development, Kelly began filling in the swale. In
August 1990, with thirty percent of the swale filled, the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") informed Kelly that he needed a federal permit to
discharge fill material into the swale, and later the Corps mailed him an
application for a permit. Kelly continued to fill the swale because an
attorney advised him that he did not need a permit.
When the Corps returned in September 1990, almost ninety percent of
the swale contained fill material.
The United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") found that Kelly violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by filling a wetland without a permit, and ordered him to
remove the fill and restore the swale to its prior condition. Kelly hired a
friend, Jonathan Prisk, to do some of the work. In January 1994, Kelly
again hired Prisk to dig pits in the swale, bury debris left by the previous
summer's flooding, and level the ground.
Prisk inquired about the
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necessity of a permit and suggested doing the work upland away from the
swale, to which Kelly replied, in effect, "Don't worry, be happy." The
Corps again visited the property and observed the work Prisk was doing.
After an administrative hearing, the EPA assessed administrative penalties
against Prisk and Kelly in the amount of $3,000 and $4,000, respectively.
The district court upheld the penalties. Both men appealed to this court,
which affirmed the district court's decision.
Kelly and Prisk argued on appeal that they did not violate the CWA
because they did not do so knowingly. The court disagreed for three
reasons. First, their brief never developed this argument, thus the court
deemed it waived. Second, the court held civil liability under the CWA,
unlike criminal liability under the CWA, was strict. Last, even if the
statute required knowledge, the incident in 1990 put Kelly and Prisk on
notice that filling a wetland violated the CWA.
Kelly and Prisk also suggested that their actions caused no
environmental harm, even though there was some contradictory evidence.
The court stated that the CWA did not forbid the filling of wetlands,
rather, it forbade the filling of wetlands without a permit. The court found
that had Kelly applied for a permit, he might have received one (less than
one percent of such applications were denied in 1994). Nevertheless, Kelly
did not do so.
Contrary to their arguments, the court found that Kelly and Prisk's
fines were not too high or retaliatory in proportion to the amount of
damage caused. The intent of civil penalties under the CWA were to
punish and deter. While the EPA could have sought civil penalties up to
$25,000 per day, it chose instead to assess administrative penalties with a
maximum of $10,000 each.
In response to Kelly and Prisk's final
argument that the $7,000 in total fines violated the "excessive fines" clause
of the Eighth Amendment, the court said that when Congress had
determined the appropriate punishment, a fine well within the statutory
limits could not be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
While Kelly and Prisk could have made other, more persuasive
arguments, the court said, theirs was essentially nothing more than a
diatribe against federal power under the CWA.
Adam B. Kehrli
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 14,
2000 (holding that because certain intrastate waters provided habitat to
migratory birds, and the potential aggregate result of the destruction of this
habitat and subsequent decrease in population of migratory birds
substantially affected interstate commerce, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers justifiably exercised jurisdiction over the waters at issue based
on the migratory bird rule).
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC"), a
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consortium of twenty-three municipalities formed for the purpose of
locating and developing a disposal site for nonhazardous waste, instituted
this action to challenge the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
("Corps") exercise of jurisdiction based on the migratory bird rule over its
proposed "balefill" site. SWANCC proposed to build a balefill (a landfill
where disposed waste is baled before it is dumped) on approximately 410
acres of land, over half of which consisted of an early successional stage
forest and more than 200 permanent and seasonal ponds. Upon the initial
finding by the Corps that the aquatic areas on the site could potentially
serve as habitat for migratory birds crossing state lines, the Corps
exercised its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and
ultimately found that the aquatic areas serve as habitat to several species of
migratory birds. Specifically, the proposed balefill required the filling of
almost eighteen acres of known migratory bird habitat, and, relying on the
migratory bird rule, the Corps denied SWANCC's section 404 permit
application.
The migratory bird rule resulted from the Corps' longstanding
interpretation of the phrase "waters of the United States" in the CWA's
implementing regulations. This interpretation included intrastate waters
which were, or could potentially be used as, habitat for species protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties or which were, or could potentially be, habitat
areas for unprotected species of migratory birds which cross state lines.
Although SWANCC did not challenge the Corps' finding of migratory bird
habitat on the proposed site, SWANCC challenged the migratory bird rule
as a basis for the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction. In particular, SWANCC
argued that: (1) Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce
Clause to grant the Corps jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters
merely because of the presence of migratory birds; (2) the Corps exceeded
its statutory authority in interpreting that the CWA conferred jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of migratory birds in intrastate water; and (3)
the Corps did not promulgate the migratory bird rule in accordance with
the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
The court rejected each of these challenges and upheld the Corps' exercise
of jurisdiction over aquatic areas that were found to serve as habitat to
migratory bird species, but did not address whether the Corps could
properly exercise jurisdiction over areas that were only potential habitats.
The court dispelled the constitutional challenge to the migratory bird
rule by invoking the cumulative impact doctrine. Under the cumulative
impact doctrine, a single activity that by itself had no recognizable effect
on interstate commerce might still be regulated if the aggregate effect of all
similarly-typed activities had a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
Citing various statistics exemplifying the effect of the presence of
migratory birds on interstate commerce, the court found that the
destruction of this habitat and the accompanying decrease in population
substantially affected interstate commerce. This aggregate effect justified
regulation under the Commerce Clause.
With regard to SWANCC's challenge that the Corps exceeded its
statutory authority in interpreting the CWA to confer jurisdiction over
intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory birds alone, the court
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first noted that to assert jurisdiction under the rule, the Corps had to first
make a factual determination that a body of water provided a habitat for
migratory birds. That is, the Corps had to establish that the water was not
merely a place a bird might occupy momentarily, but rather that the water
was the place where the species naturally lived. Additionally, recognizing
the existence of several international treaties and conventions designed to
protect migratory birds, the court found that the constitution's Supremacy
Clause clearly gave precedence to federal law in the regulation of
migratory bird species. The court reasoned that because it was within
Congress's Commerce Clause power to permit regulation of waters based
on the presence of migratory birds, the Corps could reasonably do the
same.
Finally, by noting the distinction between the APA's procedural
provisions pertaining to interpretative rules and policies as opposed to the
notice and comment requirements applicable to legislative rules, the court
classified the migratory bird rule as an agency interpretation and not a
substantive rule. The notice and comment provisions of the APA were
therefore inapplicable.
Thus, the court concluded that the Corps
reasonably and justifiably exercised jurisdiction over the isolated intrastate
bodies of water based solely on the presence of migratory birds utilizing
the water as habitat.
Lucinda K. Henriksen
Wisconsin v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 192 F.3d 642 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Wisconsin did not have standing under the Federal
Power Act to challenge the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
granting of six licenses for hydroelectric power projects proposed on the
Flambeau River).
Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") authorized the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to license hydroelectric power
projects on waterways subject to federal Commerce Clause regulation. In
exercising this authority, the FPA required FERC to consider whether a
proposed project was in the public interest.
FERC must take into
consideration, among other factors, the adaptability of a project to a
comprehensive plan for the "improvement and utilization of water-power
development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife." This determination mandates FERC to give equal
consideration to the fish and wildlife protection and enhancement aspects of
a project as it does to a project's water-power development potential.
At issue in this case was FERC's 1998 issuance of licenses for six
hydropower projects on the Flambeau River, a tributary of the Chippewa
River, in Wisconsin. In accordance with applicable regulations, through
the course of the licensing process, the applicants for the proposed projects
consulted with the appropriate state regulatory agencies. Additionally, the
applicants conducted a year-long fish entrainment study in five of the six
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proposed project sites.
Following FERC's 1993 public notice of the applications,, the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("Department") filed
preliminary comments on each of the projects declaring the analyses of fish
entrainment insufficient. The Department cited two reasons for its findings
of insufficiency: the analyses underestimated fish mortality and the
applicants failed to use the Department's fish sampling methodology in tie
analyses. Additionally, the Department recommended that the applicants
be required to develop fishery management plans and consult with the
Department on fishery management practices, including fish entrainment.
Next, FERC published a draft Environmental Impact Statement ("draft
EIS") in December 1995 pertaining to the projects. The draft EIS
recognized the difficulty of predicting the effects of entrainment and the
accompanying mortality on fish populations from the projects without
"long-term detailed information on fish population dynamics" in the
Flambeau River.
Nevertheless, the draft EIS concluded that the
inexistence of a fishery management plan for the river, the estimated extent
of entrainment losses that applicants cited in their license applications, and
the estimated cost of installing devices to protect fish from entrainment did
not justify the installation of fish protection devices.
In its final Environmental Impact Statement ("final EIS"), issued
approximately a year later, FERC considered, but rejected, the
Department's comments and concluded that applicants' data showed a
"minimal or no project-caused adverse impacts on fish populations" that
required mitigation. Accordingly, FERC issued licenses for each of the six
projects in early 1997. Each license, however, contained a standard
"reopener" clause, under which FERC reserved the right to impose
additional mitigation measures at a future time, if necessary; required a
fish entrainment study; and required a confirmation of the applicants'
agreement to consult with the Department in implementing reasonable
fishery management practices.
Immediately after the issuance of the licenses, the applicants objected
to the imposition of mandatory fish entrainment studies as "unduly
burdensome" and "not supported by the record." Shortly thereafter,
FERC issued its Rehearing Order pertaining to these licenses and removed
the mandate for the fish entrainment studies.
After FERC reconsidered and affirmed the Rehearing Order at the
request of the Department, the Department instituted this action alleging
that FERC erred as a matter of law in deleting the fish entrainment
provisions. FERC challenged that the Department was not "aggrieved" by
FERC's issuance of the licenses, and, therefore, was not entitled to judicial
review of the agency action.
Under the FPA, a party was only
"aggrieved" if it meets both the constitutional and prudential requirements
for standing, including: (1) that the party has suffered a imminent or
actual, concrete, and particularized injury; (2) that a causal connection
existed between the alleged injury and the agency conduct; and (3) that it
was likely, not merely speculative, that the injury would be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that because the licenses contained the "reopener" clauses, it
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was "merely speculative" that any judicial review and decision on the
matter would redress the injury to the Department.
IThe court reasoned that the Department's concern that further fish
entrainment studies might be required was valid; however, the "reopener"
clauses in the licenses provided for just such a concern. The court
reasoned that should it become necessary, under the "reopener" clauses,
FERC could impose additional requirements such as fish entrainment and
other alternative fish protection devices. Thus, the court concluded that
any injury to the Department from the failure to explicitly require
mandatory fish entrainment studies in the license provisions was not
redressable. The "reopener" clauses provided protection to prevent the
realization of the Department's speculative injury. The court, therefore,
dismissed the Department's challenge for lack of standing.
Lucinda K. Henriksen

NINTH CIRCUIT
B.J. Carney Indus., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
192 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding Carney's appeal untimely because
Carney filed it more than thirty days after the Administrative Law Judge's
order assessing a civil penalty).
B.J. Carney Industries, Inc. ("Carney") operated a wood pole treating
company.
Water from the company flowed into Sandpoint, Idaho's
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW").
The United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), pursuant to Sandpoint's
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, required
Sandpoint to issue industrial waste acceptance ("IWA") forms to
Sandpoint's industrial POTW users like Carney.
In November 1985, the EPA wrote Carney and declared: (1) that
Carney's discharge to the Sandpoint POTW violated pretreatment standards
because the discharge contained PCP and diesel grade oil; and (2) that the
EPA would defer to Sandpoint's pretreatment standards enforcement
program. On January 9, 1987, Sandpoint issued Carney an IWA allowing
small amounts of PCP discharge. Carney contacted the EPA regarding the
EPA's conclusion that Carney's discharge violated the EPA's pretreatment
standards. Furthermore, Carney stated that Sandpoint and Carney's IWA
was more consonant with sensible environmental policy. Consequently,
the EPA reasserted that Carney's discharge to the Sandpoint POTW
violated the EPA's "no discharge standard," even though Sandpoint had
given Carney an IWA permitting such discharge. The EPA, again, stated
that it would defer to Sandpoint's enforcement authority and inform
Sandpoint of the situation. Carney's IWA allowing PCP discharge expired
May 29, 1990. Shortly thereafter, Sandpoint issued Carney an IWA
permitting no discharge of PCP. On July 16, 1990, Carney closed its plant
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and cleaned up the site.
The EPA filed a complaint seeking a civil penalty assessment for
Carney's previous years of noncompliance. The Administrative Law Judge
("AU") found that Carney had violated the pretreatment standards,
assessed a $9000 gravity-based penalty, and disallowed the EPA to recover
Carney's economic benefits from its violations.
Both the EPA and Carney appealed to the Environmental Appeals
Board ("Board"). The Board affirmed the ALJ's ruling, but remanded the
case solely for: (1) a determination regarding Carney's obtained economic
benefits amount during the limitations period; and (2) a penalty
recalculation accordingly. A different ALJ concluded on remand that the
economic benefit and gravity-based penalties sum surpassed the maximum
statutory penalty of $125,000; therefore, the ALJ assessed Carney with a
$125,000 civil penalty. The ALJ's penalty order was issued on January 5,
1998. Carney appealed the AL order seventy days later, on March 16,
1998.
The EPA moved for dismissal, arguing that the appeal was
untimely.
The EPA argued that a federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the
appeal because the statute of limitations had run. The Clean Water Act
("CWA") provided that a civil penalty assessment appeal to a federal court
of appeals had to be filed within the thirty-day period, beginning on the
date the civil penalty order was issued.
Carney maintained that the ALJ's initial decision became an appealable
order by the Board forty-five days after the AL issued the order, relying
on the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR"). The CFR provided that a
presiding officer's initial decision became final forty-five days after service
unless an appeal was taken to the Board or the Board chose to review sua
sponte. Carney also argued that the CWA authorized only the EPA
Administrator to assess civil penalties, and the Administrator had delegated
that power to the Board, as opposed to the ALs; accordingly, the AL
lacked the authority to issue a civil penalty order under the CWA.
The court noted that the CFR expressly empowered an AL with the
authority to make an initial decision with a recommended civil penalty
assessment. The court asserted that Congress might have desired to devise
an opportunity, via the CWA, where parties could bypass the
administrative process and obtain immediate review by a federal court of
appeals. The court concluded that it did not posses the authority to
override Congress' policy decisions when the statutory language was clear.
Therefore, the court held that Carney's appeal was untimely.
One judge dissented to the majority's opinion. This dissent contended
that nothing required the court to interpret the ALJ's decision as a civil
penalty order as soon as it was dispensed. Even though the Administrator
had delegated ALJs with the authority to issue all necessary orders, that
fact did not force the court to perceive the ALJ's initial decision as a
matured civil penalty order. The dissent reasoned that the CFR language
pertaining to the presiding office's initial decision's development into the
Board's final order within forty-five days after its service upon the parties
without further proceedings buttressed the view that the ALJ's initial
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decision was not the final agency decision. Criticizing the majority's rigid
construction of the words "final" and "issued," the dissent declared that
Congress could not have intended for such a statutory interpretation. In the
dissent's opinion, the law could have been construed to require a notice of
appeal filing within thirty days following an ALJ's final decision. The
dissent would have held that Carney's appeal was timely.
Sara Franklin
Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Clean Water Act did not require municipalities to strictly
comply with state water-quality standards when applying for storm water
discharge permits).
In 1992 and 1993, five Arizona cities submitted applications for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits to
discharge storm water. The permits did not attempt compliance with
Arizona's water-quality standards. Defenders of Wildlife ("Defenders")
objected, arguing that the permits should strictly comply with state
standards. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") required the
cities to implement a Storm Water Management Program, which included
numerous environmental controls, such as storm water detention and
retention basins and infiltration ponds. The program also incorporated a
system to eliminate illegal discharges. After inclusion of these practices,
the EPA determined that the permits complied with state water-quality
standards, and, in February 1997, issued final NPDES permits to the
cities.
The Defenders requested a hearing, raising the legal question of
whether the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required strict numeric limitations
to ensure compliance with state water-quality standards. In June 1997, the
EPA denied the request; the Defenders petitioned for review with the
Environmental Appeals Board ("Board"). The Board also denied the
petition. Thus, the Defenders moved for reconsideration and, upon denial
of this motion, appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit held that, based upon statutory interpretation and
congressional intent, the CWA did not require municipalities to strictly
comply with state water-quality standards regarding storm water
In reaching this decision, the court utilized a two-step
discharges.
approach to review an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute.
Under the first step, the court used traditional tools of statutory
construction to decide whether Congress had expressed its intent clearly.
If Congress left a gap in the statute for the administrative agency to fill,
then in step two, the court was required to uphold the agency's decision
unless it was "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."
The court first noted that the CWA prohibited discharge of any
pollutant into navigable waters. However, an entity could obtain an
NPDES permit, allowing the entity to discharge some pollutants. Under
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one section of the CWA, an NPDES permit required a permit-holder to
achieve effluent limitations. This provision also required the permit-holder
to follow stringent standards established by state law. The court also
observed that the CWA generally did not require entities discharging storm
water to obtain an NPDES permit. However, the CWA did require a
permit for discharges related to industrial activity and discharges from
municipal sewer systems. When such a permit was required, the CWA
established two different standards.
For industrial users, the CWA
required permits for discharges to comply with all sections of the CWA,
including provisions requiring strict adherence to state standards. On the
other hand, the CWA did not require permits for municipal discharges to
comply with the strict statutory section that required compliance with state
standards. Rather, the statute required municipalities to use "controls to
reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable,
including management practices, control techniques and system design and
engineering methods."
Thus, under the two-step analysis, the court found that the language of
the CWA was clear and unambiguous and that Congress did not require
municipal storm water discharges to comply with state standards. The
court also stated that textual clues supported the plain meaning since the
CWA also contained other provisions that exempted certain discharges (i.e.
irrigated agriculture and storm water runoff from oil, gas, and mining
operations) from compliance with state water-quality standards. This
interpretation was also supported by a previous decision by the Ninth
Circuit in which the court held that the 1987 amendments to the CWA
allowed for relaxed controls for municipal storm water discharges.
Nevertheless, the court stated that although the CWA did not require
municipal storm sewer discharges to strictly comply with state standards,
the EPA was given discretion under the CWA to determine what pollution
controls were appropriate.
Thus, the EPA's choice to include the
additional water management practices in each applicant's permit was
within its statutory discretion. Finally, the court held that the EPA did not
act arbitrarily by issuing the permits to the Arizona municipalities.
Stephanie Pickens
Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the United States Department of the Interior had a duty to
provide drainage pursuant to the San Luis Act, but that the United States
had discretion regarding the manner in which it provided such drainage).
In June 1960, as an integral part of the Central Valley Reclamation
Project ("Act"), Congress authorized construction of the San Luis Unit,
principally to provide water for irrigation of land in certain California
counties. As a part of the Act, Congress recognized the necessity for
drainage and conditioned the construction of the San Luis Unit on the
provision for drainage facilities to be provided either by the State of
California ("State") or by the United States Department of the Interior
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("Department"). A feasibility report for the San Luis Unit contemplated a
system of drains that would empty into a receptor drain that would convey
the water to the Contra Costa Delta ("Delta") for disposal. In January
1962, after the State notified the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") that
it would not provide the master drain for the San Luis Unit, the Secretary
notified Congress that the Department would arrange for and construct the
required drain.
The Department began construction of the San Luis Unit and, in 1967,
began water service to the Westlands Water District ("District").
Construction of the master drain began in March 1968 and approximately
forty percent of the drain was complete by 1975. During the construction
period, the Secretary also built the Kesterson Regulating Reservoir
("Reservoir") near the middle portion of the drain to act as a regulator
before drainage waters reached the planned terminus at the Delta.
Beginning in 1965, certain appropriations were approved which
contained provisions prohibiting selection of a final discharge point for the
drain until the State, in conjunction with the Bureau of Reclamation
("Bureau"), addressed concerns regarding the effect of the effluent on the
The Department suspended construction of the
San Francisco Bay.
interceptor drain in 1975 due to "questions" and "concerns" raised by the
public. However, the Department did construct a subsurface drainage
collector system for the District and commenced temporary drainage
service to the Reservoir in 1978.
Pursuant to studies conducted at the Reservoir in 1983, the Secretary
found instances of deformity and mortality in waterfowl, suspected to be
the result of selenium carried into the Reservoir with the effluent. The
Secretary closed the Reservoir in March 1985, plugged the District drains,
and closed the middle portion of the interception drain. After this, the
District received water with no means of drainage.
In 1992, affected landowners sued the Department seeking completion
of the master drain, claiming that the Secretary was obligated to construct
drainage facilities. The district court granted plaintiff partial summary
judgment holding that the Act required the United States Government
("Government") to provide drainage to lands receiving water through the
San Luis Unit. In response, the Government argued that changes in law
and knowledge regarding the environment subsequent to the Act made
compliance impossible and, therefore, excused its duty to construct the
drain. The district court determined that the Secretary's obligation to
construct the drain was not excused. It ordered the Secretary and the
Bureau to take necessary steps to pursue an application for a discharge
permit. The Government appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered several
contentions of the Government. First, the Government claimed that the
plain language of the Act did not require it to build the master drain to the
Delta. Second, the Government argued that the appropriations riders,
which required consideration of water quality and environmental standards,
cumulatively led to an implicit repeal of the Department's duty to provide
drainage under the Act. Finally, in response to the contention that the
Department had been negligent in failing to fulfill its obligations, the
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Government argued that Congress, through actions subsequent to the Act,
encouraged the Department to investigate alternatives to the interceptor
drain.
On the Government's first claim, the court held that the district court's
finding that the Act mandated the Secretary to provide the interceptor drain
was proper. In considering the plain language of the Act, the court
acknowledged that the Act authorized the Secretary to construct, operate,
and maintain the San Luis Unit, but did not mandate it. However, the
court stated that the Act denied discretion as to what constituted the San
Luis Unit through use of the word "shall" in requiring engineering features
of the San Luis Unit to include particular characteristics (including
necessary drains). The court determined that although the Department had
discretion to decide whether to participate in construction of the drain for
the San Luis Unit pursuant to the Act, once the Department committed to
construction, it had no discretion in determining whether or not to include
the interceptor drain.
Next, the court of appeals held that it was apparent from the language
of the Department appropriations acts that it was not Congress's intention
to repeal the drainage requirements, but merely to order the Secretary to
develop a plan for addressing environmental problems associated with the
discharge of effluent. The court noted that repeals by implication were not
favored and that the intention of the legislature to repeal had to be "clear
and manifest."
The court recognized that the appropriations acts
contemplated the existence of an interceptor drain and, therefore, Congress
did not intend to repeal the drainage requirement.
Finally, in response to the Government's argument that Congress
encouraged the Department to investigate drainage solutions other than an
interceptor drain, the court acknowledged that Congress appropriated funds
subsequent to the Act in order for the Bureau, in cooperation with other
interested entities, to examine alternatives to the interceptor drain. The
court confirmed that the ability of the Department to examine alternatives
did not eliminate its duty to provide some form of drainage pursuant to the
Act.
Megan Becher-Harris
Klamath Water Users Protective Assoc. v. Patterson, 191 F.3d 1115
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that irrigators did not possess third-party
beneficiary water rights, the government retained overall control over the
dam, direct dam operations were subject to the Endangered Species Act,
and Indian water rights were protected).
In 1905, the United States appropriated all available water rights in the
Klamath and Lost Rivers pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902. In 1917,
as part of the construction of a series of water diversion projects, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") entered into a contract with the
California Oregon Power Company ("Copco") under which Copco would
construct the Link River Dam and convey it to the United States, but maintain
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the right to operate it. The parties entered into the contract pursuant to "acts
of Congress relating to the preservation and development of fish and wildlife
resources."
Operation of the dam was subject to requirements of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
The Secretary of the Interior also
recognized fishing and water treaty rights for a number of Oregon Indian
tribes ("Tribes"). The United States and Copco were the only named parties
to the contract and have since renewed for an additional fifty years. Due to
the federal government's various obligations related to the Klamath Basin and
the Link River Dam, the United States and PacifiCorp (Copco's successor in
interest in operating and maintaining the dam) agreed upon a short-term
modification of the contract in 1997. As part of Reclamation's one-year
interim plan for water distribution, PacifiCorp implemented the modifications
with flow levels lower than specified by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"). PacifiCorp implemented the plan contingent upon
FERC concurrence.
The Klamath Water Users Protective Association and other irrigators in
the Klamath Basin ("Irrigators") filed a breach of contract action based on
their alleged third-party beneficiary status.
The district court granted
PacifiCorp's and Reclamation's motions for summary judgment on
PacifiCorp's counterclaim seeking a declaration of rights with respect to the
Irrigators. The issues on appeal included whether the Irrigators were thirdparty beneficiaries to the contract, whether PacifiCorp or Reclamation had the
right to control the dam, whether PacifiCorp had a legal duty to operate the
dam to meet its ESA obligation, and whether the Irrigators' water rights were
senior to those of the Tribes.
The court held that Irrigators did not possess third-party beneficiary water
rights. Reclamation retained overall control over dam, the Irrigators' rights to
water were subservient to the ESA, and Indian water rights were protected.
The court found that the Irrigators were not third-party beneficiaries, but
rather were incidental beneficiaries that benefited from a government contract
and could not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary.
Furthermore, the language of the contract illustrated no intention of Copco or
the United States to grant the Irrigators enforceable rights. The contract also
controlled in determining that Reclamation retained overall authority over
decisions on use of the Klamath Basin, and PacifiCorp did not control the
dam. In determining that the Irrigators' rights were subservient to the ESA,
the court pointed to Reclamation's status as a federal agency. Federal agencies
have responsibilities under the ESA to meet specified requirements that
overrode the water rights of the Irrigators. The court found that similar to its
duties under the ESA, the United States, as a trustee for the Tribes, had a
responsibility to protect their rights and resources. The Tribes held implied
water rights guaranteed by treaty, and only Congress could abrogate such
rights. Therefore, Reclamation had the authority to direct operation of the
dam to comply with tribal water requirements.
The court concluded that under the language of the contract between
Copco and Reclamation, the Irrigators did not possess any third-party
beneficiary water rights and affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Reclamation and PacifiCorp.
Sommer Poole
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FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. CI. 154
(1999) (holding that sophisticated developer's investment-backed
expectations for its property were not reasonable due to developer's actual
knowledge of the Clean Water Act and the possible existence of non-tidal
wetlands on the property and the nature of the Army Corps of Engineers
action was not so unreasonable as to constitute a compensable taking).
Plaintiff, Broadwater Farms Joint Venture ("Broadwater Farms"), was
a general partnership that bought and prepared unimproved land for
residential developers. It contracted out for roads, electrical lines, storm
drains, and sewage removal systems for residential use.
In 1987,
Broadwater Farms purchased property known as Spyglass, consisting of
fifty-one lots near the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area of Anne Arundel
County, Maryland. The County zoned the Area for residential use ten
years prior to the Broadwater Farms' purchase. When Broadwater Farms
had finished eight-five percent of the work on the development, an
employee from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") enforcement
section surveyed the property. The Corps determined that much of the
development violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The Corps
determined that the Spyglass area consisted of non-tidal wetlands and
ordered Broadwater Farms to cease and desist the development.
Broadwater Farms asserted that they acted consistently with the permits
and plans for residential development approved by the County. While the
Corps allowed construction to continue in some areas, Broadwater Farms
received a letter from the Corps ordering it to restore eleven lots "to the
maximum extent possible."
The trial court determined that the alleged taking by the government
represented a mere diminution in the property's value and did not
constitute a compensable taking. The appellate court agreed that a
categorical taking did not occur. It remanded the case to the trial court to
consider whether a categorical taking occurred. On remand, the trial court
considered the extent to which the government regulation interfered with
the Broadwater Farms' investment-backed expectations and the character of
the government action.
On remand, first, the trial court determined that the buyer's reasonable
expectations had to be discounted when a regulatory scheme was in place.
Here, Broadwater Farms had no reasonable investment-backed expectation
for its planned development because it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the CWA's regulatory scheme. Broadwater Farms was
familiar with the CWA's potential effects before it developed its property.
Broadwater Farms and its representatives even dealt with the CWA's
mandates on three previous occasions. In addition, Broadwater Farms'
engineer informed it that non-tidal wetlands may exist and advised
Broadwater Farms that the wetlands could affect development. Thus,
Broadwater Farms, a sophisticated developer, took a calculated risk in
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developing the property and could not reasonably have expected
unencumbered development.
Second, the court concluded that government's action was not
improper. Broadwater Farms argued that the regulation enforced by the
Corps left Broadwater Farms without compensation. It argued that the
Corps acted unreasonably, irresponsibly, and was unwilling to
compromise.
The court noted that to the extent the Corps seemed
unwilling to compromise, it was merely enforcing a regulation as ordered
by Congress. Thus, the action that left Broadwater Farms without a permit
to develop did not constitute a compensable taking. The Court entered
judgment for the government.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
Lakewood Assocs. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 320 (1999) (holding
Lakewood's regulatory taking claim not ripe).
Lakewood Associates ("Lakewood") purchased unimproved real estate
known as the Elbow Lake Property and the Boy Scout Tract around 1987
and 1988, respectively. Lakewood planned to use the properties for
residential development.
At the time of purchase, Lakewood had
knowledge that both properties contained wetlands. In 1991, pursuant to
the Clean Water Act, Lakewood submitted a joint application for an
individual section 404 permit to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
("VMRC"). Lakewood noted in its application that practicable alternative
sites existed but did not evaluate them.
At the time of the submission of the application, the permit granting
system provided for: (1) avoiding impacts to wetlands to the extent
possible; (2) minimizing them to the extent appropriate and practicable;
and (3) compensating for the creation, restoration, and/or preservation of
other wetlands. Lakewood did not offer mitigation packages for the
wetland impacts its joint application proposed. After submission of the
application, the Virginia State Water Control Board, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency all voiced concern to
the Corps that before making a decision, more information was needed
from Lakewood, including a detailed alternatives analysis and further
environmental information on the wetlands impacted. The Corps sent a
letter to Lakewood in April 1991 requesting further documentation
regarding these concerns.
Lakewood failed to respond with the
information and in September 1991, the Corps closed the permit file. In
1992, Lakewood performed a wetlands delineation that the Corps
confirmed in 1993. In 1996, Lakewood asked the Corps to extend the
1993 delineation to 1998, to which it agreed.
Then, in 1997, Lakewood filed a compliant alleging a taking of its
property occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The government
asserted that since Lakewood failed to fully participate in the available
administrative permit process, the issue was not ripe for decision.
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Lakewood argued that continuing the permit process was futile and futility
excuses the requirement of a final agency decision before judicial review.
Lakewood argued that compliance with the Corps document request
was burdensome and did not serve a legitimate purpose. In Lakewood's
opinion the information requested by the Corps was too expensive and time
consuming and would do nothing to advance the approval or denial of its
permit application.
The court agreed that a plaintiff does not need to proceed with the
application process if the procedures were so burdensome as to deprive
plaintiffs of their property rights. However, the court stated that plaintiffs
could not simply plead futility when faced with long odds or demanding
procedural requirements. Without the establishment of futility, a claim that
the application of government regulation was a taking of property was not
ripe until the government reached a final decision on the application of the
regulations to the property.
The court found the information requested by the Corps both necessary
and legitimate to the permit review process. In reaching this conclusion,
the court pointed to the facts that the Corps and three other agencies
requested the information and that all the agencies felt the information
critical to determining the consequences of the practicable alternative sites.
In conclusion, the court held that Lakewood's taking claim was not
ripe for judicial review due to the absence of a final agency decision
regarding its section 404 permit application and that Lakewood failed to
establish futility in the permit process. Therefore, the court granted the
government's motion to dismiss.
Karen McTavish

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cabeza de Vaca Land & Cattle Co., L.L.C. v. Babbitt, 58 F. Supp.2d
1226 (D. Colo. 1999) (granting Babbitt's motion to dismiss based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing Cabeza's cause of action).
This case concerned the Rio Grande River Compact ("Compact"), the
connected Closed Basin Project ("Project"), and the Department of the
Interior's ("DOI") administration of the Project. In 1938, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas signed a compact in an effort to share water resources
of the Rio Grande River. In accordance with that agreement, Colorado
agreed to meet its obligations through the Closed Basin Project of the San
Luis Valley. The Project's plan entailed drawing water from the Closed
Basin aquifer to send to the Rio Grande.
The Reclamation Project Authorization Act of 1972 ("Act") authorized
DOI to oversee the Project. Section 102(b) of the Act limited DOI's ability
to draw water from the aquifer. Project facilities could not cause more
than a two-foot drop in water tables allocated for irrigation or in domestic
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wells lying outside Project boundaries. Section 102(b) also protected
artesian flows, which existed prior to the Project. The Act also enabled an
Operating Committee to monitor DOI and its compliance with
sectionl02(b) limitations.
Cabeza claimed DOI violated the Act and harmed neighboring
landowners through unauthorized draw-downs of the water table and
The court heard primarily procedural
reductions in artesian flows.
arguments on subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Cabeza brought the
case under a private right of action it claimed the Act provided. Babbitt
countered with an argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the United States did not waive sovereign immunity under the Act.
Cabeza alternatively argued that DOI acted ultra vires, depriving them of
The court established that the party asserting
sovereign immunity.
jurisdiction had the burden of proof.
The court first pointed out that the United States and its agencies and
employees could not be sued without consent or express waivers of
sovereign immunity. The court noted that an implied private right of
action did not create a waiver of sovereign immunity. Since Cabeza failed
to cite an express waiver of sovereign immunity within the Act, it did not
have a private right of action.
Next, the court examined the ultra vires doctrine. The court defined
actions as ultra vires when governmental officials and employees acted
"completely outside [their] authority," when they failed to do business "the
sovereign has empowered [them] to do," or were "doing it in a way that
the sovereign has forbidden." The court explained that ultra vires actions
did not occur simply because the official or employee made a mistake of
fact or law while exercising delegated power. The court stated that to
determine whether an official has acted ultra vires, a court should analyze
the statutes or regulations defining the official's duties.
Cabeza asserted the DOI Secretary "failed to meet his statutory
obligations to . . . the Project" and that the Operating Committee "failed in
their duty to determine whether the Project ... compli[ed] with section
102." The court, following Tenth Circuit precedent, stated that even if
Cabeza's allegations proved true, they "are but examples of erroneous
conduct falling with the statutory authority of federal officers" of the
Project.
Finally, Cabeza presented two other arguments, both of which the
court denied.The court rendered its holding in two parts: first, it granted
Babbitt's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
second, it dismissed Cabeza's action.

JenniferLee
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United States v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 98C4785, 1999 WL 417388
(N.D. Ill., June 15, 1999) (holding that the "other waters" regulation,
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), under which the United States
asserted jurisdiction, did not lack jurisdictional nexus to interstate
commerce and was thus within Congressional authority).
The United States brought this action against Hartz Construction for
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants into
United States waters without a permit. The United States asserted that the
Hartz wetlands were covered by the "other waters" provision because at
least one of the wetlands was used by migratory birds and another of the
wetlands was adjacent to navigable waters. Hartz Construction moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
denied the motion.
The court stated that Congress' objective in enacting the CWA was to
restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation's waters. The court stated
that the CWA prohibited discharging dredge or fill materials into navigable
waters without a permit and that navigable waters were "waters of the
United States." The Environmental Protection Agency and the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") promulgated regulations that defined
"waters of the United States" to include "all waters such as intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams, mudflats, sandflats, wetlands . . . the use,
degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce." The Corps further defined "other waters" as those which
"are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines. Wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are also subject to the
CWA."
Hartz asserted that based on the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Lopez, the "other waters" regulation, under which the United
States asserted jurisdiction, exceeded congressional authority because it
lacked a jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce. The court noted that
the Seventh Circuit had reviewed the "other waters" provision in prior
cases. The Seventh Circuit had previously determined that the presence of
migratory birds created the jurisdictional nexus between wetlands and
interstate commerce. The court also noted that the Seventh Circuit had
read Lopez narrowly. In a related case, the Seventh Circuit stated that
although the majority in Lopez intended to draw an outer limit to
congressional authority, Lopez did not represent a retrenchment of already
established Commerce Clause precedent.
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not addressed the "other
waters" regulation since Lopez was decided. Until a better clarification,
the court declined to depart from what it thought was the established law in
the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the court found it was within congressional
authority to regulate Hartz Construction's wetlands, and therefore denied
Hartz's motion to dismiss.
Kimberley Crawford
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Cameron v. Navarre Farmers Union Coop. Ass'n, 76 F. Supp.2d 1178
(D. Kan. 1999) (holding on government's motions to dismiss that: (1) the
issue of costs for alternative water supply under the National Contingency
Plan raised fact issues; (2) the issue of the government's qualification
under CERCLA's pesticide exemption raised fact issues; and (3) the
government's sovereign immunity defense was premature).
Twelve families ("families") who resided in Navarre, Kansas, alleged
that pesticide products that the defendants, the United States Department of
Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation ("USDA") and the Navarre
Farmers Union Cooperative Association and the North Central Kansas
Cooperative Association ("Coop"), used and stored on a nearby grain
storage facility contaminated the groundwater underlying their properties.
Because of the groundwater contamination, the families incurred expenses
for an alternative water supply, which they would need indefinitely.
The families filed a cost-recovery action under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")
against the USDA and the Coop seeking a judgment for more than $1.5
million plus costs. In order to recover under CERCLA, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) defendant was a "covered person" within the meaning of
CERCLA; (2) a "release" or "threatened release" of any "hazardous
substance" from the site in question has occurred; (3) the release or
threatened release caused plaintiff to incur costs; (4) plaintiffs costs are
"necessary" costs of response; and (5) plaintiff's response action or
cleanup was consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").
Both USDA and the Coop denied liability and denied the families had
suffered actionable damages. The Coop, however, filed a cross-claim
against the USDA for contribution in the event the plaintiffs were
successful on their CERCLA claims.
The United States ("the government") intervened on behalf of the
USDA, and moved to dismiss the families' claims for two reasons: (1) the
defendants' activities fell within CERCLA's pesticide exemption; and (2)
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The government also moved to
dismiss the Coop's cross-claim because: (1) CERCLA preempted the
Coop's common law theories; and (2) the Coop failed to identify a
sovereign immunity waiver.
First, the government argued that CERCLA's pesticide exemption
applied because the pesticide, a grain fumigant, was registered under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") and USDA
and the Coop applied it appropriately and in the customary manner. The
court stated that the government bore the burden of proof. The court found
that no proof existed that the fumigant was FIFRA-registered or that the
defendants had applied it in a customary manner.
Second, the government argued that the families failed to state that the
costs incurred for an alternative water supply were "necessary" and
"consistent" with the NCP. When considering this motion, the court
determined that a fully developed record had to exist before it could
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determine consistency with the NCP. Because the court found that a fully
developed record did not exist, it concluded that the NCP issue was not
ripe.
Finally, the court found the government's cross-claim and sovereign
immunity issues were premature given the liberal pleading standards and
the Coop's intent to amend its cross-claim if the families amended their
complaint to assert tort claims against the Coop pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the court denied without prejudice the
government's motions to dismiss.
Kris A. Zumalt
South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. Partnership, 73 F. Supp.2d
17 (D. Me. 1999) (holding that under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
damages are not limited to physical property and may include goodwill and
other intangibles if adequate evidence was presented to show actual loss).
South Port Marine ("Marina") filed suit under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 to recover e images from a Gulf Oil ("Gulf") gasoline spill. A jury
verdict in favor of the Marina awarded $181,964 for property damage,
$105,000 for lost profits, and $300,000 for loss of goodwill and business
stress. Subsequently, Gulf filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law
or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
The district court granted Gulf's motion for judgment as a matter of
law on all but the granting of $15,000 of lost profits, and eliminated the
judgment for the entire $300,000 for loss of goodwill and business stress.
The statute allowed an injured party to recover for economic losses
resulting from destruction of real or personal property. The court stated
that "personal property" included intangible assets. Therefore, damages
for loss of goodwill and business stress were permitted. However, in this
case, the Marina did not present adequate evidence to prove future lost
profits or the loss of goodwill. The basis for the majority of the $105,000
of lost profits was a plan prepared by one of the owners of the Marina.
The plan included dredging of the Marina to cut down on draft, and for
expansion by twenty-five slips. Due to the lack of evidence of market
demand for the twenty-five additional slips, the Marina could not recover
the $90,000 of the lost profits attributed to the additional slips. The court
did award $15,000 of the lost profit damages for future slip revenue from
customers who left slips due to the spill.
The court stated the Marina was entitled to recover the decline in fair
market value ("FMV") due to the dock damage under goodwill but ruled
the evidence for assessment was inadequate. The Marina accountant
valued goodwill at $100,000, but he never provided any evidence that the
spill reduced goodwill to zero or by any other amount. The accountant
provided the figure of $150,000 as the amount of damages attributable to
business stress. He provided this amount as the reduced price a purchaser
would pay for the Marina. However, the accountant did not provide any

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

analysis of the calculation. The court ruled that the inadequate evidence
should have prevented the claim for business stress from submission to the
jury.
The court granted the motion for a new trial in the event that the
judgment as matter of law was vacated, unless the Marina agreed to a
remittitur in the amount of $100,000.
Tiffany Turner

Colbro Ship Management Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp.2d 253
(D.P.R. 2000) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
because substantial evidence in the administrative record supported the
finding that the plaintiff was liable for the discharge of garbage mixed with
plastic into the navigable waters of the United States and holding that the
assessment of the civil penalty of $10,000 was not an abuse of discretion).
In May 1995, the United States Coast Guard ("USCG") in Miami,
Florida, received notification that Michael Schrader, an operator of an
ocean-going vessel, had witnessed a man throwing a large, white garbage
bag from an all-white freighter vessel with a red waterline into the United
States' Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") waters off the coast of Florida.
Schrader approached the ship and found a trail of food, paper, and plastic
trash from a split open trash bag in the water. Two vessels were in the
approximate vicinity of the witnessed incident; however, the USCG, based
on the reported position and visual description given by Schrader,
identified the vessel as the Phoenix Spirit.
An ensuing inspection conducted by the USCG revealed an insufficient
amount of garbage on board in relation to the size of the crew and to the
voyage's duration since the last port of call where garbage could have been
discharged. Further, the ship's master did not produce any receipts from
any previous shoreside discharges. Empty white trash bags were found on
board. Schrader later identified the vessel from photographs taken by the
USCG while on approach and on board.
The USCG investigators
subsequently filed an official report with the USCG hearing officer.
The hearing officer advised Colbro Ship Management Company
("Colbro"), the responsible party for the Phoenix Spirit, of the initiation of
civil penalty proceedings pursuant to the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships ("APPS"), the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships of 1973, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
for the discharge of garbage mixed with plastic into the navigable waters of
the United States. The hearing officer's notice further advised Colbro of
the proposed penalty of $10,000, and of its rights. Colbro purportedly
requested a hearing, although such a request never materialized. Colbro
never spoke with Schrader. Further, Colbro never secured counsel and
chose instead to correspond with the hearing officer, denied liability, and
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.
After reviewing all the evidence in the administrative record, the
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hearing officer determined that Phoenix Spirit was responsible for the
discharge of garbage mixed with plastic into the EEZ and assessed a
penalty of $10,000.
Colbro appealed the decision to the USCG
Commandant, who, through his designee, affirmed the decision of the
hearing officer. Colbro brought this action to review the decision of the
monetary penalty against it under the Clean Water Act. Both parties
moved for summary judgment on the issue of substantial evidence.
The court reviewed two issues: (1) whether liability for the discharge
of garbage into United States waters was supported by substantial evidence
in the record; and (2) whether the assessment of the $10,000 penalty was
arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The court, limiting its
review to the administrative record, affirmed the USCG's determination on
both issues.
On the first issue, the court defined substantial evidence as relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The agency, in determining liability, relied on both direct and
circumstantial evidence. The USCG had authorization to inspect the
Phoenix Spirit to determine if the ship complied with APPS under Title 33
of the Code of Federal Regulations. Section 151.63 enumerated the types
of evidence that the USCG could consider in its determination: records and
receipts of garbage discharged at port facilities; the absence of plastics on
board; and the presence of shipboard spaces used for collecting, storing,
and discharging ship-generated garbage. Although the evidence regarding
the amount of garbage on board was not overwhelming, the court found
that when viewed in totality with the lack of receipts, empty trash bags,
and the eyewitness account of trash being thrown overboard from the
vessel positively identified as the Phoenix Spirit, the preponderance of the
evidence supported the hearing officer's determination of liability. The
court further found that the manner in which the USCG handled the issue
of vessel identification was rational.
Last, the court determined that the $10,000 penalty was not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion based on provisions in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, which provided factors the court considered
in determining the amount of the civil penalty. The factors included: the
seriousness of the violation; the degree of culpability involved; history of
prior violations; the economic benefit to the violator; and the nature,
extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or
mitigate the effects of the discharge. Colbro presented no mitigating
evidence. Further, the USCG determined that the $10,000 penalty was
appropriate in light of the seriousness of the violation. Thus, the court
granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, denied Colbro's
cross-motion, and affirmed the Commandant's decision.
Elizabeth Appleton
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STATE COURTS
ALASKA
Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that an Alaskan statute permitted recovery of damages for the
municipalities' diverted-services claims for services diverted due to cleanup
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
This suit arose from the March 1989 spill of eleven million gallons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound. As a result of the spill, the
surrounding municipalities had to divert employee resources from their
normal services to the massive cleanup operation. The Cities of Seward,
Cordova, Old Harbor, Ouzinkie, Port Lions, and Larsen Bay ("Cities")
sued the parent corporation of the oil tanker, Exxon Corporation
("Exxon"), for costs of municipal services associated with diverting the
resources to the clean up.
The Cities sued under Alaska statute 46.03.822(a), which imposed
strict liability for harm caused by release of hazardous waste. The statute
provided for recovery for a variety of damages associated with an oil spill
including, but not limited to, additional costs of services in cleaning up the
spill as well as costs due to delayed function or activity because the
municipality or state was involved in a clean up. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Exxon, determining that the Cities' claims for
diverted services were not "damages" covered by the statute. The Cities
appealed and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed.
Exxon presented four arguments: (1) the "free public services
doctrine" barred any claims for damages by the Cities; (2) the Cities
waived any right to claim these damages due to a prior settlement
agreement; (3) the Cities lacked standing; and (4) Federal Maritime law
preempted the Cities' claims.
The free public services doctrine stated that the public had to bear the
cost of emergency public services, thereby relieving individual tortfeasors
from liability. The court addressed the issue by stating that even assuming
the doctrine applied, the statutes abrogated the doctrine regarding the
municipal recovery for spill-related damages.
The court relied on the specific language of the statute. It pointed out
that the broadness of the language indicated the legislature's intent to
provide compensation for governmental services, even if not recoverable at
common law. The court found particularly compelling that the statute
allowed for strict liability "not withstanding any other provision or rule of
law." The court also held that diverted services fell within the types of
damages allowed under the Alaska statute. The court recognized that there
existed some room for confusion because of a series of amendments to
statute sections 46.03.822 and .844. The court reviewed the legislative
history and determined that the legislature's definition of "damages" and
"loss of economic benefit" were broad and intended to include diverted

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 3

services costs. The court held that the trial court's interpretation of
46.03.822 was too narrow. The court qualified its holding by reiterating
that the burden still lay on the Cities to show actual damages under
46.03.822 and .844.
Exxon contended that even if the damages applied, the Cities waived
their right to the diverted services claims due to a prior settlement
agreement. The court held that since the Cities had reserved the right to
appeal, the Cities had not waived the right.
Exxon next argued that the Cities did not have standing to bring the
claims because the right belonged to the citizens themselves. In response,
the court stated that the plain language of the statute conferred standing to
the Cities; the statute defined damages incurred by "a state, a municipality,
or a village."
Exxon contended that even if the Alaskan statutes allowed the diverted
services claims, federal maritime laws preempted them. Exxon relied on a
case that stated that recovery for purely economic loss without physical
injury was not allowed under federal maritime law.
The court used a two-part test to determine if federal law preempted
the Alaskan statute. First, the court looked to see if the statute worked a
"material prejudice to a 'characteristic feature' of the maritime law." The
court defined "characteristic feature" as one that "originated" or "has
exclusive application" in admiralty. The court cited a case that held that
merely because a purely economic claim arose out of admiralty did not
mean the claim was immediately preempted.
In applying the second part of the test, the court addressed whether the
state statute "interfere[d] with the proper 'harmony and uniformity' of
maritime law." To determine this, the court applied a balancing test of the
federal and the state interests in the subject matter. Here, the court agreed
with the Cities that the state had a legitimate and strong interest in
regulating oil pollution of its waters. The court recognized that imposing
liability might have had some influence on maritime commerce, but that
the state interest was strong enough to defeat preemption. Further, the
court noted a diminishment of the federal interests over the years,
evidenced by recent regulations such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act that allowed, to some extent, liability for purely
economic loss. The court held that the Alaskan statutes did not interfere
with the federal maritime laws, and thus were not preempted.
Kim Shropshire
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ARIZONA
In re the Gen. Adjudication Of All Rights To Use Water In The Gila
River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
federal reserved water rights doctrine applies to groundwater, and that the
holders of federal reserved water rights can invoke federal law to protect
their groundwater to the extent necessary to fulfill the reserved rights, even
if they would enjoy greater protection than state law water rights holders).
Comprehensive and contentious litigation regarding the waters within
the Upper Salt, Verde, Upper Gila, Lower Gila, Agua Fria, Upper Santa
Cruz, and San Pedro watersheds began in 1988. This opinion was the third
in a series that addressed issues accepted for interlocutory review by the
Arizona Supreme Court. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
federal reserved water rights extended to groundwater to the extent that
groundwater was necessary to accomplish the purpose of a reservation.
The court also held that holders of federal reserved rights were entitled,
under federal law, to greater protection than state law holders to the extent
necessary to maintain sufficient water to accomplish the purpose of a
reservation. While the court tackled the scope of federal water rights, it
refused to declare a standard for determining the purpose of a reservation
and also refused to define how imminent a threat to a reservation's
essential waters must be in order to grant injunctive relief.
Before reaching federal reserved rights doctrine, the court discussed
the current state of Arizona water law by stating that prior appropriation
governed surface water; reasonable use governed groundwater; and
somewhere in the middle existed subflow, which marked a zone where
water pumped from a well so appreciably diminished the surface waters
that it was also governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation. While
admitting that subflow was a legal artifice, the court reaffirmed this
bifurcation of state water law because of the enormous agricultural,
industrial, mining, and urban reliance on such tenets.
The court, however, broke new ground in stating that groundwater was
subject to the federal reserved rights doctrine. In doing so, the court found
several arguments persuasive. First, the court acknowledged that some
Indian reservations depended, either substantially or entirely, upon the
pumping of underground water. The court reasoned that the United States
could not have reserved land for habitation without reserving the water
necessary to sustain life. Therefore, the United States must have intended
the implied reservation of water to come from whatever particular source
each reservation had at hand. Second, the court looked to United States
Supreme Court precedent to determine that federal water rights were
shaped by the integral nature of the hydrologic cycle, not legal artifice. By
analogy to the holding in United States v. Cappaert, the court determined
that because federal reserved rights decline to differentiate between surface
and groundwater when addressing the diversion of protected waters, the
law would similarly decline to differentiate between surface and
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groundwater when identifying the water to be protected. Third, federal
water rights must have continued through the years. Thus, the theoretical
equality of the reasonable use doctrine did not protect federal water rights
holders from a total future depletion of underlying aquifers by offreservation pumpers.
Arizona had already consumed far more
groundwater under the reasonable use doctrine than nature could replenish;
thus, continuing to apply this state law to federal reserved rights would
defeat the federal water rights, in violation of federal substantive law.
In the end, a federal reserved right to groundwater might only be found
where other waters were inadequate to accomplish the purpose of a
reservation. To determine the purpose of a reservation and the water
necessary to achieve it, the court engaged in a fact-intensive inquiry on a
reservation-by-reservation basis.
Once a right to groundwater was
established, the federal holders could invoke the greater protections of
federal law to protect their water rights from off-reservation groundwater
pumping. However, this right did not require a zero-impact standard of
protection for federal reserved rights.
Susan Klopman
ARKANSAS
White v. J.H. Hamlen & Son Co., 1 S.W.3d 464 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999)
(precluding summary judgment because material questions of fact existed
regarding whether land changes were caused by accretion or avulsion, and
whether the land formation was a sandbar or island).
White and several neighboring property owners ("White") appealed a
summary judgment order quieting title to a portion of Hardin Island owned
by J.H. Hamlen & Son Co. ("Hamlen"). Hardin Island was originally a
peninsula connected to the west side of the mainland and surrounded by the
meandering Arkansas River. In 1966, the government completed a project
designed to straighten the river's course and severed the peninsula from the
mainland, creating Hardin Island. Hamlen acquired title to a portion of
Hardin Island in 1982. White had title to property across the former river
channel (now slackwater) and to the east of Hardin Island since the mid1940's or early 1950's. The southeastern portion of the island claimed by
Hamlen was also included in the metes and bounds descriptions of White's
property.
The lower court granted Hamlen's motion for summary judgment to
quiet title in the disputed land based on aerial photographs and a set of
drawings prepared by a registered land surveyor admitted as exhibits by
Hamlen.
These exhibits evidenced Hamlen's theory that land along
White's riparian boundary was gradually eroded and deposited on Hardin
Island, thereby vesting title in Hamlen's increased land mass. White did
not dispute the changes as portrayed in Hamlen's exhibits. Instead, he
asserted that the exhibits did not prove whether the changes were caused by
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accretion rather than avulsion. Avulsion would have allowed White to
retain ownership. Accretion involved "a slow and gradual addition or
building up of lands due to the deposit of sediment eroded from upstream
lands." Whereas, avulsion involved "a sudden and rapid disruption of a
piece of ground due to the change in the course of a river."
The Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed with White that summary
judgment was not proper because material questions of fact existed about
the nature of the changes in the disputed land. The court noted that when a
stream changed its course by accretion rather than avulsion, the boundaries
of the riparian landowners changed with the stream. The court expressed
concern that Hamlen's exhibits contained a substantial gap of time not
documented, that they were merely illustrative of intermittent moments,
and did not conclusively prove that the land change was gradual, especially
in light of the government's river project in 1966. In addition, the court
held that a genuine issue of fact also existed regarding White's second
argument invoking an Arkansas statute. This statute would vest title to the
disputed land depending on whether the land formation was an island or
sandbar, a determination not clear from Hamlen's exhibits. Thus, the
court reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case.
Several judges dissented from the majority opinion. The dissenting
opinion stated that the summary judgment order should have been upheld
because White submitted a deficient abstract to the court according to
procedural rules, and did not create a genuine issue of material fact in
response to Hamlen's prima facie case.
Vanessa L. Condra
CALIFORNIA
County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 91 Cal. Rptr.
2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an environmental impact report
("EIR") based upon an unadopted, draft general plan that did not
adequately describe the baseline environment was insufficient, thus
affirming the trial court's order to set aside approval of the EIR for the El
Dorado Project, as well as its findings of fact and statements of overriding
concerns).
The defendants, the El Dorado County Water Agency ("Water
Agency"), and the El Dorado Irrigation District ("Irrigation District"),
created a two-part strategy to meet water demands of the area's growing
population. The first prong of this plan, the El Dorado Project, diverted
17,000 acre feet of water per year from three high Sierra lakes for
consumptive use. The Water Agency and the Irrigation District jointly
prepared an environmental impact report ("EIR") and certified it as
complying with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
However, the need for new water supplies described in the EIR had been
based upon a draft, unadopted general growth plan for the area.
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The second aspect of the defendants' strategy required the Irrigation
District to purchase a hydroelectric dam, known as Project 184, from the
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The agencies planned to shift
the dam's focus from electricity generation to supplying consumptive water
demands. The Irrigation District concluded that this agency action was
exempt from CEQA requirements. Therefore, an EIR for this action was
not necessary.
The California Department of Fish and Game, Amador County, and
the League to Save the Sierra Lakes (collectively "coalition") challenged
the agencies' decisions concerning the El Dorado Project and Project 184.
The trial court ruled for the coalition, concluding the EIR for the El
Dorado Project was inadequate, and Project 184 was not exempt from
CEQA requirements. The agencies appealed, contending that El Dorado
County's and State Water Resources Control Board's ("SWRCB") actions
before the trial court's decision mooted many of the concerns. In addition,
the agencies claimed that the EIRs for the El Dorado project were
adequate. Finally, the agencies asserted that Project 184 was exempt from
CEQA because state CEQA claims were preempted by the Federal Power
Act, the plaintiffs' claims against Project 184 were barred by the statute of
limitations, and that Project 184 was categorically exempt from CEQA.
The agencies stated that the coalition's claims were moot for two
reasons. First, El Dorado County approved the general growth plan
subsequent to the EIR. Thus, the agencies argued the coalition's challenge
to the El Dorado Project EIRs was moot. The court, however, disagreed.
The court concluded that this issue was not moot because the Sacramento
County Superior Court had previously invalidated the general plan as
inadequate and ordered a redraft. In addition, the court stressed that
another entity's subsequent determinations are irrelevant when considering
whether a lead state agency complied with CEQA.
The agencies' second mootness argument focused on whether
SWRCB's decision D-1635 mooted the issue that the EIRs did not
adequately address the impacts on the lake levels and fishery resources. D1635 imposed conditions relating to water flows and lake levels. The
agencies maintained that the decision provided the requisite impacts and
mitigation analysis for the EIRs. However, the Court of Appeals noted
that SWRCB had withdrawn D-1635 for reconsideration. Therefore, the
court concluded that D-1635 did not moot this issue.
The court next considered whether defendants abused their
discretion by basing the EIR on a draft general plan. The court determined
that an EIR based upon a projection of population growth and subsequent
water demand that has not been approved was an abuse of the CEQA
process. In addition, the Court of Appeals gave weight to the fact that the
general plan had been judicially deemed to be lacking. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals concluded that an EIR, predicated on a draft general
plan, was fundamentally flawed and inadequate.
In addition, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that the
EIRs did not adequately describe the baseline environment of the source of
the water, the high Sierra lakes, and PG& E's historic operations of those
lakes. This information was necessary in an EIR to compare the affected
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area's environment before and after the agency takes action. The agencies
used prior, end of the month, lake water levels and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's regulations for Project 184 to describe the
baseline environment and the historic operations. The court stated the
agencies' baseline environment description was a historical description, not
an operational analysis. Thus, the court concluded the description was
insufficient to compare the effects of a diversion of 17,000 acre-feet per
year from the affected lakes.
The court next considered whether the Federal Power Act ("FPA")
preempted the CEQA, thus rendering the Irrigation District's action
exempt from CEQA. The court recognized that the FPA regulated
hydroelectric power facilities such as Project 184, and that state law was
preempted to the extent that it conflicted with the FPA. However, the
court also noted that the FPA contained a savings clause, expressly stating
that the FPA was not to interfere or affect "the laws of the respective
States relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein." The court decided that this savings clause applied only
if Project 184 affected proprietary water rights. The agencies claimed that
there were no such rights at issue. Conversely, the court stated that water
consumption, and its removal from a stream bed, substantially affected
proprietary water rights. Therefore, the court concluded that the savings
clause applied to the agencies' employing Project 184 for consumptive
water purposes, and the FPA did not preempt this action.
The court then determined whether the coalition timely challenged
the agencies' actions within the statute of limitations. A party must file a
challenge to agency's notice of exemption from CEQA within thirty-five
days of the agency's filing of the notice. The Irrigation District filed for
exemption in April 1995. The plaintiffs challenged the action in September
1995 when the agency took steps to actually acquire Project 184.
However, the court stated that a notice of exemption was invalid if the
agency did not officially approve the action first. The court further
concluded that the official approval by the Irrigation District for Project
Therefore, the plaintiffs'
184 did not come until September 1995.
challenge was timely and did not violate the statute of limitations.
Finally, the court determined whether the proposed use of Project
184 fit within one of the two categorical exceptions to CEQA. The first
consideration involved the "existing facilities" exception. The court stated
that the key consideration concerning this exception was whether the
agency action involved a negligible or non-expansion of a facility's existing
use. The court concluded that a shift from a hydropower focus to a
consumptive use of the water was not a negligible expansion of Project
184's use.
The court next considered the "ongoing project" exception. This
exception excluded any project from CEQA that had been operating prior
to April 5, 1973. The court concluded that this exception did not apply to
Project 184 because the change from nonconsumptive use to consumptive
use expanded the project beyond its original purpose. Therefore, the court
resolved that employing Project 184 for a consumptive use was not
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categorically exempt from CEQA. Consequently, the court affirmed the
trial court's decision in favor of the coalition. In addition, the coalition
received costs for the appeal.
Kirk Waible

COLORADO
Municipal Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA,
Inc., 990 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1999) (holding Colorado's can and will and
anti-speculation doctrines, in addition to the reasonable diligence
requirement, apply to hexennial reviews of conditional water right
applications).
OXY USA, Inc. ("OXY") filed a hexennial review application in 1995
to maintain its conditional water rights in Garfield County. The Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Subdistrict")
objected, arguing that OXY had failed to diligently develop its conditional
rights, thus, had abandoned those rights. The water court found that OXY
had met the reasonable diligence requirement necessary to maintain its
conditional rights. The Subdistrict appealed. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the water court's decision.
OXY owned over ten thousand acres of land in Garfield County that
contained large oil shale reserves. OXY held a conditional water right
decree for the future extraction of oil shale.
OXY obtained these
conditional rights when it purchased Cities Service Company. Cities
Service Company initiated the conditional rights in 1951 and 1966,
obtaining a decree in 1970. The extraction of oil shale at the time of this
decision was economically infeasible due to low oil prices.
To meet the reasonable diligence requirement, OXY asserted that it
spent $5,052,235.00 on its oil shale project during the prior six years. The
costs included money spent drilling four natural gas wells, performing
technological and economic feasibility studies, soliciting financial partners,
participating in multiple Colorado River Projects and related resource
extraction associations, and gathering water supply data. OXY incurred
other expenses, such as paying salaries, engineering fees, legal fees, and
litigation costs to protect its water rights. In light of this evidence, the
water court found that OXY was able to show that it was diligently
developing its conditional water rights to eventual maturity.
Applying its recent Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado
Conservancy District v. Chevron Shale Oil Co. standard which allowed
water courts to make ad hoc factual findings based on project specific
factors surrounding the development of an appropriation in diligence
proceedings, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's
decree. The court held that it was proper for the water court to weigh all
relevant evidence, including economic conditions beyond the applicant's
control, in hexennial reviews for reasonable diligence. The court said that
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economic infeasibility alone did not defeat a diligence finding.
The Subdistrict argued that the court was required to analyze OXY's
application in light of Colorado's can and will test and anti-speculation
doctrine. OXY argued that the can and will standard applied only to the
granting of initial conditional decrees. The court found that both the can
and will and anti-speculation requirements should apply to hexennial
diligence proceedings.
The court stated that the very nature of conditional water rights
required application of these two doctrines. The can and will test required
the applicant to show a substantial probability that the intended
appropriation can and will reach fruition. The court found that analysis of
current economic conditions beyond the applicant's control was a part of
this test. OXY successfully met the can and will standard by proving it
possessed the technology necessary to make the project feasible.
Similarly, the court stated that the anti-speculation doctrine applied in
diligence proceedings because a conditional right, or some portion of that
right, might become speculative over time. The court found that OXY met
its anti-speculation burden by showing a steady effort to complete the
appropriation through investment and litigation, evidencing its intention to
pursue the project to completion in the future.
The court also upheld the water court's imposition of sanctions against
OXY for impeding the discovery process.
The Subdistrict sought
information during pre-trial discovery regarding OXY's future plans for its
oil shale project. OXY's appointed representative did not know enough to
provide adequate information. The water court found this frustrated the
Subdistrict's legitimate discovery attempts and ordered OXY to pay the
Subdistrict's related attorney fees and expenses.
The court also found that the water court had committed an error when
it took judicial notice of the testimony of OXY's appointed representative.
However, because the error was not central to the issue of OXY's adequate
diligence, and OXY was able to present other evidence that it was
diligently pursuing its conditional rights, it was not reversible error.
Chip Cutler
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d
46 (Colo. 1999) (holding that an undecreed change of use could not
establish historic use).
In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether diversions
not used for decreed uses established historic consumptive use in a change
of use proceeding if the water commissioner was aware of the diversions
and did not order their discontinuance or curtailment and no other users
had complained of injury. The court held that they may not.
Santa Fe Ranches sought to change the use of two water rights
appropriated by Colorado Fuel & Iron Company ("CF & I"). CF & I
obtained the water rights at issue in the late nineteenth century for
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manufacturing and domestic purposes. From 1966 to 1985, CF & I leased
the rights, without a change in use proceeding, to El Moro Ditch Company
("El Moro") which used the water for irrigation via different points of
diversion from CF & I's diversions. In 1985, CF & I transferred the rights
to a third party, but El Moro continued to use the rights under an
arrangement with the third party. Santa Fe Ranches, the applicant in this
case, had the option of purchasing the rights from the third party, a
transaction requiring a change of use proceeding. Santa Fe Ranches sought
to rely on El Moro's use of the water rights instead of CF & I's to establish
historic use.
The water court held that undecreed changes in use could not establish
historic consumptive use in a change in use proceeding. The water court
required Santa Fe Ranches to provide information on use undertaken
pursuant to the decreed uses, which Santa Fe Ranches could not. CF & I
had destroyed or misplaced all records on the water rights and the water
had not been used for decreed purposes for decades. Santa Fe Ranches
requested the water court to dismiss its application in order to appeal to the
Colorado Supreme Court. The water court dismissed the application.
This Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's ruling. The
court stated that a change in use was predicated upon two issues: (1) the
historic beneficial use that had occurred pursuant to the appropriation; and
(2) the conditions that the court was required to impose on the change to
prevent injury. After reviewing the historical foundations and fundamental
premises of Colorado water law that pertained to change proceedings, the
court concluded its review of the law by stating that the right to change a
water right was limited to that amount of water actually used beneficially
pursuant to the decree at the appropriator's place of use. The court
explained the policy behind this requirement: to prevent waste and to
prevent the recognition of water claims not justified by the nature and
extent of the appropriator's need.
Applying the law to the facts, the court explained that the applicant
sought "to dispense with the basic requirement of a change of water right
proceeding that require[d] the proponent of the change to identify the
extent of actual beneficial use of the decreed appropriation at its place of
use." For several reasons, including the policies behind change of use
proceedings which were not vindicated in this case, the requirement of an
inquiry into abandonment of CF & I's rights which could not be conducted
due to lack of evidence, and the proper role of water officials, the court
stated that the applicant could not dispense with the requirement of a
demonstration of beneficial use for decreed purposes.
Amy W. Beatie
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In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas,
986 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1999) (holding that certain provisions of the Colorado
Ground Water Management Act did not apply to the Laramie-Fox Hills
aquifer located outside of the Denver Basin in South Park, Colorado).
Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP ("Ranch") received three well
permits in 1992 allowing it to withdraw groundwater from 2307 acres of
land in South Park. In 1996, prior to the permits' expiration, the Ranch
applied to the Division I Water Court for a decree that would confirm the
Ranch's continued right to withdraw groundwater. At this time, several
appellees ("Opponents") filed an opposition to the Ranch's application, and
the matter was set for trial.
The State Engineer subsequently filed a series of determinations
After conducting numerous
regarding the Ranch's application.
investigations, the Engineer found that because there was stream-aquifer
contact along 3500 feet of the Tarryall Creek the groundwater underlying
that part of the Ranch's land was "not nontributary" as defined in a
provision of the Colorado Ground Water Management Act ("CGWMA")
but the groundwater underlying the remainder of the acreage was
"nontributary" as defined in a related section of the CGWMA. The
CGWMA defines "not nontributary" as a withdrawal of water that would,
within 100 years, deplete stream flow at an annual rate of greater than onetenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal. The statutes define
"nontributary" as any withdrawal of water that would not deplete stream
flow by one-tenth of one percent of withdrawals within 100 years.
Consequently, the Opponents requested the water court to determine
whether the statutory definitions of "not nontributary" and "nontributary"
applied to groundwater in the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer of South Park.
The water court found that sections of the CGWMA were ambiguous, but
after reviewing the legislative history, the water court concluded that the
General Assembly intended to refer to the four aquifers at their locations in
the Denver Basin area, and not to aquifers, such as the South Park aquifer,
located outside the Denver Basin. The court also noted that all parties
agreed that the water in question was tributary absent the CGWMA's
provisions. Thus, the court ruled, "all out-of-priority pumping would
require replacement or augmentation for 100% of out-of-priority
withdrawals." Due to this ruling, the Ranch could not claim a right to
remove groundwater under the CGWMA. Thus, it appealed the water
court's judgment.
On appeal, the Ranch argued that the water court's holding was
erroneous based upon plain language in the CGWMA statutory subsections.
It also contended that even if the court were correct in holding that the
CGWMA was inapplicable and that the water was tributary, the water
court erred by holding that the Ranch must replace 100% of its out-ofpriority diversions.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of the CGWMA
at issue applied only to the Denver Basin and that the Ranch did not have
to augment 100% of any out-of-priority withdrawals. In reaching this
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decision, the supreme court first defined and discussed the terms
"tributary," "nontributary," and "not nontributary." The court stated that
the right to tributary water was subject to the doctrine of prior
appropriation. In contrast, the right to withdraw nontributary groundwater
was more riparian in nature. It did not consist of a diversion requirement,
but was based on overlying land ownership and upon the operation of
statute.
In addition, the CGWMA created a relaxed standard for
determining the tributary character of water in four aquifers in the Denver
Basin, which included the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifers. This standard meant that water in the four specified
aquifers, which generally would be considered tributary, would be
considered nontributary and thus, the prior appropriation doctrine would
not apply to these waters. Further, the CGWMA's definition of "not
nontributary" included groundwater in the four aquifers that still exceeded
the relaxed standard for determining tributariness. Thus, if groundwater
failed to meet the relaxed standard, owners of lands overlying "not
nontributary" water could still withdraw the water. However, the statute
required that any such water withdrawn must be replaced to the extent
necessary to prevent injurious effects on surface water rights.
In order to decide whether these relaxed standards applied to the
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer of South Park, the court first found that it could
not discover the answer from the plain meaning of the statute. It stated that
the statute was susceptible to more than one interpretation. Thus, the court
took a detailed look at the legislative history, including the General
Assembly's declarations made at the time it enacted the CGWMA. The
court discovered that the Assembly was well informed regarding the
geographic extent and hydrological conditions of the aquifers located
within the Denver Basin, yet there was no mention of such factual
representations regarding the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer in South Park.
The court also reviewed committee reports, which proposed the relaxed
definition of nontributary ground water. The reports indicted that the
committees' intent was that the relaxed definition would apply only to the
four aquifers in the Denver Basin. The supreme court also reviewed
statements from various senators, who introduced the bill to the General
Assembly. The statements corroborated what was also stated in Senate
hearings: that "the designation of the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers in subsection 10.5 was designed to modify the
definition of nontributary for purposes of the Denver Basin only."
The court found that there was no indication in the legislative record
that any senators were aware either of the existence of the South Park
formation or of the amount o augmentation necessary to avoid injury to
senior surface rights near the formation. Additionally, the title of the
statute itself was labeled "An Act Concerning Augmentation Requirement
for Water Well Pumping in the Denver Basin Aquifers" and the General
Assembly used the term "Denver Basin" interchangeably with the
enumeration of the four aquifers.
Thus, the court held that the enumeration of the four aquifers applied
solely to the formations of the aquifers located in the Denver Basin.
Therefore, the provisions at issue were not applicable to the South Park
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aquifer, and the Ranch was not entitled to use the relaxed standards set
forth in the statute for determining tributariness. Minus these particular
standards, the groundwater underlying the South Park property was
tributary and was be subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
However, the supreme court also stated that it did not agree with the
water court's ruling that because the groundwater was tributary, the Ranch
must replace 100% of its out-of-priority withdrawals. The court held that
"water is available for appropriation if the taking thereof does not cause
injury and that where senior users can show no injury by the diversion of
water, they cannot preclude beneficial use of water by another." Thus, if
the Ranch made an out-of-priority diversion, it was required to avoid
material injury to senior surface rights, but was not required to replace
100% of such diversions.
Stephanie Pickens

CONNECTICUT
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847
(Conn. 1999) (holding that the commission could not accept monetary
payment and in-kind services as mitigation for wetland destruction).
Based upon Stop & Shop's ("S & S") desire to construct a
supermarket, S & S applied to the Inland Wetlands Commission
("Commission") for a permit to conduct regulated activities on property
located within the town of Branford. Three wetlands and one watercourse
existed on the property. S & S's initial plan proposed to eliminate two
wetlands and create a new wetland adjacent to the third existing wetland.
The commission found that "significant activity," as defined in the
Branford inland wetlands and watercourse regulations, would occur on land
regulated as "wetlands" or "watercourses" in accordance with state
statutes.
Consequently, the Commission scheduled public hearings
pertaining to S & S's application.
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C.
("Branhaven"), intervened in the matter.
During the proceedings, S & S altered its proposal by suggesting a
detention or infiltration basin construction on the property, instead of
creating a new wetland. The Commission expressed skepticism about S &
S's new proposal's effect on the watershed. S & S amended its proposal
by offering monetary payment and in-kind services for future off-site
mitigation. The Commission accepted that proposal and integrated it into
the approval of the permit.
On March 13, 1997, the Commission condoned S & S's application
subject to nine conditions. Condition six declared that S & S give the
Commission money for future mitigation, restoration, improvement, and/or
study in the same watershed. Furthermore, condition six stipulated that the
banking mitigation amount was to be no less than $25,000 plus a like
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amount of in-kind professional/engineering services to be provided for the
above-mentioned purposes during the next four to five years. Finally,
condition six dictated that the Commission's funding and gift of services
usage was discretionary.
Branhaven appealed the Commission's decision to the trial court. S &
S filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. After the trial
court heard argument on the merits, the court decided to dismiss the
appeal; thus it upheld the Commission's decision approving S & S's
application. Branhaven appealed to the lower court, which granted the
appeal. S & S filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Branhaven lacked
standing to intervene. The appellate court denied S & S's motion. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut rendered a stay of execution.
The issue before the court was whether the trial court improperly
determined that the Commission could accept monetary payment and inkind services as mitigation. The court determined that it had plenary
review due to the fact that no special deference was bestowed to an agency
decision when a question of law, not previously subject to judicial scrutiny,
existed.
The court analyzed the legislative intent to ascertain a statutory
interpretation. A state statute averred that the purpose of the act was to
further the preservation and protection of the wetlands and watercourses
from random, unnecessary, undesirable, and unregulated uses. The court
asserted that the legislature limited the municipality's scope of conduct,
because the state statutes pronounced factors the commissioner must
consider in accomplishing these purposes and policies, including matters
relating to regulation, licensing, and provisional enforcement. The factors
included: (1) the proposal's environmental impact on the wetlands or
watercourses; (2) the applicant's purpose and any alternatives; (3) the
relationship between the proposal's short-term and long-term impacts on
wetlands or watercourses; (4) the irreversible and irretrievable loss of
wetland or watercourse resources, including the extent to which such
activity would foreclose a future ability to protect, enhance or restore such
resources, and any mitigation measures; (5) the character and degree of
injury to or interference with safety, health, or the reasonable property use;
and (6) the proposed regulated activity's impacts on wetlands or
watercourses outside the area and on future activities.
Appropriate
mitigation requirements might include measures to: (1) prevent or
minimize other environmental damage; (2) maintain or enhance existing
environmental quality; or (3) in the following order of priority: restore,
enhance, and create productive wetland or watercourse resources. The
court relied on the delineated hierarchy of considerations for mitigation
reviewal incorporated within the state statute and concluded that the
wetland creation was preferentially lower than all other mitigating
measures.
The court observed that precedent was factually distinguishable from
the present case. In the earlier case, the court held that nothing in the
statute prohibited the Commission from agreeing with the applicants that
the applicants would provide off-site compensation for the wetlands loss, as
long as the Commission had contemplated the impact on the property.
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There, the applicants were responsible for actual mitigation and were
required to excavate an off-site pond, not merely pay money. In the
present case, S & S had dislodged itself from all responsibility by giving
monetary payment and in-kind professional services. The court concluded
that S & S's proposal negated the legislative intent to protect and preserve
the state's wetlands and watercourses, because the monetary payment and
in-kind service proposal removed S & S from all mitigation
responsibilities. Thus, the court held that the lower court incorrectly
decided that the Commission could properly accept monetary payment and
in-kind services in lieu of mitigation.
The court pondered whether the Commission's monetary payment and
in-kind services acceptance was an integral part of the Commission's
decision to grant the permit. The court pointed out that the Commission
approved S & S's proposal only after S & S offered mitigation of monetary
payment and in-kind services. Therefore, the court concluded that the
mitigation was integral to the Commission's decision-making and
invalidated the commission's decision.
Sara Franklin
Wood v. Somers Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. CV970063972S, 1999 WL
1013118 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs claim
that the collection, storage, and transportation of spring water were within
the local zoning regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming).
A Town of Somers zoning enforcement officer issued a cease and
desist order to the plaintiffs, Bruce Wood ("Wood") and David Gavlak
("Gavlak"), in 1996.
A natural free-flowing spring flowed through
Wood's farm. Gavlak, owner of Hillside Spring Water, Inc., leased a part
of Wood's farm to collect, store, and transport the spring water from the
farm for commercial human consumption. The cease and desist order
stated that Wood's and Galvak's activities pertaining to the spring were not
agricultural and/or farming in nature, and thus not permitted by local
zoning regulations.
Wood and Gavlak (collectively "Bottlers") contested the zoning
officer's order before the Somers Zoning Board of Appeals. The Bottlers
argued that their use of the spring was "harvesting" of spring water, and
was thus permitted within the zoning regulation's definition of agriculture
and/or farming. Alternatively, the Bottlers claimed that their use fit the
non-conforming use exception to the zoning regulations because water had
been extracted from the spring for the last 200 years. The Somers Zoning
Board, after a public hearing on the issue, ruled against the Bottlers on
both points. Therefore, the Bottlers brought this claim to the Superior
Court of Connecticut.
The court found no merit for the Bottlers' assertion that the present
use of the spring was a non-conforming use. The court found the Bottlers
could not carry their burden to produce evidence that the use existed at the
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time the zoning regulation was enacted. While the Bottlers were able to
show that the water from the spring had been extracted for personal
consumption for the last 200 years, they were unable to provide any
evidence that the spring water had been collected, stored, and transported
to be sold prior to 1991. Thus, the present use did not exist at the time the
zoning regulations were enacted. Therefore, the court concluded that the
zoning board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or abused its discretion in
dismissing the non-conforming use claim.
In addition, the court refused to contradict the zoning board's
decision that "harvesting of spring water" was not within the local zoning
regulation's definition of agriculture and/or farming. The court cited the
record concerning the evidence considered at the public meeting on the
issue. The court also re-emphasized it recognized the wide and liberal
discretion of a local authority in such a determination. Therefore, the
court concluded that the Somers Zoning Board had weighed all of the
appropriate evidence on the issue, and had come to a reasonable decision.
Because the decision was within the board's discretion, the court dismissed
the claim.
Kirk Waible

FLORIDA
Brevard County v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an order restricting a county's drainage
discharge into a drainage easement in anticipation of future environmental
regulations was improper).
Brevard County ("County") acquired 240 acres of land owned by A.
Duda & Sons, Inc. ("Duda") in order to construct a wetland to aid in
wastewater treatment and disposal. Adding the wetland would increase the
facilities' disposal capacity. The County entered an order of taking for the
240 acres; however, it had to file an amended petition to acquire an
easement over Duda's land known as the 4-Mile Canal. The County
needed the easement so that treated water could flow from the wetland to
Lake Winder, where the treated effluent ultimately ended up.
The possibility that pollutant loading reduction goals and total
maximum daily loads could be imposed on the 4-Mile Canal increased the
chances that pollutants from the County would substantially lessen the
amount of pollutants Duda could discharge from his ranch. Duda wanted a
restriction on the County's use of the easement. The County agreed in
some respects and disagreed in others.
The parties agreed to a non-exclusive easement that could only be used
for specific purposes such as treated effluent or stormwater conveyance, or
water intake from the 4-Mile Canal. The County would have to adhere to
the pollution limits set in the Wastewater Facility Permit and the

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Environmental Resource Permit governing the Wetlands Disposal System
("System").
Duda did not waive his right to challenge permit
modifications, but did waive the right to challenge the County's legal
interest in a non-exclusive easement. In addition, the County agreed to
take necessary steps to insure that Duda maintained his ability to use his
land. Such steps could include, but would not be limited to, reducing
pollution from the System and installing additional treatment facilities.
However, the County would only have to take steps to eliminate the
System's operations effects. If the County failed to take these necessary
steps, Duda would have a cause of action in eminent domain for the
resulting damages. Both parties agreed to these stipulations, which became
paragraph five of the supplemental order.
Both parties did not agree to the language in paragraph six. The trial
court adopted the language in Duda's proposal. The Florida Court of
Appeals found that in doing this, the trial court had exceeded its authority
in requiring the County to "take steps in the future to reduce or eliminate
contaminants to meet unascertained standards." The court also found the
County's proposal insufficient in that it failed to compensate Duda for the
current taking and limited compensation for possible future takings. In
addition, the County's proposal only addressed the issue of Duda's ability
to discharge phosphorus or nitrogen and did not address other pollutants.
Since deleting paragraph six was not an option, the appellate court vacated
the entire order and remanded for entry of a new one.
Rebekah King

Palm Coast Util. Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 742 So. 2d 482
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Florida Public Service
Commission failed to provide evidentiary support for changes to certain
components of its rate-fixing methodology for utility).
Palm Coast Utility Company ("Palm Coast") provided water and
wastewater services to customers in Flagler County, Florida. The Florida
Public Service Commission ("Commission") granted Palm Coast a rate
increase amount that was significantly less then the rate increase the utility
requested. Florida case and statutory law entitled a regulated utility to earn
a fair rate of return on its rate base, that is, capital prudently invested in
the utility's facilities that are used and useful in the public service. Thus,
in determining Palm Coast's rate base, the Commission was required to
determine the portion which was "used and useful" for each component of
Palm Coast's water and wastewater system.
Palm Coast appealed the Commission's final order. Palm Coast argued
that the Commission erroneously determined components of the utility's
rate base and raised seven issues on appeal. The court first discussed Palm
Coast's three main arguments. Palm Coast argued that the Commission
erroneously calculated the used and useful portions of the utility's plant by:
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(1) changing to a "lot count" methodology; (2) eliminating a previously
included fire flow allowance for wells; and (3) changing to an annual
average daily flow measurement.
This court held that while the Commission was given great discretion
in rate-fixing, it still was required to comply with Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). The APA required the Commission to show
support for any change in rate-fixing policy through documentary evidence,
expert testimony, or other relevant evidence. Holding that the change to a
lot count methodology as a change to the rate-fixing policy lacked
substantiation, the court reversed and remanded the issue with directions to
the Commission to provide support for its decision to change to the lot
count methodology. The court also rejected Palm Coast's argument that
they lacked notice of the change to a lot count methodology. The court
stated that evidence of discussion of the proposed change in pre-hearing
documents demonstrated that Palm Coast had adequate notice.
The court similarly rejected the Commission's decision to eliminate the
fire flow allowance for wells. The court stated the change in the ratefixing policy lacked adequate evidentiary support. The court rejected the
Commission's justification that the fire flow allowance was not cost
effective from an engineering design perspective. Thus, the court reversed
and remanded the issue with directions to the Commission to provide
evidence to substantiate the decision to eliminate the fire flow allowance.
The court also rejected the Commission's justification for changing its
average flow measurement from a three-month average daily flow to an
annual average daily flow. The Commission argued that its decision was
justified because the Department of Environmental Protection recently
began using an annual measurement in issuing wastewater treatment plant
operation permits. The court held that the justification was insufficient to
uphold the decision to change the measurement technique. Thus, the court
reversed and remanded the issue with directions to the Commission to
provide evidence to substantiate the decision to change to an annual
average flow measurement.
In addition, the Commission's rate-fixing policy included a margin
reserve. The margin reserve enabled the utility to charge rates to its
current customers. This procedure was designed to provide extra money to
enable the utility to expand facilities to meet short-term growth demands
for future customers. Palm Coast argued that the Commission erroneously
permitted only an eighteen-month margin reserve period for water and
wastewater treatment plants and a twelve-month margin reserve period for
transmission lines. Although a departure from previous policy, the court
affirmed the Commission's time frames because substantial evidence,
including expert testimony, provided sufficient substantiation for the
change.
However, although the court accepted the Commission's
justifications for calculating margin reserve for treatmentplants and water
lines, the court held that the departure in time frame for the wastewater
treatment facility lacked substantiation. Thus, the court reversed and
remanded the issue for the Commission to provide adequate support.
Palm Coast also argued that the Commission erred in determining
imputed contributions-in-aid-of-construction by using proposed service, as
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opposed to actual availability charges. Palm Coast argued that actual
service availability charges were available to the Commission as of
November 1996 when the Commission approved the new charges of Palm
Coast. The court rejected the Commission's argument that it was not
required to use the actual service availability records because they were not
in the record of the case. The court held that the Commission was capable
of taking notice of its own orders.
The court affirmed the remaining issues without discussion.
Julie E. Hultgren

GEORGIA
Goode v. Mountain Lake Invs., L.L.C., No. S99A01710, 1999 WL
1048240 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding the trial court had broad discretion
in fashioning an equitable remedy in a case to control the excess flow of
water running from one property to another).
The plaintiffs, David, Marjorie, and James Goode ("Goodes"), filed
suit against Mountain Lake Investments, L.L.C. ("MLI") claiming MLI
caused excessive surface water and sediment laden surface water to flow
onto the Goode's property. The Goodes' property lay at the bottom of a
forty-acre drainage basin, and MLI owned about fifteen acres of property
uphill from the Goodes. After acquiring its property, MLI added a road,
parking lot, and small manufacturing plant, and altered the property's
slope. The Goodes contended MLI's development diverted sediment laden
surface water onto their property causing a nuisance.
The trial court ordered MLI to reduce the flow of water from its
property to the Goodes' property to the level that existed prior to MLI's
development. MLI constructed a detention pond to correct the water flow
and sediment discharge problems. On the Goodes' request, the court
entered an order for permanent injunctive relief. The court noted that
siltation, caused by runoff from MLI's property, created the impetus for
the prior injunction, and the detention pond constructed by MLI alleviated
the problem. The court found that water flow from MLI's property to the
Goodes' property still exceeded the natural flow, but evidence showed this
problem existed prior to MLI's development. To remedy the situation, the
court found that the water flow needed to be controlled on the Goodes'
property with the construction of a ditch. Therefore, the court ordered
MLI to contribute fifty percent of the money needed to construct a ditch
across the Goodes' property.
The Goodes appealed the trial court's order. The Goodes first
contended the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring MLI to bring
Recent precedent,
the water flow back to pre-development levels.
however, held that a trial court's order to return surface water runoff to
pre-development levels constituted an "impossible and overreaching
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mandate," and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court held the trial
court had the discretion whether or not to require MLI to return the water
flow onto the Goodes' property to pre-development levels.
Second, the Goodes contended the trial court erred in finding that no
further reasonable remedies existed to limit the flow of water from MLI's
property to the Goodes' property beyond the limit attained by the detention
pond. Furthermore, the Goodes argued the trial court erred by ordering
the ditch to be constructed on their property rather than MLI's property.
The court stated that the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning
equitable remedies based on the exigencies of the case. Moreover, the
court would not disturb an injunction fashioned by the trial court unless it
found a manifest abuse of discretion. In reviewing the record, the court
could not conclude that requiring the parties to share the cost of
constructing a drainage ditch across the Goodes' property constituted an
abuse of discretion.
The dissent argued the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
fashion a remedy which addressed abatement of the nuisance, and by
compelling the affected party to bear responsibility to clean up a nuisance it
did not create. Furthermore, the dissent argued the majority overlooked
expert testimony that presented evidence of further reasonable steps
available for decreasing the water flow from MLI's property.
Ryan 0. Remners

Rouse v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, No. S99A1148, 1999 WL
1048241 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding that the Protection of Tidewaters
Act was not unconstitutional for vagueness of terms and neither infringed
on fundamental rights nor violated equal protection).
The Protection of Tidewaters Act ("Act"), passed in 1992, included
provisions that allowed the Department of Natural Resources
("Department") to order the removal of any "structure" that was located in
the "tidewaters" of the State. A grandfather provision allowed some
structures predating the Act to remain for a maximum of five years. Rouse
owned a houseboat and a river house on the tidal portion of the Altamaha
River. The houseboat consisted of a styrofoam bottomed, six-sided wood
frame bolted on top with a roof tied to a tree with four lines. The river
house was on stilts and was embedded in the river bottom with concrete
cylinders. The Department permitted Rouse's houseboat to remain until
1997, but denied a permit for the riverboat due to "sanitation and safety"
concerns.
Rouse argued the Act was unconstitutional on a variety of grounds.
The court addressed three central arguments: (1) the vagueness of the
terms "structure" and "tidewaters;" (2) the denial of equal protection; and
(3) an unconstitutional taking.
In addressing the first issue, the court noted that a statute would violate
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due process when it was so vague that those of common intelligence must
guess at the meaning and differ in its application. The Act defined
"structure," in part, as something constructed or built that was "capable of
being used as a place of habitation ... not being used [or] not capable of
being used as a means of transportation." The court declined to find the
term "structure" as unconstitutionally vague merely because it failed, as
Rouse argued, to define "means of transportation." In addressing the term
"tidewaters," the court determined that the statute "plainly" indicated all
public waters within the territory of the State of Georgia.
Rouse also contended the Act violated equal protection because it
granted exceptions to commercial establishments. The court first noted
that the Act did not affect a fundamental right of Rouse. As such, there
needed only be a "reasonable relationship" between the legislative
classification and the state purpose.
The court determined it was
reasonable for the legislature to exempt certain commercial establishments
from the Act because those establishments benefited the public's use of the
tidewaters of the State.
Rouse's final contention alleged the Act equated a taking of his
property. The court stated that Rouse did not have any entitlement to
maintain his property in the tidewaters since he did not have permits to be
there before the passage of the Act. Further, Rouse did not fall into any
exception within the Act, and therefore was entitled to no protection from
the enforcement of the Act.
Kim Shropshire
IDAHO
United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999) (holding
that the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not provide the basis for federal
reserved rights for national forests).
The United States ("U.S.") brought an action for general adjudication
of water rights concerning thirty-seven water right claims located in
Idaho's Snake River basin. The U.S. originally filed these water right
claims under the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 ("MUSYA") in
1993, claiming a priority date of June 12, 1960 (the date of MUSYA's
enactment) under MUSYA and Idaho water appropriation law. The U.S.
claimed that the MUSYA provided the basis for non-consumptive instream
flows to allow for water to remain in streams and lakes for the purpose of
protecting recreational values, fish, and wildlife. Such water rights could
potentially curtail upstream water rights, but would allow downstream
users to divert water.
The State of Idaho ("State") filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that MUSYA did not establish a basis for implied federal reserved
water rights. The U.S. also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that no material facts were in dispute as to legitimate federal reserved
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water rights for the purposes specified under MUSYA. Following a
hearing, the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") District Court held
as a matter of law that MUSYA did not provide implied federal reserved
water rights. Specifically, the court held that MUSYA did not create a
reservation of land and that, absent a reservation for specific MUSYA
purposes, the MUSYA purposes were secondary and could not support an
implied reservation of water. The court also held that certification under
state procedural law was proper for the federal reserved water right claims
under MUSYA, and that these claims were fully severable from the state
law-based claims and therefore constituted final judgment.
The U.S. filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's
ruling granting certification and the district court denied this motion. The
U.S. appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed both the district court's certification of the U.S.'s MUSYA claim,
and the district court's holding that MUSYA did not provide a basis for
federal reserved water rights.
The court first addressed the certification issue, and held that the fact
that the district court certified a judgment as final and appealable under
state law did not restrict the court's right to review the matter. The court
noted that in order for a partial summary judgment to be certified as final
and appealable under state law, the order granting partial summary
judgment must finally remove one or more of the claims between the
parties. Otherwise, the certification was in error. The court determined
that because the U.S. withdrew the state law portion of nine of the water
claims, those claims on appeal were asserted only under federal law and
were not supported under a state law basis. Accordingly, the court held
that the U.S.'s argument against certification no longer existed, and the
court had the ability to address whether MUSYA provided a basis for
implied federal water rights.
The court next addressed whether MUSYA provided a basis for
implied federal reserved water rights. The court summarized the rule
pertaining to federal reserved water rights as fashioned in a series of
United States Supreme Court cases: a federal reserved water right arises by
implication when the federal government reserves public land for a
particular governmental purpose, such as the creation of parks, wildlife
refuges, and national forests. The reserved water right must be based on a
reservation of land, and the U.S. acquires a right to unappropriated
appurtenant water to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
land reservation.
The U.S.'s water rights vest on the date of the
reservation and the water right is superior to the right of future
appropriators.
The court held that the necessity of the water must be so great that
without the water the reservation would be entirely defeated. However, if
water were only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, the U.S.
was required to acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriators. Applying these principles, the court reasoned that a
federal reserved water right arose under MUSYA if, first, a reservation of
land occurred pursuant to MUSYA, and second, Congress showed an
expressed or implied intent to reserve unappropriated water for the
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purposes of MUSYA.
The U.S. argued that MUSYA re-reserved the national forests as of
June 12, 1960, when Congress enacted MUSYA, for the purpose expressed
Therefore, federal reserved water rights necessary to
in MUSYA.
accomplish the purpose of this reservation dated back to June 12, 1960.
However, the State claimed that MUSYA did not create a new land
reservation, but merely established additional purposes for the management
of national forests. Therefore, the State argued, MUSYA was a land
management statute, not a reservation of land. Furthermore, MUSYA did
not enlarge reserved water rights for the national forests, which Congress
created pursuant to the Organic Administration Act of 1897 ("Organic
Act").
The court ruled, based on its own analysis of the statutory language,
legislative history, and Supreme Court case law, that under MUSYA,
Congress intended only to broaden the purposes for administering the
national forests already reserved under the Organic Act. The court
emphasized that the language in MUSYA specifically made the purposes of
the statute supplemental to, and not in derogation of, the purposes for
which the national forests were created under the Organic Act. Therefore,
no specific federal land reservation occurred under MUSYA.
The court further noted, based on the MUSYA provisions and
legislative history, that MUSYA did not indicate an express or implied
congressional intent to reserve a federal water right. Therefore, because
MUSYA merely supplemented the Organic Act, any water use required for
the purposes of MUSYA were secondary, and thus, the U.S. had to
acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator. The court concluded that since MUSYA made no land
reservation, and did not create a federal reserved water right, the U.S.
could not claim a water right with a priority dating back to June 12, 1960.
Steven Marlin
LOUISIANA
Bransford v. International Paper Timberlands Operating Co., 750 So.
2d 424 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an owner of a servient estate had
no affirmative duty to remedy naturally occurring conditions on the
servient land).
Camille S. Bransford and International Paper Timberlands Operating
Company ("International Paper") owned adjacent tracts of land in Webster
Parish, Louisiana. Due to the proximity of the lands, surface water from
Bransford's land naturally drains across International Paper's land. In late
1995, Bransford's son, who had power of attorney to manage the land,
began removing beavers and beaver dams from the property due to
flooding caused by the obstructions. In late summer 1996, Bransford's son
determined that a beaver dam located on International Paper's property
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caused flooding on the land, in an area contiguous to International Paper's
land.
Bransford brought suit to recover damages claiming that
International Paper's failure to remove the beaver dams located on its
property caused flooding and loss of timber on her land.
The district court granted summary judgment for International Paper
based on its finding that International Paper did not have an affirmative
duty to remedy naturally occurring conditions on its own property. To
require such action would place an unreasonable burden on rural
landowners. On appeal, this court agreed that International Paper did not
have a duty to remedy conditions that occur naturally, affirming the district
court's decision.
The court of appeals recognized that the basis of Bransford's claim for
damages was International Paper's ownership of a servient estate, thus
International Paper was subject to a servitude of drainage for the benefit of
Bransford's dominant land. However, the court determined that, pursuant
to the Louisiana Code, the owner of a servient estate generally did not have
an affirmative duty to do anything. A servient landowner only had a duty
to abstain from taking any action that would prevent the natural drainage
flow of water from the dominant estate owner's land. Although the court
acknowledged that it previously allowed damages for interference with a
servitude, it stated that this was only where the owner of a servient estate
acted directly to obstruct drainage. The court found International Paper
not liable for damage caused to Bransford's property because it did not take
any action to obstruct the natural drainage flow from her land.
In response to Bransford's argument that International Paper had an
affirmative duty to remove the naturally occurring condition, the court
recognized that the Louisiana Code might require a servient estate owner to
keep his estate in a suitable condition in order to exercise the servitude.
The court noted, however, that Bransford did not bring suit seeking
injunctive relief and, therefore, refused to address the issue of compelling
International Paper to remove the obstructions.
Megan Becher-Harris
Eubanks v. Bayou D'Arbonne Lake Watershed Dist., 742 So. 2d 113
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming lower court's denial of a damages and
injunctive relief).
The plaintiffs in this case consisted of a class of 157 homeowners
("Homeowners") residing close to the manmade Bayou D'Arbonne Lake
("Lake"). The construction of a spillway and a dam completed in 1963
created the Lake. The Lake reached its normal pool stage in 1964,
however calculations predicted that a 100-year storm would cause the Lake
to rise ten feet above the normal pool stage. All of the Homeowners
residences were below the 100-year flood level. The Lake rose above the
normal pool stage each year after its completion.
In 1991, a rare
meteorological event flooded the Lake.
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Homeowners filed suit against the watershed district claiming
negligence for failing to warn of the danger and extent of flooding.
Homeowners also sought injunctive relief based on the violation of a
natural servitude of drain whenever the Lake rises above the normal pool
stage. Homeowners finally requested damages in place of injunctive relief.
The trial court rejected both of Homeowners claims. The trial court
determined that damages were prescribed as the flooding was common
occurrence prior to the 1991 flood, Homeowners had consented to the
alteration of the natural drain, and flooding was an act of God and did not
subject defendant to liability. Homeowners appealed this decision to the
Louisiana Court of Appeal.
Homeowners first alleged that the trial court had erred in prescribing
their request for damages. In affirming the trial court's prescription of
damages, the appellate court first articulated the two-year statute of
limitations for private property damaged for public purposes. The court
then determined that this statute does not apply when the damage did not
result from the public construction work. The court concluded that
Homeowners' damages resulted from flooding, but because the Lake was
not designed as a flood control device, the dangers of flooding should have
been apparent. Therefore, the Homeowners' claim of failure to warn fails
and damages were correctly prescribed.
Homeowners next alleged that the trial court had erred in not awarding
injunctive relief, or damages in lieu of injunctive relief, for violation of the
natural servitude of drain. The appellate court recognized that damages
may be appropriate in lieu of injunctive relief as an alternate remedy. The
court determined that such a servitude may be altered by agreement if it
does not adversely affect the public interest. The court analyzed the
servitude agreement and concluded that the Homeowners' ancestors in title
agreed to the alteration of the natural servitude of drain.
The court supported its conclusions by commenting on the evidence
presented which suggested that the flooding would have occurred even had
flood control measures been taken and that the flooding was clearly an act
of God. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of damages and
injunctive relief and assessed the costs of appeal to Homeowners.
Sarah E. McCutcheon
MASSACHUSETTS
Enos v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 719 N.E.2d
874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to
maintain an action for alleged injuries which fell within the protection of
the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act).
The plaintiffs ("Landowners") were fourteen taxpayers who lived in
the town of Plymouth and owned property near the Eel River. Landowners
used the Eel River for recreational activities such as fishing, boating, and
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swimming. The Town of Plymouth ("Plymouth") committed violations of
water quality standards caused by it's method of sewage disposal. As a
part of a settlement agreement, Plymouth agreed to construct a wastewater
treatment plant and other facilities needed to comply with the
Massachusetts Clean Waters Act. The Secretary of the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs ("Secretary") required Plymouth to submit a Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Report ("FEIR") for review under the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act ("MEPA"). Plymouth submitted
a FEIR with regard to a proposed sewage treatment plant which disposed
of permitted amounts of treated sewage through an existing outfall pipe,
with the remainder channeled into the groundwater of the Eel River
watershed. The proposed plant was also located in the immediate vicinity
of Landowners' properties.
After the Secretary's approval of Plymouth's FEIR and the issuance of
a compliance certificate, Landowners brought suit to declare the
Secretary's certificate invalid because the town's FEIR did not comply with
MEPA and furthermore, that another FEIR was required for review.
Landowners alleged that reasonable foreseeable injuries to the use,
enjoyment, and value of their real property would occur if Plymouth's
sewage treatment plant went forward due to the pollution of the Eel River
and offensive odors the plant would produce. The lower court granted the
Secretary's motion to dismiss on the ground that Landowners lacked
standing to maintain their action. The lower court accepted the Secretary's
argument that Landowners' injuries, if any, would stem from the town and
not the Secretary.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court concluded that Plymouth's FEIR
failed to satisfy the requirements of MEPA and determined the Secretary's
certificate of compliance presumptively invalid. The court then turned to
the issue of whether Landowners had standing to bring the action. The
Secretary argued that Landowners failed to show a causal connection
between their alleged injuries and the Secretary's decision that the FEIR
complied with MEPA. The court determined the critical question was
when does an alleged injury become legally cognizable. After analysis of
prior case law, the court concluded that a party that alleges an injury within
the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the
injurious action had occurred has standing. Thus, the central issue became
whether Landowners' alleged injuries fell within the area of concern of
MEPA.
The court found the primary concern of MEPA was to protect and
minimize damage to the environment caused by agency actions. The court
concluded that MEPA uses the administrative process and the
environmental impact report to accomplish this goal. The court held
Landowners' alleged complaints and injuries fell into the area of concern
which MEPA and its administrative process were designed to protect. In
reaching the decision, the court looked to Landowners' allegations of
environmental damage if the project went forward without adhering to the
review process and improving the defective FEIR. The court reversed the
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Karen McTavish
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NEW JERSEY
Lacey Mun. Utils. Auth. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 738
A.2d 955 (N.J. 1999) (holding that, as a matter of fairness, Lacey
Municipal Utilities Authority ("Lacey") could proceed with its claims
under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act ("Spill Fund")).
On November 18, 1986 and January 6, 1987, a residential potable well
in the area of Lacey Township, designated as Municipal Utilities Authority
Zone 12 ("Zone 12"), was found to contain benzene, a hazardous
substance, in excess of the level established as safe for drinking purposes.
Later, additional contaminated wells were discovered.
On March 3, 1988, Lacey Municipal Utilities Authority ("Lacey")
began the preliminary work necessary, including cost estimates and the
preparation of a water master plan report, to conduct a public hearing on
whether it should expand its water system into Zone 12. The Zone 12
project consisted of two contracts: (1) a contract for the construction of a
water transmission main; and (2) a contract for a water distribution system
for several zones, including Zone 12. Lacey solicited bids and awarded
the contract for the water transmission contract in late 1989. Construction
on the project began in February 1990.
On April 4, 1990, Lacey approved the first payment for the work on
the water transmission main. Lacey then solicited bids and awarded the
contract for the water distribution system. On September 5, 1990, Lacey
approved the first payment for the work on the water distribution system.
On February 28, 1991, Lacey filed a claim in the amount of $746,540 for
compensation for costs related to the Zone 12 project against the fund
established by the Spill Fund.
In July 1990, a residential potable well located in Municipal Utilities
Authority Zone 10 ("Zone 10") was found to contain trichloroethylene, a
hazardous substance, at a level unsafe for drinking. Later, more wells
were found to be similarly contaminated. Lacey then approved the
expansion of the waterlines into Zone 10. On January 2, 1991, Lacey
solicited bids for this extension project and awarded the contract on
January 23, 1991. Construction of the Zone 10 extension began on May 2,
1991 and the first payment was approved on June 26, 1991. Lacey filed a
claim against the Spill Fund for the reimbursement for the costs of the
Zone 10 project in the amount of $181, 834.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"),
acting in its capacity as administrator of the New Jersey Spill
Compensation and Control Act ("Spill Fund"), denied both of Lacey's
claims based on the statute of limitations that required claims be filed
within one year from the date of discovery of damage. Lacey then
requested arbitration and an administrative law judge ("ALJ") decided that
the statute barred Lacey's claims. Lacey appealed. The lower court
disagreed with the ALJ stating that Lacey did not actually incur damages
until it authorized payment for each of the construction projects, thus the
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claims were not barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
This court agreed with the decision of the lower court, but not with its
rationale. The court stated that the Spill Fund was a revolving fund used to
finance both the prevention and the cleanup of hazardous discharges and to
compensate those damaged by these discharges. The Spill Fund set the
statute of limitations for one year from the discovery of damages.
However, at the time of Lacey's claims, no regulations clarified how
discovery of damage applied to a public-entity claimant whose claims
resulted from contamination to a residential water supply.
The court looked at the issue of when a public entity would know or
have reason to know that a Spill Fund claim would need to be made. A
new regulation had since been adopted that clarified this situation.
However, because no clear regulations existed at the time of Lacey's
claims and this caused uncertainty, the court held that it would be unfair
not to let Lacey proceed. The court also looked at the compatibility of the
interests among the parties involved and found that each parties' interests
would be advanced by allowing Lacey to file these claims.
Melinda B. Barton
In re Tideland's License, 740 A.2d 1125 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (holding that the inland owners had sufficient indicia of riparian
ownership to justify approval of the tideland's license by the New Jersey
Tidelands Resource Council).
A landowner appealed the issuance of a seven-year revocable tidelands
license permitting the "use and maintenance of a pier in Clay Pit Creek,
out shore of a twenty-foot wide riparian right-of-way" located between two
adjacent riparian properties. The appellant owned one of the properties.
Between the two lots existed a strip of land running from the street to the
creek. It seemed fairly evident that the subdivision developers planned and
approved this strip of riparian property to provide the inland lot owners
access to and use of the creek. Recently, a storm destroyed a dock
constructed offshore of the twenty-foot strip of riparian land, which the
inland owners maintained and used over the years. This offshore use
impinged upon the State's ownership interests in the adjacent tidelands, so
when the inland lot owners sought to rebuild the dock in the late 1990's, a
statute required them to obtain a waterfront development permit and a
tideland license from the New Jersey Tidelands Resource Council
("Council"). The landowner then appealed the Council's grant of the
license.
The landowner first contended that the issuance to the inland lot
owners was beyond the authority of the Council and contrary to N.J.S.A.
12:3-10, because the inland lot owners were not "riparian owners" within
the meaning of the statute. The statute authorized the Council to make
grants, leases, or licenses to: "any riparian owner on tidewaters in this
State who is desirous to obtain a lease, grant or conveyance from the State
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of New Jersey of any lands under water in front of his lands . . . . " The
State was the proprietor of all lands under tidelands and possesses all of the
incidents of ownership, including the absolute discretion in making
conveyances or granting licenses to its tidelands, subject to the governing
statutory criteria and the demands of the public trust doctrine. The Council
held the authority to exercise this discretion with the approval of the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Its
determinations were entitled to a presumption of validity.
The court found that the Council reviewed the factual evidence and
properly concluded that the inland lot owners were riparian owners within
the meaning of the statute. It accepted the position that the deeded rights to
the twenty-foot strip of riparian property gave the inland lot owners
sufficient indicia of riparian ownership, giving them the ability to apply for
a riparian lease. It further concluded that appellant's stated reasons for the
purpose of the right-of-way, for an underground drainage system, were
without any evidence.
The appellant also contended that the language in the deeds conveyed
an easement. An easement holds a right in land different from a fee or
leasehold interest, because it is a "use" interest and not a "possessory" one
in the land. However, the court looked to the intent of the parties as the
determinative element of what a deed conveys, not the labels used. The
court held that the Council properly concluded that the inland lot owners
had sufficient indicia of riparian ownership such as to justify the exercise
of its discretionary authority to issue the revocable license, and does not
reach the title considerations. The court, therefore, affirmed the Council's
grant of the tideland's license.
Melody Divine

NEW YORK
People v. Duell, 698 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (denying
defendant's request for bill of particulars, and claim of ineffective
counsel).
The Duells owned and operated an apartment building located in the
Town of Minerva, Essex County.
A tributary flowed through an
underground culvert on the Duells' property and connected with the
Minerva Stream, a stream environmentally protected for public recreation.
Over a five-year period, the Department of Environmental Conservation
discovered that Duells' sewage system discharged raw sewage onto the
surface of the Duells' property, close to the stream. The Duells were
convicted for failure to repair the sewage system or to acquire the proper
permit for discharging sewage into a state waterway. The Duells appealed
on two points, both of which the court found without merit.
First, the Duells alleged inadequacies in the People's response to their
demand for a bill of particulars.
The court held this contention
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unpersuasive because the Duells made their demand more than thirty days
after their arraignment and failed to offer a valid excuse. If the Duells
wanted to challenge their indictment as vague, they should have made a
timely demand for a bill of particulars. Since they failed to do this, the
court held that the People's indictment was appropriate and the Duells'
appeal on this issue was without merit.
Second, the Duells claimed they had ineffective counsel. They argued
that their counsel's trial strategy was ineffective and therefore, was
prejudicial to their case. The court held that absent proof that the Duells
were actually prejudiced by their counsel's trial technique, their claim of
ineffective counsel was without merit. Therefore, finding both claims
without merit, the court affirmed the lower court judgment.
Sheela S. Parameswar
Cammon v. City of New York, 700 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (holding New York Labor Law's strict liability provisions were not
preempted by federal maritime law and that New York State had the right
to continue regulating safe construction practices in its navigable waters
concurrently with the application of the federal maritime law).
The plaintiff, Willie Cammon ("Cammon"), received injuries while
engaged in renovation and reconstruction work at the Hunts Point
Sanitation Department Transfer Station in New York. While Cammon
worked on a raft secured to a land-based structure, a passing tugboat
created turbulence shifting a crane bar and float stage. This caused a
timber to swing into Cammon and injured him. Cammon brought an action
against New York City, who owned the Hunts Point Station, and the
general contractor Anjac Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendants"). The trial court
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to New York Labor
Law. In granting the motion, the trial court found that both New York
Labor Law causes of action were preempted by federal maritime
jurisdiction.
Cammon appealed the order granting the Defendant's motion to
dismiss to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. This court granted
review to decide whether federal maritime law preempted New York Labor
Law.
The court stated that a party seeking to invoke Federal admiralty
jurisdiction must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with
maritime activity. In this case, repairing a pier adjacent to a navigable
waterway constituted traditional maritime activity governed by the
principles of Federal maritime law. Neither party disputed that the
accident occurred in navigable waters, or that Cammon had coverage and
received benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation
Act ("LHWCA").
The court referred to precedent which held that state law could be
preempted if either Congress evidenced an intent to occupy a field or if
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state law actually conflicted with federal law to the extent it stood as an
The court found neither of these
obstacle to Congress' objectives.
situations existed here. Thus, the court found no basis for refusing to
enforce New York's Labor Law in this case.
The court found that protecting workers employed in New York fell
within the state's historic police powers. Furthermore, the court noted that
the LHWCA only regulated the relationship between longshoremen/harbor
workers, their employers, and vessel owners. Congress did not regulate
rights or remedies outside of those relationships. Therefore, since the
LHWCA did not address claims by injured workers against third parties,
the court found no indication Congress intended to preclude application of
New York law to third-party claims against non-maritime defendants. In
addition, the court found no inconsistencies between the strict liability
provisions of the New York Labor Law and admiralty law. Therefore, the
strict liability provisions of the New York Labor Law were not preempted,
and the court reversed the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Ryan 0. Reimers
In re Moores Lane Dev. Corp. v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 699
N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the county water
authority assumed the contractual obligation to provide water service to
developer when the authority purchased the water distribution system from
the village).
Pursuant to a contract, the Village of Greenport ("Village") agreed to
provide water to ninety-nine condominium units that petitioner's
In exchange for this service, the
predecessor intended to build.
predecessor agreed to pay $2570 per unit and any increases in hookup
charges that the Village imposed in future years. After the predecessor
built thirty-nine units, he sold the remaining property and assigned the
water contract to the petitioner, Moores Lane Development Corporation
("Moores Lane"). In 1994, the Village consented to the assignment and
demanded an additional $2162 per unit and a water up-front fee for the
remaining sixty units. The Village provided water to nineteen units as
Moores Lane built them. Subsequently, the Suffolk County Water
Authority ("SCWA") purchased the water distribution system outside the
Village boundaries. At that time, the Village and the SCWA denied
responsibility for supplying water to the remaining forty-one units.
Moores Lane commenced an action to compel either the Village or the
SCWA or both to supply water service. The Supreme Court of Suffolk
County directed the SCWA to supply water to Moores Lane's subdivision
and directed the Village to refund the sum of $88,642. The court also
directed Moores Lane to pay additional water hookup fees to the SCWA.
The issue on appeal was whether the SCWA assumed the obligation to
Moores Lane when it purchased the water distribution system from the
Village.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

This court found that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract was
a function of the court. The court stated that it would not consider
extrinsic matters when the instrument showed the intent of the parties. The
court held that the contract between the Village and the SCWA clearly
provided that the SCWA would assume operation and responsibility for the
water supply and distribution system outside of the Village.
The court held that the SCWA assumed the contractual obligation to
provide water service to Moores Lane. In addition, the court found that
the lower court erred in its determination of the amount of the refund to
Moores Lane. The court directed the Village to refund a new amount of
$194,012, which represented the $2,570 per-unit connection fees that the
predecessor previously paid. Therefore, the court affirmed and modified
the lower court's decision.
Kristen L. Cassisa
In re Warrensburg Hydro Power Ltd. Partnership, 694 N.Y.S.2d 506
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the deed conveying water power
rights appurtenant to property on north bank to the owner of the parcel
located across the river, together with certified title abstract, supported a
determination that owner of north bank parcel was not entitled to any
compensation for water power rights).
Petitioner obtained title to less than one acre of land located on the
north bank of Schroon River in the Town of Warrensburg, pursuant to a
1992 eminent domain proceeding brought against claimant, the owner of
the land. The parcel was appropriated for construction, maintenance, and
operation of a hydroelectric facility. The eminent domain order, vesting
title in petitioner, reserved to claimant continued use of the land for
transmission poles and lines. Claimant filed a claim for $270,000 seeking
just compensation for the taking of water power rights purportedly
associated with the land acquired by petitioner on which claimant's
transmission lines were situated. The court denied claimant's motion and
granted partial summary judgment for petitioner and claimant appealed.
On appeal, the issue was whether the water power rights were
appurtenant to the north side property or if the water rights belonged to the
land across the river. In addressing this issue, the court traced the chain of
title pertaining to the adverse interests. It found that in the 1800's, the
water power rights were severed from the north side property and
conveyed to the land across the river. Claimant contended the water power
rights were restored to the north side property, but could not produce
substantiating evidence. A title search concluded no documentation existed
revealing claimant, or its predecessors, were granted water power rights.
Claimant also contended that Maurice Ashe, a prior owner, obtained
the exclusive right to construct a dam on the river with certain water rights
through a deed dated June 21, 1930. However, the court concluded that
the June 1930 deed reserved an easement authorizing the grantor to
maintain and operate the present dam and to continue the upstream flooding
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caused by the dam. Ultimately, the claimant conceded that the water rights
were severed from the north side property and the court concluded that
claimant failed to produce any sufficient evidence to rebut the facts asserted
in the certified title abstract. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to
any compensation for water rights.
Anna Litaker
NORTH DAKOTA
Huber v. Oliver County, 602 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1999) (holding that: (1)
landowners were not entitled to a new trial for damages and injunctive
relief for flood damage to farm land as the jury was properly instructed
concerning the "Act-of-God" defense; (2) Oliver County ("County") met
its duty to maintain the natural course of Otter Creek when constructing a
road and was not required to construct road to avoid all possible damage;
and (3) damages were properly awarded to the County).
The Huber family ("Hubers") owned a farm where they raised crops
and livestock. Otter Creek ("Creek") meandered on and off the land
providing irrigation for forty acres along the creek and water for the
livestock. In the 1950's, Oliver County ("County") voters approved the
construction of a federal-aid "farm-to-market road" on the land. In 1961,
the Hubers contracted with the County for a provisional qualified easement
across the land to build the road. By building the road across the Huber
farm, the County would save money by crossing the Creek only twice at
either end of a small oxbow in the Creek. The contract required that the
County construct two culverts and a concrete barrier to maintain normal
flows of water along the oxbow. The contract also specified that the
County would pay for the cost of constructing an additional structure to
maintain the natural course of the Creek's flow in the event the culverts
and barrier failed to achieve the purpose.
The County constructed the road with the two culverts and barrier.
The system soon failed despite additional County efforts to maintain the
Creek flows. The Hubers sued the County in 1989 for breach of the 1961
easement contract seeking damages and specific performance. The trial
court denied specific performance and granted summary judgment
dismissing the breach of contract claim as barred by the statute of
limitations. In 1995, the supreme court affirmed the denial of specific
performance, but reversed and remanded for trial concerning the statute of
limitations issue.
After the Hubers experienced flood problems in 1993 after a heavy
summer rain and in 1996 after a heavy spring runoff, the Hubers sued the
County in 1996 alleging that the County's insufficient culvert system failed
to prevent the 1993 and 1996 flood damage. The Hubers sought damages
and injunctive relief to require the County to install additional culverts to
prevent future flood damage.
The 1989 and 1996 actions were consolidated into one trial. The lower
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court dismissed the 1989 lawsuit as barred by the statute of limitations.
The Hubers tried the 1996 claims for injunctive relief and damages. Prior
to trial the County agreed to build another nine-foot culvert which doubled
the amount of culvert capacity in order to alleviate future flood damage.
The jury found that the County's road construction or culvert and barrier
system did not cause the flooding on the Hubers' land, which barred a
damages award. In addition, the trial court denied injunctive relief stating
that the Hubers had "an adequate remedy at law, and a multiplicity of suits
would be necessary to address their claims . . . ." The Hubers moved for
a new trial on the 1996 claims challenging the jury instruction on the
County's "Act-of-God" defense, the denial of injunctive relief, and the
taxation of costs and disbursements against them. The trial court denied
the post-trial motions and the Hubers appealed.
The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court's jury instruction
concerning the County's Act-of-God defense adequately informed the jury
of the applicable law; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant
the Hubers' request for injunctive relief requiring the County to construct
more than one additional culvert; and (3) whether the trial court erred in
awarding the County $8,230.96 for its costs and disbursements.
The supreme court first considered whether the trial court's jury
instruction adequately informed the jury of the applicable law concerning
the County's Act-of-God defense. The Hubers argued that they were
entitled to a new trial because the trial court's jury instruction failed to
specify that to prevail, the County needed to establish that the Act-of-God
was the sole proximate cause of damage to the land to avoid liability. The
Hubers argued that they presented evidence indicating the County's
negligence. Reviewing the jury instruction as a whole, the court found that
the jury instruction language requiring the rainfalls to be of such magnitude
that the Hubers' damages "would have been suffered . . . regardless of any
acts of Oliver County" was synonymous with specifically stating that the
Act-of-God must have been the sole proximate cause of the Hubers'
damages.
Thus, the court held that the jury instruction adequately
informed the jury of the applicable law.
The supreme court next considered whether the trial court erred in
refusing to grant the Hubers' request for injunctive relief requiring the
County to build more than one additional culvert to alleviate future flood
damage.
The Hubers argued that the relevant highway construction
statutes imposed an absolute duty upon the County to prevent flow
obstruction of the Creek and provide drainage necessary to avoid flooding
on their land. The court recognized that it previously interpreted the
statutes to impose a mandatory duty to construct roads not to obstruct the
natural flow and drainage of the surface waters. However, the court
rejected the Hubers' argument that the statutes required that the County
construct a culvert to withstand any type of flood event including an Actof-God holding that statutes are not interpreted to produce absurd or
ludicrous results. Instead, the court interpreted the statutes to impose a
duty upon the County to maintain the natural flow and drainage of the
Creek to the extent required by engineering standards and prudent and
sound engineering design practices. The court held that the County's
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construction met the applicable North Dakota Department of
Transportation's twenty-five year flood event design standards. The court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant injunctive relief to the Hubers.
Finally, the supreme court considered whether the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding the County costs and disbursements under the North
Dakota statute granting such awards to prevailing parties. The Hubers
argued that they were the prevailing party under the statute because of the
County's pretrial agreement to build an additional culvert. The court
rejected the Hubers' argument finding the County was the prevailing party
in the case. The court also rejected Hubers' argument that the costs were
not properly detailed and verified as required by the North Dakota rules of
civil procedure. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Hubers' argument that the County inappropriately
taxed the costs of its expert engineer because the engineer changed his
position before trial which increased the litigation costs.
In conclusion, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying
the Hubers' motion for a new trial and affirmed both the judgment and the
post-judgment orders.
Julie E. Hultgren
OHIO
Friends of Ottawa River v. Schregardus, No. 98AP-1314, 1999 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4236 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1999) (upholding issuance of
a section 401 Water Quality Certification to City of Toledo, Ohio, where
appellants claimed they had submitted an incomplete application and had
made alterations to the original plan).
Friends of Ottawa River ("Friends") appealed the Ohio Environmental
Review Appeals Commission's ("ERAC") decision to uphold issuance of a
section 401 Water Quality Certification to City of Toledo, Ohio ("Toledo")
by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("OEPA"). Toledo agreed
to remediate several parcels of real estate to prepare for Chrysler's
expansion of a Jeep production plant ("Jeep project"), thereby making
Toledo responsible for the appropriate permits.
Toledo applied to the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("COE")
for a section 404 permit to fill roughly twenty-five acres of wetlands
surrounding the facility, including 5.34 acres adjacent to the Ottawa River.
The Clean Water Act required section 401 certification as a prerequisite to
a section 404 permit. Under Ohio law, a section 404 permit application
with COE simultaneously effects application for section 401 certification
from OEPA. Toledo filed supporting documentation as required.
After the notice and comment period, OEPA issued section 401
certification for the Jeep project to Toledo. Shortly thereafter, Friends
argued the certification invalid for two reasons: (1) incompleteness of the
application; and (2) a change of the planned uses after the public
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certification hearing. After a hearing, ERAC affirmed the OEPA issuance
of the section 401 certification.
Friends raised two issues on appeal from that order. Friends first
argued that OEPA issued the section 401 certification in error because
Toledo submitted an incomplete application. The court noted that the COE
must have felt the application was complete before it issued the public
notice. Further, the court concluded that submitting an incomplete section
401 permit application does not invalidate OEPA's issuance of the Section
401 certification. Friends further claimed that Toledo's application failed
to provide the required additional documentation to support its section 401
certification. Specifically, Friends contended that Toledo's section 401
application did not provide the intended fill material's chemical
composition. Friends argued that Ohio law required identification of
regulated pollutants that applicant would discharge. But the applicable
code section did not require the applicant to identify the chemical
constituents of the fill material, only the "substance" and "amount."
Further, the state administrative code addressed the potential for the
presence of "regulated pollutants" in other sections. Therefore, the court
concluded that Toledo had satisfied the applicable requirements for the
section 401 application.
Friends next claimed that Toledo must resubmit its section 401
certification due to alterations in the planned use for the 5.34 acres adjacent
to the Ottawa River. In the initial plans, a shipping lot completely covered
the 5.34 acres at issue. In the ERAC appeal, Toledo had modified the
plans by moving the access road to the northern rather than the southern
edge of the shipping lot. The court found that this "minor" change did not
cause any additional wetlands loss, and was therefore immaterial. The
court, therefore, affirmed OEPA's issuance of the Section 401
certification.
Shana Smilovits

OREGON
Norden v. Oregon, 329 Or. 641 (Or. 2000) (holding that under Oregon's
Administrative Procedure Act the scope of the record on judicial review of
an order in an other than contested water proceeding was not limited to the
information the water department had before it when it issued its order).
In November 1994, the Water Resources Department ("Department")
issued an order informing Dorothy Norden ("Norden") that she was not
entitled to divert water from a spring arising on her property without first
obtaining a water right permit. In Oregon, a property owner was required
to obtain a water right permit if waters leaving a spring on the property
form a watercourse and, if undiverted, would flow onto the land of
another.
The circuit court considered evidence as to what information was
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before both Norden and the Department before and after the time the order
was issued. That court found in favor of Norden. It set aside the
Department's order, concluding that there was not substantiai evidence
from which a reasonable person could conclude that the water arising from
the spring on Norden's property would flow off her property and into a
nearby creek if she did not divert it. Thus, she had the right to use the
water without first obtaining a water right permit.
The issue before the appeals court was whether the record on judicial
review in an other than contested water proceeding was confined to the
information gathered at the time the order was issued or whether it
included information gathered both before and after that time. The
Department argued the latter; Norden the former. Under O.R.S. section
183.482, the court reviewed for legal error, abuse of agency discretion,
and lack of substantial evidence in the record. It found that the scope of
the record that the circuit court had developed under O.R.S. section
183.484 was correct, but that the court had erred in setting aside the
Department's order on the ground that it was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Appealing to the supreme court, two questions were presented: (1)
whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the record in an other
than contested case hearing was not limited to the information that the
agency had before it when it issued its order; and (2) whether substantial
evidence existed from which a reasonable person could have concluded that
the water arising from Norden's property would run off her property if not
diverted. This court affirmed the appellate decision on both issues.
The supreme court's task was to determine the legislature's intent. To
do so, it examined the text and context of section 183.484, giving words of
common usage their plain and ordinary and, if applicable, legal meaning.
The court found nothing in Oregon's Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") directing an agency in an other than contested case proceeding to
make a record or to make findings of fact before issuing its order. Due to
the absence of this requirement, the first opportunity that a party might
have had to present evidence would be when it was before the circuit court.
Therefore, the court concluded that reference to the "record" and "findings
of fact" in section 183.484 was to the record that was made before the
circuit court and to the findings that the circuit made based on the evidence
in that record when it reversed the agency.
Section 183.484(4) mandated judicial review for substantial evidence of
the whole record. Under state case law, the court had previously held that
whole record review meant consideration of whatever evidence the record
contained that would detract from, as well as support, the agency's order.
The effect of limiting the scope of the record to the evidence that was
available to the agency at the time it issued its order would thus undermine
the whole record review as required by section 183.484(4). The court
therefore found that the text of the statute suggested that the legislature's
intent was not to limit the scope of review only to the evidence that the
agency had before it when it issued its order.
The supreme court also looked to the procedural statutes on contested
cases for guidance. Those statutes revealed that in a contested case the
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legislature imposed on agencies the requirement of trial-like proceedings,
culminating in a record, findings of fact, and conclusions of law that must
have accompanied the agency's final order. Further, judicial review for
substantial evidence of the whole record was required. The court found no
suggestion in the Act that the legislature intended the record in an other
than contested case proceeding to be less complete or more developed than
the record in a contested case proceeding. The court concluded that the
parties in an other than contested case proceeding are afforded the same
opportunity to develop a record as those parties in a contested case
proceeding.
On the second issue of substantial evidence, both sides presented
documentary and testimonial evidence.
The supreme court found,
however, that the record, when viewed as a whole, would permit a
reasonable person to conclude that the water arising from the spring on
Norden's property would run off her property if not diverted.
Accordingly, Norden was required to obtain a water right permit.
Elizabeth Appleton
Plotkin v. Washington County, 165 Or. App. 246 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing Land Use Board of Appeals' decision to disallow county's
approval of a subdivision in a designated wildlife habitat because the
habitat was neither identified as protected in the county's community plan
nor was it adjacent to an area of significant natural resources identified
under the plan).
A Washington County, Oregon hearings officer approved a twelve-lot
residential subdivision on a parcel of land designated as a "wildlife
habitat." The Plotkins and Wilsons (collectively the "Plotkins") appealed
the county's decision to the Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA"), which
held that as a riparian zone, the area in question was protected from
development under the county's Community Development Code ("CDC").
The CDC regulated development in areas that possessed "significant
natural resources." Section 422-2 stated that areas subject to the terms of
the CDC are "[t]hose areas identified in the applicable Community Plan or
the Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element as Significant Natural
Resources." The plot of land in dispute was not identified under the
county's plan. On the Plotkins' appeal, however, LUBA found that as a
riparian zone, the identification requirement of section 422-2 did not apply
to the habitat, but rather that section 422-3.3A governed the area
independent of the primary provision. Section 422-3.3A stated that "[n]o
new or expanded alteration of the vegetation or terrain of the Riparian
Zone ... or significant water area or wetland [as identified in the
applicable Community Plan or the Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element]
shall be allowed subject to exceptions."
According to the LUBA
interpretation, this provision prohibited development in the riparian zone as
contemplated by the county regardless of the area not being identified
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within the county's development plan.
The CDC defined a riparian zone as "the area, adjacent to a water
By
area, which is characterized by moisture dependent vegetation."
definition, all riparian zones bordered other significant natural resources,
including wetlands.
In rejecting the LUBA ruling, this court construed section 422-3.3A as
protecting only those riparian zones that were adjacent to significant natural
resources specifically identified under the Community Plan. The court
found this construction to be reasonable considering the natural relationship
of riparian zones to other water areas, identifiable under section 422-2.
The court thus understood the intention of the section was to apply only to
those riparian zones that bore some relationship to an identified protected
area such as wetlands. Since the plot of land in dispute did not border an
identified habitat and was not itself an identified habitat, it was not afforded
protection under section 422-3.3A.
Although section 422-3.3A addressed developmental restrictions on
riparian zones without specifically requiring that they be listed in a
Community Plan, the court held that this provision was nevertheless
subject to such a restriction under section 422-2. Contrary to the LUBA
interpretation, the court held that other than the exception of riparian zones
adjacent to identified significant natural resources, all lands that were not
distinguished within the Community Plans were not subject to regulation
under any provision of section 422. LUBA held that the limitations
imposed by section 422-2 applied to all the subsequent provisions of that
section. The parcel of land slated for development by the county, by
limitation, was not subject to CDC protection. Therefore, the court found
that LUBA erred in prohibiting the county's approval of the subdivision
upon the land at issue.
Jason Wells

Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 986 P.2d 536
(Or. 1999) (holding that the irrigation district was a public corporation,
which was exempt from general statutes of limitation, but not exempt from
statute of ultimate repose in products liability action).
The members of the Shasta View Irrigation District ("Shasta"),
organized and formed in Oregon on December 5, 1917, own irrigable land
within the geographic boundaries of Shasta and farm or lease their land to
others. As part of a betterment project, Shasta replaced over twenty-one
miles of existing unlined canals with buried pressure pipeline. Shasta
received a sixty-five year loan for the work from the United States Bureau
of Reclamation, with a specification requirement that the pressure pipe
used in constructing the irrigation system must last for at least sixty-five
years.
Shasta used Techite, a brand of reinforced plastic mortar pipe
manufactured by Amoco Reinforced Plastics Co. ("Amoco"), in the
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construction of over half the pipeline. Shasta ordered the Techite from
Amoco between June and September 1973. The installation of the pipe
took place between February 1974 and June 1974. In July 1975, Shasta
accepted the irrigation system as complete and operational.
According to Shasta, the Techite pipe failed twenty-six times since
1978, with two failures occurring before July 1, 1982. In 1989, the Shasta
board of directors voted to pursue legal action against Amoco, as
manufacturer of the Techite pipe.
In 1994, Shasta brought a products liability action against Amoco in
state court. Amoco removed the action to federal district court on the basis
of diversity. Amoco then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
Shasta's claims were statutorily time barred. The district court granted
summary judgment in Amoco's favor and Shasta appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit presented certified questions
of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court.
The supreme court first addressed whether an irrigation district could
be considered a 'public corporation' for purposes of applying the
exemption to applicable limitations set out in Or. Rev. Stat. section
12.250. This statute exempted actions brought by public corporations, as
well as state and county actions, from general statutes of limitations. Since
the formation of the irrigation district fostered the public's beneficial use of
water and was located on public property and its officers were public
officers, elected by the legal voters of the irrigation district, the irrigation
district was a public corporation for the purposes of section 12.250.
Next, the court addressed whether the above-mentioned exemption
applied to a statute of repose under Or. Rev. Stat. section 30.905(1). This
statute provided that a products liability civil action must be commenced no
later than eight years from the date on which the product was first
purchased for use or consumption. The court then stated that section
12.250 unambiguously states that it has no application outside of Chapter
12. Therefore, the municipal corporation was not exempt from the eightyear statute of repose for Shasta's product liability claim by way of section
12.250.
The court added a further inquiry to the two certified questions. It
looked at if a common law variation of section 12.250 existed to make
Shasta's action timely. In Oregon, as a matter of public policy, general
statutes of limitations did not run against the government unless the statute
expressly provided otherwise. The court found this rule necessary to
preserve public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss by the
negligence of public officers. Statutes of repose started to run on the date
on which a product first was purchased for use or consumption, not on the
date on which a purchaser knows or should have known of an injury
caused by the product. The eight-year statute of ultimate repose ran
despite whether a public official failed to assert a claim in a timely manner.
Therefore, the court found that the public policy for exempting government
from statutes of limitations did not apply to statutes of repose.
Elaine Soltis
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Staats v. Newman, 988 P.2d 439 (Or. 1999) (upholding Water Resources
Department's cancellation of water rights because irrigation of water rights
holders' land occurred by natural subirrigation rather than artificial
irrigation, and therefore was not a beneficial use).
The Staats owned a ranch and associated water rights allowing water to
be diverted from several streams for irrigation. In 1997, Newman and
others who own neighboring property, filed affidavits with the Water
Resources Department ("Department") alleging that the Staats had not
exercised their water rights since 1982. The Staats filed a protest to the
Department's proposed cancellation of their water rights, and the
department held a hearing.
At the hearing, the Staats contended that they use their water rights to
irrigate their lands by ditches dug by the previous owner.
The
administrative law judge ("AL") held that the Staats properly irrigated
portions of their property, and therefore maintained water rights related to
those portions. However, the AU ruled that the Staats either did not
irrigate or improperly irrigated much of the remaining portion of the land.
The AU found that many of the ditches were in disrepair, and that
irrigation only occurred through subsurface seepage and capillary action
("subirrigation").
The AU concluded that by a preponderance of
evidence, and based on applicable Oregon state law which defines
"irrigation" as the "artificial application of water," the Staats forfeited
their water rights pertaining to the portions of their property subject to
subirrigation practices.
The Staats filed exceptions to the AU's ruling. They argued that the
applicable standard of proof was "clear and convincing evidence," and that
based on this standard of proof, the evidence did not support AU's finding
of a nonuse of water on the Staats' property. The AU rejected these
exceptions and ruled that under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
correct standard of proof was a showing by a preponderance of evidence.
The department adopted both of the AL's findings in its final order, and
the Staats appealed.
The Staats first contended that the department incorrectly based its final
order on the proof of nonuse of water based on a preponderance of
evidence, rather than a showing of nonuse of water by clear and convincing
evidence. The supreme court held that in the absence of an expressly
contrary legislative directive, the preponderance of evidence standard of
proof applied under state law to water rights cancellation proceedings.
The Staats next contended that the department erred in ruling that
subirrigation did not constitute proper use of their water rights, thereby
resulting in a forfeiture of these water rights. The Staats claimed that
"use" of their water right was accomplished by virtually any diversion,
regardless of the particular method of diversion.
The department
responded that under state law, subirrigation does not constitute a "use."
The supreme court concurred with the department and held that under
Oregon law, failure to "use" water rights results in cancellation of those
rights, and the use must be what was permitted by the water right itself. In
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this case, the Staats' water rights allowed for diversion of water for
irrigation.
The court also noted that under the department's administrative rules,
"irrigation" was defined as the artificial application of water to promote
growth of crops, and that the department interpreted the rule to mean that
only the artificial application of water constituted "irrigation."
Furthermore, according to the court, the department's interpretation of the
administrative rule deserved highly deferential judicial review, as long as
the interpretation was plausible. The court finally concluded that the
department's findings that the Staats' artificial ditches were incapable of
irrigation use, and therefore irrigation had occurred through naturally
occurring subsurface seepage on their land, were both reasonable.
Steven Marlin
Dority v. Hiller, 986 P.2d 636 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that: (1) an
irrevocable license existed for a pipeline through plaintiffs property; (2)
defendants did not abandon such license when they changed the location of
the pipeline; (3) plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the license;
and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting an injunction
requiring plaintiffs to remove riser and restore defendant's pipeline
connection).
Milton Wolsborn originally owned Dority's property, which was
situated on a diversion point on the Willamette River. In 1964, the Hillers
applied for and were granted a permit to take water from a point on
Wolsborn's property. The Hillers buried a steel pipeline from the river,
across the Dority's field, and into their property. The Hillers also installed
an electrical pole and box in order to operate the pump. They used this
pipeline to irrigate their fields.
In 1967, the Doritys purchased Wolsborn's property. The Doritys
applied for a permit to take water from the same diversion point where
Hillers obtained their water. In 1975, the Hiller's sought to replace the
steel pipeline with a plastic one. When Dority asked if they had an
easement, the Hillers replied that they had a written easement from
Wolsborn. Dority then gave them permission to install the plastic pipeline.
In 1994, quarrels began between the two parties. Dority installed a
rise and disconnected Hiller's pipeline at least once. Dority then filed suit
against the Hillers to quiet title to real property and for damages on
theories of trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance.
The Hillers's counterclaims sought a declaration of a right to maintain
an irrigation pipeline across Dority's property. The Hillers moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that they possessed an irrevocable
license to use Dority's property for the pipeline. The trial court granted
the motion and enjoined the Doritys from interfering with the pipe
connection. The Doritys appealed.
Before reaching the merits, the Oregon Court of Appeal decided
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several preliminary issues. First, the court ruled on hearsay questions.
The court found that defendant's sworn statements as to Wolsborn's
consent were uncontroverted. Dority's affidavit stated that Wolsborn told
her he never gave permission for the pipeline or for an easement. Because
neither party ever deposed Wolsborn, nor offered this information in the
form of an affidavit, the court deemed the statements as hearsay. As such,
the evidence was such to survive the motion for summary judgment.
Second, the court found that because the Hillers installed a pipeline and
electrical device in reliance of Wolsborn's consent, such evidence sufficed
to carry the burden of proving the element of detrimental reliance.
The court then examined the merits of the case. The appeals court held
that an irrevocable license existed. A license is "an interest created in real
property when a landowner consents to the use by another of the
landowner's property in a way that would otherwise be wrongful." An
irrevocable license is one in which "the landowner's promise to allow a use
of the land for an unlimited time induces the other party to make significant
expenditures for permanent improvements, consistent with the use for
which consent was given."
Thus, the court found Hillers held an
irrevocable license.
The court held that the Hillers did not abandon their license by burying
the plastic pipeline in a different location. In order to raise a genuine issue
of a material fact about abandonment, the Doritys needed to offer evidence
that the Hillers either verbally expressed an intention to abandon, or that
their conduct demonstrated unequivocally an intent to make no future use
of the license.
Here, the Doritys gave express permission for the
installation of the plastic pipe. In the eyes of the court, this was more than
"passive acquiescence." In addition, the Hillers never indicated intent to
abandon the use of the servient estate. Nor did the court find an inference
that the Dority's permission was conditional.
Finally, the court held the Hillers properly plead entitlement to
injunctive relief and offered facts sufficient to justify injunctive relief.
Hiller's counterclaims were equitable claims. As such, the trial court was
empowered to fashion relief as would best accomplish the ends of justice."
The Doritys interfered with Hiller's use of the pipeline for two years. The
Hillers depended on the pipeline to irrigate their crops and sufficiently
stated that compensatory damages were impossible to calculate.
In
addition, the Doritys had other points of diversion from which they could
draw water. This being so, any hardship caused by the injunction would
be minimal. The court ultimately held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted injunctive relief in favor of the Hillers.
Karina Serkin
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PENNSYLVANIA
International Land Acquisitions, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm., 743 A.2d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (granting respondent's
motion to quash appeal improvidently filed where petitioner did not move
to amend or present a petition for review).
On December 16, 1998, the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
("PUC") held that Pennsylvania American Water Company did not violate
its tariff by requiring International Land Acquisitions, Inc. ("ILA") to pay
the cost of installing an additional water line to serve ILA's proposed
development. On April 27, 1999, ILA filed a notice of appeal with the
commonwealth court. In Pennsylvania, a petition for review, not a notice
of appeal, was the only procedure for judicial review of a determination of
a government agency. This error came to the attention of counsel for ILA
during an argument for supersedeas, however, ILA did not move to
amend, nor file a petition for review.
PUC then moved to quash ILA's appeal on June 11, 1999. ILA
contended that all of the requirements of a petition for review were present
in its notice of appeal. However, there was no general statement of the
objections to the order or other determination as required under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. ILA requested that the court
deny the motion, or in the alternative, that it be permitted to amend its
pleading. Still, ILA did not make a motion to amend or submit a petition
for review.
Almost four months after ILA's counsel received actual notice that its
notice of appeal was improvidently filed, this court noted that ILA
continued to insist that its notice of appeal was adequate. Therefore, due
to ILA's obdurate noncompliance, the court granted PUC's motion to
quash the appeal.
Adam B. Kehrli
O'Neal v. Department of the Army, 742 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act's ("CERCLA") jurisdictional limitation to
federal district courts had to be strictly construed and that CERCLA did
not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims based on state law).
Well water users and other users of a tract of land brought suit against
the Department of the Army seeking medical monitoring to help them
detect disease that may arise as a result of exposure to contaminants. This
case had been in litigation in both state and federal courts for nearly a
decade.
Prior to this proceeding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case under the Pennsylvania
Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act ("HSCA") for medical monitoring. They

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

also found that the HSCA permitted recovery of attorney's fees. On
remand, the trial court granted defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. This proceeding appealed this order.
This court first discussed sovereign immunity. By bringing, suit against
government agencies, the plaintiffs effectively brought suit against the
United States, As such, the United States must waive sovereign immunity
and consent to the suit. The waiver in this case existed under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), which provided for limited jurisdiction in federal district
courts. Since CERCLA only provided for jurisdiction in federal district
court, the trial court correctly dismissed the suit.
The court next considered a state law claim's relation to CERCLA's
federal district court exclusivity provision. The plaintiffs sought medical
monitoring relief under state law provisions. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court previously held that CERCLA incorporated state laws.
The
plaintiffs argued that in incorporating state laws, CERCLA acted as a
waiver for state law claims. They also argued that CERCLA's exclusivity
provision did not apply to claims founded on state law, but only those
arising out of CERCLA itself.
In contrasting CERCLA with the Federal Tort Claims Act, plaintiffs
reasoned that when Congress intended to limit jurisdiction to federal court,
even for claims based on state law, it stated so in clear and precise terms.
The court found no merit in this argument. Instead it found that CERCLA
provided for federal district court jurisdiction for all controversies arising
out of it, and that the right to enforce state law for medical monitoring
remedies was clearly a "controversy" under CERCLA.
Plaintiffs also argued that since CERCLA employed state law for
removal, remedial, and enforcement action, HSCA alone confeed state
court jurisdiction. The court held, however, that no reason existed to
assume Congress intended to confer jurisdiction over this controversy to
state courts since CERCLA contains a separate jurisdiction and venue
provision.
Finally, plaintiffs argued that the dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction
violated equitable principles. The court recognized that the facts in this
case showed a "disturbing history of alarming land and water
contamination over a significant land and water area" for a long period of
time. It also noted that the government had belated its immunity claim and
the plaintiff had no further recourse after exhausting possibilities in both
state and federal forums. But the trial court only had to decide the issue of
jurisdiction and had properly decided that it did not exist. This appellate
court could only review that decision and no other issue.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had to pursue claims against the
United States in strict accordance with the sovereign immunity waiver in
CERCLA which expressly limited jurisdiction to federal district courts.
Shana Smilovits
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Youst v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp., 739 A.2d 625 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1999) (holding that the State Department of Transportation enjoyed
sovereign immunity from nuisance claims).
The Yousts owned approximately 170 acres along a state route in
Tioga County, Pennsylvania. They operated a restaurant and permitted
several mobile home tenants on their property. Two corrugated metal
pipes, owned and maintained by the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation ("PennDOT"), conveyed water from the highway and from
homes across the highway onto the Youst's property. The homes across
from the Youst property on the other side of the highway, had on-lot
sewage treatment systems. One of the PennDOT pipes servicing the
treatment systems emptied near the Youst's restaurant and well. The other
emptied near the mobile homes. The discharge caused flooding, untreated
sewage collection, and made the property impassable and unusable. The
Yousts notified PennDOT, among other parties, of the unlawful flows
through their pipes and the problems caused by the discharges.
The Yousts asserted public and private nuisance claims against
PennDOT, as well as claims under the Storm Water Management Act
("Act"). In addition, the Yousts included several ancillary claims against
their neighbors. Specifically, they alleged that the untreated sewage
combined with the storm water from the highway, caused their property to
be impassable by foot or tractor, and prevented them from entering those
areas of the property where the sewage collected. In addition, the Yousts
alleged that the contaminants from the untreated sewage and the storm
water entered the groundwater, which might have been drawn into the
well. In response, PennDOT filed preliminary objections on the grounds
that sovereign immunity bars actions to compel affirmative acts on behalf
of PennDOT to maintain the existing drainage system.
This court held in favor of PennDOT. It explained that sovereign
immunity was waived for damages against the Commonwealth arising out
of negligent acts. But, that the legislature did not waive immunity for
equitable claims. The court then concluded that sovereign immunity barred
the private nuisance claim against PennDOT. The court also found that the
Act claim was not barred because it sought to abate unlawful conduct under
the Act. This claim imposed duties upon landowners and persons who
altered or developed land to ensure that such development did not increase
the rate of storm water run-off. The Yousts did not state in their claim that
any alteration or land developments affected the land's storm water run-off
characteristics. Thus, the court concluded that the Yousts failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted. In so holding, the court dismissed
claims against PennDOT and transferred the ancillary claims against
Youst's neighbors to the Court of Common Pleas.
Karina Serkin
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RHODE ISLAND
Town of Lincoln v. City of Pawtucket, 745 A.2d 139 (R.I. 2000)
(holding that legislation which delegated power on the Narragansett Bay
Commission ("NBC") to abate combined sewer overflows that polluted
Narragansett Bay did not violate the equal protection and due process rights
of four towns and one landowner, did not violate the Home Rule
Amendment, and was not an unreasonable delegation of authority to the
NBC).
The Rhode Island legislature created the Narragansett Bay Commission
("NBC") to deal with the discharge of pollutants into the Narragansett Bay,
Rhode Island's "greatest natural resource." The NBC developed a water
remediation project to abate combined sewer overflows ("CSO"). CSO's
were overflows of sewer and storm water that occur during a significant
rainstorm and flow into the state's rivers and subsequently into the
Narragansett Bay. Normally, the combination of sewer and storm water
would be diverted into one of the state's treatment facilities. However,
during a severe rainstorm the systems in place allowed the water to flow
out into the rivers.
The CSO's took place in the towns of Providence, Central Falls,
Pawtucket, and East Providence. These communities have older water
systems, known as combined systems, that did not separate the flow of
sewer water and storm water into the treatment facilities. These combined
systems increased the flow into the treatment facilities and lead to the
problem of CSO's. Upstream from these communities were the towns of
Johnston, North Providence, Smithfield, and Cumberland whose sewer
waters flowed into the same treatment facilities, but did not have any
CSO's.
In addition, the downstream town of Lincoln, as well as
Cumberland and Smithfield, had a separate system, separating sewer and
storm water and did not have any CSO's. However, it was the combined
sewer water of all the communities, both upstream and downstream, which
ended up flowing into the river as a result of the CSO's.
All of the above mentioned communities were to absorb the cost,
through rate increases, of the multi-million dollar remediation project
developed by the NBC to deal with CSO's problem. The towns of
Lincoln, Smithfield, Cumberland and East Providence, as well as a
resident owner, claimed that they were unfairly charged with the cost of
the remediation project that was the result of downstream, older, combined
systems and sought relief from the superior court.
Lincoln and
Cumberland also alleged that they exclusively funded upgrades to their
water systems and should not be responsible for any additional rate
increases.
The superior court denied these claims, which were based on due
process and equal protection violations, as well as asserting that the
legislature acted within its authority. This court affirmed and held that no
violation of due process or equal protection existed and that the legislature
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was acting within its powers by delegating authority to the NBC to deal
with the pollution problem.
The plaintiffs' first argument was that the state, through the NBC,
violated the due process and equal protection provisions of both State and
Federal Constitutions by forcing all the above mentioned towns to equally
share in the remediation expenses instead of on a proportionate basis based
on each towns CSO's. In dismissing the equal protection and due process
claims, the court pointed out that the legislation was designed to improve
the public health or welfare and did not involve suspect classifications of
the towns in question. Therefore, the legislation only needed to pass the
rational basis test. The court held that the legislature created a reasonable
classification of ten communities with an urgent pollution problem, and
designed a remediation solution that bore a rational relationship to the
interest of the public health and welfare so the court dismissed these
claims.
The plaintiffs' second argument centered on the Equal Burden Clause
of the Rhode Island which stated that "the burdens of the state ought to be
fairly distributed among its citizens." Plaintiffs claimed that the legislation
violated this provision by only forcing the ten communities in question to
pay for the remediation project instead of all the citizens of the state. The
court determined that this provision was advisory and not mandatory,
therefore, as long as the legislation passed the Equal Protection Clause,
which it had, it was unnecessary for any additional analysis in regard to the
Equal Burden Clause.
Next, the plaintiffs asserted that under the Home Rule Amendment of
the Rhode Island Constitution, the control of a local sewer system lies
within the auspices of the local municipality and no legislation in regard to
the sewer systems could be passed without the consent of the local elected
officials. The court determined that no question existed that remediating
the pollution of Narragansett Bay represented a statewide concern;
therefore, the state legislature properly addressed the problem and the
Home Rule Amendment did not apply.
The plaintiffs' final claim asserted that the legislative delegation of
power to the NBC was inappropriate and unreasonable.
The court
dismissed this claim as without merit by pointing out the obvious need for
eliminating pollution in the Narragansett Bay, the specific guidelines set
out by statute, defining the policies of the NBC, and the agencies special
expertise in dealing with the problem. Thus, the delegation of power and
authority to the NBC was entirely appropriate and reasonable.
Spencer L. Sears

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

SOUTH DAKOTA
Sherburn v. Patterson Farms, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 414 (S.D. 1999)
(holding that: (1) trial judge's statement that perhaps an easement had
existed in past did not entitle claimant to new trial; (2) claimant could not
claim prescriptive easement with respect to dike extension built in 1993;
and (3) adjoining landowner was entitled to permanent injunction requiring
claimant to remove dike extension).
In February 1994, Sherburn sought to enjoin Patterson Farms, Inc.
("Patterson") from obstructing the flow of water across his land. Sherburn
claimed that the dike located on Patterson's property caused flooding on his
property. The dike was constructed around 1939, but did not cause
problems until it was enlarged in 1993. The trial court found no
prescriptive easement existed that would allow Patterson to obstruct the
natural flow of watir. The court issued a permanent injunction ordering
Patterson to either remove the dike or install culverts for the flow of water
at ground level. Patterson appealed claiming: (1) entitlement to a new trial
pursuant to an irregularity in the proceedings preventing him a fair trial;
(2) a prescriptive easement was established as a matter of law; and (3) the
trial court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunction.
In addressing Patterson's entitlement to a new trial, the supreme court
stated that Patterson's reliance on the trial court's statement regarding the
prescriptive easement was misplaced. At the close of the trial, the trial
court stated that a prescriptive easement "probably" existed up to 1980
when the dike was enlarged. Based on this statement, Patterson claimed
the trial court actually ruled a prescriptive easement existed as a matter of
law and that such statement "altered the entire presentation of the case and
impacted all issues before the court." Pursuant to precedent, however, any
expression or opinion by a trial judge extraneous to his opinion has no
binding effect upon the judge himself or anyone else. The supreme court
further stated that even if the trial court erred, Patterson could not show
any prejudice resulting therefrom because it received everything he would
be entitled to even if he had not been "misled." Therefore, this court
denied a new trial.
The court then addressed whether a prescriptive easement existed as a
matter of law. In South Dakota, a prescriptive easement allowed a
dominant or upper property owner to reasonably discharge surface water
over lower property through natural watercourses. The court stated that in
order to claim a prescriptive easement an individual must show "open,
continued, and unmolested use of the land in the possession of another for
the statutory period [of twenty years]. The cause of action accrues and the
statute begins to run when the landowner sustains the damage from the
overflow."
However, if obstructions erected by a defendant were
involved, the cause of action accrues when the damages were sustained,
not necessarily when the obstructions were erected. Because there was no
damage to Sherburn's property before the 1993 enlargement, the court
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concluded no prescriptive easement existed as to the 1993 extension. The
statutory period could not have begun until Sherburn suffered damage after
the construction.
Finally, the supreme court found the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting a permanent injunction. The court found that the
trial court addressed the four basic factors that need consideration when
granting a permanent injunction. Those factors were: (1) Did the party to
be enjoined cause the damage? (2) Would irreparable harm result without
the injunction because of lack of an adequate or complete remedy? (3)
Was the party to be enjoined acting in bad faith or was its injury-causing
behavior an "innocent mistake?" and (4) In balancing the equities, was the
"hardship to be suffered by the [enjoined party] ... disproportionate to
the ... benefit to be gained by the injured party?" However, because no

flooding damage occurred until after the 1993 extension construction, the
supreme court held that the permanent injunction was only proper for the
extension. Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case
requesting the trial court limit the permanent injunction to removal of the
western extension or the installation of culverts allowing the flow of water
at ground level.
Anna Litaker

TEXAS
Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 8 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 1999)
(allowing petitioners, on remand, to assert that respondents undertook a
duty to make the river safe for park visitors and that it breached that duty).
Wilton and Wilford Wilson, brothers, drowned in the Pedernales River
that flooded while they were fishing. The accident occurred on a stretch of
the river that borders the Pedernales Falls State Park. The brothers'
beneficiaries ("Beneficiaries") sued the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department ("Department") for wrongful death and survival damages on a
premise liability theory. The Beneficiaries claim that the Department had
the authority to set certain areas of the river off limits to visitors and that it
established a flood early warning system which failed on the day of the
accident. The district court found evidence that the Department attempted
to control the conduct of its visitors even though it had no control over the
river itself.
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the
Department's negligence proximately caused the Wilson brothers' deaths.
The appeals court reversed the judgment, finding that the Department did
not own the river; therefore, ownership, not control, was at issue before
the jury. That court further stated that because control was not an issue
placed before the jury, remand on that issue was proper.
On remand, the supreme court held that there was no evidence that the
Department controlled the river condition. Therefore, it found that remand
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solely on the issue of river control would be improper. However, this
court found that there was evidence with regard to the Department's
attempt to control the conduct of its visitors; therefore, remand may
involve the issue of the Department's duty to make it safe for visitors to
use the river, and whether the Department could be liable for the breach of
that duty.
Sheela S. Parameswar
Domel v. City of Georgetown, 6 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the permission of a landowner was not required, and a taking
was not implicated, when a properly state licensed City wastewater
treatment facility released treated wastewater through a state owned
watercourse).
The Domel's filed suit against the City of Georgetown ("City") for a
taking by devaluation of property due to treated wastewater released into a
stream on their property by the City from a wastewater treatment plant.
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the City. The
Domels appealed the decision.
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The
court addressed two issues on the appeal: 1) whether the stream on the
Domel's land was a watercourse, and 2) if the stream was a watercourse,
then if the City's actions constituted a taking. The court ruled that the
stream over the Domel's property was a watercourse belonging to the state,
and therefore, the City did not need the permission of the Domels for it's
actions.
Diffuse surface water belonged to the owner of the land on which it has
gathered. Water in a natural watercourse was the property of the state, and
held in trust for the public. A watercourse may be determined as a matter
of law. A watercourse must have a defined bank and beds, a current of
water, and a permanent source of supply. The court accepted the
testimony of the City's Director of Community-Owned Utilities, which
included two surveys of the Domel's property, that the three elements of a
watercourse existed in this situation. The court stated that an affidavit by
Mrs. Domel that the tributary was not a watercourse was not adequate,
admissible evidence that raised a question of fact. The court said the
affidavit set forth legal conclusions and not facts. The fact that the
Domel's did not include flooding problems in their complaint was another
factor that aided the court in determining a watercourse existed. The court
said if a natural watercourse did not exist, the increase in water flow would
have flooded the property.
Also, the court ruled that since the stream was a state owned
watercourse, and the City had the proper licensing from the state, that the
release of the treated wastewater was not a taking. In order to meet the
state's duty to conserve and develop the state's water resources, the state
had the right to transport water through watercourses for a public purpose
without permission from the riparian owners. This right was in no way
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altered by the distinction between natural or manmade water flow. The
Texas Water Code authorized a commission to issue permits for discharges
into state waters if the applicant can show feasibility of the proposed
amount of discharge from the treatment facility, and that the discharge will
not lower the quality of the stream water. In this case, the requirements
were met, thus a taking did not exist.
Tiffany Turner

Freeman v. Cherokee Water Co., 11 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
appellees on appellant's counterclaims based on the preclusion of the
claims by res judicata and statute of limitations).
In 1948, the Freemans' parents settled a condemnation proceeding with
Cherokee Water Company ("Cherokee") by conveying the title of tract of
land to them. Prior to the settlement, Cherokee sought condemnation of
the land in order to construct a reservoir to supply water to the surrounding
community and to produce electricity for the community's use. Following
the settlement, Cherokee constructed this reservoir, and later built a
residential development on the acquired property as well. As part of the
settlement with Cherokee, the Freemans' parents inserted a provision in the
deed to the land allowing them and their children to fish at the reservoir.
When their parents died, a dispute arose between the Freemans and
Cherokee as to whether these fishing rights survived the death of the
grantors. Cherokee instituted a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to construe the fishing rights provision. In response, the Freemans
entered counterclaims against Cherokee alleging fraud and violations of the
doctrine of eminent domain by Cherokee.
Cherokee filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims
stating that the claims were barred as a matter of law by both the statute of
At trial, the court severed the
limitations and by res judicata.
counterclaims from the issue of the fishing rights and then granted
Cherokee's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
The Freemans appealed the decision of the trial court arguing that: (1)
evidence produced at trial showed that contrary to the law of eminent
domain, Cherokee used the land for private rather than public purposes; (2)
the statute of limitations should not have barred their counterclaims since
the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence in dispute in
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; and (3) the counterclaims involve
different matters than those decided in the 1948 condemnation suit and
therefore were not prohibited by res judicata.
The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment issued by the trial court on all of the Freemans'
counterclaims. In so doing, the court held that: (1) the counterclaims did
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that formed the basis of
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; (2) the issues raised by the
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Freemans should have been addressed in the -1948 condemnation
proceeding; and (3) the private purposes for which the land in dispute was
being used by Cherokee was merely ancillary to the public purposes which
it served.
Although a claim may be barred as a separate action because the statute
of limitations has run on the claim, such a claim may be brought as a
counterclaim if it has a logical relationship to the dispute raised in the
original dispute. The Freemans contended that their counterclaims related
to Cherokee's declaratory judgment action in that both related to the deed
to the land in dispute. The court rejected this assertion. It held that while
the declaratory judgment action sought an interpretation of a single
provision of the deed, the Freemans' counterclaims questioned the validity
of the deed itself. In the eyes of the court, the two actions did not bear a
relationship to each other sufficient to defeat the statute of limitations.
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a claimant from litigating
allegations that have been adjudicated in a prior action, or could have been,
but were not litigated in a prior action. If a party was in privity with a
claimant from the original action, they also will be barred from bringing
such claims. Privity prevents claims from being litigated by parties who
were not parties to the original action but possess an interest in the basic
legal right that was the subject of the subsequent action. Alluding to these
principles, the court held that the Freemans were barred from asserting
claims of fraud against Cherokee because their parents, with whom the
Freemans were in privity, could have raised such challenges in the 1948
condemnation proceeding. The court based this decision on the fact that
the Freemans made assertions that Cherokee engaged in the fraudulent
taking of the land. At the time of the taking, the Freemans' parents,
interested parties, had an appropriate forum available to them in which to
assert a claim of fraud.
The court also found summary judgment proper in regard to the
Freemans' claim of wrongful acquisition by eminent domain. The rule of
eminent domain allowed for the procurement of private land for public use
by persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions that are public
in nature. The Freemans contended that because Cherokee put the land to
private use by selling off lots on the property to be used as residential
housing, Cherokee violated the law of eminent domain. The court,
however, interpreted the law more loosely, and held that there was no such
violation because this use was secondary to the public function for which
Cherokee used the land.
Jason Wells
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VIRGINIA
Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia, 519 S.E.2d 413 (Va. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming lower court's finding of waiver of sovereign
immunity and appellant's lack of standing).
The City of Newport News ("City") applied to the State Water Control
Board ("Board") for a Virginia Water Protection Permit ("VWPP") for its
King William Reservoir water supply project. The project would develop
a regional water supply to meet the projected need for the area through the
year 2040. The project involved damming a tributary between the
Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers. In December 1997, the Board issued the
VWPP to the City with specific conditions.
Four environmental organizations and two individuals ("Alliance")
appealed the Board's decision to issue the permit to the circuit court. The
Board alleged that sovereign immunity barred the appeal of the issuance of
the permit and that Alliance lacked standing to appeal its decision. The
court concluded that Alliance lacked standing to continue with their suit,
but that sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. The circuit court
dismissed Alliance's appeal in September 1998. Alliance appealed the
dismissal.
On appeal, the Board reiterated its argument presented to the lower
court. The Board first contended that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred the appeal. It relied on state statutes that provide for judicial review
of any permits for the alteration of state waters. The Board argued that
because the statute does not specify the type of permit that was subject to
judicial review, judicial review was not required for a VWPP. The court
disagreed with the reasoning of the Board, and relied on a more
generalized reading of the statute supported by precedent. The court
concluded that, based on a statutory definition, the King William Reservoir
water supply project constituted an alteration of state waters and was
subject to judicial review, therefore waiving sovereign immunity.
The Board next claimed that Alliance's suit lacked sufficient standing.
The court relied on a three-part test for standing: (1) standing was
sufficient if the person suffered actual imminent injury, (2) the injury was
fairly traceable to the decision of the Board, and (3) the injury was likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. The court determined
that in order for the King William Reservoir water supply project to go
forward, the City would have to obtain a section 404 permit for discharge
into the waters of the United States from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers based on provisions of the Clean Water Act. The issuance of
the section 404 permit was independent of the Board's decision to issue a
VWPP. Therefore, the court concluded that Alliance's injuries were not
fairly traceable to the Board's decision and standing was insufficient. The
court then affirmed the holding of the lower court and dismissed the
appeal.
Sarah E. fCutcheon
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Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, 524 S.E.2d 167 (Va. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that appellants had no standing to challenge a permit issued
by the state which certified that a reservoir project would comply with the
Clean Water Act).
In December 1997, the State Water Control Board ("Board") issued a
Virginia Water Protection Permit ("VWPP") to the City of Newport News
("City") to enable the City and surrounding communities to go forward
with a proposed reservoir project. The King William Reservoir project
was to consist of a 1526-acre impoundment produced by a new dam across
Cohoke Creek ("Creek"), a tributary of the Pamunkey River. In addition
to the new dam and reservoir, the project required the construction of a
water intake and pumping station that would take water from the Mattaponi
River ("River") and transport it to the reservoir.
The proposed dam would involve the "discharge of dredged or fill
material" into the Creek therefore requiring the State, under Clean Water
Act ("CWA") section 401(a), to certify to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") that the discharge would comply with any pertinent
provisions of the CWA. Without this certification, the Corps would not
issue a construction permit and the project would not be able to proceed.
Thus, the VWPP did not enable the project to commence, but was a
necessary step to obtain a construction permit from the Corps.
The Mattaponi Indian Tribe ("Tribe") appealed the Board's decision
based on two claims. First, the Tribe claimed that the Treaty at Middle
Plantation established a duty on the Commonwealth to "protect the Tribe
from any encroachments within three miles of the Mattaponi Reservation,"
and that flooding on Indian land as a result of the project would breach that
duty. Second, the Tribe alleged that in awarding the VWPP the Board
discriminated against the Tribe by not considering the Tribe's cultural uses
of the River and the Creek, thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The circuit court that heard the appeal sustained the demurrers of
the Commonwealth and the City to the Tribes' appeal.
The Virginia Court of Appeal addressed three issues in this case: (1)
whether the Tribe had standing to challenge the Board's issuance of the
VWPP; (2) whether the Tribe sufficiently pled that the Commonwealth
breached the Treaty at Middle Plantation; and (3) whether the Tribe
sufficiently pled that the Commonwealth violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. The court held that the Tribe lacked standing on all three
issues as any injury that would incur would be the result of the Corps'
issuance of a construction permit, not the Board's issuance of a VMPP.
The court identified the test for Article III standing as: (1) an actual or
imminent injury which was an invasion of a legally protected interest and
which was concrete and particularized; (2) an injury fairly traceable to the
defendant; and (3) an injury likely to be redressed by a favorable decision
of the court.
The court determined the general issue of whether the Tribe had
standing to challenge the Board's ruling by applying the second part of the
standing requirement. Any injury suffered by the Tribe would be the result
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of the independent action of the Corps in awarding a construction permit
which was not fairly traceable to any of the defendants in this action, the
City, the Commonwealth, or the Board.
Without ruling on whether the land in question was subject to the
Treaty at Middle Plantation, the court viewed the issue of violation of the
Treaty with respect to part one of the standing test. There was no actual or
imminent injury to any of the Tribes' alleged property rights because any
harm would be the result of the Corps issuing a construction permit, not
the Board issuing a VMPP.
The court then summarily dismissed the Tribes' Title VI claim as being
without merit. The court pointed out that Title VI has the same standing
requirements and that the Tribe had failed to meet them. The court added
no discussion as to any possible validity to the claim outside of the standing
issue.
Spencer L. Sears
WASHINGTON
Currens v. Sleek, No. 66830-2, 1999 Wash. LEXIS 883 (Wash. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that the common enemy doctrine shielded a landowner from
liability for surface water flooding only if the landowner exercised due care
in preventing unnecessary injury to neighboring properties).
The Currenses sought review of an unpublished appeals court decision
affirming the summary judgment dismissal of their complaint against Irene
Sleek and Dennis Stephenson Logging ("Logging"). At issue was whether
liability may arise for property damage caused by an increased flow of
surface water onto the Currenses' property after Sleek clear-cut and graded
her land.
The Currenses and Ms. Sleek owned neighboring property in Clark
County. Water from a portion of the Sleek property naturally seeped into a
forested, low-lying sink area on the Currenses' property. In 1993, Sleek
decided to clear-cut her property in order to develop four home sites. As
required by the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, Sleek submitted
an environmental checklist to the Department of Natural Resources, which
provided that Sleek would plant trees to enhance vegetation on the property
and would install dry wells to mitigate storm water impacts. Utilizing
Logging, Sleek clear-cut and graded her property in 1994; however, she
took no action to revegetate the land or to reduce the flow of surface water
over the sites. Sleek also never installed the required dry wells. The
following year, the natural sink area in the Currenses' property flooded
causing eleven trees to fall, and the Currenses removed an additional
twenty trees in order to ensure the safety of their home.
The common enemy doctrine governed the issues on appeal, because it
had directed the law of surface water in Washington since 1896. In its
strictest form, the common enemy doctrine allowed landowners to dispose
of unwanted surface water in any way they see fit, without liability for
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resulting damage to one's neighbor. Because a strict application of the rule
was widely regarded as inequitable, this court adopted several exceptions
to the common enemy doctrine over the years.
The first exception provided that although landowners may block the
flow of diffuse surface water onto their land, they may not inhibit the flow
of a watercourse or natural drainway. A natural drainway must be kept
open to carry water into streams and lakes, and a lower proprietor cannot
obstruct surface water when it runs in a natural drainage channel or
depression.
Another exception prevented landowners from collecting water and
channeling it onto their neighbors' land. This rule prohibited a landowner
from creating an unnatural conduit, but allowed him or her to direct diffuse
surface waters into pre-existing natural waterways and drainways. Thus,
the court stated the common enemy doctrine in Washington allows
landowners to alter the flow of surface water to the detriment of their
neighbors, so long as they do not block a watercourse or natural drainway,
nor collect and discharge water onto their neighbors' land in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, its natural flow.
The main concern on appeal was whether Washington courts should
consider the reasonableness of a landowner's actions in determining
liability for damaged caused by excess surface water. Sleek and Logging
argued that the common enemy doctrine in Washington did not permit a
court to consider the reasonableness of a landowner's actions in
determining liability. The Currenses asserted that Washington already
recognized that the common enemy doctrine shielded only reasonable
conduct; thus, a landowner that acts unreasonably may be liable for
damages caused by surface water flooding.
The court found that although Washington had not explicitly adopted a
due care exception to its common enemy doctrine, language in past cases
indicated that landowner negligence was a relevant factor in the decisionmaking process. The court held that under Washington's common enemy
jurisprudence, landowners who altered the flow of surface water on their
property must have exercised their rights with due care by acting in good
faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of others.
The Washington Environmental Council submitted an amicus brief and
urged the court to reject the common enemy jurisprudence entirely and
adopt the reasonable use rule instead. The critical difference between the
two approaches was that the common enemy doctrine did not require any
inquiry into the utility of the particular project. When determining liability
under the common enemy doctrine, the due care exception required the
court to look only to whether the landowner exercised due care in
improving his or her land. Unlike the reasonable use rule, a landowner's
duty under the common enemy doctrine was not determined by weighing
the nature and importance of the improvements against the damage caused
to one's neighbor. Rather, a landowner has an unqualified right to embark
on any improvements of the land allowed by law, but must limit the harm
caused by changes in the flow of surface Water to those that are reasonably
necessary. Since adopting a rule that required parties to litigate the
importance of a particular project in order to apportion liability was
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inconsistent with the state's historic deference to property rights, the court
declined to abandon its common enemy jurisprudence in favor of the
reasonable use rule.
The court reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded to
determine whether the third, due care, exception applied allowing the
Currenses to bring suit.
Melody Divine
Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1999) (holding that
the flood damage to landowner's properties did not support an inverse
condemnation claim against Skagit County because it did not actually or
proximately cause the levees to come into existence and the common
enemy doctrine protected Skagit County from liability).
The Skagit River delta floodplain was located in Skagit County,
Washington just before the Skagit River empties into the Skagit Bay on the
Puget Sound. The floodplain was approximately eleven miles by nineteen
miles and covers about 90,000 acres of property. The Nookachamps area
was located upstream from Mt. Vernon, Washington and across the river
from Burlington, Washington. This area has historically been subject to
flooding. In fact, there are records of numerous severe floods during the
1800s and the Skagit River reached flood stage an average of once every
2.2 years between 1900 and 1991. Beginning in 1863, landowners built
dikes to combat the flooding. The legislature passed legislation allowing
the creation and organization of public diking districts in 1895. The
legislature made these diking districts independent of the government and
they have the power of eminent domain, the power to assess taxes, and the
power to issue bonds. Sixteen diking districts currently exist and they
maintain about fifty-six miles of levees and thirty-nine miles of sea dikes in
the delta.
Severe flooding occurred twice in November 1990 and the Halversons
and the other property owners in the Nookachamps area (together
"Halversons") sued both Skagit County ("County") and the two diking
districts they felt were at fault for the flooding. The diking districts were
voluntarily dismissed; however, the Halversons pursued the suit against the
County. The Halversons alleged that the County acted in concert with the
diking districts in the maintenance, improvement, and operation of the
diking system, and thus it's actions caused an increase in the amount of
flooding on the land. They further allege that this increased flooding
constituted an inverse condemnation under the Washington State
Constitution. The County also brought a contribution and indemnity claim
against the State of Washington ("State").
In the lower court the Halversons argued that the levees flooded their
property more severely than it would have been had there been no levees
along the river. The County countered that it was not liable for the
construction and operation of the levees because the independent diking
districts owned them. The County continued stating that if it was
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responsible, despite its lack of ownership, that it was immune from liability
under the theories of prescriptive easement, common enemy doctrine, and
a statute limiting county liability. The trial judge instructed the jury on
joint and several liability as to the tort theory of acting in concert and the
jury found for the Halversons, awarding over $1.62 million in damages.
The court added additional penalties bringing the total judgment against
both the State and the County to over $6.3 million.
The first issue on appeal was whether the County was solely or jointly
liable for the damage to the Halverson's property that the levees (that are
owned by independent diking districts) caused. The Halversons argued
that the County, either alone or acting in concert with others, interfered
with the use and enjoyment of their personal or real property by diverting
the overbank floodwater onto their property. The County countered that
because the diking districts exist as statutorily independent entities and the
dikes allegedly caused the flooding, it was not liable because it did not
build the dikes or own the property on which the dikes were built. The
court agreed with the County on this issue based on case law stating that in
order to have a taking there must be some government activity that was the
direct or proximate cause of the damage. The Halverson's provided no
proof that the County designed the levee system, owned the land on which
the levees were built, or provided maintenance, repair, or improvement
activities to the extent that it would give rise to liability. The court states
that the acting in concert theory that the trial judge submitted to the jury
stated the incorrect standard for liability in an inverse condemnation action.
Additionally, because the court found no liability against the County, there
was no basis for the County's contribution claim against the State because
that claim was derivative.
The second issue on appeal was whether the common enemy doctrine
also precluded the Halversons from recovery. This court found that even if
the Halversons had stated a valid legal claim, then, contrary to the holding
of the lower court, the County should have been able to raise the common
enemy doctrine as a defense. The common enemy doctrine allows a
landowner to repel surface water from their property with dikes, regardless
of the possibility that the water may enter upon and injure adjoining land.
This defense was applicable here because once the water went above the
banks of the river it became surface water. Surface water cannot maintain
its identity and existence as a body of water and can be distinguished from
water flowing in its natural course or collected into and forming definite
and identifiable channels. The Halversons argued that the common enemy
doctrine did not apply because these waters remained in a defined channel
and that these waters fell in to a recognized exception to the doctrine, but
the court dismissed both of those arguments.
The court found that the Halversons failed to state a legal claim for
imposing liability of the County, and in addition, it found that if the
County was held responsible that it would have a valid defense in the
common enemy doctrine. The court thus reverses the lower court's
judgment of $6.3 million to the Halversons, and remands for dismissal.
Melinda B. Barton
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R.D. Merrill Co. v. State Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d 458
(Wash. 1999) (holding change in seasonal water right and transfers of
unperfected groundwater permits permissible, the public trust doctrine
argument invalid, the change or transfer of the unperfected irrigation right
and exception to water right relinquishment was properly denied; and
overturning the summary judgment motion previously granted by the State
Pollution Control Board).
This decision in the Washington Supreme Court centered on R.D.
Merrill Company's ("Merrill") applications for water right changes in
order to develop a cross-country ski resort. The Okanogan Wilderness
League ("OWL") challenged the applications at each stage: before the
Department of Ecology ("Department"), the State Pollution Control Board
("Board"), and the Superior Court.
The court first agreed with OWL and noted that a change in water right
under RCW 90.03.380 may not be determined by historic perfected use,
and may not be granted when detrimental to other appropriators' rights.
The Department must look at the existence and extent of beneficial use of
the water right, considering issues of relinquishment and abandonment.
OWL maintained that seasoaal use also limits the transfer or change in a
water right under this statute. Noting that western common law takes into
account not only time of use, but quantity, the court stated that although
RCW 90.03.380 does not expressly address a change from seasonal to year
round use, it "is implicitly covered." Without discussing whether such a
change must be detrimental to other water rights, as OWL maintained in
this case, the court simply upheld the approval for change. The Board did
reduce the quantity of change requested from one-acre foot to .67 acre-feet
per year.
The argument over whether to allow the transfer of two unperfected
groundwater permits focused on an application of laws and the time the
Department may use to determine availability of such water for use. The
Department maintained the transfer proper under RCW 90.44.100, which
allows for a groundwater permit amendment when the water has not been
put to beneficial use. A debate in lower court and the Board and
Department decisions centered on whether or not RCW 90.03.380
governed the transfer. This statute requires beneficial use to grant a
change or transfer of the right. The court explained that RCW 90.03.380
does not cover unperfected rights, the kind of water right at issue here.
The court also decided that the Department only needs to find the water
available for appropriation at the time of the original permit application,
not at the time of the application for change. This decision came in
Merrill's favor, since the Department granted, and the Board affirmed, the
transfer of two water permits for water unperfected at the time of the
application.
OWL challenged the above decisions by the Department (and Board) as
violations of the public trust doctrine. The court summarily dismissed this
argument. First, the court noted that no precedent allowed the application
of the doctrine to non-navigable waters or groundwater. Instead, the court
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pointed to state water codes, which "contain numerous provision intended
to protect public interests," and rejected OWL's argument that the doctrine
be used as "additional canon of construction" for interpreting the water
code. Second, the court stated that the public trust duty falls on the state,
not an agency. Here, the Department's enabling statute contains no grant
of authority to take on the state's duties under the doctrine.
In OWL's favor, the court upheld a Board decision to deny the
developers a change for an irrigation right. The superior court reversed
the Board's decision despite evidence that the right went unperfected. The
original water right applied to a homestead property, and the owners later
applied for diversion of that water for irrigation. The Board found no
evidence of actual diversion or appropriation of water under that
application. Since no irrigation right ever existed, the Board denied the
developer's application for change on the right, and this court agreed.
Finally, the court found the Board's granting of partial summary
judgment to Merrill improper. The Board decided OWL failed to meet its
burden of proof concerning the abandonment or relinquishment of another
irrigation right, which Merrill attempted to change. Merrill attempted to
deny findings of relinquishment by claiming statutory exceptions. First,
the Board gave Merrill an exception based on the fact that existing legal
proceedings excused nonuse of the water right. The court then remanded
the issue for further factual determination, explaining that the Board used
the wrong standard and that legal proceedings must be the direct cause of
nonuse.
Merrill claimed a second exception based on water rights claimed for
future development. To prove this type of "excused nonuse" the future
development must have a firm plan and "be fixed prior to the end of the
[allowable] five year period of nonuse." Merrill asserted a firm plan
within date restrictions based upon feasibility studies and the purchase of
property, and the court held this evidence insufficient, citing beneficial use
as a measuring stick. The debate then turned on whether Merrill put the
irrigation right to beneficial use within an allotted fifteen-year time period.
Since the Board granted partial summary judgment despite OWL raising
material issues of fact on nonuse and before it could give pertinent
evidence on abandonment and relinquishment of the irrigation right in
question, the court held the judgment improper.
In this case neither side won every issue. Merrill kept the changes and
transfer in water rights originally granted by the Department and the
Board, but lost a change to an unperfected right and partial summary
judgment in their favor. OWL did not convince the court that the
Department could use the public trust doctrine when making water code
decisions, but will get a chance to present evidence of relinquishment and
abandonment on one of Merrill's applications for change in water right.
Jennifer Lee
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WISCONSIN
County of Sawyer Zoning Bd. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Workforce Dev.,
605 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that by failing to grant a
variance to property owner who infringed upon setback from creek, zoning
board did not discriminate and department lacked authority to order the
zoning board to grant the variance and dismiss the citation for a setback
violation).
Gregory Klint, suffering from a number of health problems, hired a
contractor to build an addition to his summer cabin on Grindstone Creek.
The addition increased the view and allowed him to keep his oxygen air
hose free of traffic and entanglement. Mr. Klint was considered disabled
for purposes of the Wisconsin Fair Housing Act ("WFHA"). A triangular
portion of the addition infringed upon the forty-foot average setback from
the high water mark of the creek.
The Sawyer County Zoning
administrator issued Klint two citations-one for building without a permit
and the other for violating the minimum setback as mandated by Sawyer
County's shoreland zoning ordinance. After the zoning board denied an
after-the-fact variance, Klint filed a disability discrimination complaint
against the zoning board under the WFHA. An administrative law judge
found the board in violation of the WFHA, ordered them to grant Klint a
variance and to dismiss the setback citation. The circuit court reversed the
Department of Workforce Development's ("Department") decision,*and the
Department appealed.
On appeal the court granted de novo review of the Department's
decision, rather than the circuit court's. The issue on appeal was whether
the Department, in enforcing the WFHA, may order the zoning board to
issue a shoreland variance based on Klint's disability. Examination of an
individual's personal characteristics would require a modification of the
shoreland zoning variance standard.
The court held that the zoning board did not discriminate, but applied
the correct legal standard when it refused to grant the variance, and the
Department lacked authority to order the zoning board to grant the variance
and dismiss the setback citation. The proper standard for granting a
shoreland setback zoning variance is whether the property owner has no
feasible use of the property without the variance, taking into account only
the peculiar characteristics of the land. The Department asserted that
under both the WFHA and another Wisconsin statute, Klint would suffer
an "unnecessary hardship" if a variance were not granted. The court
reasoned that "unnecessary hardship," as claimed by Klint, applies to the
conditions affecting the lot in question, not to conditions personal to the
landowner. Unnecessary hardship would have resulted if Klint had had no
reasonable use of the land without a variance, but feasible use was possible
without a variance in Klint's case.
The court refused to expand the Supreme Court's holdings to
encompass consideration of disability because it has proscribed examination
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of personal characteristics of the owner when considering shoreland
variances, and that would have required modification or overruling of
Supreme Court case law. The court also held that the legislative mandate,
statutory scheme, and compelling state interest, dictates that the supreme
court's prohibition against considering personal characteristics controls,
and the WFHA was inapplicable here. Because the setback requirements
do not single out Klint and do not impose requirements different from those
imposed on all others, the board had not discriminated against Klint.
The court concluded that the zoning board had not engaged in
discrimination and the Department lacked authority to order the board to
grant the variance and dismiss the citation for violating the setback.
Sommer Poole
O-Ton-Kah Park v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 604
N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that easement holders with
riparian rights were not 'riparian owners' eligible for pier permits, and
statute allowing non-riparian owners to maintain a pier was inapplicable
because the pier did not meet the statutory requirements).
O-Ton-Kah Park ("Subdivision") was a subdivision near a lake that did
not contain any riparian property. The Subdivision, however, owned an
easement that allows its residents access to nearby Lake Beulah.
Subdivision wanted to construct a pier on the lake, but the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") denied Subdivision's permit
application.
After an administrative hearing and district court order
affirming the DNR's decision, Subdivision brought this appeal.
Subdivision claimed the DNR's decision was wrong for two reasons.
First, Subdivision claimed it had a right to construct a pier as a riparian
easement holder. Second, Subdivision claimed, in the alternative, that it
was allowed, by statute, to maintain the pier without a permit. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals quickly dismissed each of Subdivision's
arguments.
Addressing Subdivision's first claim, the court held that it ran contrary
to clear statutory language. The court recognized that the statutes granted
"riparian owners" and "riparian proprietors" the right to construct piers,
but not "riparian easement holders." Finding the term "riparian owner"
well defined under Wisconsin law as "one who holds title to land abutting a
body of water," the court rejected Subdivision's argument that the term
was ambiguous. Thus, the court refused to include Subdivision, by virtue
of its easement, under the statutory provision pertaining to owners.
The court then turned to Subdivision's second argument. Subdivision
had alternatively argued that it fell under the statutory exception allowing
entities to maintain piers without permits. Focusing on the statutory text,
however, the court realized the exception only applied to piers that had
been placed seasonally in the same place at least once every four years
since the easement was recorded. Because Subdivision's easement had
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been written in 1939, and Subdivision had placed its first pier in 1989,
Subdivision failed to meet the statutory requirement. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the DNR's decision to deny Subdivision's pier application.
Michael Fischer
Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources,
No. 99-0620, 1999 WL 1125252 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1999) (holding
that the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") did not have standing
as a state agency to challenge the constitutionality of two Wisconsin
statutes).
Silver Lake Sanitary District ("Silver Lake") sought judicial review of
the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") decision to set the
Ordinary High Water Mark ("OHWM") for Big Silver Lake at 868.9 feet
above mean sea level. The OHWM is an important boundary because it
establishes the extent of state ownership in the lake, which impacts the
public's right to use the lake as well as the riparian owners' rights in the
land above it.
As a direct response to Silver Lake's suit, the legislature enacted a
statute, which set the OHWM of Big Silver Lake at 867 feet above mean
sea level. This statutory OHWM was nearly two feet below DNR's mark.
The DNR subsequently filed a counterclaim challenging the
constitutionality of the statute on four grounds: (1) it was a local bill in a
multiple subject bill and therefore invalid under Wisconsin's Constitution;
(2) it violated the public trust doctrine; (3) it violated the equal protection
clause; and (4) it unlawfully encroached on the executive branch's
authority. In granting the DNR's motion for declaratory judgment, the
circuit court held that (1) the DNR had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the law; and (2) the statute was unconstitutional.
After several months, the legislature enacted a second statute
permitting a sanitary district to set the OHWM of any lake that was wholly
within its district. The second statute also prohibited the DNR from setting
a different level. The DNR filed a second counterclaim in response to the
second statute's enactment, seeking a declaratory judgment that this statute
was also unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the second statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the public trust doctrine and the
forever-free clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court of appeals
granted Silver Lake's petition for leave to appeal both orders.
Silver Lake argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that the
DNR had standing to challenge the constitutionality of both statutes
because a state agency could not challenge the constitutionality of a statute.
Although the DNR conceded that generally a state agency could not attack
a statute's constitutionality, it argued that in limited circumstances, a state
agency could challenge a statute's constitutionality if it presented an issue
of great public concern. Silver Lake argued, however, that the great
public concern exception applies only to cases where a private litigant and
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a creature of the state are involved, not to suits only limited to creatures of
the state.
In considering whether the DNR had standing, the court referred to
precedent and stated that, under the no-standing rule, agencies, municipal
corporations, and quasi-municipal corporations are all creatures of the state
and have no standing to challenge the actions of their creator. The court
further explained that courts could modify the no-standing rule only for
cases between private litigants and a municipality or state agency and not to
suits between agencies of the state, or between an agency or municipal
corporation and the state. The exceptions to the no-standing rule which a
circuit court may apply when a private litigant is a party are available: (1)
if the agency has an official duty to challenge the statute, or the agency will
be personally affected if it fails to bring the challenge and the statute is
held invalid; and (2) if the issue is of "great public concern."
The DNR urged the court to apply the "great public concern"
exception.
The court found, however, that the state supreme court
declared that the "great public concern" exception applied only in cases
where private litigants were parties. Despite the Supreme Court's ruling,
the DNR argued that private litigants were not essential for an arm of the
state to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.
The DNR relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Racine County v. WERC, where the court considered
the merits even though the case involved no private litigants. The state
agency in that case challenged a statute's constitutionality. DNR argued
this precedent implicitly held that no private actors are necessary for
standing. Therefore, the DNR contended that the presence of private
litigants was not necessary for it to challenge the constitutionality of state
statutes.
The court disagreed with DNR for two reasons. First, the court stated
that under black letter law an opinion does not establish binding precedent
for an issue if that issue was neither contested nor decided. Because the
parties in Unified did not challenge standing, the court failed to analyze
whether the "great public concern" exception required involvement of
private litigants. Second, the court in Unified quickly dismissed the school
district's argument on the merits. The court of appeals declined to read
Unified as changing the law so as to permit a state agency to challenge a
statute's constitutionality when no private litigant was present in the
lawsuit.
The court noted that in its most recent opinion on the no-standing rule,
it confirmed that the "great public concern" exception applies only to cases
with private litigants. Moreover, because the supreme court had expressly
stated that private litigants are an essential element to a lawsuit before a
circuit court may consider whether to permit an arm of the state to contest
a statute's constitutionality under the "great public concern" exception, the
court concluded that the "great public concein" exception cannot apply in a
suit between two creatures of the state, in the absence of private litigants.
Since this case contained no private litigants, the court concluded that the
DNR did not have standing to contest the constitutionality of the statutes.
Thus, the court reversed the circuit court's orders and remanded with
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instructions to dismiss the DNR's counterclaims.
A separate concurrence would like the Supreme Court to revisit the
private-litigant requirement because existing case law establishing and
A
applying this requirement does not make apparent its purpose.
reexamination of the requirement would provide municipalities and state
agencies clarification in the existing case law.
Kris A. Zumalt
West v. Marek, 604 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that state
statutes did not create rights for an easement holder to build a dock or pier
when the easement was opposed by the riparian owner, and that no pier
placement or maintenance was granted or implied by the easement).
In 1982, Roland and Jeanine West granted a five-foot easement to
Shari Marek and Greg Willis (collectively "Marek") for "private walkway
purposes" over the West's property to Wood Lake. Marek built a pier
over the water at the end of the walkway easement on the West's property.
The Wests sued Marek to force the pier's removal. The trial court
concluded that maintaining the pier violated a state statute because it was
inconsistent with the terms of the easement. Marek argued that the
easement did not specifically, or impliedly, prohibit the pier; therefore, the
right of access to the lake implied a right to construct and maintain a pier.
The court, however, asserted that in the absence of a specific grant of
permission to build a pier, no such right exists for the easement-holder
when the riparian owner upposes the easement. The court held that the
easement must be in accordance with, and confined to, the terms and
purposes of the grant.
Marek appealed the judgment on the basis that the statute allowed them
to place a pier at the end of the easement. Marek argued, again, that the
written easement's terms did not expressly prohibit a pier or dock.
However, the statute only makes constructing and maintaining a pier
lawful. It does not grant rights to the non-riparian owner vis-A-vis the
riparian owner.
The court asserted that, as the riparian owner, the West's have certain
rights that do not apply to the Marek's unless that right was specifically
granted by the easement. In other words, the easement holder did not have
title to the shoreline in order to construct a pier unless the riparian owner
granted this right. The court held that the language of the easement did not
contain a grant of riparian rights, but only rights to use the easement "for
private walkway purposes over and across the land." Thus, the West's had
the exclusive right to construct a pier. The court thus affirmed the trial
court decision.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
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Wisconsin v. Hurley, 604 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
citation for placing concrete pad on lakebed without a permit was proper,
and order compelling landowner to remove improper portion of structure
did not violate due process).
Defendant, Larry Hurley, owned riparian property adjacent to an
artificial lake. The lake was created when a nearby navigable stream was
dammed, and the lake had maintained its current water level since 1968.
Hurley acquired his property in 1982. Hurley took several futile steps
since 1984 to prevent his property's shoreline from eroding. Finally, in
1996, Hurley, without a permit, placed several rocks encased in concrete
along his shoreline.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") cited
Hurley for violating state statutes, and ordered him to remove a portion of
the concrete structure. Hurley challenged the DNR's decision and his
conviction, claiming the statute did not apply to him. He also argued the
lower court's order requiring him to remove part of his structure violated
due process. The Court of Appeals, however, thought differently.
Hurley initially claimed the statute he had allegedly violated was
First, Hurley argued that the statute
inapplicable for two reasons.
prohibited placing material or structures on the bed of any navigable water
below the established shoreline did not apply to his case because he had
placed the material on his own property. That is, it had been his property,
before it eroded and became part of the lakebed. Thus, Hurley claimed
that because the concrete's location was on land that had formerly been
Hurley's, he had not placed any material on the bed of a navigable
waterway.
Addressing this argument, the court looked at the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial. The court noted that both sides had presented
conflicting testimony regarding whether the structure was on the lakebed or
former private property. Recognizing the lower court had considered this
evidence and chosen to accept the DNR's evidence as true, the Court of
Appeals would not disturb the lower court's ruling.
Hurley next claimed the statute was inapplicable because the lake was
an artificial lake, and therefore the DNR lacked jurisdiction to cite him for
not having a permit. The court recognized that under state law, if an
artificial lake was created entirely on private property, the owner might
alter the lake in any legal way without recourse. In this case, however,
because the artificial lake was navigable and was not entirely on private
property, the DNR had authority to regulate its use. Additionally, the
court noted that when an artificial lake was created by damming a
navigable waterway, the DNR has regulatory authority despite the lake's
existence on private property. Therefore, Hurley was subject to the statute
and the DNR's authority, and the court affirmed the findings that Hurley
violated the statute.
Hurley finally claimed that the lower court's order requiring him to
remove a portion of the concrete structure violated due process. He argued
that he was entitled to a separate hearing before ordering removal. The
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DNR had argued for three alternative abatement levels: (1) complete
removal; (2) partial removal of everything that did not need a permit; or
(3) partial removal of only the portion for which DNR would not grant a
permit. Because the trial court ordered the alternative most favorable to
Hurley, allowing him to seek a permit from DNR to save some of his
structure, and noting the permit approval process would afford Hurley an
opportunity to be heard, the court ruled that the removal order did not
violate Hurley's due process rights. Thus, the court upheld Hurley's
conviction.
Michael Fischer

COLORADO WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FROM CENTERRE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, FOR APPROVAL
OF A PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR

WATER RIGHTS OF CENTERRE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, IN DOUGLAS
COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 99CW165 (Water Division 1, Oct.
1999). Applicant: Centerre Development, LLC (Atty. Holly I. Holder).

1. Application
Centerre Development, LLC ("Centerre") seeks augmentation of 82.3
acre-feet per year of not nontributary Denver aquifer groundwater.
Centerre owns the water rights underlying approximately 275 acres of
The
land, located in parts of Section 34, T6S, R68W, 6th P.M.
augmentation's water rights include return flows from not nontributary
Denver aquifer water and direct discharge and return flows of nontributary
groundwater located beneath the property.
Under the proposed augmentation plan the available groundwater
would serve as many as eighty residential lots via central or individual
wells. To meet the requirements for the plan each lot would require 0.75
acre-feet per year for 100 years. The 0.75 acre-feet would be divided as:
0.3 acre-feet to in-house use; 0.4 acre-feet to irrigation; and 0.05 acre-feet
to stock watering. Any remaining water could be used commercially.
Consumptive in-house and commercial use would be approximately ten
percent of the used water. Centerre estimates that approximately ten
percent of irrigation water would be returned to the stream system.
During pumping, four percent of the annual amount withdrawn from
the stream system would be replaced. The water would be replaced as
return flows from in-house and commercial use through nonevaporative
septic systems and irrigation. The return flows would accrue to the South
Platte River system. Centerre stated that the post pumping depletions
would be non-injurious.
A Summary of Consultation ("Summary") was held on January 19,
2000. The Summary first restated the facts. Next, the Summary stated
that post pumping depletions would injure water rights in the South Platte
River drainage. Finally, the Summary found that Centerre should provide
information showing that the proposed return flow plan would actually
replace the requisite amount of water. If Centerre is unable to show this, it
may be required to provide an alternate augmentation source.
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2. Opposition
The General Manager of the Centennial Water and Sanitation District
("Centennial") filed a statement of opposition to the application.
Centennial owns surface and groundwater rights in the South Platte River
drainage. In addition, Centennial owns groundwater rights from sources
underlying and appurtenant to Centerre's rights.
Centennial asked that Centerre be placed on strict proof as to each
element of its claim, including, but not limited to: the quantity, timing, and
location of depletions from the proposed tributary well's use as well as the
amount, timing, and location of the water Centerre proposes to use to
replace the depletions. Since Centerre did not provide further information,
Centennial reserved the right to amend its statement of opposition as more
information becomes available.
Rebekah King

WATER COURT DIVISION 4
APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS AND FOR APPROVAL OF A
PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR
WATER RIGHTS OF ROBERT N. AND FRANCES J. SHARPE IN CEBOLLA
CREEK, A TRIBUTARY OF GUNNISON RIVER. Case No. 99CW251 (Water
Division 4, Dec. 28, 1999). Applicants: Robert N. and Frances J. Sharpe

(Atty. John R. Hill, Jr., Bratton & McClow, L.L.C.).
1. Application
Robert N. Sharpe and Frances J. Sharpe ("Applicants") request a
surface water right of 40 c.f.s. for the Lower Meadow Channel
("Channel") in Cebolla Creek. Cebolla Creek is a tributary stream of the
Gunnison River. Applicants request this surface right for the beneficial use
of maintaining fish habitat. The appropriation was initiated September 30,
1996 with the construction of this new Channel and diversion structure in
Cebolla Creek, allowing fish to migrate into the Channel. The water was
applied to beneficial use on April 30, 1997.
Applicants request the water court to approve their plan for
augmentation of Cebolla Creek or find that their plan for augmentation is
not required. No prior decree exists for the water rights to be used for this
augmentation. Instead, the Channel traverses a former slough area that
was historically created by the collection of irrigation tail-water from the
Youmans Irrigating Ditches 1 and 2, covering approximately ten acres.
The tail-water now collects in the Channel, which is approximately 4,800
feet long, no more than eight feet wide, and approximately three feet deep.
Engineers hired by the Applicants have estimated that the construction of
the Channel has reduced the consumption of Cebolla Creek water by
approximately three acre-feet annually. This reduction is most prominent
during May through October, while the water consumption during the
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remaining months is essentially the same as the historical use. As the
development of the Channel has enlarged the quantity of water returning to
Cebolla Creek annually, Applicants ask the water court to find that their
plan for augmentation is not required.
2. Opposition
Statements of opposition have been filed.
Objecting are: Trout
Unlimited, State Engineer, Harold D. Simpson, and Division Engineer,
Wayne Schieldt. Objectors claim that the application fails to adequately
identify and quantify the historic consumptive use of the water. They
argue that Applicants must be held to a standard of strict proof of the
elements of their claim, that no existing water users will be injured, and
that no waste will result from either the proposed change in use or the
Applicants' plan for augmentation.
The State and Division Engineers assert that the Applicants cannot be
allowed to claim consumptive use credits for the salvage of water by
eliminating naturally occurring phreatophytes. They also assert that the
Applicants must provide the terms and conditions for the dry-up of
irrigated acreage as a result of the proposed change of use.
Chip Cutler

APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHT AND WATER STORAGE
RIGHT CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF OLD
CURRY RANCH PARTNERSHIP, IN SAN MIGUEL COUNTY, COLORADO.

Case No. 99CW249 (Water Division 4, Dec. 28, 1999). Applicant: Old
Curry Ranch Partnership (Atty. Frank Cicero, Jr., Kirkland & Ellis).
1. Application
The Old Curry Ranch Partnership ("Applicant") first claims an
absolute surface water right to 0.04 c.f.s. for Massey Spring, located
northwest of Hastings Mesa in San Miguel County, for the beneficial uses
of stock watering, wildlife propagation, and piscatorial uses. Applicant
claims an appropriation and application date of August 25, 1965. The
beneficial uses to which the water has been historically applied are stock
watering, wildlife propagation, and piscatorial uses. The water has never
been used for irrigation. Massey Spring is made up of two discreet spring
channels and other seep sources located within 200 feet of one another.
These seeps and spring channels provide part of Massey Pond's source
water, the subject of Applicant's second claim. Run-off flows and
precipitation are the other sources of water for Massey Pond.
Applicant also seeks a storage right of 2.50 acre-feet for its Massey
Pond property, with a right to fill and refill in priority. Massey Pond has
existed since at least 1965, according to the Applicant, and is located
adjacent to Massey Spring. Massey Spring and Massey Pond are both
tributaries of Leopard Creek, which in turn is a tributary stream of the San
Miguel River. Applicant claims an August 25, 1965 priority for its
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absolute water storage right of 0.80 acre-feet. Uses of this absolute storage
right include stock water, piscatorial, recreation, and wildlife propagation.
Applicant further requests a conditional water storage right of 1.70 acrefeet, with a priority date of December 1, 1987. The 1.70 acre-feet
conditional amount has never been applied to a beneficial use. Applicant
asserts it initiated this conditional right through its formation of intent and
field investigations for the past thirteen years. It requests this conditional
right to provide sufficient storage water for a future enlargement of Massey
Pond. Applicant plans to enlarge Massey Pond by building a dam one
hundred fifty feet long by nine feet high. The current storage capacity of
Massey Pond is 0.80 acre-feet. After the dam is built the Applicant asserts
a water storage capacity of 2.50 acre-feet.
If the conditional amount is approved the Applicant offers two distinct
potential beneficial uses of this water: irrigation and fire protection. If its
application is approved for irrigation purposes, Applicant proposes to
irrigate the 0.50 acres of land containing Massey Spring and Massey Pond.
If its application for conditional rights is limited to non-irrigation uses,
Applicant proposes to use the stored water for stock water, piscatorial,
recreation, wildlife propagation, and fire protection.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Chip Cutler

APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS, IN GUNNISON COUNTY,

COLORADO.
Case No. 99CW267 (Water Division 4, Jan. 2000).
Applicant: United States of America (Atty. David W. Gehlert, Esq.).
1. Application
The United States of America ("America") seeks a 0.2 c.f.s. absolute
water right to irrigate riparian habitat and to provide wildlife with water at
Mt. Emmons Iron Bog Springs ("Bog"). Specifically, the Bog's acidic,
mineral laden spring water provides water for insects, animals, birds, and
plants including a rare carnivorous plant species called the drosera
rotundifolia (the broad-leaved sundew).
America initiated the water rights on December 10, 1999, by posting
notice at the Bog's site. The Bog, which constitutes a fourteen-acre area
where hundreds of springs and seeps surface, occurs on National Forest
Lands. The Bog's springs originate from an unnamed stream, which is
tributary to the Coal Creek, the Slate Creek, the East River, and the
Gunnison River.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Madoline E.S. Wallace
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WATER COURT DIVISION 5
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS OF

KUMMER

DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,

IN

EAGLE

COUNTY,

Case No. 99CW242 (Water Division 5, Oct. 29, 1999).
Applicant: Kummer Development Corporation (Atty. Holland & Hart
LLP).
COLORADO.

1. Application
Kummer Development Corporation ("Applicant") applied for five
different surface water rights to be drawn from Brush Creek, a tributary of
Eagle River, and used in Adam's Rib PUD development in Eagle County.
The Applicant formed the intent to appropriate on March 26, 1999, but has
put no water to beneficial use at this time. The application seeks water to
fill and maintain three to five golf course ponds and supplementally irrigate
up to 540 acres of lawn and golf course that have not been historically
irrigated. No trial is currently set in this matter and the case is still
pending before the Water Referee.
The first water right at issue is for a conditional grant of 6.5 c.f.s. to
be diverted from SE1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 12, T.6 S., R. 84 W. of
the 6th P.M., 2500 feet from the North section line and 1000 feet from the
East section line. The Matheny Tabor Golf Course Enlargement Ditch will
carry this water to five golf course ponds (A, B, E, F, and G). The second
water right is also a request for a conditional decree of 6.5 c.f.s. to be
diverted from SW1/4 of the NW1/4 of Section 36, T.5 S., R. 84 W. of the
6th P.M., 2100 feet from the North section line and 1050 feet from the
West section line. The Schlutter Golf Course Enlargement Ditch will carry
this water to four ponds (A, C, D, and G). The third water right will use
the Upper Frost Golf Course Enlargement Ditch to carry 6.5 c.f.s. to three
ponds (A, C, and G). The point of diversion for this right is in NW1/4 of
the NW1/4 of Section 36, T.5 S., R. 84 W. of the 6th P.M., 1000 feet
from the North section line and 1250 feet from the West section line.
The remaining two water rights involve smaller amounts. The fourth
water right is for a conditional grant of 2.0 c.f.s. to be diverted from
NE1/4 of the SW1/4 of Section 25, T.5 S., R. 84 W. of the 6th P.M.,
3500 feet from the North section line and 1600 feet from the West section
line. The Frost Golf Course Enlargement Ditch will carry this water to
pond G only. The fifth water right is for the Frost Creek Golf Course
Enlargement Ditch to carry 2.5 c.f.s. to ponds A, B and G. The point of
diversion for this right is in NW1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 35, T.5 S., R.
84 W. of the 6th P.M., 950 feet from the North section line and 1600 feet
from the East section line.
2. Opposition
Three different entities oppose this application: Roark Partners, LLLP;
the Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County; and the Town of
Eagle. Roark Partners has also filed a motion to intervene. Roark
Partners objects to this application because it does not sufficiently describe
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the nature of relief requested to allow Roark Partners to evaluate the effects
of this application on its water rights in the Eagle River system.
As owners of vested water rights in the Neilson South Ditch, the Board
of County Commissioners of Eagle County ("Commissioners") also objects
to this application. The Commissioners argue that the court require the
Applicant to provide strict proof that unappropriated water is available in
priority to satisfy the claimed appropriations and that the Applicant's
project is not speculative.
The third objector, the Town of Eagle ("Town"), argues that this
project is speculative and that the Applicant cannot show that it can and
will put water to beneficial use. The Town also argues that the Applicant
has not provided sufficient information to meet statutory regulations and
put others on notice. As owners of vested water rights, the Town argues
that injury may result to its rights and that terms and conditions are
necessary to prevent such injury. In addition, the Town states that the
corporation does not have the proper easements and other state and county
authorization to complete its project. Finally, as with the other objectors,
the Town states that the Applicant must be put on strict proof for the
required elements of its claimed appropriations and augmentation plan.
Susan P. Klopinan

WATER COURT DIVISION 7
AMENDED APPLICATION FOR CHANGES OF WATER RIGHTS AND FOR
MODIFICATION OF A DECREED PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION,
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF TWILIGHT

PEAKS LLC IN THE ANIMAS RIVER WATERSHED, LA PLATA COUNTY,
COLORADO.
Case No. 99CW19 (Water Division 7, May 1999).
Applicant: Twilight Peaks, LLC (Atty. Wayne B. Schroeder).
1. Application
Twilight Peaks, LLC ("Peaks") seeks approval for changes to a decree
granted in 1994 in Case No. 93CW27 ("Decree") to reflect changes from
proposed construction to actual construction. The Decree provided for a
0.5 c.f.s. change of the Butler Ditch, C.A. 1751, W.D. 30, Animas River
watershed. In addition, the Decree changed the point of diversion from W1471-76 to a point on the south bank of Elbert Creek in the SE , NW ,
Section 2, T. 38 N., R. 9 W., New Mexico Prime Meridian, where the NE
corner of Section 2 bears N 65 degrees 59' E, 3659 feet. Also, the Decree
provided for augmentation for two wells, Twilight Wells #1 and #2, and
for two ponds, Twilight and Upper Twilight ponds.
Peaks owns the land and water that was the subject of the Decree.
Peaks originally planned to build a development of thirty-eight houses, and
a pond of 0.84 surface acres upon this land. The Decree provided for a
total consumptive use of 2.75 acre-feet, 1.53 acre-feet for the thirty-eight
new homes, and 1.22 acre-feet for evaporation from the pond. However,
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the "as constructed" pond area is only 0.44 acres with a corresponding
evaporation of 0.64 acre-feet. Therefore, Peaks maintains that there are
now 0.58 acre-feet available for consumptive use to augment homes or
evaporation. Peaks proposes the new distribution of the Decree should be:
1.53 acre-feet for thirty-eight homes, 0.58 acre-feet for fourteen additional
homes or 0.40 acres of pond evaporation.
Therefore, Peaks requests that sections 5.2, 5.5, 6.4, 7.2(c) and (d) of
the Decree be changed to reflect the new distributions. In addition, Peaks
is seeking approval to employ the 0.58 acre-feet of excess consumptive use
to augment evaporation or to augment an additional fourteen homes either
on or off their property. Peaks has entered into an agreement with Two
Dogs subdivision to supply water to Two Dogs from Twilight Well #1.
Subsequently, Peaks seeks an amendment to the Decree that water from
Twilight Well #1 may be used to supply water to other uses, including Two
Dogs subdivision, provided that the additional uses are augmented through
separate plans of augmentation.
2. Opposition
Tamarron, Inc. of Durango, Colorado is the only objector to this
application. Tamarron was an objector to the original Decree in 1994.
Tamarron is the owner of water rights on Elbert Creek and its tributaries
and argues that its water rights may be adversely affected if the changes to
the Decree are granted without appropriate and protective conditions.
Specifically, Tamarron requests that Peaks be placed on strict proof
with respect to each element of its claim for modification of a decreed plan
of augmentation and changes of water rights. These elements include but
are not limited to the following: (1) an analysis of whether the claimed
modifications can be approved without terms or conditions to protect
Tamarron's water rights; (2) a determination of the -historical use
associated with the water rights for which the changes are sought; and (3)
the measurement, recording, and water handling obligations that must be
assumed by Peaks to assure proper compliance with all the terms and
conditions of any modified decree entered. In addition, Tamarron states
that the application did not contain sufficient information to state more
specific objections. Tamarron reserves the right to state further objections
as more information becomes available.
Kirk Waible
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APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS-CHANGE OF USE; CLARIFICATION
OF POINT OF DIVERSION; ALTERNATIVE POINT OF DIVERSION, IN
DOLORES COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 99CW68 (Water Division 7,
Jan. 2000). Applicants: Colorado Division of Wildlife and the Colorado
Wildlife Commission (Atty. Ken Salazar).

1. Application
The Colorado Division of Wildlife and the Colorado Wildlife
Commission ("Colorado" or "the State") seek to change their decreed use,
to clarify their point of diversion, and to request an alternative point of
diversion. Colorado currently holds a 0.5 c.f.s. absolute water right for
irrigation and for stock watering purposes with an April 1, 1912 priority
date.
The decreed right originates from Morrison Creek, which is
tributary to Disappointment Creek and to the Dolores River. The State's
diversion occurs in Water District 69 at Young Ditch No. 2, which runs in
a northwesterly direction for 2300 feet until it terminates at Arrowhead
Lake.
Colorado seeks to change its decreed beneficial use from irrigation and
stock watering purposes to wildlife watering purposes. The State owns the
Lone Cone State Wildlife Area, a remote 5030-acre tract, to preserve and
to enhance wildlife habitat for big game species. Animals inhabiting the
area include bear, mountain lion, elk, deer, turkey, blue grouse, and
waterfowl.
Additionally, the State seeks to clarify its point of diversion for Young
Ditch No. 2. Colorado's decreed point of diversion occurs on the north
bank of Morrison Creek on the southeast corner of the SW1/4, SW1/4,
Section 32, T. 42 N., R. 13 W., New Mexico Prime Meridian. Based on
the use of a global positioning system, the State finds that the headgate's
actual location occurs in the SE1/4, SE1/4, Section 31, T. 42 N., R. 13
W., such that the northeast corner of Section 31 bears approximately 4710
feet north 50. 29', 27" east.
Consequently, Colorado seeks an alternative point of diversion for
Young Ditch No. 2 because beaver activity changed the stream's course
making its current diversion ineffectual. Colorado seeks to change it's
diversion from the actual location discussed above so that the northeast
corner of Section 31 bears 4,470 feet north 10', 47', 29" east. This would
change the point of diversion by approximately 500 feet.
2. Opposition
No statement of opposition has been filed.

Madoline E.S. Wallace

